


FREEDOM

Its Meaning



FREEDOM

ITS MEANING

by

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Designed by Robert Josephy

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Acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae
libertatis quam retentae.

*Freedom suppressed and again regained
bites with keener fangs than freedom
never endangered.*

—Cicero *De Officiis* ii.7.24.

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PROLOGUE

Ruth Nanda Anshen

ORIGIN AND AIM

MAN alone, during his brief existence on this earth, is free to examine, to know, to criticize and to create. In this freedom lies his superiority over the resistless forces that pervade his outward life. But Man is only Man—and only free—when he is considered as a being complete, a totality concerning whom any form of segregation is artificial, mischievous, and destructive, for to subdivide Man is to execute him. Nevertheless, the persistent interrelationship of the processes of the human mind has been, for the most part, so ignored as to create devouring distortions in the understanding of Man to the extent that one begins to believe that if there is any faith left in our seemingly moribund age it clings in sad perversion, in isolated responsibility, and with curious tenacity to that ancient tenet: "Blessed is he who shall not reveal what has been revealed unto him."

The mutual unintelligibility among most contemporary thinkers, their apparent inability to communicate the meaning and purpose of their ideas to those of differing opinions, the paucity of their knowledge pertaining to the subjects and researches of others, all this has grown to be as profound as it is ominous for the future of mankind, and the possibility of clarifying the confusion and of dissipating the distortions seems to be desperately remote. The subdivision, specialization, nay, atomization increasingly characteristic of religious, philosophic, and scientific ideas, of political events and social movements

during the last two centuries, have proved to be an almost implacable impediment to an adequate correlation of these very ideas and movements which, in truth, are in perpetual interplay. The postulates, categories, dialectical promptings, fecund analogies, or decisive doctrines which first appear in one eminent province of human thought may, and frequently do, penetrate, through their inevitable divagations, into a diversity of other realms; and to be cognizant of only one of them is to misunderstand the character, kinship, logic, and operation of the entire organism and to obscure and even eclipse the illuminating interrelations.

Human thoughts and knowledge have never before been so abundant, so kaleidoscopic, so vast, and yet, at the same time, never so diffused, so inchoate, so directionless. And human anxiety and restlessness, the dark loneliness of man amid hostile forces, exist commensurately. There has been little recognition of the importance of a synthetic clarification of modern knowledge and of the affinity of ideas, a kind of encyclopedic synthesis, indispensable, if in the future human affairs are to be handled with any hopeful freshness. We seem to have forgotten that all great changes are preceded by a vigorous intellectual reorganization and that nothing new can be attempted in collective human thought and action without a reinterpretation of the fundamental values of mankind. Is there no hope for Man to live a well-ordered life, to be able to depend upon the help of his fellow-beings, especially upon those who by their ideas direct and interpret the course of his existence? And is the knowledge which Man most requires, namely, the knowledge of himself, only to be found in terms of Delphian ambiguity or in erroneous and cruel understanding?

Out of such considerations as these and a concern for the integrity of the intellectual life, its moral and spiritual meaning, the plan to bring about a correlation of those contemporary ideas which are concerned not with sense data and logical universals, but with the status of values and the bearing of these values on conduct, had its genesis. Those humanistic thinkers in the various branches of scholarly inquiry (and the contributors to this volume) with whom this plan was discussed seemed to be poign-

antly aware of the principal ailment of mankind—of the disjunction of empirical approach from theory, of methods of observation from speculative doctrine, and of the grave lacunae existent in the study of the nature of man. They seemed to know that values are eternally present, to question how they might be discovered, to wonder why they are often confused, and to be anxious to determine in what sense they are present when they are not recognized.

It was deemed desirable to establish a series of books, each devoted to the discussion, from diverse and important contemporary points of view, of a single, well-defined question, the object being to make clear, first how much agreement there is, and on what specific points, pertinent to the question, and to make, also, as explicit as possible the points of disagreement and their real grounds. Such volumes (collectively known as the "Science of Culture Series," of which *Freedom* is the first book) could do much to clarify the present situation with respect to the questions defined, and such clarification should be an aid towards eventual agreement. A co-operative effort to accomplish this, to exhibit with all possible clarity where representatives of differing schools of opinion agree and precisely where and precisely why they disagree, and to do this fairly concisely could, it was hoped, be of some significance and importance. Just as Diderot and the other humanists of the eighteenth century were imbued with a new vision of Man in their encyclopedic integration of knowledge, so the "Science of Culture Series" will endeavor to synthesize fundamental contemporary ideas which, by virtue of their dispersion, have been rendered comparatively ineffectual.

Although such a synthesis could have no judicial or political power of any kind, it could, perhaps, exert such an influence on the peoples of the world that no ruling caste could afford to defy the moral judgment of this "conscience" of humanity, living in the thoughts of the thinkers and represented and expressed by the contributors of this volume.

One of the values of such a correlation of contemporary knowledge could be the formulation of a cultural directory for the guidance of mankind, the creation of a systematic circum-

spection compatible with democratic principles, the discernment of possible alternatives in a social crisis, leading to a genuine social democracy in which collective intelligence is so highly developed as to make individuality not only possible but fruitfully effective.

The material necessities of existence and the spiritual values of the contemporary world, which coexist in the same complex social totality, are functionally dependent upon each other and must be co-ordinated to assure the stability of our civilization. This work has been undertaken in the hope that it will be the corporeal manifestation of the spirit of science and culture prevailing in the conduct of human affairs; that it will be a laboratory for the discussion of important and earnest contemporary problems—with an end to direct the thought and action of mankind; that by gathering in a synthetic crucible knowledge pertaining to values, it may at least in part bring back into human society that humanity which has been so rudely eliminated; and that, finally, it may, in the words of Bergson, help us to think as men and women of action and to act as men and women of thought.

The subject of this volume, a problem of unsurpassed and critical importance for our age, is, happily, one on which most "intellectuals," however various their opinions on other matters, are of one mind. It has two distinct aims: one, a discussion of the problem of freedom from diverse points of view; the other, the promulgation of an authoritative or at least broadly representative synthesis or conspectus of issues and conclusions pertaining to this subject, as a basis for a program of action.

The passionate concern of the present book is the freedom of Man, the autonomy of the rational being developing to ripe maturity and achieving self-fulfillment. The question of freedom is one of the fundamental principles of Being, since the very perception of Being depends upon freedom which is itself prior to Being. This book is a positive estimation of freedom not only as embodied in institutions, but also as moral and spiritual power; it is a consideration of the personal responsibility of

Man which the freedom and dignity of choice place upon him in his every decision. And above all, it is an apotheosis of Reason which, in the final analysis, is the real mark of freedom and beyond which there is no true unifying force.

If the slumbering consciousness of man can be awakened to a clear, rational discernment of the value of Freedom and Reason, both so seriously endangered, if Man with his mind and with his heart can embrace the universal cause of humanity whose radiant synonym is liberty, if he can know the truth about freedom and its wisdom, then we may still have some tremulous hope for society, and some pride in Man's decision as to what his destiny will be. For in the words of Pico della Mirandola, Man is neither earthly nor divine, neither mortal nor immortal, but has the power to form himself into whatever shape he may desire as a free former and sculptor of himself. He can degenerate into the lower things which are brute or can be regenerated by the very sentence of his soul into the higher things which are divine. But first he must institute the radical reform of an order that is one of darkness and peril, assailed by bewilderment and demonic forces and destructive of human personality and of true freedom. He must recognize (since means must be consonant with the ends they are intended to serve) that the means to be used must be worthy of the splendor of the end in view and commensurate with the renewal of an order of society on a truly spiritual basis.

With Promethean fidelity let us fiercely resist a prostrate submission to Moloch, let us defy the blind evil of Force and the wanton creed of Militarism; let us worship only that god attained by the inspiration and insight of our love and respect for truth, for beauty and for the ideal of perfection, and with a new intensity and tenderness rekindle a resurrected vision of mankind.

It is to those men and women who realize that there is now the gravest need to bring things back to the fertile, changeless source of truth, to reintegrate that desire for justice and that nostalgia for communion through which the world can find some clear, sincere, and basic meaning and purpose, thereby creating a cultural force of freedom—that unchanging freedom

to which Plato aspired—with power to act in history and come to the aid of mankind, it is to those who demand freedom with unrelenting insistence, who not only cherish it but who wish to comprehend it, who seek a *modus vivendi* compatible with the dignity of Man, who long to experience the overpowering beauty of human existence, and who say, “Here stand I, I can do no other,” that this volume is faithfully dedicated.

Honor to those heroic warriors who have preserved for us the priceless heritage of freedom and have kept undefiled the sanctity and divine fire of the essence of Man!

1. FREEDOM INVADES HISTORY

James T. Shotwell

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FREEDOM—ITS HISTORY AND MEANING

ONE evening in December, 1938, there was broadcast one of the most stirring programs ever listened to at the firesides of this country. It was a ceremony of rededication to what has become known as the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution. A great scientist, a well-known jurist, and a high dignitary of the Catholic Church spoke eloquently of the importance of treasuring our heritage of individual freedom and maintaining its safeguards in the present crisis of world affairs. Art was invoked to dramatize the scenes of American history in which the issues of liberty were worked out in its decisive periods. Hollywood entered upon a new career as it turned from entertainment to this message of concern for the fundamental principles which have underlain American democracy.

No American worthy of the name could fail to be moved by this ceremony. It was a rededication almost in the religious sense of the word, touched with a sense of a common participation in a great and elevating political heritage. It carried with it as well the suggestion of challenge to those who might conceivably attack it from without, or discard it from within, as it reaffirmed the spirit and purpose of American democracy. But stirring and effective as it was, it is seriously open to criticism from the standpoint of history, for it pictured the Bill of Rights as having been wholly created at the time it was embodied in the protests of men like Patrick Henry and George Mason of

Virginia, to whom the Constitution, in its original form, seemed to be susceptible of harboring tyranny in the Federal Government.

Mason's protest, however, was the culmination of a long evolution and not the happy improvisation of a single episode. It was but the application to the government of the nation as a whole of principles already stated in the constitutions of the States when they set up their independent governments in the heart of the Revolution. It was in the Bill of Rights of Virginia that George Mason and his colleagues first asserted the rights of the American citizen in terms that influenced sister colonies in the formation of their statehood. The process had already begun which James Bryce later pointed out as the unique element in the American federal system, namely, that each State furnished models or suggestions of government to be copied and applied by other States. The process of co-operative statesmanship was begun in the earliest chapter of American independence and nowhere more clearly than in the spread, from State to State, of this assertion in their constitutions of the rights of the citizen over against any possible encroachments of the government.

There was therefore an earlier chapter of our history than that which the Hollywood ceremony recalled, when the guarantee of personal rights was finally embodied in the Constitution. But behind this chapter lay, in turn, another and longer history which in a very real sense is also the history of liberty in the United States. For in the bills of rights set forth by the newly formed States were to be found words and phrases which had already been embodied in the Bill of Rights and the earlier Petition of Right proclaimed against the tyranny of Stuart kings in England itself. It is true that the American bills of rights included more than the safeguarding of self-government against tyranny. In addition to setting up barriers against arbitrary government it established liberty of opinion and secured toleration by the bold stroke of dissociating religion from government. But in this it built upon the ideas of that English philosopher whose pioneering work first grappled with the fundamentals of society in terms of the balancing of freedom and

rights—John Locke. The pattern of American liberty was, therefore, drawn for it in the Old World.

This fact is fully as important for us to keep in mind today as the contribution which our country added to it. For it would be yielding ground to the chief enemy of personal liberty in the world today if we were to develop the wholly unjustified myth that Americans alone forged the armor of their liberty as the symbol of a unique political capacity on our part. The chief enemy of liberty is nationalism, the very thing which liberty itself created when it rescued nations from feudal tyranny or the overlordship of kings. This process, however, turns upon itself if a nation attributes its success to some peculiar quality of its own, some inherent capacity which other nations do not enjoy; for then it relies upon its native strength to meet all future exigencies and interprets every new trend of thought or action as the natural consequence of its racial or national attributes. The first step in the loss of the guarantee of our liberty would be the growth of an overwhelming pride in the capacity of America for freedom as something unique among all nations. No more profound truth was ever uttered by any American statesman than Woodrow Wilson's doctrine that democracy at home could not be safe except in a world of nations to which the promise of American life meant something worth preserving, however much less it might mean to some than to ourselves. Democracy, which is liberty in action, liberty enshrined in institutional form and vitalized by the public will, is and must always remain a generous thing and not the narrow self-assertion of individual achievement. To think of the Bill of Rights as wholly our own creation not only falsifies history but tends to endanger the maintenance of those rights by a false sense of security and a weakening of our strategic position with reference to our allies in the world of freedom.

But these thoughts carry us still further along the pathway of history, for it would be merely enlarging our error if we included only the English background in addition to our own. It is true that the history of England is by all odds the greatest element in the American political heritage and that the seals which the barons affixed to Magna Charta alongside of that of

their reluctant king are the antecedents of the seals of our own governments. It is also true that beyond Magna Charta we reach out to those inestimable guarantees that lie in the Common Law of England. But while the English people, owing to the security of their country against foreign war, led Europe in the great drama of political evolution, the fundamental principles which the English worked out in courts of law and Parliament were also the ideal, and in varying degrees the achievements, of other peoples. It was in Holland, not in England, that religious tolerance first found recognition; and it was Switzerland, defying external tyranny behind the bulwark of the Alps, that became an asylum and refuge for Central Europe. In France too, though at a later date, the spirit of liberty spoke in more vibrant tones than anywhere else in the Old World. And when the nineteenth century set about the task of building national states, it was not from any one of these but from the interplay of all that political progress registered a common regard not only for the opinion of mankind but for the rights of the individual over against the growth of government.

It was in this setting that the American Revolution made one direct contribution to liberty in Europe; for the bills of rights in the American constitutions were translated into French to give practical expression to the declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen. Unfortunately for the world today, the unification of Germany and of Italy was delayed, so that it was achieved in a period of reaction after the blighting influence of the era of Metternich. It was not Mazzini, the prophet, nor Garibaldi, the knight errant of democracy, who united Italy, but Cavour who, at heart a liberal, used the rival forces of reaction—Napoleon III and Francis Joseph—one against the other. In Germany the first serious step towards Nazi despotism was taken when Bismarck beat down the institution of representative government as a means for upbuilding the German nation and substituted for it the policy of blood and iron. The principles of liberty east of the Rhine took refuge in the world of the intellectual, who, lacking achievement in the world of affairs, became confused and uncertain and yielded to the delusive blandishments of paternalism.

Even from this brief reminder of the history of liberty in other countries, it should be clear to us that we are not alone in the appreciation of its blessings. What it shows is not that certain people are incapable of developing the institutions which safeguard personal liberty but that they must have the opportunity to school themselves in its use so that it can be made as effective in action as the forces arrayed against it. For this nations need to be relatively free from war and the threat of it. Eastern Europe through all the centuries has been a frontier region. From the days of the early migrations of Goths, Huns, and Slavs, military overlords kept watch and ward over the eastern marches of the Teutonic world. Even in Martin Luther's day the chief preoccupation of the Hapsburg was not a theological dispute but the invasion of the Turk who, at that early time, was breaching the walls of Vienna. Under these conditions government was carried on by the bureaucratic agents of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern as far as their protecting armies could hold the line of Europe against Asia. Life was regimented to make it secure, and government was conceived and accepted in terms of power. Therefore, the contrast between Central Europe and Western Europe today is one of political education, and is due to the varying circumstances of their past history rather than to any native quality that supplies the democratic peoples with inherent political capacity.

The conclusion to be drawn from this short survey of modern history is that to safeguard freedom we have to do something very different from merely reciting a ritual. Freedom lives and prospers only where society itself is confident of its stability; and that, in turn, can only be found where there is adequate provision for both foreign and domestic peace. This leads us in two directions; on the one hand, to the consideration of national security and, on the other, to that of social, economic, and political justice.

As I have pointed out on other occasions, there has never been an adequate scientific treatment of the subject of national security. It may be that at this very time some student of the fundamentals that underlie war and peace is working on the problem of the security of nations with the clarity of wisdom

and breadth of scholarship which Adam Smith^{*} put into his *Wealth of Nations*. There are whole libraries on armament and disarmament and on the nature of war in the world today, but no one has pointed out how the situation of one nation differs from that of another in the application of these techniques, especially where they are combined with the related and inseparable question of policies of power.

The conditions of security are twofold: natural and artificial. Nations are safe from external attack in so far as they keep the enemy at a distance. This means that in the natural world the obstacles that lie in the path of an enemy's advance are the prime measure of safety. Throughout past centuries the seas encircling Britain were almost as great defenses for its peace and security as the oceans are today for the United States. Mountains, rivers, marshes, and deserts rank high among the natural strategic frontiers; and where the greatest of these lie there is the least need for armaments; but where they are lacking, forts or trenches, guns and garrisons, must be their artificial substitutes so long as there is any danger on that frontier. Wherever war is recognized as the instrument of policy, armaments must be invoked as the instruments of security; and in proportion as that is the case the institutions of freedom have little chance to grow; because strategy, to be effective, cannot be called in question or debate in the hour of action. On the contrary, it must school the citizenry to obedience to hierarchical control. In proportion, therefore, as the war system pervades the civilized world, freedom is curtailed and the chances for its development are slight indeed.

If national security depended wholly upon this mechanism of defense there would be little chance for the endurance of democracy, for, as I have said above, democracy is freedom in action. But there is another aspect of security which, fortunately, can be well illustrated in the history of the United States. We have not only supreme natural security, east and west, because of the distances which separate us from Europe and Asia, but we have created another kind of defense, an artificial one, north and south.

The War of 1812 settled none of the issues for which it was

fought; but, after it was over, an agreement was made never to have armaments again on the Great Lakes—an agreement which was destined to become the symbol of an unarmed frontier between two friendly nations. The symbol by itself would undoubtedly have had little meaning if it had not been reinforced by policies of arbitration and pacific settlement of international disputes, so that when the redcoats marched down from the citadel of Quebec, in the years following the Civil War, there was no thought of ever replacing them. Disarmament on the northern frontier was made a reality by the policies of peace of two nations growing in mutual respect and understanding.

Although the fact is far less known to us, the frontier on the south, that with Mexico, has a history almost exactly parallel. In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which followed the War of 1848 with Mexico, we agreed that future disputes should be settled only by recourse to arbitration. This is an even more definite and formal agreement than we have with Great Britain. In the latter case, true to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, we have an unwritten understanding—an entente, to give it its technical term—which holds our policies away from any thought of war. But in the case of Mexico, we have pledged our honor, along with that of Mexico, to seek justice rather than to apply force. Let me say, in passing, that it is of great importance for us to remind ourselves of this obligation in the critical period through which we are now passing. In 1927, the newspapers of this country reminded us of this obligation at a time when relations between the two countries were severely strained. Fortunately, the government of the United States today needs no such reminder. The policy of the good neighbor extends the defenses of the United States far beyond the Rio Grande.

So we match the security supplied us by nature on the east and west of the United States by a political security on the north and south. It might seem, therefore, that our national safety was absolute; but science not only lessens distances, and so reduces the oceans in size, it also makes nations interdependent as they have never been in the past. And the growth of a great military power endangering peace in any part of the world

affects our prosperity and disturbs our economic equilibrium by the maladjustments which it creates. It therefore unsettles the minds of the citizens and opens the door to the demagogues.

This brings us to the second part of our problem, the problem of justice. No nation can be wholly secure, the freedom of the citizen can never be wholly guaranteed, unless justice is the guiding principle of policy and the foundation of our institutions, both in domestic affairs and in dealing with other nations. It is here that the demagogue stirs resentments into hostilities and in the name of liberty endangers its very bases.

Never has this danger been greater than at the present time. We have already seen more than half the nations of Europe resigning their liberties into the hands of those who have capitalized their grievances for an assault upon the institutions of democracy. And here, in our own land, there are voices today which speak with eloquent appeal the poisonous gospel of suspicion, hatred, and intolerance, proclaiming all the time their deep concern lest the liberties of American citizens be stolen away by others.

There is especially one who sullies the name of Christian priest by the unchristian animus of his attack and the spleen of his innuendoes against millions of his fellow-citizens to whom the United States had become the harbor of refuge from persecution in other lands. The spread of such doctrines as this man sets forth upon the air would be like a devastating army of occupation on the spirit of America if it were to find lasting lodgment there. The pathway of his ideas leads towards the most dreadful of all despotisms, that in which the victims themselves strangle their own liberties in the mistaken belief that the demagogues are rescuing them from the social and economic evils which are present in the world today. If these preachers could mobilize the discontent into forces of constructive statesmanship and build firmer foundations for the institution designed to protect the inherent rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; if their aspirations were as solid as their attack is vindictive, there would be no need for apprehension. But the fundamental principle of freedom is magnanimity.

It cannot build the structure of its desire if the eye of the architect is distorted by hatred and envy. Only the generous are free in spirit; and this is true of nations as well as of individuals. Generosity, of course, can be carried to extremes; it becomes a source of weakness if our concern about others reaches the point where we neglect to think of our own legitimate interests. Altruism is a noble sentiment but no lasting social order has ever been built upon it alone. To strike the equilibrium between our own rights and those of our neighbors is the fundamental problem of statesmanship. It follows from this that the maintenance of our liberties lies in so maintaining the balance between ourselves and others as to weaken and destroy the appeal of the demagogue. This cannot be done by attempting to out-ri- val him in vituperative attack. It cannot be done by stirring up against him similar, but opposing, passions; for ignorance and prejudice provide a stronger arsenal in such a conflict than reason and intelligence. The path which reason must take to make liberty secure is that which leads toward fair dealing and social justice.

The conclusion may seem an obvious commonplace, but, if so, it is widely ignored in the United States today. The act of Congress in strengthening, instead of disowning, the inquisition of the Dies Committee against subversive doctrines sets going in the minds of citizens the very kind of suspicion upon which the demagogue can build. If we are to proceed along this line, it will not be Congress that will reap the reward of repression, but those to whom the repression of other ways of thinking than their own gives sadistic and unholy pleasure. There were the makings of revolution in the leadership of Huey Long, but I doubt if his championship of the proletariat held any more latent dangers for the Republic than the attitude of mind which led a conservative writer to refer to his assassination as "a happy pistol shot." There was at least a more genial sense of the foibles of our common humanity in the champion of the poor whites of the South than there is in his malevolent rival and successor, Father Coughlin. The attempt to put down un-American thinking by measures of police, to which the activities

of the Dies Committee naturally lead, is not only to endanger the habit of freedom of thought and expression, it is to give aid and comfort to those who would spread the despotism of hatred over the land.

The real answer to the doctrinaire, whether he be communist, fascist, or one who masquerades under the guise of democracy, is to redress the conditions which give his teaching its appeal. In other words, the maintenance of our own liberties depends upon a quickened conscience as to our duties. Unfortunately, this formula does not say all that it should to us. Duty is an abstraction rather than a catalogue of things to do. That "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God" is mostly listened to as the prompter for doing immemorial tasks. It speaks for habit more than for reason. This was all right as long as habit was reasonable; and throughout the long past, in which the conditions of life repeated themselves generation after generation and century after century, the wisdom of the fathers was a ready guide for the present. But with the coming of modern science these conditions are in eternal flux. Invention and discovery bring increasing change with the increase in control of time and space, and the ever shifting nature of the day's work. The performance of one's duty to society, upon which rests the opportunities for freedom, is therefore no longer the unquestioned acceptance of routine either in economic relations or in government itself. The only safety for the Republic, the only guarantee for our individual liberties from now on to the end of time, lie in the constant, if conservative, criticism of the institutions, as well as the habits, which we have inherited from the past. If we cannot resolve this problem so as to satisfy the inmost needs of our fellow-citizens, our liberties either will be lost in the riot of anarchy or suppressed by the tyranny of the demagogue.

Never in all the history of civilization was there such a challenge to the most precious possessions of the spirit of man. The chief problem of today is not the creation of a vast military empire in Asia, or Nazi or Fascist developments in Europe; it is the adjustment of man to the machine. From untold millennia before the Ice Age down to yesterday, man made his way in the world with strength of body rather than by the subtle

processes of thought. The claw which he inherited from his prehensile ancestors became a marvelously accurate instrument for mastering the crude forces of nature; but now, just in our time, we are turning into a new era which has only just begun but will never end—the era in which we must think our way through rather than grapple with nature by animal strength. The prime duty, therefore, of the citizen of today is to direct his own life and that of society in terms of their innermost need, as that need shifts with the advances made in the arts and sciences in the different corners of the world. Inventions are, by their nature, of world-wide application, and the nation that attempts to cut itself off from the progress of science will be ruined by it. Therefore, merely to stand upon the sacred institutions of the past is to create a maladjustment with the present, the kind of maladjustment which breeds blind discontent. The institutions of government, as well as those of economic and social life, must henceforth be conceived in increasingly dynamic terms. It is not enough for freedom to broaden out “from precedent to precedent,” if each advance is forced upon it from without. It must take its stand on the basis of social justice and see to it that there is an adequate instrumentality for making that justice effective.

The ultimate embodiment of freedom, therefore, is to be found in institutions which balance the things we need against the needs of others. Freedom is clearly not what it seems to be, the attribute of the individual. It is a social, economic, and political fact and is another name for the equilibrium we call justice. The reason that this has not been seen is that justice has been chiefly thought of as having to do with commodities that pass from hand to hand or with the policing of society. But there is another commodity more precious than all the rest, and that is our thought and action. It is never wholly our own, for it builds upon the thoughts and acts of others and in turn affects them. Freedom is the condition under which this most intimate and yet most interdependent thing can find its happiest and fullest expression. That is why it is a problem for governments; it is also why the problem remains unsolved, because no matter how much the individual may try to remain aloof

from the currents of his time, society, as the repository of the energies of thought and action, forever shifts its ground. The conclusion is that liberty will increase in proportion as society learns to make intelligence the guide to conduct.

How this would have shocked Thoreau to speak of freedom in terms of obligation and not of escape! What of that vision of the poets which enthrones freedom on lonely mountaintops or listens for its voice upon the trackless sea? Are we not losing trace of her footsteps when we would seek for her in the market place or in the halls of justice? If reason builds the abiding home of freedom in the heart of society, instinct would seem to place it where man is alone with nature. As such, it is a thing of dreams, a symbol of that inner calm whose voice is silence and whose vision is the stars. To all of us there comes at times the far sweep of such experiences and, in our daily life, there is always the plaintive note of memories that speak of our nostalgia for such unutterable peace as we have found at times in the strength of the hills and the brooding comradeship of the woods.

It was from a background of such communion with nature that Jean Jacques Rousseau startled the complacent, formal society of eighteenth-century France with the ringing words of the *Social Contract*, "Men are born free and are everywhere in chains." But in spite of all his cult of a return to nature, he sought to recover liberty by a search for the lost title deeds of society; while Thoreau's *Walden* was but an episode embroidered on the many-colored texture of society. Freedom has to come where busy men and women work to live; unless it can illumine the steady measure of their days it remains a thing apart and not that constant attribute of life which in its perfection it should be.

The history of liberty even in its earliest form was that of emancipation. In the Mediterranean basin this came with the growth of the merchant class and the need for incorporating it within the body politic. The revolution which accomplished this in Greece under Solon and Cleisthenes, in Rome under the kings and on down through the Republic, was paralleled north of the Alps and especially in Britain by the break-

ing of the blood tie in the great migrations of the Teutons and the Norsemen. The town meeting of settlers in a little community became the symbol of political rights and the repository of freedom. We cannot trace this evolution farther. But it rounds out, from the dim horizons of prehistoric times, the theme which we have followed through the problems of today. Free men are those who face and fulfill the duty of citizens.

There is a noble phrasing of this in terms of religion in the English Prayer Book, one which marks the dividing line from that most tyrannous of all servitudes, superstition, by recalling the dignity of man in relation to things divine. It is that which conceives of the Deity as one "whose service is perfect freedom." It was, we suppose, penned by Thomas Cranmer, for it occurs in the first form of the Prayer Book in 1549. But it was the rephrasing in modern terms of that still more daring paradox which already for a thousand years had been chanted in the Gelasian Sacramentary, "*Cui servire regnare est*" ("To serve whom is to reign"). From the concept of power to that of freedom was a vast and fateful step, one for which the world was not yet ready in Cranmer's time. It is a poignant commentary upon pioneering in the realm of thought that the hand which wrote the English text was the one which a few years later was burned in the fire of persecution. The thought of Cranmer remains, however, a living challenge to those who, in the name of truth, would rob it of that freedom to explore the mysteries of life and the world by which alone truth can be found.

If freedom within the body politic rests upon the development of social justice it also opens to the individual the untrammelled spaces in which the mind can range at will, the world of creative thinking, by the exercise of which comes mastery. Therefore the heritage of freedom is the opportunity of the future, if we but keep our trust inviolate.

Benedetto Croce

Senator of the Kingdom of Italy; Minister of Public Instruction

THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY¹

EVERYBODY can see, everybody admits, that in the period since the beginning of the Great War the love of freedom has sensibly weakened throughout the world, while the idea of freedom has progressively lost its clarity. Liberal systems that were once regarded as solidly established have collapsed in many countries, and everywhere and in general liberal convictions have been shaken, liberal enthusiasms have cooled, people have grown lukewarm toward an ideal of freedom that has ceased to fill hearts, inspire conduct, and give direction to outlooks on the future.

It should nevertheless be apparent to everybody that this so-called decadence of the liberal idea, or, as others say, this crisis that at present confronts it, is a strange sort of decadence, a strange sort of crisis, in that it is illumined by no flash of a new ideal that is to subsume, replace, outmode the old, in that no new order is put forward to replace the order that is being attacked or overthrown. The liberal ideal is a moral ideal, expressing an aspiration toward a better humanity and a higher civilization. The new ideal that is to triumph should, therefore, present itself with promise of a newer, richer, deeper humanity and civilization.

Now the one alternative to freedom that is being practically suggested in our day cannot be regarded as offering any such

¹ Translated from the Italian by Arthur Livingston, Professor of Romance Languages, Columbia University.

promise. It is the alternative of violence, and violence, in whatever name it be exercised, whether of race or country or proletariat, can have no status as morality. Violence contains within itself none of those energies that enhance civilized human living. It is capable at best of expanding in a very problematical future the physical living of a few individuals, while narrowing the physical living of all others. Violence may punch to the floor and silence a person, for instance, who is trying to solve a problem in mathematics, but no one will claim that the silence thus brutally obtained will provide the solution for the mathematical problem. All we shall have will be a man on the floor and a problem still pending—it will pend till some mathematician is allowed to speak and solve it.

Hence the barrenness in terms of thought, science, art, civic virtues, human relations, that systems based on violence—or on what amounts to the same thing, on authority—commonly show. Everything sound and productive that still survives or flourishes in them in the directions mentioned, survives and flourishes either through the survival of free minds or through the persistence of acquired habits. But these latter gradually weaken for lack of sustenance and replenishment and through the passing of the human beings who possess them. Meanwhile none of the new formulas or ideals is allowed to defend itself in orderly discussion, to justify itself by critically tested arguments, by interpretations of history, in a word by perspicacious, cautious, sober research. It is forced to drone its arid mechanical assertions over and over again, without variations, without proofs, without elaborations, deriving such animation as it can from an accompaniment of threats. There is talking in plenty, there is much brandishing of clubs and swords; but while scorn and ridicule are heaped upon it, the ideal of freedom stands substantially intact and intangible, since it can be overthrown and replaced only by a better and sounder ideal—and such an ideal cannot even be conceived.

Our experience of the present world, therefore, can lead only to one conclusion: that the so-called crisis of liberalism is not the crisis of any particular ideal—as, for instance, of the ancient polis as compared with imperial forms of government, or of

feudalism as compared with absolute monarchy, or of absolute as compared with constitutional monarchy, and so on; but a crisis of the ideal itself. It is a bewilderment, a degeneration, a corruption, a perversion, of the moral sense, of that moral enthusiasm which ennobles the individual life and glorifies the history of humanity, marking the latter off into its great periods.

How this degeneration has come about is made clear enough by history, and the history more particularly of the period following 1870, when the policies, the pronouncements, and the whole spirit of Bismarck combined with the theories and the influence of Marxian socialism to discredit the ideal of freedom, and the lives of the peoples turned in predominantly economic and material directions, though liberal constitutions were kept and in fact proved very serviceable to the new materialism.

This historical development, which has not yet ended and in fact is probably in its most acute stage, I have examined elsewhere, and from the point of view just mentioned; but if I were to summarize its significance in a single sentence I might say that it lies in the anguish and the travail incident to the growth of a new religious faith, and to the quest for such a faith on the part of humanity or at least on the part of the civilized peoples. The old religions have worn out before the religion of freedom has spread widely enough abroad and taken a sufficiently firm hold. Not only has the religion of freedom failed to translate itself into conviction and accepted opinion in the masses—clothing itself meantime in more or less of a myth, as inevitably happens. Even among the educated the religion of freedom has not attained such a solid theoretical elaboration as to render it impregnable to attacks frontal or treacherous.

But we should not lose heart on that account, we should not give way to pessimism—pessimism is by definition incoherent and profitless. We have no reason despondently to resign ourselves to a new aeon-long era of barbarism such as a number of apocalyptic writers of our day foresee and foretell—such fancies, like all structures of the imagination, have their empty possibility, they have no certainty whatever.

We should not lose heart in the first place because it is the

lot and the duty of man to work on and fight on. But then again human society has lived through other periods when moral sentiments have waned and materialisms have waxed triumphant, and in every such case it has recovered through a spontaneous rekindling of enthusiasm and idealism, through an ever reblossoming spiritual exuberance, through the words and the examples of apostles aflame with the religious spirit who sooner or later have recaptured the ears of men. As regards our scholars and thinkers of the present time, it is their task to keep the concept of freedom precise and clear, to broaden it and work out its philosophical foundations. That is the contribution that may properly be required of us in the many-sided struggle that is laid upon us to resurrect the ideal and restore life under freedom.

There are those who smile at this sort of contribution and doubt its necessity and its utility. The tree of theory, we are told in the words of the poet, is gray, while the tree of life is green. We are told that ideas and arguments do not create the passion or the flaming resolve that alone counts in practice. But the notion that thought and action are separate things, that they are indifferent to each other and without influence upon each other, is a hasty judgment based upon superficial observation. In the living and concrete spiritual act the two terms stand perfectly united. The act of thought is at the same time an act of willing, since it derives from nothing less than a moral urge, from the torment, the pain, the necessity, of removing an impediment to the flow of life; and it eventuates in nothing else than a new disposition of will, a new attitude and demeanor, a new manner of acting in the practical field. A thinker who does not suffer his problem, who does not live his thought, is not a thinker; he is a mere elocutionist, repeating thoughts that have been thought by others. Rarely enough, to be sure, has the thinker also been the statesman, the warrior, or the leader of parties or peoples; but that fact depends on the specification of human activities, each of which, for that matter, evolves in its particular sphere but with an outlook upon life as a whole. Within its sphere, the labor of speculation does not stand cut off from life; rather it gathers there the energy that it requires

for functioning in the world at large; and it so functions not merely by communicating the logical processes involved in it to those who accept it, rethink it in compendious form, and make it their own, but also and very particularly through the fact that in many people conclusions that are products of the thinker's labor are transmuted into axioms, commonplaces, proverbs and, stripped of the proofs that justify them, become articles of faith and trusted guides of conduct.

So the educated and the so-called ruling classes are formed. Without such classes no human society has ever been able to endure and their strength is the strength of society as a whole. There is, to be sure, a class now large, now very large, that lives on from day to day indifferent to moral questions and to problems of public life, devoting neither thought nor attention to them and speaking, when it speaks, only to voice its satisfactions or dissatisfactions in respect of its needs and comforts. Such are the so-called "masses," to whom a demagogic romanticism ascribes mysterious and mystical virtues and pays a worship corresponding. The potency of ideas being at its minimum among the uneducated, it is certainly not to be expected that the truths that are discovered by thinkers and become part of the common patrimony of civilization should be easily carried down to the masses. But we must nevertheless do our best to educate them, and enable them on the one hand to replenish the ruling classes with fresh forces, new workers, new members; and on the other to bring themselves progressively into harmonious accord with the educated. Whenever and wherever this is not possible the masses must be handled with the political wisdom that the special case requires, in order to prevent them from ruining the conquests that society has made—in other words, from ruining civilization. Civilization has been ruined a number of times in the course of history, but always, sooner or later, now with more, now with less difficulty, the dismantled dikes have been repaired and the stream has resumed its regular flow.

For a full and clear discussion of the philosophical theory of freedom, three aspects, or levels, had better be kept distinct.

Under the first aspect, freedom may be regarded as the force that creates history—indeed this is so truly its real and proper

function that one might say, in a sense somewhat different from the Hegelian, that history is the history of freedom. In fact, everything the human being does or creates is done or created freely—actions, political institutions, religious conceptions, scientific theories, the productions of poetry and art, technical inventions, instruments for increasing wealth and power. Illiberal systems, as just indicated, are barren. Their counterfeit achievements have the traits of the so-called imitations, or artificial reworkings, of poetry and art, which retrace through more or less grotesque or repulsive recombinations poems or paintings that already exist, and which, devoid as they are of anything truly new or original and therefore devoid of esthetic reality, are thrust aside and ignored by the critic or the historian. So in civic history all those things that are done under constraint, even though they may help to some extent to meet individual needs of patronage, livelihood, or comfort, belong to physiological living and not to the moral or civic living which they fraudulently ape. Periods of suppressed or oppressed liberty contribute to the general productivity of history only in so far as the suppression or oppression cannot be and never is absolute and complete, since the very violence of the oppression provokes multifarious reactions in an opposite direction. On the one hand, therefore, we often see oppressors inclined to favor or promote labors of freedom, not because they like the freedom, indeed the reverse, but because they come to see that for the particular social or political systems that they have instituted, whatever these may be, they need certain services and certain kinds of support. They cannot, for instance, dispense with doctors, engineers, scientists, or writers; and, soon discovering that such experts cannot be produced by mechanical processes, they find themselves obliged to leave them more or less free in their training and in the prosecution of their work. On the other hand we always observe efforts and activities on the part of an opposition, now overt and talkative, now secret and silent, but which are never lacking and which to some extent fertilize the barren present and attenuate its despair by planting seeds for a more or less immanent future. If human affairs did not develop in this manner, ages of oppression would be altogether sterile—

they would be periods of death and not of life, or at least of no civilized living—they would represent vacuums in the historical process. Such a thing is unthinkable and that it does not take place is evidenced by the little or much that ages which for one reason or another are considered ages of oppression have nevertheless produced, and even more emphatically by the joyous resilience which spreads abroad in the succeeding ages, which must therefore have been prepared for by the earlier and so after a fashion have existed in them.

The historian looks at things and judges them otherwise than people who are in the thick of the fight and feel all its passions, whether these be the oppressors who gloatingly imagine they have stamped out liberty or the oppressed who mourn liberty as dead and would fain resurrect her. The historian knows that the issue in the struggle is never whether freedom shall live or die—freedom, after all, being naught else but humanity, a humanity that is at war with itself. He knows that the question always is of a more or a less, of a more rapid rhythm or a slower rhythm, and that the contrasting beliefs just mentioned are illusions, mistaken impressions, reflecting the share which the opponents of freedom and the lovers of freedom severally have in the struggle.

Under its second aspect, on its second level, freedom is thought of not as the force that creates history but as a practical ideal which aims to create the greatest possible freedom in human society and therefore to overthrow tyrannies and oppressors and establish institutions, laws, ethical systems, that will successfully uphold it. If one plumbs this ideal to the bottom one finds it in no sense different or distinguishable from conscience and moral behavior, and one observes that the will to freedom as conscience expresses the sum and the synthesis of all the moral virtues and of all the definitions which have been given of ethics. However variously these may describe the moral ideal—placing it now in respect for one's neighbor, now in the general welfare, now in an enhancement of the spiritual life, now in a striving for a better and better world, and so on—they all agree on one thing: on a resolve that freedom shall triumph over the obstacles that rise in its path and over the

aversions that beset it, and give full expression to its life-creating power. When we go to the rescue of a person who is ill and quiet or lessen his pain, we are striving, in effect, to restore a source of activity, in other words a source of freedom, to society. When we educate a child, we aim to make of him a person able to go his own way as a free autonomous being. When we defend the just against the unjust, the true against the false, we do so because the unjust and the false represent servitude to passion and to mental inertia, whereas the true and the just are acts of freedom.

Altogether inappropriate, therefore, is the fear, nay the terror, that some people manifest when it is proposed to foster or recognize the full and unlimited freedom of the human being. Their thoughts turn at once to the abuses that the wicked, the criminal, the insane, the young and inexperienced, may make of unlimited freedom—as though to control or to help those sorts of people there were no moral judgments and condemnations on the part of society, no penal sanctions, sanatoria, asylums, schools, and the like, on the part of the State. They ignore or pretend to ignore the fact that when we speak of the need of freedom we are thinking strictly and exclusively of ways of facilitating the activities of people who are neither wicked nor criminal nor insane nor inexperienced and immature, and not of ways of facilitating the excesses of people who are subject in one way or another to bestial unrestraint, madness, childishness, ignorance, or the like. It should be clear that only with the former in mind do we assert that all obstacles that are set in the way of free activity are harmful to human society.

Since, as we have seen, the liberal ideal is one and the same with conscience, that ideal in one form or another and to a greater or lesser degree exerts its influence in all ages and cannot therefore be regarded as a historical phenomenon that appears at a certain moment, endures for a certain length of time and then, like all historical phenomena, wanes and disappears. It is of course true that, as we commonly say, the liberal ideal is a product of modern times; that it had its beginnings in the seventeenth century and reached its full blossoming in the first half of the nineteenth. In strict exactness, however, we could

not say that the sense of freedom or the ideal of liberty originated and developed during that period or any other particular period. What we should say is that during that period people became strongly and growingly conscious of the essential character of freedom and of its status as a supreme principle. That perception had not been so easy in earlier periods, because of the prevalence of transcendental conceptions, and the strings of commandments and prohibitions ordained on high which went with transcendental systems and were upheld against dissenters by punishments and persecutions, now of Protestants by Catholics, now of Catholics by Protestants, and so on.

But with the end of the religious wars and the advent of religious tolerance people began to see the importance of not suppressing unpopular ideas but of meeting them with opposite ideas. This liberty gradually brought all other liberties in its train, till the principle that underlay and upheld them all was finally perceived in its completeness. Thus a higher, more comprehensive ideal made its way to triumph, breaking through beliefs in the transcendental, subsuming, replacing them, warming, enlightening, reshaping the soul of the modern man, which is a very different soul from the soul of the medieval or ancient man.

This was a movement of moral liberation and of moral ascension. To imagine, after the fashion of the economic-interpretationists and their imitators, that it can be explained by the simultaneous rise of an economic social class, the *bourgeoisie*, and the rise of capitalism, industry, and free commercial competition, in other words to regard it as an economic phenomenon, is to misunderstand it altogether. Nor, really, are we any better served by attempts, such as have been made, to explain it as a strictly psychological derivation from a Calvinistic concept of vocation or mission.

This deliberate, self-conscious aspiration for freedom as a supreme and fundamental good exerted a tremendous influence upon the generations of men who witnessed and provoked 1830, 1848, and 1860. In those days, and indeed long afterwards, it seemed to be a permanent acquisition of the human spirit, an abiding conquest of civilization. Now, as we have seen, it is the

sentiment that has faltered and weakened to a greater or lesser extent in all parts of the present world.

Under a third aspect, on a third level, one may think of freedom in terms of the process by which the ideal of freedom and the aspiration to freedom have been worked into a philosophical concept and brought under a general conception of reality that defines and justifies them; and here we perceive the intimate connections that subsist between the history of the theory of freedom and the history of philosophy which has so strongly influenced, as it is still influencing, the former.

During the long period when metaphysical, transcendental philosophies prevailed in Europe, the concept of freedom as the law of life and history did not find the place that rightfully belonged to it, and it experienced no end of difficulty and labor in making its way forward. Even when the sense of freedom was very keen it was a matter of feeling and conduct rather than of theory. Now, one might ask, what was needed in order that the ideal of freedom might find larger reference and support in a philosophy? The need, evidently, was that the same negation of the transcendental that liberalism was making in the practical field it should also make in the logical field and in more and more comprehensive form. Philosophy, in other words, had to be a philosophy of absolute immanentism, an immanentism of the spirit and therefore not naturalism and not materialism, and not, either, a dualism of spirit and nature but an absolute spiritualism. Moreover, since the spirit is a dialectic of distinctions and oppositions, since the spirit is perpetual growth, perpetual progress, philosophy had to be absolute historicism.

Such a conception was very far indeed from ways of thinking in the country where the ideal of freedom found its first and noblest expressions, and was so embodied in institutions and in public and private morals as to supply most stimulating examples to the rest of the world. English philosophy in those days was what it was to remain for two centuries more or less: sensistic, utilitarian, empirical, and, in the religious field, agnostic and possibilistic. The first-born offspring of liberalism was therefore of all philosophies the one least qualified to provide

a philosophical justification of the ideal and the practice of freedom.

To measure the full scope of this deficiency one has only to glance again at John Stuart Mill's famous treatise *On Liberty*. Of the author's sincere libertarian faith there can be no slightest doubt. But what cheap, what ignoble arguments he is provided with by his concepts of public welfare, happiness, wisdom, opportuneness, human frailty! In view of this last, Mill argues, as long as men are what they are, we had better allow free play to differing individual opinions and traits, provided their exercise involves no harm to one's neighbor!

To wretched and fallacious reasonings of this type we owe a widespread belief that liberalism is identical with utilitarian individualism, with "social atomism," as Hegel said, and that it regards the State as a mere instrument for helping individuals in their quest for comforts and pleasures. If at all, one might identify liberalism with moral individualism, viewing the State as an instrument for attaining a nobler plane of living and therefore, in the light of that assumption, requiring the individual to love it, serve it, and if need be die for it. Unfortunately, in thinking along that line, not even the concept of the individual is analyzed critically enough. Utilitarian theory continues to substantialize the individual as a monad, to naturalize him as a physical person to be respected and guaranteed as a physical person; whereas the individual should be resolved into the individuality of doing, into the individuality of the act, in other words into the concreteness of universality.

Lack of definiteness in the moral ideal and superficial conceptions of history have meantime led people to drowse fondly in beliefs of a rosy progressive hue. It is assumed that such things as elections, parliaments, and free discussion have once and for all opened to mankind a royal road, a *chemin de velours*, leading to higher and higher levels of existence, ever more abundant comforts, ever greater wealth and power, a steadily increasing culture and refinement, a greater and greater splendor of civilization. On that theory the day of harsh conflicts and cruel devastations are supposed to be over. There are to be no more wars and revolutions, no further danger of re-

lapses to lower forms of political and social living. There may be some slight disturbance, but in the end everything will be smoothed out in agreements arrived at through good-humored conference. Actually, achievement of the moral ideal requires unremitting effort and vigilancy on our part. We are obliged continuously to reachieve with our labor and with our sufferings all that we have inherited from those who have gone before us. The course of history—the “education of the human race,” as Lessing called it—advances over roads that are rough and rugged, roads that are broken by precipices and pitfalls and strewn with killed and wounded. Just as the course of history never ends in a finer and static condition of happiness, so it is never able to signboard and utilize a way of progress that is safe and sheltered from all mishap. All the worst in the worst past can always return. But we should remember it will always return under new conditions and, for that very reason, once we have again mastered it, we will find that it has lifted us to a higher and nobler plane. The epic of history stands closer to the tragedy than to the idyl.

The fact that people have not grasped this truth, the fact that they so readily succumbed to fatuous optimism, is the main cause of the pessimism and the lack of confidence that prevail so widely in the world today. The world is indeed beset by difficulties, but instead of thinking of these as natural aspects of the individual life and of history as a whole, as manifestations so to say, of life’s eternal rhythm, instead of ridding themselves of their illusions and correcting their childish errors, such people adopt the easier course of dropping the ideal itself—in other words, the ideal of freedom—by swiftly denying it, only to be left in a sort of stupor where they fall prey to one or another of the political forms that are provided in a whirling dance about us.

In another direction, in Germany, philosophy had gone far beyond sensism, hedonism, utilitarianism, empiricism, and associationism, but in the major philosophical systems ancient metaphysical and theological elements survived among new and original ideas. The tendency, therefore, was to subject the idea of freedom to pre-established historical schemes and, in the

political field, in view of the weakness of the liberal tradition in German life, to smother it under the idea of the State, which in turn was conceived as a sort of personified abstraction possessing many of the attributes and attitudes of the Hebrew God.

Worse yet, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Darwinism and evolutionism came to the fore and the liberal ideal began to be justified with concepts deriving from such doctrines as the struggle for existence or the survival of the fittest, and from the habit of thinking of men as mere animals. Therewith the dialectic, the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the alternating victories and defeats, the progressive solutions, which liberalism had regarded as part and parcel of its spiritual conception of life, gave way to picturings and admiring descriptions of wild beasts clawing at one another and devouring and destroying one another.

The fact that a theory gives an inadequate or inappropriate account of a thing by no means implies that the thing is not enjoying a fulsome and exuberant prosperity, so long as the vital force that is at work within it is vigorous and inspiring. Often excellent paintings, poems, or sculptures are produced by men who hold fantastic, conventional, or outmoded theories on art, and acts of the highest morality and nobility are performed quite unpretentiously by men who profess the crudest and most hardhearted materialisms. For a person to act in one way and think in another involves, of course, incoherence and lack of balance. There are such cases, however, and we see that there must be, once we remember that we reach coherence through our incoherences, we attain our balance from our frequent stumblings. The fiery and fruitful development of liberalism in England and all over Europe in the nineteenth century dashed the absolutisms to earth, liberated oppressed peoples from foreign dominions and united them into great states. It created a supple form of living that enjoyed an intense interchange among the nations of economic but also of moral, intellectual, and esthetic values.

It is in no way surprising that the theory of liberty, meantime, should have groveled on the wretched planes just described. A Cavour was so deeply and devoutly inspired by the

ideal of freedom that in him the word and the deed seemed a living theory, so that nothing more was needed. But that is not the case when the practical urge has weakened, when the vision is veiled or is growing dim, when action falters, draws back, or even renounces and betrays its ideal to fall in with the current that it once combated. And meantime false ideas, mistaken opinions, mendacious histories, step forward as though to deliver an unflattering obituary for the liberty that is reported dead or to inscribe a condemnatory epitaph upon her waiting tomb. At such times it becomes imperative to have a truly adequate theory of freedom. As he stands waiting for the practical revival to dawn again the thinker should start things going in his own field, he should scatter the clouds that are gathering above it and bring clear skies back into the domain of thought. The time when freedom is dead or dying in others is the time when she should resume the weaving of her tapestry before the thinker's mind.

This reconsideration of the problem of freedom, this construction or reconstruction of the foundations of the theory of liberty, should also help us to correct a number of mistaken impressions that more directly affect the life of our times. One of these regards the relationship—not very adequately understood as yet—between “moral liberalism,” liberalism proper, and “economic liberalism,” or free trade. This is not a relationship of cause and effect, of principle and consequence, of premise and conclusion. It is a relationship of form and matter. The economic life becomes matter as compared with conscience, and matter are the various systems that economic life proposes—free trade, protectionism, monopoly, planned economy, economic autarchy, and the like. No one of these systems can claim moral status as against the other, since they are all economic and non-moral and can each, in the various situations that eventuate in history, be either adopted or rejected by the moral man. The same may be said of property systems, capitalistic, communistic, or otherwise, which are necessarily variable and can never be fixed on by reference to any moral law. It might seem possible to fix on one or the other of them with reference to some dream of a general and permanent state of comfort or welfare. But

such a dream would not only be utopian. Intrinsically it would have nothing to do with ethics. Morals envisage no impossible state of individual or general comfort. They are exclusively concerned with an *excelsius*.

Another mistaken notion comes to us from the opposite direction—not from laissez faire and free trade, but from the communists. This is the distinction that is drawn between a “legal” or “formal” or “theoretical” freedom and an “actual” or “real” freedom. The first sort of freedom is the one that was allegedly bestowed upon the peoples by the Revolution of 1789 and which has been made deceptive and unreal because it has not been accompanied by the second and, worse yet, has been used as a pretext to resist propaganda or action for the second. On careful examination, freedom of the first sort, the allegedly “legal” or “formal” freedom, turns out to be the real and actual freedom—freedom as a moral principle and therefore the only freedom. The other sort, which is called “actual” and “real,” is not freedom at all, but just a name for a communist and equalitarian system of economic organization. The fact that the two things have, with revolting callousness to facts, been subsumed under one concept by exponents of the economic interpretation of history is just another instance of the obtuseness which that school of thought has encouraged towards everything pertaining to the spiritual and moral life.

It cannot be argued, in rebuttal, that the communist ideal, as merely economic, is, among the various possible or plausible ideals, adapted to certain conditions and more or less permanent in relation to them. The communist system, to begin with, is very improperly called a system of “equality” and “justice,” but that is not the point here. What we must reject is the assertion that represents that system of economic organization as the foundation, and liberty as the pinnacle, of the social edifice. Liberty is not dependent on any particular economic system, or on either of the two systems here contrasted. It calls all systems to the bar of judgment and accepts or rejects any or all according to the case. If, therefore, one insists in the face of the facts on conceiving the relationship upside down, there is nothing to do except to begin by founding the equalitarian economic order,

without reference to freedom and consent, and resorting to violence. Then, in line with the principle that states are upheld by the same forces that create them, one can only go on and uphold the equalitarian order by violence and suppress freedom.

The truth of this contention is so obvious from the standpoint of reason and logic that it would hardly be necessary to seek a verification of it in the facts. Yet the verification has been supplied, and in no doubtful terms, by a number of the so-called proletarian dictatorships of our time. These systems can pretend to establish liberty in their written constitutions. They cannot achieve it in the fact, any more than they can divest themselves of their dictatorial character—divest themselves, that is, of their actual selves. As in the case just mentioned, therefore, the real relationship is the reverse one: first and fundamental, freedom, which judges, accepts, or rejects either or any system of economic organization according as the latter shows itself to be morally the more salutary and thereby economically the more advantageous in the conditions supplied at the given historical moment.

One might touch briefly, also, on a third misapprehension which comes to us not from the battle of conflicting economic systems but from the more strictly political field, the field of diplomacy. There we find a formula of "nonintervention," which decks itself out in a halo of liberalism and declares humble deference to the rights particular countries have of freely working out their problems and fighting out their domestic quarrels even by civil war.

In the background of such propositions lurks a very important truth, the truth that the government of a given country is in duty bound to consider the vital interests entrusted to it and to concern itself with the affairs of other countries only as these affect those interests in line of prospect or menace, advantage or harm. This truth, however, is never the predominant consideration with those who use the formula. The pious respect that is professed for the self-determination of the peoples must be classed with the political hypocrisies. The principle is evidently not applied, and is in fact inapplicable, to the so-called backward or uncivilized peoples and cannot be applied, either,

to peoples who fall into temporary conditions of civic inferiority. The interests that the given government is called upon to protect all by itself cannot be conceived in terms of an exclusive and abstract particularity. All countries participate in the common life of Europe, or of the world. To refuse to consider the moral vicissitudes of peoples beyond one's own country's frontiers involves, first of all, exposing one's country to the danger of the *proximus ardet Ucalegon*. But then again such policies are definitely unhealthy to the sense that a people must have of itself. This sense cannot be satisfied by the mere idea of power. It has to be re-enforced by a persuasion that the power is beneficial to humanity—otherwise the country shrinks into a sort of cynical selfishness that works against the country itself.

In the light of this truth a friend and co-worker of mine² saw fit, with some reason, to accuse the English sense of freedom of narrowness, in that the English seem to conceive of liberty as a private, personal, or national possession of their own, not as a universal human value which it is their duty to spread abroad and with which the destinies of their own liberties are necessarily bound up.

This reluctance—a very understandable reluctance—to embrace and apply an active international morality rests in part on historical memories—memories of the Crusades, for instance, which were so idealistic in their dreams and so unidealistic in their realities and which anyhow failed; memories of certain Catholic crusades, which were so unwisely undertaken by the Spain of the Hapsburgs; or memories of the religious wars, which laid Europe waste, drowned a continent in blood, and ended not in the victory of one faith or the other, but in a return to the *cuius regio eius religio*, followed by a general outburst of rationalism and illuminism before which both Catholicism and Protestantism gave ground.

This reluctance tends, at any rate, to lose sight of the fact that morality, and the ideal of freedom which is the political expression of morality, are not the property of a given party or group, but a value that is fundamentally and universally human, to diffuse and enhance which all of us must devote our

² Omodeo, review of Fisher's *History of Europe*, *La Critica*, Vol. XXXVI (1938).

efforts of good will in the ways that are most appropriate to the given case and which political wisdom must advise and guide. No people will be truly free till all peoples are free.

I confess that I am not a little alarmed at the scant attention, if any at all, that is being paid to the problem of freedom in the philosophical literature of our time, and at the little interest that is being shown in the vicissitudes and destinies of freedom throughout the world. One can say the same, for that matter, of literature in general—of the drama, of the novel, of historical writing.

This is just the opposite of what went on during the first half of the nineteenth century, though it should be going on even more intensely today when the liberties which were then won are in danger of being lost and of having to be won again. Actually, philosophy and literature seem to be indifferent to the distress of those who love our sacred heritage of freedom and fear its passing. Philosophy is turning back to the old and far-away problems of the schools, and literature to irrelevant sentiments and impulses; when indeed both philosophy and literature are not being placed at the service of adversaries of the liberal ideal in an effort to construct a body of doctrine that will help the oppressions that are being exercised and the various attempts that are being made to brutalize the world.

For my part, for some two decades I have been trying to revive interest in the subject of freedom through a number of philosophical or historical treatises; and in the course of those labors I have been impressed by the relatively imperfect state in which the doctrine of liberty has been left by thinkers of the past. The lightness of the armor, the ancientness and inadequacy of the weapons, with which they provided freedom may in part account for the ineffectiveness of the defense that it has made against the surprises and attacks that have of late been hurled upon it. I have therefore set down here a few of the outlines of a doctrine of freedom that seem to me essential; but I cannot end these pages without observing that the subject has so many and such varied aspects, that it intertwines with so many of the gravest problems of life and history, as to require all the energy and talents that any number of scholars can devote to it.

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ASPECTS OF FREEDOM

THE cultural history of Western civilization for the period illuminated by written records can be considered from many aspects. It can be conceived under the guise of a steady economic progression, diversified by catastrophic collapses to lower levels. Such a point of view emphasizes technology and economic organization. Alternatively, history can be conceived as a series of oscillations between worldliness and otherworldliness, or as a theater of contest between greed and virtue or between truth and error. Such points of view emphasize religion, morality, and contemplative habits eliciting generalizations of thought. Each mode of consideration is a sort of searchlight elucidating some of the facts, and retreating the remainder into an omitted background. Of course in any history, even with a restricted topic, limited to politics or to art or to science, many points of view are in fact interwoven, each with varying grades of generality.

One of the most general philosophic notions to be used in the analysis of civilized activities is to consider the effect on social life due to the variations of emphasis between Individual Absoluteness and Individual Relativity. Here 'absoluteness' means the notion of release from essential dependence on other members of the community in respect to modes of activity, while relativity means the converse fact of essential relatedness. In one of their particularizations these ideas appear in the antagonism between notions of freedom and of social organization. In

another they appear in the relative importance to be ascribed to the welfare of the State and to the welfare of its individual members. The character of each epoch as to its social institutions, its jurisprudence, its notions of ideal ends within the range of practicability, depends largely upon those various patches of activity within which one or the other of these notions, individual absoluteness or individual relativity, is dominant for that epoch. No period is wholly controlled by either one of these extremes, reigning through its whole range of activities. Repression in one direction is balanced by freedom in others. Military discipline is severe. In the last resort individual soldiers are sacrificed to the army. But in many fields of human activity soldiers are left completely unfettered both by regulation and by custom. For members of university faculties the repressions and the freedoms are very different from those which obtain for soldiers.

Distribution of emphasis between absoluteness and relativity is seemingly arbitrary. Of course there is always a historical reason for the pattern. Frequently the shifting of emphasis is to be ascribed to the general tendency to revolt from the immediate past—to interchange black and white wherever we find them. Also the transformation may be a judgment upon dogmas held responsible for inherited failures. It should be one function of history to disengage such a judgment from the irritation due to transient circumstances.

More often changes in the social pattern of intellectual emphasis arise from a shift of power from one class or group of classes to another class or group of classes. For example, an oligarchic aristocratic government and a democratic government may each tend to emphasize social organization, that is to say, the relativity of individuals to the State. But governments mainly satisfying the trading and professional classes, whether nominally they be aristocratic, democratic, or absolute, emphasize personal freedom, that is to say, individual absoluteness. Governments of the latter kind have been that of Imperial Rome with its middle-class imperial agents and its middle-class Stoic lawyers and, in its happiest period, its middle-class em-

perors; and that of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

With the shift of dominant classes, points of view which in one epoch are submerged, only to be detected by an occasional ripple, later emerge into the foreground of action and literary expression. Thus the various activities of each age—governmental, literary, scientific, religious, purely social—express the mentalities of various classes in the community whose influence for those topics happens to be dominant. In one of his speeches on the American Revolution, Burke exclaims, "For heaven's sake, satisfy *somebody*."

Governments are best classified by considering who are the 'somebodies' they are in fact endeavoring to satisfy. Thus the English government of the first sixty years of the eighteenth century was, as to its form and its persons, aristocratic. But in policy it was endeavoring to satisfy the great merchants of the City of London and of the City of Bristol. Their dissatisfaction was the immediate source of danger. Sir Robert Walpole and William Pitt, the Great Commoner, personify the changing moods of this class, in the earlier period sick of wars, and later imperialistic.

In a period when inherited modes of life are operating with their traditional standard of efficiency, or inefficiency, the class to be actively satisfied may be relatively restricted, for example, the merchants of eighteenth-century England. The majority will then be relatively quiescent, and conservative statesmen, such as Walpole, will be anxious to do nothing to stir the depths—" *Quieta non movere*." Walpole was an active reformer in respect to trade interests, otherwise a conservative.

The corresponding statesmen in France were actively concerned with the interests of the Court, whose power was based on a bureaucracy (legal, administrative, and ecclesiastical), and an army. As in contemporary England, the personnel of the whole French organization, civil and military, was aristocratic and middle class. French politics ran more smoothly, but unfortunately for France its active political element was more divorced from the main interests of the country than the active element in England, though in each country government ex-

hibited its periods of insight and folly. The French emphasis was towards co-ordination, the English towards individual freedom. In the latter portion of this century, in England the more active class politically were the rural landowners. Note for instance the way in which, at the end of his political life, Burke hugs the improbable belief that he understood agriculture. Also the municipality of the City of London was in the earlier period an element of support for the government, and—until the excesses of the French Revolution—in the later period an element of opposition.

In the later period the oncoming industrial revolution absorbed the energies of that English industrial class whom at the earlier period the slogan "the Protestant Succession" had stirred to political activity because for them it spelled "Industrial Freedom." The mass of the people were now, towards the end of the century, stirring uneasily, as yet ignorant of the ways in which their interests were being determined, and with its better members engaged in saving their souls according to the directions of John Wesley. Finally out of this welter, after a delay caused by the wars of the French Revolution, the Victorian epoch emerged. The solution was merely temporary, and so is the planet itself.

II

In our endeavor to understand sociological change we must not concentrate too exclusively on the effect of abstract doctrine, verbally formulated and consciously assented to. Such elaborate intellectual efforts play their part in preserving or transforming or destroying. For example, the history of Europe is not to be understood without some reference to the Augustinian doctrines of original sin, of divine grace, and of the consequent mission of the Catholic Church. The history of the United States requires in addition some knowledge of the English political doctrines of the seventeenth century, and of French thought in the eighteenth century. Men are driven by their thoughts as well as by the molecules in their bodies, by intelligence and by senseless forces. Social history, however, concentrates on modes of human experience prevalent at different periods. The physical condi-

tions are merely the background which partially controls the flux of modes and of moods. Even here we must not overintellectualize the various types of human experience. Mankind is the animal at the head of the Primates, and cannot escape habits of mind which cling closely to habits of body.

Our consciousness does not initiate our modes of functionings. We awake to find ourselves engaged in process, immersed in satisfactions and dissatisfactions, and actively modifying, either by intensification or by attenuation or by the introduction of novel purposes. This primary procedure which is presupposed in consciousness, I will term "instinct." It is the mode of experience directly arising out of the urge of inheritance, individual and environmental. Also, after instinct and intellectual ferment have done their work, there is a decision which determines the mode of coalescence of instinct with intelligence. I will term this factor "wisdom." It is the function of wisdom to act as a modifying agency on the intellectual ferment so as to produce a self-determined issue from the given conditions. Thus for the purpose of understanding social institutions, this crude three-fold division of human nature is required: instinct, intelligence, wisdom.

But this division must not be made too sharply. After all, intellectual activity is itself an inherited factor. We do not initiate thought by an effort of self-consciousness. We find ourselves thinking, just as we find ourselves breathing and enjoying the sunset. There is a habit of daydreaming, and a habit of thoughtful elucidation. Thus the autonomy of thought is strictly limited, often negligible, generally beyond the threshold of consciousness. The ways of thought of a nation are as much instinctive—that is to say, are subject to routine—as are its ways of emotional reaction. But most of us believe that there is a spontaneity of thought which lies beyond routine. Otherwise, the moral claim for freedom of thought is without meaning. This spontaneity of thought is, in its turn, subject to control as to its maintenance and efficiency. Such control is the judgment of the whole, attenuating or strengthening the partial flashes of self-determination. The whole determines what it wills to be, and thereby adjusts the relative importance of its own inherent

flashes of spontaneity. This final determination is its wisdom or, in other words, its subjective aim as to its own nature, with its limits set by inherited factors.

Wisdom is proportional to the width of the evidence made effective in the final self-determination. The intellectual operations consist in the co-ordination of notions derived from the primary facts of instinctive experience into a logically coherent system. Those facts, whose qualitative aspects are thus co-ordinated, gain importance in the final self-determination. This intellectual co-ordination is more readily achieved when the primary facts are selected so as to dismiss the baffling aspects of things into intellectual subordination. For this reason intellectual activity is apt to flourish at the expense of wisdom. To some extent, to understand is always to exclude a background of intellectual incoherence. But wisdom is persistent pursuit of the deeper understanding, ever confronting intellectual system with the importance of its omissions. These three elements, instinct, intelligence, wisdom, cannot be torn apart. They integrate, react, and merge into hybrid factors. It is the case of the whole emerging from its parts, and the parts emerging within the whole. In judging social institutions, their rise, their culmination, and their decay, we have to estimate the types of instinct, of intelligence, and of wisdom which have co-operated with natural forces to develop the story. The folly of intelligent people, clearheaded and narrow visioned, has precipitated many catastrophes.

However far we go back in recorded history, we are within the period of the high-grade functioning of mankind, far removed from mere animal savagery. Also, within that period it would be difficult to demonstrate that mankind has improved upon its inborn mental capacity. Yet there can be no doubt that there has been an immense expansion of the outfit which the environment provides for the service of thought. This outfit can be summarized under the headings modes of communication, physical and mental, writing, preservation of documents, variety of modes of literature, critical thought, systematic thought, constructive thought, history, comparison of diverse languages, mathematical symbolism, improved technology providing phys-

ical ease. This list is obviously composed of many partially redundant and overlapping items. But it serves to remind us of the various ways in which we have at our service facilities for thought and suggestions for thought far beyond those at hand for our predecessors who lived anywhere from two to five thousand years ago. Indeed the last two hundred years has added to this outfit in a way which may create a new epoch unless mankind degenerates. Of course, a large share of this outfit had already accumulated between two and three thousand years ago. It is the brilliant use which the leading men of that millennium made of their opportunities which makes us doubt of any improvement in the native intelligence of mankind.

But the total result is that we now discern a certain simple-mindedness in the way our predecessors adjusted themselves to inherited institutions. To a far greater extent the adjustment was a matter of course, in short, it was instinctive. In the great period they discovered what we have inherited. But there was a naïvety about the discovery, a surprise. Instinctive adaptation was so pervasive that it was unnoticed. Probably the Egyptians did not know that they were governed despotically, or that the priests limited the royal power, because they had no alternative as a contrast either in fact or in imagination. They were nearer in their thoughts to the political philosophy prevalent in an anthill.

Another aspect of this fact is that in such societies, relativity is stressed rather than individual freedom. Indeed, in the earlier stages freedom is almost a meaningless notion. Action and mood both spring from an instinct based upon ancestral co-ordination. In such societies, whatever is not the outcome of inherited relativity, imposing co-ordination of action, is sheer destructive chaos. Alien groups are then evil groups. An energetic prophet hewed Agag in pieces. Unfortunately the spiritual descendants of Samuel still survive, archaic nuisances.

III

We can watch some of the episodes in the discovery of freedom. About fourteen hundred years before Christ the Egyptian

king Akhenaton evidently belonged to an advanced group who thought for themselves and made a step beyond the inherited religious notions. Such groups, with flashes of free thought, must have arisen sporadically many times before, during countless thousands of years, some successful and most of them failures. Otherwise the transition to civilization, as distinct from the mere diversity of adaptations of thoughtless customs, could never have arisen. Bees and ants have diverse social organizations; but, so far as we know, neither species is in any sense civilized. They may enjoy thoughtless adaptations of social customs. Anyhow their flashes of freedom are below the level that we can discern. But Akhenaton, having exercised his freedom, evidently had no conception of freedom as such. We have all the evidence archaeology can provide that he rigidly endeavored to impose his notions upon the thoughts and customs of the whole Egyptian nation. Apparently he failed; for there was a reaction. But reactions never restore with minute accuracy. Thus in all probability there remained a difference which the evidence before us is unable to discriminate.

A more successful group were the Hebrew prophets about eight or nine hundred years later. Spurred by the evils of their times they exercised a freedom in the expression of moral intuition, and fitted out the character of Jehovah with the results of their thoughts. Our civilization owes to them more than we can express. They constitute one of the few groups of men who decisively altered history in any intimate sense. Most spectacular upheavals merely replace one set of individuals by another analogous set; so that history is mostly a barren change of names. But the Hebrew prophets really produced a decisive qualitative alteration, and what is still more rare, a change for the better; yet the conception of freedom never entered into the point of view of the Jehovah of the prophets. Intolerance is the besetting sin of moral fervor. The first important pronouncement in which tolerance is associated with moral fervor is in the Parable of the Tares and the Wheat, some centuries later.

Subsequent examples of intolerance supervening upon the exercise of freedom are afforded by the Christian Church after its establishment by Constantine and by the Protestants under the

guidance of Luther and Calvin. At the period of the Reformation mankind had begun to know better and so charity of judgment upon the Reformers begins to wear thin. But then charity is a virtue allied to tolerance, so we must be careful. All advanced thinkers, skeptical or otherwise, are apt to be intolerant, in the past and also now. On the whole, tolerance is more often found in connection with a genial orthodoxy. The apostles of modern tolerance—in so far as it exists—are Erasmus, the Quakers, and John Locke. They should be commemorated in every laboratory, in every church, and in every court of law. We must however remember that many of the greatest seventeenth-century statesmen and thinkers, including John Locke, owed their lives to the wide tolerance of the Dutch Republic.

Certainly these men were not the originators of their admirable ideas. To find the origins we must go behind them for two thousand years. So slow is translation of idea into custom. We must however first note that the examples cited have all been concerned with religion. There are other forms of behavior, active and contemplative. The Athenians have given us the first surviving instance of the explicit recognition of the importance of tolerance in respect to varieties of social behavior. No doubt antecedent civilizations must have provided many practical examples of it. For example, it is difficult to believe that in big metropolitan cities such as Babylon and Nineveh, there was much detailed supervision of social behavior. On the other hand, the ways of life in Egypt seem to have been tightly organized. But the first explicit defense of social tolerance, as a requisite for high civilization, is found in the speech of Pericles as reported by Thucydides. It puts forth the conception of the organized society successfully preserving freedom of behavior for its individual members. Fifty years later, in the same social group, Plato introduced deeper notions from which all claims for freedom must spring. His general concept of the psychic factors in the Universe stressed them as the source of all spontaneity, and ultimately as the ground of all life and motion. The human psychic activity thus contains the origins of precious harmonies within the transient world. The end of human society is to elicit such psychic energies. But spontaneity is of the

essence of soul. Such in outline is the argument from Platonic modes of thought to the importance of social freedom.

Plato's own writings constitute one prolonged apology for freedom of contemplation, and for freedom for the communication of contemplative experiences. In the persistent exercise of this right Socrates and Plato lived, and it was on its behalf that Socrates died.

The establishment of freedom requires more than its mere intellectual defense. Plato above all men introduced into the world this further essential element of civilization. For he exhibited the tone of mind which alone can maintain a free society, and he expressed the reasons justifying that tone. His Dialogues are permeated with a sense of the variousness of the Universe, not to be fathomed by our intellects, and in his Seventh Epistle he expressly disclaims the possibility of an adequate philosophic system. The moral of his writings is that all points of view, reasonably coherent and in some sense with an application, have something to contribute to our understanding of the universe, and also involve omissions whereby they fail to include the totality of evident fact. The duty of tolerance is our finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future, and to the complexity of accomplished fact which exceeds our stretch of insight.

Thus two types of character must be excluded from those effectually promoting freedom. One type belongs to those who despair of attaining any measure of truth, the Skeptics. Such temperaments can obviously have no message for those who hold that thought does count. Again the pursuit of freedom with an intolerant mentality is self-defeating. For all his equipment of imagination, learning, and literary magnificence in defense of freedom, the example of Milton's life probably does as much to retard the cause as to advance it. He promotes a frame of mind of which the issue is intolerance.

The ancient world of paganism was tolerant as to creeds. Provided that your actions conformed, your speculations were unnoticed. Indeed, one mark of progress beyond purely instinctive social relations is an uneasy feeling as to the destructive effect of speculative thought. Creeds are at once the outcome of specula-

tion and efforts to curb speculation. But they are always relevant to it. Antecedently to speculation there can be no creeds. Wherever there is a creed, there is a heretic round the corner or in his grave. Amid the great empires, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Hittite, and with the discovery of navigation, the intercourse between races promoted shrewd comparisons gradually broadening into speculative thought. In its beginnings this shift in human mentality must have developed slowly. Where there is no anticipation, change has to wait upon chance, and peters out amid neglect. Fortunately the Bible preserves for us fragments of the process as it affected one gifted race at a nodal point. The record has been written up by editors with the mentality of later times. Thus the task of modern scholars is analogous to an endeavor to recover the histories of Denmark and Scotland from a study of *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*. We can see initial antagonisms broadening into speculative attempts to rationalize the welter. We can watch Samuel and Agag succeeded by Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. There are the meditations of Job and his friends, the prophetic books, and the "wisdom" books of the Bible. And with a leap of six hundred years one version of the story ends with the creed of the Council at Nicaea.

I V

The episode of Greek civilization during its short phase of independence created a new situation. Speculation was explicitly recognized. It was ardently pursued. Its various modes and methods were discovered. The relation of the Greeks to their predecessors is analogous, as to stretch of time and intensity of effect, to that of the second phase of the modern industrial revolution during the last fifty years to the first phase, which in truth sprawls over the long centuries from the fifteenth century to the close of the nineteenth.

By reason of its inheritance from the episode of Hellenic culture the Roman Empire was more self-conscious than its predecessors in its treatment of the problem of liberty and of the allied problem of social institutions. So far as concerns Western Europe, the origin of the medieval civilization must be dated

from the Emperor Augustus and the journeys of Paul. For the Byzantine, Semitic, Egyptian area, the date must be pushed back to the death of Alexander the Great, and the renaissance of Greco-Egyptian learning. For the first two centuries after Augustus the former area, centered in Italy, was incomparably the more important. Latin literature is the translation of Hellenic culture into the medieval modes of thought, extending that period to end with the French Revolution. Throughout that whole period culture was backward looking. Lucretius, Cicero, Vergil were medievals in their relation to Hellenic literature and speculation, though they lacked the Semitic factor. After that first Latin period, the notable contributions to thought, Pagan, Christian, and Mohammedan, all derive from the eastern region, with the important exception of Augustine. Finally, the center of culture again swings westward, as the Eastern civilization collapses under the prolonged impacts of Tartars and Turks. The notes of these three allied cultures, the Eastern, the Latin, and the later European, are scholarly learning, recurrence to Hellenic speculation restated in creedal forms, imitative literatures stressing humane aspirations, the canalization of curiosity into professional grooves, and—in the West—a new grade of intelligence exhibited in the development of a variety of social institutions. It is this last factor which has saved the progress of mankind.

The new epoch in the formation of social institutions unfolded itself very gradually. It is not yet understood in its full importance. Social philosophy has not grasped the relevant principles, so that even now each case is treated as a peculiar fact. But the problem of liberty has been transformed by it. The novelty consists in the deliberate formation of institutions, embodying purposes of special groups, and unconcerned with the general purposes of any political state, or of any embodiment of tribal unity playing the part of a state. Of course any big empire involves a coalescence of diverse tribes, customs, and modes of thought. But in the earlier examples, each subject race had its own status in the complex empire, and its ways of procedure were part of the imperial system. Also there must have been complex modes of behavior, peculiar to the various races, in-

herited and tolerated as a matter of course. In the case of the smaller units such as the Greek city states, we find a condition of affairs in which all corporate action is an element in state policy. The freedom was purely individual, never corporate. All incorporation, religious or secular, was communal, or patriarchal. The saying, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" was uttered by Christ in the reign of Tiberius, and not by Plato four hundred years earlier. However limited may be the original intention of the saying, very quickly God was conceived as a principle of organization in complete disjunction from Caesar.

It is interesting to speculate on the analogies and differences between the deaths of Socrates and of Paul. Both were martyrs. Socrates died because his speculative opinions were held to be subversive of the communal life. It is difficult to believe that the agents of Claudius or Nero or Galba were much concerned with Paul's speculative opinions as to the ways of God to man. Later on, Lucian's opinions were as unorthodox as Paul's. But he died in his bed. Unfortunately for Paul, as he journeyed he left behind him organized groups, indulging in activities uncoordinated with any purposes of state. Thus imperial agents were alarmed and sympathized with popular prejudice. Indeed, we know exactly what one of the best of the Roman emperors about half a century later thought of the matter. Trajan in his letter to the younger Pliny dismisses Christian theology as negligible. He is even unconcerned with the organization of Christians into groups, so long as no overt action emerges affronting the traditional association of the State with religion. Yet he recognizes that the Christians will fit into no current political philosophy, and that they represent corporate actions on the verge of the intolerable. Thus if circumstances unearth them, they are to be questioned, dismissed if possible, but punished when their actions become glaring. It is interesting to compare the Christians in the Roman Empire, from Nero to Trajan, with the communists in modern America.

Trajan shows himself as a fine statesman dealing with the faint dawn of a new epoch, not understood, and indeed not yet understood. The old organization of mankind was being af-

fectured by the influence of the new width of intellectuality due to Hellenism. Organizations mainly derived from blind inheritance, and affected by the intellect only in detail and in interpretation, are to receive the shock of other types founded primarily on the intellectual appreciation of private ends, that is to say, of ends unconcerned with the State. What Henry Osborn Taylor has termed "rational consideration" is becoming a major force in human organization. Of course, Plato and Aristotle exhibited rational consideration on a magnificent scale. But a group of thinkers do not necessarily constitute a political force. Centuries, sometimes thousands of years, have to elapse before thought can capture action. It is typical of this gap that Aristotle's manuscripts are said to have been stowed in a cellar for two hundred years, and that even to this day Plato is mainly valued as a religious mystic and a supreme literary artist. In these latter functions, Plato represents the world he inherited and not the world he created. Perhaps these constitute his best part. But he played two roles.

The situation in the Roman Empire was in effect novel. Pericles had conceived a freedom for private actions, of a certain civilized type within narrowly restricted bounds. Plato voices the claim for contemplative freedom. But the Empire was faced with the claim for freedom of corporate action. Modern political history, from that day to this, is the confused story of the strenuous resistance of the State, and of its partial concessions. The Empire reasserted the old doctrine of the Divine Emperor; but also yielded by admitting as legal principle the Stoic doctrine of the Voice of Nature. The Middle Ages compromised with the doctrine of the two swords. In recent times, the State is fighting behind its last ditch, which is the legal doctrine of sovereignty. The thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalized its political philosophy under the fiction of the "Original Contract." This concept proved itself formidable. It helped to dismiss the Stuarts into romance, to found the American Republic, and to bring about the French Revolution. Indeed, it was one of the most timely notions known to history. Its weakness is that it antedates the era of the importance of rational consideration, and overestimates the po-

litical importance which at any time reason has possessed. The antagonistic doctrine was that of the "Divine Right of Kings," which is the ghost of the "Divine Emperor."

V

Political philosophy can claim no exemption from the doctrine of the golden mean. Unrestricted liberty means complete absence of any compulsory co-ordination. Human society in the absence of any compulsion is trusting to the happy co-ordination of individual emotions, purposes, affections, and actions. Civilization can only exist amid a population which in the mass does exhibit this fortunate mutual adaptation. Unfortunately a minority of adverse individual instances, when unchecked, are sufficient to upset the social structure. A few men in the whole caste of their character, and most men in some of their actions, are antisocial in respect to the peculiar type of any society possible in their time. There can be no evasion of the plain fact that compulsion is necessary and that compulsion is the restriction of liberty.

It follows that a doctrine as to the social mingling of liberty and compulsion is required. A mere unqualified demand for liberty is the issue of shallow philosophy, equally noxious with the antithetical cry for mere conformation to standard pattern. Probably there can be no one solution of this problem adapted to all the circumstances of human societies which have been and will be. We must confine ourselves to the way in which at the present day the issue is being adjusted in the Western civilization, European and American.

The organization of professions by means of self-governing institutions places the problem of liberty at a new angle. For now it is the institution which claims liberty and also exercises control. In ancient Egypt the Pharaoh decided, acting through his agents. In the modern world a variety of institutions have the power of action without immediate reference to the State. This new form of liberty which is the autonomous institution limited to special purposes was exemplified in the guilds of the Middle Ages; and that period was characterized by a remark-

able growth of civilized genius. The meaning that—in England at least—was then assigned to the word “liberty” illustrates the projection of the new social structure upon the older form of customary determination. For a “liberty” did not then mean a general freedom, but a special license to a particular group to organize itself within a special field of action. For this reason “liberties” were sometimes a general nuisance.

Of course the Catholic Church was the great “liberty” which first confronted the Roman Empire, and then dominated medieval life. In its early stages it is seen in its proper theoretical relation to other autonomous societies. For example in the pagan Empire, its legal status seems to have been analogous to that of the pagan burial societies; although the status of the Church property before the age of Constantine has not yet been finally elucidated by scholars. But in the Middle Ages, the Church so towered above other institutions that it outrivaled the state itself. Accordingly its analogy to secular guilds and to other professional institutions such as universities was obscured by its greatness. The Catholic Church had another characteristic of priceless value. It was, so far as concerned Europe, universal, that is to say, Catholic. Until the approach of the Renaissance there were no European nations in the modern sense. But the Church transcended all governmental boundaries, all racial divisions and all geographic divisions. It was a standing challenge to any form of communal despotism, a universal “liberty.”

V I

From the beginning of the sixteenth century this first form of institutional civilization, with its feudalism, its guilds, its universities, its Catholic Church, was in full decay. The new middle classes, whether scholars or traders, would have none of it. They were individualists. For them the universities were secondary, the monasteries were a nuisance, the Church was a nuisance, feudalism was a nuisance, the guilds were a nuisance. They wanted good order, and to be let alone with their individual activities. The great thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were singularly detached from universities. Erasmus

wanted printers, and Bacon, Hervey, Descartes, Galileo, Leibnitz, wanted governmental patronage, or protection, more than university colleagues, mostly reactionary. When Luther, Descartes, Galileo, or Leibnitz shifted his residence, it was not to find a better university, but a more suitable government—a Duke who would protect, a Prince who would pay, or a Dutch Republic which would not ask questions. Nevertheless, the universities survived the change better than other institutions. In some ways it was a great time for them, though they shrank to the national. What finally emerged was the modern national organization of Europe with the sovereign State dictating every form of institutional organization, as subordinate elements for its own purposes. This was a recurrence to that earlier form of human organization which showed its faint signs of decay during the period of the Roman Empire. Naturally there were great differences. For nothing is ever restored. In fact the reaction was a failure, because mankind has outgrown the simplicities of the earlier form of civilization.

The political philosophy of the modern era was a retrogression, based upon a recurrence to the philosophers and lawyers of the old classical civilizations. The Middle Ages, in the simplified form of the relations of Church with State, were considering the problem of a civilization in which men owed a divided allegiance to many intersecting institutions pursuing diverse ends. This is the real problem in a world dominated by fraternity derived from the catholic diffusion of ideas and from the international distribution of property. The solution provided by the doctrine of the sole sovereignty of the State, however grateful to Protestants and to sovereigns, is both shocking and unworkable, a mere stick with which to beat Papists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a mere way to provide policemen for the countinghouses of merchants. But, amid this reactionary triumph of Periclean individualism in the political philosophies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was an outcrop of institutions based upon the vigor of modern intellectual interests. These institutions, even when national, were concerned with interests impartial among the nations. These were the centuries in which science triumphed, and science is

universal. Thus scientific institutions, though in form national, informally established a catholic league. Again the advance of scholarship, and of natural science, transformed the professions. It intellectualized them far beyond their stage of advance in earlier times. Professions first appear as customary activities largely modified by detached strains of theory. Theories are often wrong; and some of the earlier professional doctrines erred grievously and were maintained tenaciously. Doctrines emerged as plausible deductions, and survived as the wisdom of ancestors. Thus the older professional practice was rooted upon custom, though it was turning towards the intellectual sunlight. Here and there individuals stood out far in advance of their colleagues. For example, in the fourteen hundred years separating Galen from Vesalius, the standard of European medical practice was not to be compared with the attainments of either of these men. Also more than a century after Vesalius, Charles II of England on his deathbed was tortured by physicians employing futile remedies customary at that time. Again, as a designing engineer Leonardo da Vinci was unequaled until the advent of Vauban and James Watt. In the earlier centuries the professional influence, as a general sociological fact, was mainly a welter of bygone flashes of intelligence relapsing into customary procedures. It represented the continual lapse of intellect into instinct. But the culmination of science completely inverted the roles of custom and intelligence in the older professions. By this inversion professional institutions have acquired an international life. Each such institution practices within its own nation, but its sources of life are world-wide. Thus loyalties stretch beyond sovereign States.

Perhaps the most important function of these institutions is the supervision of standards of individual professional competence and of professional practice. For this purpose there is a complex interweaving of universities and more specialized institutions. The problem of freedom comes in here. For it is not opinions which are censured, but learning and ability. Thus in the more important fields of thought, opinion is free and so are large divergencies of practice. The community is provided with objective information as to the sort of weight to be attached to

individuals and as to the sort of freedom of action which may safely be granted. Whatever is done can be subjected to the test of general professional opinion, acting through this network of institutions. Further, even large freedom can now be allowed to nonprofessional individuals. For the great professional organizations, so long as they are efficient, should be able to demonstrate the dangers of extravagant notions. In this way, where sudden action is not in question, reason has obtained an entrenchment which should be impregnable. Indeed individual freedom, standing apart from organization, has now its indispensable role. For all organizations are liable to decay, and license for outside criticism is the best safeguard for the professions.

Also the sovereign State of modern legal theory has its sphere of action and its limitation. The State represents the general wisdom of the community derived from an experience broader than the topics of the various sciences. The role of the State is a general judgment on the activity of the various organizations. It can judge whether they welcome ability, whether they stand high among the kindred institutions throughout the world. But where the State ceases to exercise any legitimate authority is when it presumes to decide upon questions within the purview of sciences or professions.

For example, in the teaching profession it is obvious that young students cannot be subjected to the vagaries of individual teachers. In this sense, the claim for the freedom of teaching is nonsense. But the general community is very incompetent to determine either the subject matter to be taught or the permissible divergences to be allowed or the individual competence. There can be only one appeal, and this is to general professional opinion as exhibited in the practice of accredited institutions. The appeal is catholic. The State of Tennessee did not err in upholding the principle that there are limits to the freedom of teaching in schools and colleges. But it exhibited a gross ignorance of its proper functions when it defied a professional opinion which throughout the world is practically unanimous. Even here that State is hardly to be blamed. For the current political philosophy of sovereignty is very weak as to the limitations of moral authority. Of course whoever at any moment has physi-

cal power has that power of physical compulsion, whether he be a bandit or a judge or political ruler. But moral authority is limited by competence to attain those ends whose immediate dominance is evident to enlightened wisdom. Political loyalty ceases at the frontiers of radical incapacity.

The functions of professional institutions have been considered in some detail because they constitute a clear-cut novelty within modern societies. There were faint anticipations in the ancient world, for example the schools at Athens, in particular those founded by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, and elsewhere the great foundation at Alexandria. Also later the theologians of the Christian Church formed another professional group which even stretched its claim to authority beyond all bounds of good sense. It is by reason of these anticipations, and of the legal developments of the Roman and Byzantine schools of law, that the beginnings of the modern world, in respect to the problem of freedom and of moral authority, have been placed as early as Alexander and Augustus.

VII

In the immediate present, economic organization constitutes the most massive problem of human relationships. It is passing into a new phase, and presents confused outlines. Evidently something new is developing. The individualistic liberalism of the nineteenth century has collapsed, quite unexpectedly. So long as the trading middle classes were dominant as the group to be satisfied, its doctrines were self-evident. As soon as industrialism and education produced in large numbers the modern type of artisan, its whole basis was widely challenged. Again the necessity for large capital, with the aid of legal ingenuity, produced the commercial corporation with limited liability. These fictitious persons are exempt from physiological death and can only disappear by a voluntary dissolution or by bankruptcy. The introduction into the arena of this new type of 'person' has considerably modified the effective meaning of the characteristic liberal doctrine of contractual freedom. It is one thing to claim such freedom as a natural right for human per-

sons, and quite another to claim it for corporate persons. And again the notion of private property had a simple obviousness at the foot of Mount Sinai and even in the eighteenth century. When there were primitive roads, negligible drains, private wells, no elaborate system of credit, when payment meant the direct production of gold pieces, when each industry was reasonably self-contained—in fact when the world was not as it is now—then it was fairly obvious what was meant by private property, apart from any current legal fictions. Today private property is mainly a legal fiction, and apart from such legal determination its outlines are completely indefinite. Such legal determination is probably, indeed almost certainly, the best way of arranging society. But the ‘voice of nature’ is a faint echo when we are dealing with it. There is a striking analogy between the hazy notions of justice in Plato’s Republic, and the hazy notions of private property today. The modern artisan, like Thrasymachus of old, is apt to define it as ‘the will of the stronger.’

Of course these extremes as to the nature of property—simple-minded assertion and simple-minded denial—are exaggeration. The whole concept of absolute individuals with absolute rights, and with a contractual power of forming fully defined external relations, has broken down. The human being is inseparable from its environment in each occasion of its existence. The environment which the occasion inherits is immanent in it, and conversely it is immanent in the environment which it helps to transmit. The favorite doctrine of the shift from a customary basis for society to a contractual basis is founded on shallow sociology. There is no escape from customary status. This status is merely another name for the inheritance immanent in each occasion. Inevitably customary status is there, an inescapable condition. On the other hand, the inherited status is never a full determination. There is always the freedom for the determination of individual emphasis. In terms of high-grade human society, there is always the customary fact as an essential element in the meaning of every contractual obligation. There can be no contract which does not presuppose custom, and no custom leaving no loophole for spontaneous contract. It is this

truth that gives vitality to the Anglo-American Common Law. It is an instrument, in the hands of skilled experts, for the interpretation of explicit contract in terms of implicit status. No code of verbal statement can ever exhaust the shifting background of presupposed fact. What does alter for dominant interests within each social system is the relative importance of the contractual and customary factors in general conscious experience. This balance, fortunate or unfortunate, largely depends on the type of social inheritance provided by that society. But contract is a mode of expression for spontaneity. Otherwise it is meaningless, a futile gesture of consciousness.

In the end nothing is effective except massively co-ordinated inheritance. Sporadic spontaneity is composed of flashes mutually thwarting each other. Ideas have to be sustained, disentangled, diffused, and co-ordinated with the background. Finally they pass into exemplification in action. The distinguishing mark of modern civilization is the number of institutions whose origin can be traced to the initial entertainment of some idea. In the ancient civilizations thought was mainly explanatory. It was only creative in respect to individual actions. But the corporate actions preceded thought. The ancient Gods, either as notions or as persons, did not create the thunderstorm, they explained it. Jehovah did not create the Hebrew tribal emotions, he explained them. He never made a covenant which initiated Hebrew history; the notion of the covenant was an explanatory idea. It was influential; but the idea arose as an explanation of the tribal history. Nevertheless it intensified a pre-existing fact. The Old Testament is on the verge of the dividing line between ancient and modern. This watershed is Hellenism. The difference is only one of proportion, of more or less. But a sufficient change of proportion makes all the difference. In the last phase of ancient life there is a haunting feeling that corporate actions ought to have originated from ideas. Thus their historical imagination unconsciously imported types of explanation of their past which were faintly relevant to their own present: explanations fantastic, incredible, fit only for exposure by scholars. It was the shadow of the future thrown back onto the past.

Returning to the economic side of life, in the ancient world there were economic transactions between tribes and between states, and there were also the economic activities of craftsmen, merchants, and bankers. There was communal activity and individual activity. Cicero's financial worries are preserved for us in his letters to Atticus. They are very analogous to Gibbon's letters to Holroyd, which are characteristic of educated Europe in the eighteenth century. Certainly Cicero's affairs were sufficiently complex. It is not in that respect that the ancient world fell short. It would be worth sacrificing a good deal of Latin literature to know what Atticus thought of Cicero's financial position. Even after two thousand years it is difficult not to entertain a friendly anxiety on the subject. Perhaps as Cicero put his head out of the litter he had been dreaming of bankruptcy, when the sword of the soldier gave him death.

That ancient world is modern both in the physical facts which await us, and in the ripples of anxiety arising from its social intricacies. At that time the human mind was singularly powerful for the generation of ideas. To the epoch between Plato and Justinian, we can trace our philosophical ideas, our religious ideas, our legal ideas, and the model of modern governmental organization. We can recognize Pliny as he discusses whether the parents should serve on the board of governors of the Grammar School he had founded. Sidonius Apollinaris is an anticipation of many New England gentlemen, ecclesiastic and lay. But within that period the ferment of ideas had not persisted for a sufficient time to transform society by a profusion of corporations originated by explicit thought. In particular the great commercial corporations awaited modern times, the Bank of St. George at Genoa, the Bank of England, the great trading companies to India and the East. Atticus was a banker; but he was not the president of a banking corporation. Private wealth was deposited in pagan temples; but temples were corporations devoted to the customary rites of religion. The state taxes were farmed by private corporations of Roman capitalists. Here we approach modern notions. Yet after all the *publicani* were engaged in performing one of the direct services of the State. Their actions were communal and traditional with a tinge

of modern modes of incorporation. No doubt many anticipations of modern commercial institutions can be found. Those times lie within the modern world. But it was modern commerce in its infancy. Indeed, the examples quoted of modern commercial activity belong to an intermediate period, and only recently has the influence of ideas produced its full economic effect. But wherever ideas are effective, there is freedom.

VIII

Unfortunately the notion of freedom has been eviscerated by the literary treatment devoted to it. Men of letters, artists in symphonies of pictorial imagination, have staged the shock of novel thought against tradition. The concept of freedom has been narrowed to the picture of contemplative people shocking their generation. When we think of freedom, we are apt to confine ourselves to freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinions. Then the limitations to freedom are conceived as wholly arising from the antagonisms of our fellow-men. This is a thorough mistake. The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws, determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birth and death, heat, cold, hunger, separation, disease, the general impracticability of purpose, all bring their quota to imprison the souls of women and of men. Our experiences do not keep step with our hopes. The Platonic Eros, which is the soul stirring itself to life and motion, is maimed. The essence of freedom is the practicability of purpose. Mankind has chiefly suffered from the frustration of its prevalent purposes, even such as belong to the very definition of its species. The literary exposition of freedom deals mainly with the frills. The Greek myth was more to the point. Prometheus did not bring to mankind freedom of the press. He procured fire, which obediently to human purpose cooks and gives warmth. In fact, freedom of action is a primary human need. In modern thought, the expression of this truth has taken the form of "the economic interpretation of history."

The fact that the "economic interpretation" is itself a novel thought arising within the last sixty or seventy years illustrates

an important sociological fact. The literary world through all ages belonged mainly to the fortunate section of mankind whose basic human wants have been amply satisfied. A few literary men have been in want throughout their lives, many have occasionally suffered. The fact shocks us. It is remembered because it is rare. The fortunate classes are oblivious to the fact that throughout the ages the masses of mankind have lived in conscious dread of such disaster—a drought, a wet summer, a bad harvest, a cattle disease, a raid of pirates. Also the basic needs when they are habitually satisfied cease to dominate thought. Delicacies of taste displace the interest in fullness of stomach. Thus the motives which stir the fortunate directing classes to conscious activity have a long-range forecast and an esthetic tinge—power, glory, safety in the distant future, forms of government, luxury, religion, excitement, dislike of strange ways, contemplative curiosity, play. Mankind survived by evolving a peculiar excitability whereby it quickly adapts itself to novel circumstance. This instability is quickly diverted to some simple form of the more abstract interests of the minority. The great convulsions happen when the economic urge on the masses has dovetailed with some simplified ideal end. Intellect and instinct then combine, and some ancient social order passes away. But the masses of the population are always there, requiring at least a minimum of satisfaction, with their standard of life here higher and there lower, also rising or falling. Thus, even when the minority is dominant, the plain economic facts of life must be the governing force in social development. Yet in general the masses are intellectually quiescent, though the more ideal ends of the minority, good and bad, permeate the masses, directing policies according to the phantasies of the generations. And the primary demand for freedom is to be found in the general urge for the accomplishment of these general ends, which are fusion of ideal and economic policies, making the stuff of history. In so far as a population is dominated by some general appetite, freedom presents no peculiar problem to the statesman. The tribal actions are shaped inevitably, and that group of mankind is pushed towards accomplishment or frustration.

In modern states there is a complex problem. There are many types of character. Freedom means that within each type the requisite co-ordination should be possible without the destruction of the general ends of the whole community. Indeed, one general end is that these variously co-ordinated groups should contribute to the complex pattern of community life, each in virtue of its own peculiarity. In this way individuality gains the effectiveness which issues from co-ordination, and freedom obtains power necessary for its perfection.

This is the hope of the statesman, the solution which the long course of history is patiently disclosing. But it is not the intuition which has nerved men to surpass the limitations of mankind. After all, societies of primates, of animals, of life on the earth's surface, are transient details. There is a freedom lying beyond circumstance, derived from the direct intuition that life can be grounded upon its absorption in what is changeless amid change. This is the freedom for which Plato was groping, the freedom which Stoics and Christians obtained as the gift of Hellenism. It is the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all harmony. For it is conditioned only by its adequacy of understanding. And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of insight. It is the reconciliation of freedom with the compulsion of the truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the harmony which is the height of existence.

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FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

MODERN democracy is historically nothing more than the form of sovereignty of the *bourgeoisie*, of the *tiers état*, which established its mercantile and industrial world-dominion upon the ruins of feudalism. It was achieved through revolution against the ancient forces of inequality and privilege, of spiritual as well as material oppression. It was achieved in alliance with the forces of enlightenment and reason, which were felt as divinely beneficent, the destruction alike of bondage and of prejudice. This world-dominion is one of freedom and at the same time one of peace, industry, usefulness, and prosperity. Benjamin Constant writes in the year 1813, toward the end of the Napoleonic era: "After the history-making epoch of war, we have arrived at the epoch of trade; the former is barbaric impulse, the latter is civilized calculation; the new nations aim only at tranquillity and in addition to this at wealth whose source is industry."

It is curious how clearly this utterance of the French novelist and political moralist reveals the sensitive function of the literary man to discern and to define the will of the times, the changes and transitions of the spiritual, ethical, and social life. He does this with a precision which is the result of acute powers of perception and of nervous reaction, and he registers these reactions even when outward circumstances, as in these days, make them difficult of recognition to less penetrating eyes. It was daring to declare, between Moscow and Waterloo, that the war period had been replaced by one of trade and of rational

welfare; and yet the observation was, on the whole, strictly accurate, especially since it was the function of the Napoleonic wars to spread the revolution and its bourgeois ideas throughout Europe.

Moreover, this particular author was not the only one to entertain such timely ideas. Another French social critic observed at the same time that money, cities, intellect, and trade were now taking the place of landed property, castles, and the honors of military life: he claimed that these changes defined the new social order which had already affected the Council of Monarchs and thereby reacted upon the people. The evolution from feudalism to *bourgeoisie* and democracy could not be more simply or more satisfactorily described. What was then a critical judgment based upon actual experience corresponds exactly to our own sentiments when we try historically to determine the new social spirit and the essence of democracy. The change was clearly felt everywhere and occupied every alert and observing mentality—whether in the form of a protest or of a hopeful agreement.

The attitude of Goethe toward the victorious democracy is of the highest personal and objective interest. Living, as he did, from the eighteenth century well into a decisive part of the nineteenth century, he was a deeply disturbed spectator of the governmental convulsions by which political forms spasmodically adjusted themselves to new moral and social conditions. His old age was troubled by the serious menace to the future of culture which would result from the period of rapid communication, of money and mass domination that he could see approaching. But stronger or at least just as strong were his sense of reality, his instinct to remain intensely alive, to absorb life, and to incorporate it within his gigantic life-work to his very last breath. Everybody knows the poetical tribute which he paid to the "New World"—an expression which he used in its double geographical and social meaning:

America, your life is better
Free from our old Europe's faults,
You no ruined castles fetter
And no basalts.

At the age of eighty his attention was directed especially toward America, as is proven by the last parts of *Wilhelm Meister*. The farseeing and eager sympathy of the old man for utopian plans and for great technical problems such as the Panama Canal was simply magnificent. He discusses the latter with a penetration and detailed knowledge as if it were more important to him than all the poetry in the world, and in the last analysis it actually was. The hopeful pleasure which he felt in the civilizing influence of technical progress and rapid methods of communication is not surprising in the author of *Faust*, whose highest experience, toward the end, is the realization of a utilitarian dream, the draining of a swamp—an idea that was peculiarly shocking to the narrow-minded, philosophical affections of the German public at that time. The elderly poet delights in discussions of the possibilities of joining the Mexican Ocean with the Pacific and the incalculable results of such an undertaking. He advises the United States to undertake the idea and lets his imagination play with the vision of flourishing commercial cities which would gradually spring up along the Pacific Coast. He could scarcely wait for the realization of all this, as well as the union of the Danube with the Rhine, which, he conceded, would be an undertaking gigantic beyond one's fondest hopes. And there was a third idea—a really magnificent one; this time it was for the English—the Suez Canal. "Oh," he exclaims, "to see all this, it would certainly be worth while to preserve on earth for another fifty years." This tendency toward the useful, toward world-unity, was a tendency of the times, a democratic tendency. It finds additional expression in certain applications of liberal economic principles to the life of the mind, as, for example, when the aged Goethe speaks of a "free trade in ideas and feelings," or when he explains that national literature was no longer of great importance and that the day of universal literature had come.

It is impossible not to admire this ready acceptance of life under new conditions in a mentality that had matured to greatness in such a different world. But Goethe needed only to be touched by the new spirit in order to express it in words in which sensibility and sympathy can scarcely be distinguished.

It is hope that speaks in all these words, hope for the happiness and peace of humanity, hope that borders on the utopian, and which constitutes a surprising concession to the spirit of the times on the part of an elderly poet who was fundamentally pessimistic about the cultural future. For hope, yes even utopianism, is really a characteristic of this young democracy which combines in a most peculiar way industrialism with love of humanity and common sense with faith in the immanence of a golden age. In the French social prophecies of that time, we read: "The Golden Age which a blind tradition has hitherto placed in the past now lies before us." This faith is the spiritual fruit of sudden freedom from clericalism and feudalism, a rapid progress in the knowledge and control of nature, in technical skill and in wealth-producing business activity. This faith has decidedly moral and even religious associations; in spite of its materialism and utilitarianism, it reveals traces of spirituality. "Money, cities, spirit, and trade." "Spirit" is the "third word," and it plays no unimportant role in the total complex.

A general conviction prevails that after the disappearance of the old war atmosphere and of the institutions that depend upon the church, society must be based upon the two new forces, science and industry; also, that scholars and industrialists must henceforth divide the leadership of the world. Heine defends these beliefs enthusiastically in his book on *Conditions in France*, evidently under the social and religious influence of Saint-Simon who in 1825 had published his *Opinions, littéraires, philosophiques, et industrielles*. Another of Saint-Simon's books is called very characteristically *Nouveau Christianisme*. His pupil Dumoyer writes *De la morale et de l'industrie*, and this combination of industry and morality is more typical and more frequent than that of industry and science. Together with Auguste Comte, this same Dumoyer publishes *Le Producteur*, a periodical "which is to help the progress of humanity, in science, morality, and industry through the encouragement of the spirit of co-operation." The good will and the confidence in humanity are almost overwhelmingly touching, and especially in this day may well put us to shame. It was a utopianism of progress,

practical-minded, to be sure, but basically very religious and oriented toward spirituality. It mingled the material and the sensual with the moral, and was dominated by ideas of peace, work, fraternity, welfare.

This did not imply an individual and egotistical welfare so much as a universal, social one. That precisely was the moral element. Morality and the social life are synonyms in this sphere; morality is the social spirit; scarcely anything but that. And imperceptibly, without a break, and as if it were taken for granted, we see here, in the first flowering of democratic thought, the transition of democracy into socialism. It is exceptionally noteworthy and instructive to observe in the work of Goethe's old age that a trend toward socialism is an apparent spiritual necessity in democratic morality. We find these sudden flashes of a collectivistic prophecy in the *Wanderjahre* where he deals, toward the end, with humanity's victory over its individualism and over its concept of individual culture, a concept which Goethe, himself, had primarily created and molded. Here the ideal of the highest personal development, the highest cultivation and universality, are actually renounced, and a period of specialization is proclaimed. The inadequacy of the individual is revealed; only the sum total of humanity completes the human; the individual becomes a function; the concept of universality appears, the community.

Likewise in the system of Saint-Simon, the individual is of value only to the extent that he contributes to the improvement of the condition of the many, of the universality in which he must lose himself. There will always be inequalities, says Saint-Simon, but there must be none which God himself has not ordained. It is the right of inheritance which creates rich and poor, educated and ignorant, yes, good and bad individuals. Let it be eliminated, and chance can no longer put the tools of production into the hands of the lazy and the incapable. Everyone will be rewarded according to his capacities; every capacity according to its products; that is the formula of justice, maintains Saint-Simon, and the young socialists of 1830 are convinced that it corresponds to the original will of God. Saint-Simon's thinking and willing are without doubt religiously

determined, and are proclaimed by his contemporaries, themselves, as a religion, as "*la religion Saint-Simonienne*." "Religion," declares Saint-Simon, "must lead society toward the great goal of the quickest possible improvement of the good of the greatest number." That statement expresses Christian feeling, but it is a developed Christianity, freed of dogma, and directed toward the earth and toward community life. It is a Christian humanism, that sees in humanity *la fille de dieu*, the daughter of God, and desires that her future be glorious. Man should consider and promote not only his physical life, according to heathen practice, nor only his spiritual life, as in ascetic Christianity, but both in combination. He is not merely a traveler and stranger here on earth, or a fallen angel who must keep his eyes fixed on the Beyond, but he has come upon earth with the vocation to complete the task of the gradual perfection of all things. The reorganization of the whole world-order is needed, but this must be achieved through efforts of the individual and left to the progress of time.

It would be impossible, even now, to define the idea of Christian socialism or of social humanism more precisely. Above all, a clear and exact appreciation is manifested of the independence of occidental Christian ethics from church and dogma, that is, of the capacity inherent in Christianity for spiritualization, which constitutes its great superiority over the religions of the classical world. In ancient Rome, says the literature of the period, the disintegration of state religion and pontifical office created moral anarchy, brought about a confusion of contradictory and unstable aspirations and philosophies which led to destruction. The ancient peoples and their states were destroyed because religion and politics were one and the same thing, and because religion was bound to a rigid priestly hierarchy. To Christian races, on the contrary, metamorphosis is vouchsafed instead of destruction, for in Christianity spiritualization is innate; Christianity is, itself, conducive to the spiritual life and therefore does not die with its dogmatic and pontifical forms, but remains the living spirit of the people; and while it purifies the public and cultural life, it, in turn, is stimulated through them toward transfiguration of itself.

It must be conceded that this insight into the immortality of Christianity, due to its capacity for spiritualization, is a meritorious discovery of the young socialism which was born of bourgeois democracy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is this power which enables Christianity to survive its churches and to remain, independent of them, the inspiration and the foundation of occidental civilization. It is a fact of greatest immediacy for us today, since it has become evident that Christianity will be swept into the crisis of democracy which we are experiencing. That is only logical, for democracy and Christianity are closely bound together. They are united to such an extent that democracy may be called the political expression of the Christian feeling for life; and in the name of Christianity we are defending nothing else than the ethical foundation of occidental life, the spiritual unity of our cultural solidarity. Though democracy itself, as a movement toward freedom, grew up in an emancipating struggle against oppressive clericalism, this did not prevent the new popular form of occidental society from retaining its roots in Christianity. Thus it is clear that democracy does not insist upon the preservation of the ecclesiastical-pontifical forms of Christianity if they prove to be outworn and obstructive. Democracy, itself, is an example and proof of the spiritualizing influence of Christianity and its power of sublimation, which make it possible for the postclassical social structures that Christianity has shaped to replace destruction with transformation. And we may conclude from the close relationship of democracy and Christianity not that they will disappear together but that they will survive together.

The early evolution of a religiously tinged socialism from early bourgeois democracy proves the close relationship of the two, and their common root. This root, this common ground, is Christianity. That there is also a contradiction and contrast between them is undeniable. The contrast between democracy and socialism is that of freedom and equality—a logical contradiction without doubt—for logically and absolutely considered, freedom and equality are mutually exclusive, just as the individual and society are mutually exclusive. Freedom is the creed of the individual, but equality is a social need, and social equal-

ity, obviously, limits the freedom of the individual. But logic has not a final nor the highest validity for life, and in human emotions, in human ethical requirements, freedom and equality are not a real contradiction. With a slight change of emphasis, democracy and socialism include both tendencies, for the contrast between them is resolved in that which transcends and relates both of them, in Christianity.

Christian humanity, moreover, has also combined the individual and social principle in a way that is emotionally unassailable and wholly natural. The value and dignity which it bestows upon the individual being, the human soul in its immediate relationship to God, are not contradicted by the equality of all before God. It is in the statute of human rights, this Christian heritage of the great bourgeois revolution, that both principles, the individualistic and the social, freedom and equality, are combined and mutually justify each other. In democracy freedom predominates over equality. In socialism, equality prevails—in the name and for the purpose of freedom. But at the same time it cannot be denied that all socialism has a tendency to exaggerate the mechanization and regimentation of society and to sink the individual in the group, in a practical uniformity and in mass movements. But if we consider what high and final cultural and esthetic values are associated with individuality, it is easy to understand the alarm which mentalities like Goethe and Heine felt at the democratic transformation of the world and its socialistic consequences, which they were very quick to anticipate.

Goethe, the son of the eighteenth century, suffered so acutely under the convulsions of the French Revolution that it nearly cost him his talent and his productivity. For Heine, the social revolution seemed the direct outcome of the bourgeois revolution, and with visionary clarity, with mingled despair and consent, he saw the approach of communism—a world in which he expected Heinrich Heine's poetry would have no further use than to serve as wrapping paper for the sausages of the proletariat.

That the cultured person should fear the disappearance of liberty and individual values in collectivity and socialistic equal-

ity is readily comprehensible. It is, so to speak, democracy's fear of itself—a fear that plays no small part in the distress and weakness from which the spiritual and moral position of democracy is suffering today. Democracy is being shamelessly exploited, exploited by the worst and lowest enemies of freedom—enemies that I need not name. They hope to make democracy “ripe for assault,” to use their own language, by persuading it that it is the forerunner of Bolshevism. For this reason it may be the moment for a word of caution and defense.

Such fears would only be justified if freedom and equality constituted an insuperable and irreconcilable contrast. But for people of our feelings, determined as they are by our Christian influences, this is not true. These feelings accept as necessarily true that a human synthesis must be possible between limitation and justice, freedom and equality, individual and society, the person and the collectivity. Nor is this unreasonable. For reason tells us that pure individualism and absolute freedom are just as humanly impossible and contrary to culture as their liberty-destroying opposite. There would be no hope for humanity if it had a choice only between anarchy and that extreme socialization which destroys personality. But that is not the meaning of a socialism that feels democracy as its native soil, and demands an equalizing justice in the name of freedom; in other words, a social democracy. Socialism implies socialization. And this concept itself—the mere recognition of the fact that man is a social being—amounts to a definition and limitation of freedom and the individual. It means an appreciation which, to be sure, does not come easily to the individual proud of his special cultivation, that a purely individualistic, purely personal and spiritual humanity is incomplete and dangerous to culture. It means also that political and social activities are expressions of humanity; that it is not possible to separate them completely from spiritual and cultural activities. Nor is it possible to devote oneself to culture and declare that one is “not interested” in politics. In a word, culture together with politics denote the totality of the humane, which must be carefully distinguished from *totalitarian politics* in which one part, an ingredient or segment of the humane, swallows up the whole and destroys

freedom. The just and reasonable division of emphasis between the individual and the social element in man, the limitation of the political and social to their natural and necessary share in humanity, culture, and life—that is freedom. When politics becomes absolute and establishes a total dictatorship over everything human, that is the end of freedom, and it is no less destructive of culture than anarchy. In the antihuman will toward this political absolutism, fascism and communism meet.

It is possible to find differences of opinion between these two, to make comparisons between their moral levels which will always be to the disadvantage of fascism. The fact remains that there is no difference between them in their dictatorial negation of freedom; and as far as communism is concerned, its essential contrast to what we call social democracy, to responsible freedom, cannot be grasped too clearly nor emphasized too strongly. But if it is a lie to declare social democracy the first step toward communism, deception reaches its pinnacle when fascism—and especially German National Socialism—pretends to be a protection and a bulwark against communism. This is deceptive propaganda to which actually a considerable part of the middle classes have succumbed, at least for a while. I do not know how much progress the appreciation of the deceitful character of these claims has made—especially since certain very recent experiences. But it cannot be denied that the sympathy which fascist dictatorship aroused among the possessing classes rested upon these claims, and that fascism owes most of its successes, first in its own countries, then in the outside world, to the fiction that the choice lay between fascism and communism.

We were told that we must cling to fascism, increase its power; and even if fascism's unbridled thirst for power should endanger it, we must save it at every sacrifice in order to avoid communism.

And yet the great body of middle-class citizens throughout the world should be warned, above everything else, of the horrible disappointment which awaits them if they succumb to this deceptive propaganda—a deep disappointment which the peoples that surrendered to fascism have already tasted. It is entirely erroneous to assume that it is the function and

intention of fascism, or of German National Socialism, to protect private property and an individualistic economy. Especially in its economic policies, National Socialism is nothing but Bolshevism; they are hostile brothers of whom the younger has learned almost everything from the elder, Russian, brother. There is no doubt—all signs point to it—that the National Social Revolution which began as a radical movement to the right is developing, ever more rapidly, toward the left, that is, toward Bolshevism. Or rather, from right-wing Bolshevism it is on the point of becoming left-wing Bolshevism. Therefore it is absolutely certain that the expropriation of the Jews is only a prelude to more comprehensive acts of this sort which will be wholly free of any race ideology. And particularly if the concept of Bolshevism is understood in its popular mythical interpretation as the epitome of terror and raging destruction, no better picture of it can be imagined than that which was exhibited in the German pogroms.

There the world was given a clear illustration of what National Socialism really is: namely, the most radical, unrestrained, and destructive revolution which the world has ever seen, wholly unsuitable to serve as a rampart for middle-class conservatism or to be used by it for protective purposes. Indeed the word revolution is actually too honorable to define this phenomenon, for an invasion by the Huns would not be described as a revolution. Revolutions usually contain some relationship to the idea of humanity, a faith, a will—however confused—to progress and to bring about the improvement of human society. They have as a rule some passionate relationship to the Absolute and to the idea in the name of which they perpetrate their deeds and misdeeds. Because of this faith, this relationship and passion, and out of respect for them, humanity has always shown a tendency to forgive revolutionary misdeeds. It was inclined to overlook them, because of the ultimate good and the high aspiration out of which the terror resulted. That was the attitude toward the French Revolution, and again toward the Russian proletarian revolution, or at least that was the attitude when it began. But the misdeeds of the so-called National Social Revolution are devoid of any human excuse,

for it lacks every concern and every love for humanity or for the idea of perfecting human society. It is a revolution of empty force or, let us say, of spiritual nihilism. It is a revolution such as has never existed, a revolution of absolute cynicism without relationship to any kind of faith and filled with lust for the degradation of men and of ideas. What it means economically may be termed anarchy, and that may leave us comparatively indifferent. But morally its purpose is extermination—the extermination of the foundations of civilization. The final meaning of its anti-Semitism is not the foolish idea of the racial purity of the German people but an assault upon Christianity itself. And even when it ridicules democracy, the contempt is really aimed at Christianity in which democracy is rooted and whose political expression it is. Freedom, truth, justice, reason, human dignity—what is the source of these ideas which are the support and mainstay of our existence and without which our spiritual life would crumble? Whence do they come if not from Christianity which has made them the law of the world? A revolution which supplants every one of these ideas with the law of force—that is the anti-Christ. And yet this is the revolution in which the European middle classes have seen their bulwark against communism for so long a time that its successes approach a complete conquest of the world.

Democracy itself was once revolution. Today it is the greatest conservative power upon earth, conservative in the deepest sense of the word, because it is the defense and the maintenance of the shamelessly menaced ethical foundations of the Occident. But in order to do justice to this new responsibility, it must, to a certain extent, return to its revolutionary state; it cannot merely *be*, it must give battle. For without battle it will cease to *be*. A passionate desire and will are slowly evolving out of the necessity and the confusion of the moral retreat of our times: the will to concentrate and to resist, the will to call a halt, to *command* a halt, the will to defend civilization against the corrupting onward march of force. The history of religion speaks of the *ecclesia militans*, the church militant, which preceded the *ecclesia triumphans*, the church triumphant. Likewise if democracy is to triumph, it must give battle, even though

it has long been weaned from the habit of combat. A militant democracy is the need of the day, a democracy freed of all self-doubt, a democracy that knows what it wants, namely, victory—the victory of civilization over barbarism!

This victory will not be paid for too dearly with the sacrifice of an exaggerated humanity, namely, that patience which endureth all things—even the determination to terrorize humanity. Never can humanity permit itself such extreme patience; least of all at a critical time of battle such as ours. Democracy's concept of freedom must never include the freedom to destroy democracy; never must it give its deadly enemies freedom of speech and of deed. If I say that, you will reply: That is the very problem which freedom sets itself! No, I reply, its first problem is self-preservation. But the very fact that there can be a difference of opinion on this question is proof that freedom is debatable, that it has become a problem. Or rather it has become evident that freedom has always been a problem. The crisis of democracy is, in truth, the crisis of freedom; and the salvation of democracy from the hostile attack which threatens it will only be possible through an honest solution of the problems of freedom.

Everyone who speaks of the conditions which freedom must impose upon itself for its own sake, of a voluntary restriction and a social self-discipline of freedom, must be prepared for accusations of treachery toward freedom and democracy. And yet I believe that the people who are the first and the most vociferous with such reproaches are by no means the most valuable or the most unselfish friends of freedom. The solution of the problem of freedom is made the more difficult because there are three different attitudes toward freedom. It has real enemies—and with them it is easy to deal. It has real friends—and among them we would all like to be counted. But in between are its false friends, and they create disorder because, consciously or unconsciously, they confuse the love of freedom with an interest in freedom, with their particular interest. They shout "Democracy is in danger" whenever freedom is advised to place itself under a wholesome social discipline. And yet it is a fact that democracy can only be saved by means of a liberty

ripe with wisdom, that has outgrown the stage of unsocial liberalism.

A personal interest in freedom is not a real love of freedom. Otherwise, certain elements in the democracies of Europe would not associate themselves with the archenemies of freedom and prepare the most terrible victories for them at the expense of their own countries. If they had a genuinely disinterested love of freedom, they would prefer to accept a social regulation of freedom, which alone can help freedom to survive liberalism.

That these two, liberalism and freedom, are identical, and that the one will stand or fall with the other, is a false pretense of fascism—one of the many—but a particularly malicious one. Let us not succumb to it. Liberalism, spiritually and economically, is the form which life took at a given period; it marked the spirit of those times. And times changed. But freedom is an immortal idea, which does not age with the spirit of the times and vanish, and he who maintains that freedom will fall with the forms of liberalism is not its friend. Freedom is not served but harmed, and consciously or unconsciously we are playing the game of its enemies, when we deny that freedom today should assume severer and more binding social forms than were appropriate in the *laissez faire* period of our fathers and grandfathers.

We have tried to discover what democracy is: it is the human adjustment between a logical contrast, the reconciliation of freedom and equality, of individual values and the demands of society. This adjustment, however, is never completely and finally attained; it remains a problem that humanity must solve again and again. And we feel that today in the relationship of freedom and equality, the center of gravity has moved toward the side of equality and economic justice, away from the individual and toward the social. Social democracy is now the order of the day. If democracy is to hold its own, it must do so through socially established freedom, which rescues the individual values by friendly and willing concessions to equality; through an economic justice which ties all of democracy's children closely to it. Only then can democracy resist the assault

of a dehumanized spirit of violence, and fulfill its great conservative task, to preserve the Christian foundations of occidental life, and to protect civilization against barbarism.

I am one who never expected in former years to be called upon to make statements and efforts such as these. As a writer, it is and always will be my natural function to reserve my energies for that free service of humanity which we call art. It is not by chance that we speak of the arts as "free"; for art is the sphere of free thought, of free contemplation and formulation. Politics, on the other hand, is the field of decision, of opinion and volition. Is it not, therefore, significant and symptomatic that today an artist whose native concern is the right, the good and true, should feel obligated to apply these standards to political and social questions: that he should seek to unite his thoughts with the political will of the times because he feels that he cannot fulfill his human responsibilities if he refuses to do this? Is not this political endeavor of the spirit, inadequate as it may be, an example of that voluntary limitation of freedom for social purposes of which I have been speaking? And is not this voluntary limitation a moral one?

I have discussed truth, justice, Christian civilization, democracy. In my purely esthetically determined youth, it would never have occurred to me to deal in such terms. Today I pronounce them with a wholly unexpected rapture. For the position of the spirit has changed upon earth in a peculiar way. Civilization is in retreat. A period of lawlessness and anarchy reigns over public opinion. But for that very reason, paradoxical as it may be, the spirit has entered upon a moral epoch, let us say an epoch of simplification and of humble-minded distinctions between good and evil. Yes, we know once more what is good and what is evil. Evil has been revealed to us in such crassness and meanness that our eyes have opened to the dignity and the simple beauty of the good. Once more we have taken it to heart and deem it no slight to our intellectual pride to confess it.

That, if you like, is a rejuvenation of the spirit, and I have often thought that this period of spiritual rejuvenation and simplification, this moral epoch, in which we have entered,

might well be the great hour of America. That is what I really meant to convey when I stated in other contexts that the preservation and guidance of our occidental cultural heritage would devolve upon America during these European dark ages. Because of its youth and moral vigor, because the soul of this country is still close to the biblical and the monumental, America is attuned to the spiritual needs of the hour and seems called to assert itself in the present situation with a natural authority. To do this would not indicate presumption but an independence and a moral self-reliance which have become morally necessary to this country and which could contribute to the recovery of Europe. May America stand forth in an abandoned and ethically leaderless world as the strong and unswerving protector of the good and the godly in mankind. I salute America as a country that is conscious of its own human inadequacy but knows what is good and what is evil; that despises force and untruth; a country that perseveres in a faith which is sound and utterly necessary to life—faith in goodness, in freedom and truth, in justice and in peace.

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LIBERTY AND JURIDICAL RESTRAINT

IN the recent, but already famous, case of the *National Labor Relations Board v. The Jones-Laughlin Steel Corporation* the question at issue was the constitutionality of the Labor Relations Act. The act requires that employers permit their employees to organize into unions and that they treat the representatives of such unions as the sole bargaining agents of the members thereof. The Jones-Laughlin Corporation assailed the statute as beyond the power of Congress to enact, one of their principal contentions being that it deprived them of "liberty" "without due process of law." The Court rejected the contention on the ground that labor had a "fundamental right" to organize and bargain collectively, and that the act implemented and gave effect to this "right," or as we may properly translate it, this "liberty."

Here we have a vivid illustration of the opposition between two fundamental conceptions of Liberty. By the one, which I shall term Civil Liberty, is meant that liberty which one enjoys because of the restraints which government imposes on one's fellows. By the other, which I shall term Constitutional Liberty, is meant that liberty which is sometimes claimable under a higher law against government itself. "Juridical restraint" is, of course, a phase of the latter—the peculiarly American phase. It exists when the courts of a country are authorized to enforce their views of Constitutional Liberty against the acts of the other chief organs of government, and especially against

the acts of the legislative branch. It is, in brief, Constitutional Liberty implemented by Judicial Review.

It requires little insight to perceive, or at least strongly to guess, that the historical record of man's devising in the field of law and government presents far too vast a panorama to be viewed from the angle of any single theory without distortion; yet the instinct for logical consistency is so strong that once one's angle is chosen a general expectancy is created that it will be adhered to. We in America, to judge from most of our professions, have chosen that point of view from which the human record composes itself into the picture labeled "Democracy," and from which any strong obstacle to legal change would seem to be an anomaly. Nevertheless, as between the concept of Civil Liberty and that of Constitutional Liberty, as these terms have just been explained, American constitutional thought has thus far clustered predominantly about the latter. How has this come about? And what is the significance of the recent change of attitude of the Supreme Court?—for change it undoubtedly is. The following paper has for its purpose to discuss both these questions, and largely in the terms of our legal tradition.

The Western tradition of liberty in both the aspects of it which are of interest to us takes its rise in Cicero's attempt, especially in his essay *De Legibus*, to render the Stoic doctrine of Natural Law into juristic idiom. This doctrine comprised two basic ideas, that of the inherent justice of the Universe and that of man's unique significance in it, since of all created things man alone possesses reason and hence is able to comprehend the order of Nature and so conform his conduct to it. Conversely, thanks to his same divinely given attribute, all differences between particular classes and races of men become of minor import. In Cicero's words, "There is no one thing so like or so equal to another as in every instance is one man to another." Or as the Carlyles have summarized this aspect of Stoicism, "There is only one possible definition for all mankind, reason is common to all."

Stoicism has been credited with laying the rational founda-

tions for the two outstanding political aspirations of modern times, that of Democracy and that of World Order, and justly so, it would seem. Yet both of these Totalitarianism professes to repudiate. Indeed, if the question be asked, what is the principal ideological difference between Totalitarianism and Democracy, the answer is clear—Totalitarianism has cast aside the doctrine of Natural Law.

But what conception of liberty does Cicero derive from Stoic doctrine? Again much that he says anticipates modern issues—indeed, the very issue with which this paper deals. His answer is furnished in implication by his contention that the social nature of man is the “true source of laws and rights,” and more explicitly in such statements as the following: “The laws are the foundation of the liberty which we enjoy—we are all the law’s slaves that we may be free”; and again: “Nor is anything more conformable to *jus*”—by which he evidently means both “right” and “a right”—“and to the order of nature than is authority (*imperium*).”

In short, Cicero regards the laws which emanate from human authority as being ordinarily man’s best reliance for freedom and justice. At the same time, he is not blind to the fact that there are occasions when this presumption must be abandoned. “Not all things,” he writes, “are necessarily just which are established by the civil laws and institutions of nations,” nor “is justice identical with obedience to the written laws”; otherwise all that would be necessary to make robbery, adultery, or falsification of wills right and just would be a vote of the multitude. Furthermore, as counsel, Cicero did not hesitate now and again to invoke “*jus*” in a client’s behalf against a statute—a suggestion of judicial review to which Alexander Hamilton made pertinent reference many centuries later.

Thus Cicero clearly envisaged both the conceptions of liberty which are here under discussion. Ordinarily he regarded liberty as resulting from the restraints which are imposed by human authority; but he also glimpsed the kind of liberty which results when human authority itself is restrained. That is to say, his emphasis is upon Civil Liberty rather than Constitutional Liberty—which brings us again to the question, whence did Amer-

ican Constitutional Law derive its bias in favor of the latter? Within the limitations of space here available only the main elements of a complete explanation can be given, and they but briefly.

1. The apostle of the Ciceronian tradition to the Teutonic world which succeeded the Roman Empire was an English cleric, John of Salisbury; and a casual examination of the pages of John's *Policraticus* suffices to show the problem which he has most at heart. Legislation as it was known in the days of the later Republic and the Empire was at an end, while rulership was in the hands of military chieftains and essentially personal. That which took the place of law at this period and for long afterward was immemorial custom, or what claimed to be such; and its relation to rulership was that of a curb rather than an instrument. John's endeavor accordingly is to equate so far as possible *rex* with *lex*. Particularly illuminating are those passages in which he endeavors to draw the teeth from certain troublesome texts of the *Digest* and the *Institutes* which assert that the Prince is "*legibus solutus*" and that "what the Prince has willed has the force of law." It is not true, he answers, that the Prince is absolved from the obligations of the law "in the sense that it is lawful for him to do unjust acts," but only in the sense that his character should guarantee his doing equity "not through fear of the penalties of the law but through love of justice"; and as to "the will of the Prince," in respect of public matters "he may not lawfully have any will of his own apart from that which the law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common interest requires." Indeed the very title *rex* is derived from doing right, that is, acting in accordance with law (*recte*).

The importance of all this is that in arguing thus John foreshadowed, even though he did not altogether succeed in formulating it, the distinctive contribution of the Middle Ages to modern political science, and especially to American political science, the notion that all political authority is intrinsically limited authority. Conceding the principle, however, an exigent question of method arises: How are the limitations to be ascertained and enforced? On the Continent this question went unan-

swered, but in John's own country, the mother country of our institutions, it furnished the main stimulus to constitutional development for centuries.

2. Although as a general thing historical parallels are more of a hindrance than a help to real comprehension of the past, when they are associated with the history of an idea the case is often otherwise. For ideas have a life of their own, an internal vigor which is capable of calling forth suitable institutions to embody them, and a particular idea is apt to display a certain constancy of preference in this respect in whatever environment it occurs. Certain it is that the contribution of medieval England to the American theory of liberty versus government shows some interesting similarities to the strictly American phase of the subject. There is to begin with a fundamental document, Magna Charta, to symbolize the subordination of political authority to law. Then ensues the slow absorption of this document into judge-made law, a process which is attended by the projection of a portion of the latter into the status of a higher law of liberty. Finally this higher law of liberty becomes a professional mystery—the arcana of Bench and Bar. And incidentally there is a minor parallel between the roles played in the two cases by commentators, albeit the greatest commentator on American Constitutional Law, Thomas M. Cooley, stands nearer to Coke than to Bracton in intention and method, as well as chronologically.

There was a time within recent years when scholars took much apparent delight in writing down the Great Charter, but the sound residuum that remains from this often frothy criticism is that Magna Carta was not at first all that Magna Charta eventually became, and indeed became quite early. There is, therefore, no need to quarrel with the contention that the great Charter was originally “a feudal document,” even “a reactionary document,” which was wrested from John by selfish feudatories in the service of their own selfish “liberties.” For however this may have been, the reissue of the Charter ten years later in 1225 was contemporaneously described as conceding their liberties “to people and to populace alike (*tam populo quam plebi*),” while less than a half century after Runnymede

we find Bracton describing the Charter as "*Constitutio libertatis*," a designation which merges all particular liberties into one liberty. Nor was Bracton's phrase merely casual or inadvertent, for other portions of his great work, the *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae*, are shot through with John of Salisbury's theory of inherently limited monarchical power, a doctrine which Bracton compressed into the famous axiom that "the King ought to be under no man, but under God and the law (*sub Deo et lege*), for the law makes the King."

There is, to be sure, one matter in respect of which constitutional development in medieval England offers an apparent contrast to constitutional development in the United States; I mean the role which Parliament sustained throughout the fourteenth century as defender in chief of Magna Charta. The fact illustrates what was said earlier, that law was generally thought of at this date as something existing independently of human authority, and as therefore something to be *declared*, not *made*—indeed, Magna Charta was itself just such a declaration. Furthermore, the contrast tends to dissolve under closer scrutiny. For notwithstanding the deceptively clear categories of the doctrine of the Separation of Powers, American legislatures have never lost their capacity to read the Constitution with final authority as to the political rights of the citizen, and even as to his private rights they were originally thought to be—I use Madison's words—"the safest guardians."

And what is equally to the point as foreshadowing the parallel development of American constitutional law four centuries later, the day came when Parliament's guardianship of Magna Charta yielded precedence for a period to the guardianship of the ordinary courts over the Common Law. For this there were several causes, two being of outstanding importance—the enfeeblement of Parliament through the almost complete destruction of the old nobility in the Wars of the Roses, and the immense enhancement of the prestige and social influence of the ordinary courts through the rise of a learned Bar, of which the judges were the nucleus, though only the nucleus.

The spokesman of this period was Sir John Fortescue, who had been Henry VI's Chief Justice and had followed his master

into exile. In his nostalgic *De Laudibus Legum Angliæ* Sir John describes the laws of England as repelling that maxim of tyranny, "*quod principi placuit*," which the laws of France admit, and as declaring "in all cases . . . in favor of liberty, the gift of God to man in his creation." Yet this divine donation, it appears from other pages of the *De Laudibus*, is conferred indirectly, through the agency of the judges, since the knowledge which men in general can have of legal learning is, and can be, but superficial, comparable with that which they have of "faith, love, charity, the sacraments, and God's commandments," while leaving "other mysteries in Divinity to those who preside in the Church." Nor, indeed, is the case of the ruler himself different from that of the generality of his subjects in this respect; wherefore "the chancellor"—Sir John himself—is made to say:

My Prince, there will be no occasion for you to search into the arcana of our laws with such tedious application and study. . . . It will not be convenient by severe study, or at the expense of the best of your time, to pry into nice points of law: such matters may be left to your judges and counsel . . . ; furthermore, you will better pronounce judgment in the courts by others than in person, it being not customary for the Kings of England to sit in court or pronounce judgment themselves. (*Proprio ore nullus regum Angliæ judicium proferre usus est.*)

I know very well the quickness of your apprehension and the forwardness of your parts; but for that expertness in the laws the which is requisite for judges the studies of twenty years (*viginti annorum lucubrationes*) barely suffice.

Thus the King is under the law, which only the judges know—he is, in short, under the judges. Or in other words, English liberty has its source in a professional, a craft mystery. At the same time it is the source in turn of English prosperity, the reason why Englishmen wear "good woolens," have always "great abundance" of "all sorts of flesh and fish," and "drink no water, unless at certain times, upon a religious score and by way of doing penance." One recalls certain idyllic pictures a few years since of the American Way of Life and of its dependence upon American Constitutional Liberty as conceived by a certain section of the American Bar.

But the question remains, whether the judges were in a posi-

tion to enforce their views of the Common Law against the royal will, as Parliament long enforced its views of Magna Charta. The answer is that from the early fourteenth century on, royal acts and royal claims were constantly brought to the test of the ordinary law before the ordinary courts, although of course it must not be overlooked that the judges who decided such matters were the King's appointees and held their offices at his pleasure. Nevertheless, in theory the law was often an available recourse against the highest authority in the realm, which is the very definition of liberty as a juridical restraint.

3. But how, by what agency, did ideas which attained fruition in fifteenth-century England become the fountainhead of the stream of American constitutionalism? The question is the more intriguing from the fact that throughout 140 years of the Tudor monarchy the system which the *De Laudibus* depicted with such loving admiration was in complete abeyance, a condition of affairs which is curiously symbolized by Shakespeare's failure in *King John* to so much as mention the Great Charter. And this is only a part of the story, for when the medieval conception of the relation of law to political authority did finally emerge once more into the light of day early in the seventeenth century it was primarily to serve the purposes of political controversy, and to meet the challenge of the opposed conception.

The Tudor monarchy made one outstanding contribution to the existing stock of political concepts. It revived the idea, which harks back to the popular assemblies of Greece and Rome, that law can be *made* by human beings and that law so made can be of the highest obligation. The greatest achievement of the Tudors was the creation out-of-hand of a new ecclesiastical constitution for the realm, which was effected mainly by resort to the forms of Parliamentary enactment. The consequence of this method for political thought is stated by Professor Maitland, in the following words:

Throughout the Middle Ages there was at least one limitation set to temporal sovereignty; it had no power in spiritual matters. . . . But now statutes have gone to the very root of religion. . . . Thus statute has given the most conclusive proof of its power.

Nor did this deduction escape contemporaries of the events on which it is based. The words of Sir Thomas Smith in his *De Republica Anglorum*, which was published in 1589, are conclusive testimony in this connection:

The most high and absolute power of the realm of England consisteth in the parliament . . . That which is done by this consent is called firm, stable and *sanctum*, and is taken for law. The parliament abrogateth old laws, maketh new, giveth orders for things past and for things hereafter to be followed, changeth rights and possessions of private men, legitimateth bastards, establisheth forms of religion, altereth weights and measures, giveth forms of succession to the crown, defineth of doubtful rights, whereof is no law already made, appointeth subsidies, tailes, taxes, and impositions, giveth most free pardons and absolutions, restoreth in blood and name as the highest court, condemneth or absolveth them whom the prince will put to that trial. And to be short, all that ever the people of Rome might do either in *centuriatis comitibus* or *tributis*, the same may be done by the parliament of England which representeth and hath the power of the whole realm, both the head and body.

Certainly the author of this passage was not far from the notion of a legally unlimited lawmaking authority, the idea which Dicey tells us lies at the basis of the British Constitution today.

So, I repeat the question: How did England's medieval constitution become the fountainhead of the American constitutional tradition? The explanation is to be found in the attempt of the first Stuarts to appropriate to the King alone the powers which their predecessors had ventured to exercise only in association with Parliament, and in the part played by Sir Edward Coke, whose *Institutes* and *Reports* were the chief intellectual provender of the first generation of American lawyers, in resisting this attempt. The extent to which Coke, whose learning was unquestionably immense, embroidered his juristic materials to suit his political purpose, has often been a matter of controversy. Certain it is that the tradition he passed on did not suffer in the process.

Coke's war upon Stuart pretensions falls into two periods, first, that of his two Chief Justiceships and, secondly, that of

his membership of Parliament. In the former period we find him seizing every opportunity to assert the doctrine that the royal prerogative was a concept of the common law and hence was subject to judicial delimitation; and in the famous case of Dr. Bonham, decided in 1610, he advanced comparable doctrine with respect to the legislative power. "When," he there declared, "an act of Parliament is against common right and reason . . . the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be void." Nor can there be any doubt as to what Coke meant here by "common right and reason." He had, in fact, explained to James I somewhat earlier that "reason" in the sense of the common law meant not "natural reason but . . . the artificial reason and judgment of the law . . . which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it." It was, in short, the same professional mystery that Fortescue had described to his Prince. The so-called "dictum" in Bonham's Case foreshadows, therefore, not only judicial review of legislative acts, it foreshadows also that indefinite type of judicial review which came to prevail in this country about 1890 in reliance on the "due process of law" clause. In the history of liberty as juridical restraint the "dictum" is a landmark.

In 1616 Coke was removed as judge, the "dictum" in Bonham's Case furnishing one of the principal grounds of complaint against him; and four years later he entered Parliament. Here his outstanding service was his leadership in the House of Commons in the fight for the Petition of Right in 1628. The apprehensions which he had, perhaps, entertained earlier that the Stuarts, like the Tudors before them, would succeed in making Parliament a tool of the Crown, were now dismissed. Indeed, it was altogether evident that if the King was to be kept within bounds it must be by Parliament; and in this persuasion Coke fell back upon the constitution of Edward III, that is to say, upon Magna Charta and Parliament's protective role in relation thereto. Likewise in the *Institutes*, the first part of which was published this same year of 1628, Magna Charta is described as "the fountain of all the fundamental laws of the realm," while Parliament,

which is termed "the High Court of Parliament," is depicted as a *law-declaring* rather than a *lawmaking* body.

Coke's contribution to American constitutionalism is three-fold. In the first place, his revival of Magna Charta is undoubtedly responsible in some measure for the American notion that the Constitution ought to be embodied in a fundamental *document*. In the second place, the influence of his sanctification of certain institutions and procedures of the common law, like the grand jury, the petit jury, the writ of habeas corpus, and so on, is evidenced even today by the Bill of Rights of the national as well as of most of the state constitutions. In the third place, he clearly suggested judicial review of statutes, and judicial review of indefinite scope. The indispensability of the first two contributions to the final result is speculative, that of the third is certain—at least, as certain as such things can ever be said to be.

4. Let us at this point cast a brief backward glance over the argument thus far. We have been tracing the gradual contraction of the idea of Natural Law conceived as the informing principle of a universal moral order to a principle of limitation upon governmental action. Adopting the highly optimistic conception of human nature which was propagated by Stoicism, Cicero deduced therefrom the juristic notion of liberty in the sense of individual freedom of action; and this he discovered was of two sorts, that which results from the restraints which authority imposes, and that which the individual is entitled to claim as against authority when it lapses into injustice. Of these two conceptions only the latter was of much use to the early Middle Ages, which found in immemorial custom the principal reliance against the boisterous violence of military chieftains. And in medieval England the conception of a higher law delimiting authority attained a still stricter definition and corresponding solidity, being finally identified with certain principles and institutions of the common law, to the cognizance of which long years of study were requisite. Natural Law was squeezed to the dimensions of a craft secret.

Luckily for the survival of the idea of a law which derives its right to prevail because of its intrinsic merits rather than

its authorship, the contracting process was at this moment arrested for the time being. For as the quarrel between Parliament and the Stuarts passed from the stage of controversy to open warfare, it became evident, especially to the King's enemies, that some higher authority than that of the past must be invoked, first, because the system which had come down from the past was being shattered, and secondly, because it was necessary to address the nation at large in a language which laymen as well as lawyers could understand. At this very period, as it chanced, Hugo Grotius was endeavoring to resuscitate the Ciceronian conception of Natural Law in order to make it the basis of a system of international law; and from Holland, which had become a refuge from Stuart wrath for English dissenters, the revived conception passed to England, whence in due course a particular version of it reached the American Colonies. I refer to John Locke's second *Treatise on Civil Government* of 1691, which in justifying one Revolution laid the ideological groundwork for another.

Locke's contribution to the American conception of Constitutional Liberty—Liberty *versus* Government—is very great—even greater perhaps than Coke's, although when one studies the *Treatise* somewhat carefully its teaching is found to contain inconsistencies which are absent from Coke. In the first place, as I have already indicated, Locke rendered viable once more the notion of a law of transcendental obligation and hence capable of controlling authority. To be sure, the idea did not long retain its restored viability in Great Britain, for the competing notion of legislative sovereignty had progressed much too far; but the circumstances in which it found its way to America were more favorable to survival, as the result showed. In the second place, the higher law which Locke promulgated in his most explicit passages was almost exclusively a law of private *rights*; so much so, indeed, that reading those passages by themselves, one would be well warranted in declaring that Locke had replaced the conception of Natural Law with one of Natural Rights. Finally, there is one type of private rights for which Locke manifests a very special concern, those which

cluster about Property. Locke thus contributed definitely to impart to American constitutional law its distinctive bias.

But there is another side to Locke's thinking, one which reveals much closer kinship to Cicero's conception of Natural Law. Following both Cicero and Grotius, Locke emphasizes the sociable nature of man; and indeed rests human society on this basis in the first instance, although *politically organized* society he represents to be the outcome of Social Contract. Again, he betrays no awareness of any such institution as judicial review; to the contrary, private rights are dependent ordinarily for their security on the supreme *legislative* power. At the same time he asserts repeatedly that the grand objective of legislative power is the realization of the Public Good; and the same objective is set before the royal prerogative, which—astonishingly enough—he says is entitled in the name of the Public Good to override the laws in times of stress. One is consequently left to draw the conclusion that Locke regarded the rights of the individual which he so much stresses as being usually the outcome of sound governmental policy—that his real concern is the same as Cicero's, namely, for Civil Liberty, as I have termed it.

Lastly, the *Treatise* contains two extremely democratic implications. The first is that all political institutions exist simply by the will of the majority. The other is that which is suggested by his theory that Property is the result of labor. In Locke's own words:

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

Here *in ovo* is the labor theory of value of modern Socialism.

In short, though it has always been regarded as the gospel par excellence of individualism, and indeed of proprietarian individualism, the *Second Treatise on Government* contains many of the ingredients of a very different interpretation of the doctrine of Natural Law.

5. The conveyance of the teachings of Coke and Locke into the emergent stream of American constitutional ideology, and the crystallization of the latter into the distinctive American principle of juridical restraint, is a story the full telling of which would require volumes. Here there is space for only the outstanding features, and not all of those. The obvious starting point is the controversy over American rights which led to the Revolution, when the Colonial advocates turned from a vain appeal to the British Constitution as they had pieced it together from Coke to the more sweeping and more easily comprehended gospel of Locke. Our interest, however, is in the constructive rather than the destructive phase of the Revolution; nor did the former lag behind the latter. Nearly a month before the Continental Congress voted independence, the first American constitutional convention, sitting at Williamsburg, adopted a Bill of Rights which, mingling Cokian and Lockian concepts with an important addition from the *Esprit des Lois* of Montesquieu, is the prototype of all later redactions both here and abroad of limitations upon government.

But while the Bill of Rights is the bridge which historically joins American constitutionalism to its procreant tradition, it was not deemed originally to imply judicial review. In the frameworks of government to which the first bills of rights were affixed the legislature was overwhelmingly preponderant. This did not, to be sure, mean that their authors accepted the notion of legislative sovereignty, although the current influence of Blackstone's *Commentaries* undoubtedly tended in that direction; it meant rather that legislative majorities were regarded at that date—to quote Madison again—as “the safest guardians both of public good and private rights.” Indeed, even after the idea of judicial review came to be generally accepted, its advocates did not invariably regard bills of rights as affording

a valid basis for it to operate upon, but only as "recommendatory" to the legislature, "otherwise," as John Marshall explained at the time, "many laws which are found convenient would be unconstitutional." In short, the principle of Constitutional Liberty was accompanied in the first American Constitutions, as it was in Locke's *Treatise*, by the principle of legislative supremacy.

The coalescence of the Bill of Rights with the Constitution proper as a basis of judicial review—obviously an event of the very first moment for the conception of liberty as juridical restraint—resulted from the cleavage of American society shortly following the Revolution into a debtor and a creditor class, and the perception which this development stimulated especially among the lawyers of the logical implications, or at any rate, the logical *possibilities*, of the principle of the Separation of Powers. Thus, with the State legislatures pretty generally under the control of the debtor class, the proprietary interest and its professional spokesmen speedily developed the theory that only the judicial branch could authoritatively declare the meaning of the standing law, and hence of the Constitution, and that the legislative branch was the organ of the *will*—not to say the *willfulness*—of society, and hence was incapable from the very nature of things of keeping that will within predetermined bounds.

Nevertheless, the principle of legislative supremacy was by no means to be exorcised from the State constitution at one fell swoop; nor in fact has it been entirely so to this day. Confining our present attention, however, to the period prior to 1850, we may say roughly that it witnessed the establishment of a kind of working compromise between the idea of legislative supremacy and that of juridical restraint which, while it handed over the ultimate delimitation of the *property right* to the judiciary, still for the most part left the remainder of the domain of interests covered by the Bill of Rights to legislative demarcation. And that this compromise proved at the time a highly successful emollient of the democratic process can scarcely be doubted. On the one hand, the easy availability of free land left every American feeling that he had prosperity

within his grasp and hence disposed to regard judicial solicitude for vested rights sympathetically. On the other hand, the only liberty which was much talked about at this period was *political* liberty, and the whole trend of legislation favored its extension and never came within judicial cognizance.

The ultimate breakdown of this compromise resulted from two reform movements which in the late forties came to fruition within the sphere of proprietary interests. The first was the movement to put married women in control of their own property—a serious invasion of the common law rights of husbands; the other was the movement to remove the protection of the law from the liquor traffic. The battle came finally to be joined over the legislative product of the latter movement, the so-called "Prohibition Acts." Initially the opponents of this legislation appealed to the Lockian version of Natural Rights, but gradually the argument was shifted to the "due process of law," or equivalent "law of the land" clause of the local bills of rights. The outcome of the struggle was decidedly favorable for the idea of Civil Liberty. In the majority of States adopting it, Prohibition legislation was held to be within the "Police Power," which was defined as the power of the State to promote the general welfare; to that power, it was held, proprietary, like all other interests, were subordinate. In New York alone did the notion of the special sanctity of the property right prevail, and it was held that legislative power was constitutionally estopped from adopting measures on any justification whatsoever which went to the length of destroying property without providing for the owner's reimbursement. Such legislation was not "due process of law."

Meantime the contest between the conception of liberty as Civil Liberty and of liberty as Constitutional Liberty was developing on a national scale in consequence of the crusade against Slavery; and with the freeing of the Negroes and their investiture with legal equality with their erstwhile owners, the former conception met with its most resounding triumph in juristic history. The legislative monument of the period is the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

By the fifth section of the Amendment Congress was authorized to adopt appropriate legislation to enforce the above provisions. Thus civil rights in the United States were put under the protection and control of the national legislative power. Fortunately or otherwise, the framers of the Amendment had not reckoned with the tenacity of the contrary tradition.

Hardly was the Fourteenth Amendment enrolled as a part of the Supreme Law of the Land than members of the Bar began to urge upon the Court a conception of "due process of law" which would have made it—to quote Justice Miller—"a perpetual censor" upon all State legislation. The Court declined the invitation and even scolded the lawyers for their temerity—but it refused just the same to define "due process of law," preferring, it explained, to leave that to "the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion"—that is, to its own future lucubrations and those of counsel. Quite naturally the lawyers renewed their endeavors with increasing insistence, and a variety of circumstances aided their cause.

For one thing, the language of the Amendment to the contrary notwithstanding, the American people were by no means prepared at this date to turn over to Congress the entire business of regulating civil rights, so that when by its decision in the Civil Rights Cases in 1885 the Court reduced Congress's positive powers under the Amendment to a virtual nullity, its action was generally applauded. It is true, of course, that by this time the industrial and economic unification of the country was already getting under way, and the process was to become progressively accelerated with the passing years. Popular perception, however, of the bearing of this fact on the subject of civil rights was blunted by the rise at the same time of what is best describable as a new doctrine of Natural

Rights. Drawn about equally from the still youthful science of Economics and the infant science of Biology, the new gospel taught that national prosperity was best promoted by the unfettered judgment of business men and that in the industrial and commercial "struggle for existence" it was "the fittest" who survived. It followed that government ought not to interfere with business, and especially ought it not interfere with the right of the successful employer to deal with his employees as he saw proper. Indeed, it was implied—and sometimes bluntly stated, as by Herbert Spencer—that legislative majorities represented little more than a conspiracy of the unfittest.

But, of course, before these teachings could be addressed to the Court, they had to be translated into an acceptable legal terminology, and in essaying this task the Bar turned to the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. Taking for granted the correctness of the New York conception of "due process of law"—a conception to which Judge Cooley's famous volume on *Constitutional Limitations* now gave learned countenance and currency—they proceeded to urge its applicability when "liberty" in the sense of "freedom of contract" was involved. Taken up first by a powerful minority of the Court, then by the high courts of certain of the States, then by legal writers and publications, this doctrine had by the turn of the century received the official imprimatur of the Court itself. And the practical upshot was that within a few years the Court—though not without many retreats and advances—became the third house of every legislature in the country, especially when legislation affecting the employer-employee relationship was concerned. To that extent, the intended regime of Civil Liberty of the Amendment had been converted into a regime of Juridical Restraint.

So we return to our starting point—the Jones-Laughlin Case. Projected against this background the Court's decision there takes on new significance. *It represents the retirement of the Court from its role of superlegislature touching economic and industrial relations.* What precisely were the considerations moving the Court to abandon a point of view which was forti-

fied by precedents reaching back nearly half a century can only be surmised; but it is highly probable that the Justices were influenced in part by a new perception of the radical deficiencies of an ideology which established the teachings of *laissez faire* political economy as the supreme concern of the Constitution.

Certain it is that liberty conceived primarily as juridical restraint is exposed to certain grave objections when the needs of a modern society, and especially one organized on democratic principles, are considered. Such an ideology rests, in the first place, on the most superficial view of the nature of *power*, which it identifies simply as *political* power, thus overlooking the obvious fact that the possession of wealth may be just as potent to control the lot and conduct of large numbers of persons. Again, in the pursuit of some vague, undefined concept of "*independence*" this ideology closes its eyes to the actual *interdependence* of interests and individuals which today pervades every phase of life, so that a strike in Wisconsin may mean that babies in New York City have to starve. Likewise, it ignores the number and importance of the services which a modern government is called upon to render its constituents and the cost which the smooth, unhindered performance of these must often exact in terms of legal restrictions on private conduct. It propounds, moreover, an utterly jejune conception of Natural Rights, one which defies the teachings of modern psychology as to the fundamental requirements of human nature and the dangers which society courts when it fails to supply these in one way or another. And this is not to mention the challenge which the Totalitarian states throw down to Democracy in some or all of these matters.

At the same time, I am far from saying that the conception of Constitutional Liberty—of Liberty against Government—is without validity or value any longer, or that judicial review should be scrapped. Judicial review still has its uses, and important ones. Especially does it present an admirable forum in which to rationalize and clarify, to authenticate in terms of broad principle, the determinations of legislative authority, and thus to articulate them with the more durable elements of tradition.

Nor should it escape attention that while retiring from the field of economic legislation the Court has shown an even enhanced concern to protect against hasty and prejudiced legislation the citizen's freedom to express his views—a right of vital importance for the maintenance of free institutions. Yet even such rights, it is necessary to insist, must always depend for their most complete and beneficial realization much more upon the ordinary law as it comes from the legislature than upon the extraordinary interventions of the Court. Freedom of speech and press has frequently more to fear from private oppressors than from the minions of government; conversely, in the close-knit society of our times there are utterances which cannot be tolerated on any scale without inviting social disintegration—incitations to race hatred, for example—and this even though the common law paid no attention to such utterances.

More and more, in short, we emerge into an era in which we must expect the concept of liberty as Constitutional Liberty to yield ground to Civil Liberty. "We are all slaves of the law that we may be free."¹

¹ In the preparation of much of this paper I have laid my articles on "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law" under contribution, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. XLII (1928-29), pp. 149 and 365 ff.; reprinted in *Selected Essays on Constitutional Law*, Cambridge, 1938, Vol. I, pp. 1-67.

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FREEDOM IN AMERICA

IT may be asked why we speak of the concept of freedom in America. Is the term "freedom" not a universal, the same *semper et ubique*? Is there a special United States brand? The answer is that there are innumerable brands. There is a universal freedom in the abstract, but what most people think of as "freedom," and for which they may be willing to fight and die, is made up of many concrete items, just as in the long political history of England the concept of liberty grew from the struggle for or against specific "liberties" in a technical legal sense. What men mean by freedom is the freedom to do certain things or freedom from not having other things done to them. What those things may be vary from nation to nation and even from individual to individual.

We may illustrate the point simply by the old story of the Englishman who found himself on occasion in a curtainless shack on a ranch in the American West. Wishing to take a bath he hung his undershirt at the window, to find it drawn aside by an inquisitive cowboy who announced that he wanted to see "what there was so d—d private going on in there." Here was freedom in the abstract and the concrete. Both men wanted freedom, but the cowboy wanted to look where he chose, whereas the Englishman wanted freedom from intrusion on his affairs. Obviously these particular freedoms *to* and *from* could not exist simultaneously in a society made up of these two men. Unless they settled by blows they would have to decide in time

which freedom had the greater value. But in this oversimplified case there is another point to note. Each man was led to his assertion of freedom not only by personal character and predilection but by environment and past history. On these would largely depend the values of these conflicting freedoms for each of them.

On a larger scale we see such conflicting ideas of freedom at work in the nations today. We are largely the slaves of words, and often fail to realize that the same word may have utterly different connotations for different people. Because, for example, the vast majority of Englishmen or Americans would feel themselves unfree under the rule of a Mussolini, it would be a great mistake to consider that the vast majority of Italians must do so also. I believe that a large part of the Italian youth feel themselves free in following Il Duce blindly as their leader. This unlocks all sorts of stimulating emotions, many of them fine and among the oldest in the mental development of man.

Thomas Jefferson was one of the first political philosophers to unloose himself from words and to think of government not in abstract terms but as something that had no value in itself but only as it was fitted to the people whom it was to serve. A great believer in democracy for the America of his day he saw that his democracy would not work in other nations then, nor possibly in America under altered conditions. It was one of the tragic failures of Woodrow Wilson that he did not realize that a government suited to one people could not be made to work by another. The rapid decline from the postwar German Republic to the Third Reich of Hitler is a case in point, as was Wilson's meddling in Mexico.

It may be that all or most people want to feel themselves free to attain certain ends, but what those ends are differ almost infinitely. Some may feel that they cannot live unless they have a voice in their own government. Others may care nothing about this provided they are free to go about their own private affairs in an ordered State. Some may find release from inner strains only in the fiercest individualism; others in throwing themselves into some cause or mass movement regardless of self. Concepts of freedom, like those of government, would seem to

have to spring from the deeds of a people and be adapted to them.

What of our concept of freedom in America?

Life is not only action but *reaction*, not in the sense of going backward but of struggling against something. I recall my father used to say that in his long life he had never but twice voted wholeheartedly for any man for President; that he had always been placed in the position of having to vote *against* somebody. Often the things we battle against are of more influence than those we battle for. This I think is particularly true in developing the concept of freedom in an individual or a nation. The particular freedom, or freedoms, which we desire depend largely on our psychological make-up, the result to a great extent of heredity. Our awareness of their value to us as individuals depends also largely on whether we enjoy them freely or are being, or have been, denied them; in other words our present social and political environment on the one hand and history on the other.

The combinations of all of these, as I have said, vary widely. The American combination has been in many ways unique. It is true that the national period saw tens of millions of immigrants with their native-born children, from lands whose character and past were different from those of Britain. But in the formative colonial period, when our character and traditions were being set, it was almost wholly by those from England, the country which has had the longest and sturdiest training in political self-government. There were even then many Scotch and Celtic Irish as well as Germans, but the predominating influences were English. In the light of what I have said above this was of immense importance in determining the colonial American ideas of freedom. It was the English concept of freedom, with its parliamentary institutions, its trial by jury, its common law, its political representation, its ideas on taxation, and others, crude as many of these were at the time, which determined primarily the concept of freedom in America. But there were other factors at work.

Most of these have been written about repeatedly, notably the frontier. In a new country, where a man could soon find

land and a living for himself, labor was scarce even when not wholly unattainable. When men of social standing and some wealth emigrated to America they found themselves stripped by circumstances, and not by social theory, of most of the privileges which wealth and family had brought them in the Old World. We need not repeat here what has so often been said of the democratizing and leveling influences of the frontier.

It must be recalled, however, that America has not had one but a multitude of frontiers across its three thousand miles from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Gulf to Canada, during the periods of its successive expansions. Had there been only the first frontier, that would in time have become settled, as it did to a great extent along the Atlantic seaboard before the Appalachians were crossed, and a type of European life developed, even if provincial. But the frontiers, until a generation ago, were a continuing influence actively at work on those who lived on them. Life on all of them developed a new concept of freedom—the freedom for a man to get ahead as fast as his own brawn and brain would permit, almost untrammelled by any laws or government. It was an extraordinarily exhilarating freedom, this sense that nothing need hold you back but yourself if you were strong, energetic, and ambitious, with a new world to conquer if you could. Riches or social and political advancement were achieved by only a small number among them all, but the chance seemed to be there, and it came to be universally felt that the right, at least, to get ahead, if you could, was part of American freedom. Governmental interference was resented, though from the beginning governmental aid, local, state, or national, was invoked when it promised to help the individual along. American freedom in this respect, however, meant a government for the benefit of the individual citizen and never that the citizen existed for the benefit of the government or a mythical entity called “the State.”

The fact, moreover, that the colonies were three thousand miles away from the mother country, and that central control was so far removed, tended to emphasize the English concepts of freedoms, such as freedom of press and speech, self-government, and others which all appear in our original Con-

stitution and the Bill of Rights. If an Englishman in England resented unjust taxation, unjust laws or judicial decisions, so, infinitely more, did an Englishman in America resent such things when the result of acts of men far remote. Before the Revolution the Americans in some instances tasted of injustice. The result was that the American concept of freedom included by inheritance the whole of the English, emphasized, broadened, and in some details altered. We may note, for example, that as the Executive appeared in colonial governments in the form only of the Royal Governor for the most part, the colonial American came to hate and mistrust the executive branch of government while giving excessive confidence to the Legislative, in which he had hitherto found his only defense. It is a good example of reaction against a condition, as was our adoption of the congressional instead of the parliamentary form of self-government, though this was to prevent the later development, as in England, of responsible and cabinet government, which brings the electorate much closer to power than in America.

The Americans had also suffered, as they believed, from unjust searches and seizures, so, as another case of reaction, they wove into the American concept of freedom a guarantee against such acts some half century before the English themselves did. Also, a considerable number of immigrants—such as the Dissenters in New England, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, the Roman Catholics in Maryland—had come here to escape from religious persecution in England and other Old World countries. Religious freedom was far, for a while, from being established in each colony, but gradually the great variety of religions in neighboring, or the same, colonies, brought about a feeling—both as reaction against European persecution and as a matter of plain example in America—that the American concept of freedom should also include complete freedom of religious thought and worship.

These and other aspects of the American concept as developed from history, character, reactions, and the circumstances of the new environment, have been immensely reinforced by the fact that of the millions who have come to us from lands

in no way connected with the English tradition of freedom, practically all have come to escape from some form of oppression in their native countries—social, political, religious, or economic. They have wanted to escape barriers of one sort or another which prevented them from being, doing, or believing what they wished. They enriched American life in many ways, but perhaps more in their passionate devotion to the concept of freedom as it has developed here than in any other way. That concept is found not only in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Those simply give the legal foundation for a whole way of life which embodies the American brand of the idea of freedom. It has been noticeable in folkways, in political contests, sometimes in violence, and perhaps it could be summed up in the belief in the inherent right to make what you can of yourself in every way, without being told what to think, do, or say.

What of the present situation? We began this article by pointing to the necessity of making choices as to sorts of freedoms wanted. What are Americans likely to want in the future? It is perhaps one of the great questions of today not only for ourselves but for the world. We have seen that the idea of freedom as a universal does not necessarily indicate what a person or nation may consider as desirable freedoms in the concrete.

One of the chief contests in the world of this century is between freedom as security and freedom as adventure. Americans hitherto have preferred the latter, with all the incidental freedoms of speech, press, religion, and so on which have been integrated with the fundamental one chosen. Conditions on which Jefferson laid so much stress have changed. Free land has not lasted, as he expected when he made the Louisiana Purchase, for a thousand years. The frontier is closed. The statement of a Harvard professor that because there are still abandoned chicken farms and cheap land in northern New England there is still a frontier fails wholly to understand the psychology of a frontier. We are now a great industrial nation of a wholly different type from the America in which the American concept of freedom had its genesis and growth. Jef-

person thought democracy and our ideals of liberty would fail when our population became "piled on each other" as in the Europe he knew in his time. Economic changes in many lands have wrought corresponding changes in what men consider freedom. The freedom now desired by many is not freedom *to* do and dare but freedom *from* care and worry, with the promise of a safe though dull and mediocre private existence if tinged with the emotion of a mass movement, in the name of race or some ism.

We may ask, though it leads only to further questions, whether security (if it could be attained) or risk, danger, and personal freedom will tend most to progress. In the sense in which we have, frequently thoughtlessly, considered progress, there seems to be no doubt of the answer. The effort to attain a completely mediocre security can lead only to the totalitarian state, which, as it progresses from one step seemingly inevitably necessary to the next, means the suppression of all free thought, speech, press, and even of all contact with the news of the outside world. We need not look far for examples of what happens. The Germans at the moment are cut off, under pain of death, from trying to learn what other peoples are thinking and doing. The doors to the Russian mind are locked on both sides. Progress, intellectual, spiritual, and scientific, is impossible under such conditions, which may spread like a blight over other parts of modern civilization.

But here we plumb deeper depths of our topic. We have to define terms and estimate values. Without freedom there cannot be progress, but what *is* progress? Is what we think of as progress, and not mere change, the same for all peoples? Evidently not. Consider what some highly intelligent and adaptable peoples, such as the Japanese, have made of what the West calls progress. By adopting the ideas which have come from the Western freedom of thought, speech, and press, are the Japanese a better human breed than they were in 1700? What has "progress" done to the formerly populous and happy peoples of the Polynesian islands? Is "progress" a value for all peoples? If not, then the freedoms which lead to what we

think of as progress lose the particular sanction of helping progress.

On the other hand, it seems to me that, just as there is a general idea which is valid of freedom, as contrasted with particular freedoms, there is also a general idea of progress. The original cells in the primordial ooze which gradually developed into man progressed according to our ideas. What we call man has gradually risen in esthetic, intellectual, and moral stature. Whether there are points beyond which races, like individuals, cannot continue is aside from the argument. Man as man is something much more valuable in our eyes now than what he started from. Without freedom to develop, he could not have developed. With different kinds of freedom he has developed in different ways and up to different levels.

Personally I believe still in the American concept of freedom, but that has come from many factors working together, some of which have now changed, as I have tried to indicate. The devotion to a particular kind of freedom depends largely on circumstance and environment. Freedom to do one thing may block the freedom to do some other thing. What things may we want in the future? Mere prating about freedom will get us nowhere. Freedom for what? Does the farmer want freedom from care, anxiety, and thought—an assumed security—at the cost of being told at every turn what he must or must not do, or does he prefer the freedom to do as he pleases at the risk of failure, the freedom, as the old saying is, of “going to hell in his own way”? If concepts of freedom depend largely on circumstances past and present, have we sufficient idea of what sort of freedom we want and sufficient willingness to make sacrifices of one freedom in favor of another to try to mold our life and conditions to bring about the *desire* for one sort of freedom rather than another? If conditions, particularly economic, should alter sufficiently, it might be that we would come to desire a new set of freedoms—in the ideal if not the reality—from those which have hitherto made the American concept of freedom. Do we care enough about the old concept to try to alter the conditions so that they may still breed the old concept or will we drift into a new sort of society, as many

other nations have done, which will breed a new concept? What do we care about most?

The concept of freedom comes down, in the final analysis, it seems to me, to what are the deepest and most abiding needs of man. What, for him, are the real values in life? Does he want to become, as many seem to wish today, a stall-fed domesticated brute, helpless not only to progress but even to fend for himself in the world without the supervising care of an owner or master; or does he still wish to fight his own way upward and take the chances of falling? It has been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, but eternal anxiety is also the lot of the free man.

The question of freedom is generally considered political but it is in reality religious. In many countries it has been largely because the inhabitants have lost the philosophy of life and the scale of values that their religions gave them in the old days that they have also been willing to give up such liberties as they formerly possessed, though the liberties, like the religions, may have differed widely. The question of what type of freedom we want, and in what departments of our life, is twin brother to the old question in the Presbyterian catechism, "what is the chief end of man?" Until we can answer that we cannot decide what type of freedom we desire. If man is merely of the same order as an ant, bee, or wasp, we might well try to emulate their highly efficient order of social life. Through the ages there have always been men who have fervently believed they were something different from the most intelligent and highly organized animals. There seems to be something in man, call it what you will, which makes him insistent on taking chances and striking out for himself. There has been something which has made him demand freedom. There are some freedoms which lead him upward and some which lead him downward into the animal class again. I have tried to show that which sort he chooses depends on much beside mere abstract thought. America has had perhaps the widest concept of freedom of any nation but if that concept is to last we must, in a fast-changing world, try to make the sacrifices and alterations which will continue the conditions, even in a different form, which will give that con-

cept ever renewed birth. The American concept of freedom has not been an abstraction. It has grown from the circumstances, needs, aspirations, and beating hearts of innumerable human beings of all races, creeds, and classes, under conditions which promised opportunity. If we close the doors to opportunity and advancement, will the majority still desire the same form of freedom? And if they should not, what will happen to the minority which has always carried mankind upward?

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THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA AND JAPAN

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CULTURAL CONFLICT
AND A CONSIDERATION OF FREEDOM

IN recent years I have published some of my reflections on the modernization of Japan and China. What I am now going to state is a summary and restatement of what I have been thinking on this fascinating subject during these years.

I

First of all, we must state the problem of our inquiry. What special aspect of the modernization of China and Japan arouses our curiosity and requires our study and explanation?

Generally speaking, there are two aspects of the question that have puzzled the outside world and demanded some explanation.

For many decades, down to very recent years, the question often asked was: Why was Japan so successful in her task of modernization, and why was China so unsuccessful? That is the first aspect of the question, which has called forth many explanations.

But in recent years, the problem has radically changed. After almost a century of hesitation and resistance, China has emerged as a modern nation, not sufficiently westernized (it is true) in her material aspects, but fully modern in her outlook on life and feeling completely at home in the modern world. On the

other hand, Japan, after seventy years of apparently rapid modernization, is suddenly discovered by the outside world as having never been transformed in all the fundamental aspects of her national life. Professor G. C. Allen, one of the most sympathetic interpreters of Japan, said: "If the changes in some of the aspects of her [Japan's] life have been far-reaching, the persistence of the traditional in other aspects is equally remarkable. . . . The contrasts between these innovations and the solid core of ancient habit are as striking as ever they were." Professor Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, in their joint work on *Japan in Transition*, another most sympathetic interpretation of Japanese life, have dwelt on the most strange phenomenon in Japan, namely, her "immunity to the dialectic play of deep-lying evolutionary forces," her being "devoid of dialectic and dynamic" and her ancient civilization "offering strong resistance to the facile assimilation of foreign elements."

In short, the new problem is just the opposite of the older puzzle. It is: Why has China at last succeeded in overthrowing her old civilization and in achieving a Chinese Renaissance? And why has Japan, after seven decades of extraordinarily successful modernization, yet failed to break up her "solid core of ancient habit"? That is the second aspect of the problem.

Any theory that attempts to explain the first set of questions must also explain satisfactorily the second set of questions. And vice versa.

II

In 1933, I was trying to solve the first set of puzzles: Why and how has Japan succeeded, and China failed, to achieve a speedy and orderly cultural readjustment and bring about the modernization necessary for national survival in the new world? The explanation I offered then was that China and Japan had been going through two distinct types of cultural response. The modernization in Japan I described as the type of cultural transformation under centralized control, made possible by the existence of a powerful ruling class—the feudal militaristic caste—from which came the leaders of the Reformation who not only decided for the nation what to change and what not to change,

but who also had the political power to carry out their decisions. On the other hand, I pointed out, China, because of the non-existence of a ruling class and because of the thoroughly democratized social structure, could only go through the slow and often wasteful process of cultural transformation through the gradual and diffused penetration and assimilation of ideas and practices, usually initiating from a few individuals, slowly winning a following, and finally achieving significant changes when a sufficient number of people are convinced of their superior reasonableness, convenience, or efficacy.

The advantages of the Japanese type of modernization under the centralized control of a ruling class are easy to see. It is orderly, economical, continuous, stable, and effective. But, I point out, "it is not without very important disadvantages. The Japanese leaders undertook this rapid transformation at so early a time that even the most farsighted of them could only see and understand certain superficial phases of the Western civilization. Many other phases have escaped their attention. And, in their anxiety to preserve their national heritage and to strengthen the hold of the State and the dynasty over the people, they have carefully protected a great many elements of the traditional Japan from the contact and contagion of the new civilization. . . . Much of the traditional medieval culture is artificially protected by a strong shell of militant modernity. Much that is preserved is of great beauty and permanent value; but not a little of it is primitive and pregnant with grave dangers of volcanic eruption."

The disadvantages of the Chinese type of cultural changes through gradual diffusion and penetration are numerous: they are slow, sporadic, and often wasteful, because much undermining and erosion are necessary before anything can be changed.

But they have also undeniable advantages. They are voluntary. From the lipstick to the literary revolution, from the footwear to the overthrow of the monarchy, all has been voluntary and in a broad sense "reasoned." Nothing in China is too sacred to be protected from the contact and contagion of the invading civilization of the West. And no man, nor any class, is

powerful enough to protect any institution from this contact and change. In short, this process of long exposure and slow permeation often results in cultural changes which are both fundamental and permanent.

III

This, in general, was my theory regarding the modernization of China and Japan. Japan was modernized under the powerful leadership and control of a ruling class, and China, because of the nonexistence of such control from above, was modernized through the long process of free contact, gradual diffusion, and voluntary following.

We may ask, Can this theory satisfactorily explain all the four phases of our main inquiry? Can it explain the marvelously rapid westernization of Japan and at the same time the unchanging solid core of medieval Japan? Can it explain both the long failures and the recent successes in China's modernization? I think not only that it can, but that it is the only hypothesis which can satisfactorily resolve all the apparent contradictions of the problem.

According to my theory, the early and rapid successes of the Meiji Reformation were brought about by the effective leadership and powerful control of the ruling class, which happened to coincide with the militaristic class of feudal Japan and which naturally was most anxious and at the same time best fitted to undertake the adoption of the Western armaments and methods of warfare. As Professor Lederer has pointed out, "It could hardly be foreseen at this early stage that in this case one step leads inexorably to a second." "Since a modern military state is possible only on condition that it is an industrialized state, Japan had to develop in that direction. But industrialization, by reason of the economic interrelationship between various types of production, means also the development of branches of industry which are not essential to the conduct of war. . . . Just as militarism reaches beyond itself into industry, so the technological system of industrialism has far-reaching implications for the social system." The leaders of Japanese westernization started out with the desire to adopt Western militarism and

have thereby brought about what Professor Lederer calls the "militaristic industrial system."

Of all the non-European countries with which the European civilization has come into contact, Japan is the only nation that has successfully learned and mastered that one phase of the occidental civilization which is most coveted by all races, namely, its militaristic phase. Japan has succeeded where all these non-European countries have invariably failed. This historical mystery can only be explained by the fact that no other non-European country was so favored with the existence of a militaristic caste which has been the governing class of the country for over twelve centuries.

But this militaristic caste was not an enlightened or intellectual class. Its leaders were courageous, pragmatic, patriotic, and in some cases statesmanlike. But they were limited in their visions and in their understanding of the new civilization that had knocked at their shores. They thought, just as Lafcadio Hearn thought, that they could build up a Western war machine which should be made to serve as a protective wall behind which all the traditional values of Tokugawa Japan should be preserved unaltered.

Unfortunately for Japan and for the world, the military successes of Japan against Russia and China tended to vindicate these narrow-visioned leaders. The result has been an effective artificial protection and solidification of the traditional culture of medieval Japan against the "dangerous" contact and influence of the new ideas and practices of the ever-changing world. By the use of the modern means of rigidly controlled education, propaganda, and censorship, and by the use of the peculiarly Japanese methods of inculcating the cult of emperor-worship, Japan has succeeded in reinforcing and consolidating the "solid core" of unchanging medieval culture left over from the 250 years of Tokugawa isolation. It was the same centralized leadership and control which made possible the rapid and successful changes in militarization and industrialization and which has also deliberately protected and solidified the traditional values and made them "immune to the dialectic play of deep-lying evolutionary forces."

The same theory also explains the history of modernization in China. The early failures in the Chinese attempts at westernization were almost entirely due to the absence of the factors which have made the Japanese Meiji Reformation a success. The Chinese leaders, too, wanted to adopt the Western armaments and methods of warfare and to build up the new industries. Their slogan was "Fu Ts'iang" (Wealth and Strength). But there was in China neither the militaristic tradition, nor an effective and powerful governing class to undertake the leadership and direction in such gigantic enterprises. China had come out of feudalism at least twenty-one centuries ago; the social structure had been thoroughly democratized; and governmental policy, religion, philosophy, literature, and social usage had combined to condemn militarism and despise the soldier. Whereas the Samurai was the most highly esteemed class in Japan, the soldier ranked the lowest in the Chinese social scale. Therefore the new Chinese army and the new Chinese navy of the eighties and nineties of the last century were doomed to failure. With the destruction of the Chinese navy in 1894-95, all the new industries—the shipyard, the merchant marine, the government-operated iron and steel industry—which were to feed and support the new war machine, gradually came to nought. The government and the dynasty were thus discredited in their early efforts in modernization. After the failure of the reforms of 1898 and the tragedy of the Boxer Uprising of 1900, the discrediting of the dynasty and the government was complete. From that time on, China's main endeavor was to destroy that center of ignorance and reactionism—the monarchy and its paraphernalia—and then to build up a new center of political authority and leadership.

Thus, while Japan's first successes in westernization were achieved under the leadership and control of her feudal-militaristic class, China has had to spend three or four decades in the effort of first removing the monarchy and later destroying the newly arisen militarists. It has been found necessary for China to bring about a political revolution as the precondition for her modernization.

In 1911-12, the revolution succeeded in overthrowing the

alien rule and the monarchy together with its historical accompaniments. The political revolution was in every sense a social and cultural emancipation. In a country where there is no ruling class, the overthrow of the monarchy destroys the last possibility of a centralized control in social change and cultural transformation. It makes possible an atmosphere of free contact, free judgment, and criticism, free appreciation, free advocacy, and voluntary acceptance.

What has been called the Chinese Renaissance is the natural product of this atmosphere of freedom. All the important phases of cultural change in China have been the result of this free contact and free diffusion of new ideas and practices, which are impossible in Japan under rigid dynastic and militaristic taboos. The net outcome is that modern China has undoubtedly achieved more far-reaching and more profound transformations in the social, political, intellectual, and religious life than the so-called "modern Japan" has ever done in similar fields.

I wish to cite one important and fundamental fact as illustration of the character of the cultural change in China. I refer to the spirit of free and fearless criticism which the leaders of China have applied to the study and examination of their own social, political, historical, and religious institutions. It is no accident that all the men who have exerted the greatest influence over the Chinese nation for the last forty years—Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Wu Ching-heng, Chen Tu-shiu, and others—have been men who know our historical heritage critically and who have had the moral courage ruthlessly to criticize its evil and weak aspects and to advocate wholehearted changes. Neither Confucius, nor Lao-tse, nor the Buddha, nor Chu-hsi; neither the monarchy, nor the family, nor religion, is too sacred to be exempt from their doubt and criticism. A nation that has encouraged honest doubt and free criticism even in matters touching the sacred and most time-honored institutions is achieving a modernity undreamed of by its neighbors whose intellectual leaders are persecuted and punished for having taught thirty years ago a certain theory of constitutional law or for having suggested that certain Sacred Treasures at a certain shrine might be of doubtful authenticity.

To sum up, the modernization in China illustrates the view that, in the absence of centralized control from above, cultural changes of basic importance may take place through the process of free contact and slow diffusion. It is the reverse side of what has happened in Japan. The breakdown of the monarchy and its paraphernalia has removed the possibility of artificial protection and solidification of the old culture, which is then thrown open to the natural processes of cultural transformation through free contact and voluntary acceptance.

I V

If I have any moral to present it is this: freedom of contact and choice is the most essential condition for cultural diffusion and change. Wherever two civilizations come into contact, there are natural tendencies (or laws) of one people learning and borrowing from the other what each lacks or recognizes as of superior utility or beauty. These natural tendencies of cultural diffusion will have free play if only the peoples are allowed free contact with the new ideas and practices.

Where such freedom is denied to a people, where artificial isolation and solidification are consciously and effectively carried out with regard either to a whole culture or to certain specially prized aspects of it, there arises the strange phenomenon of the "solid core of ancient habit" "devoid of dialectic and dynamic," such as has been found in present-day Japan.

There is really no mystery in this unchanging Japan after seventy years of marvelously rapid change in the militaristic industrial system. There is no truth in the theory, for example, that the Japanese civilization has been able to resist change because it has its peculiar vitality and has attained "the completed perfection of its forms." The fashion of men's dress in the Western world does not change so rapidly as that of women—can we say that men's dress has achieved special vitality and "the completed perfection of form"? In the same way, sitting on the floor, for example, was discarded in China so long ago that historians have difficulty in dating the first use of chairs and tables. But the Japanese to this day continue to sit on the

floor. That does not mean the custom of sitting on the floor has any special "vitality" or has attained "completed perfection of form."

Nor is there much truth in the view that the Japanese are naturally clumsy in understanding and conservative in their outlook. Lack of understanding never prevents a people from accepting new fads. Japan probably never understood the various schools of Buddhism when she accepted them. (Certainly China did not understand some of them when she adopted them.) Besides, a people can always learn. European observers in the seventeenth century recorded that the Japanese knew "nothing of mathematics, more especially of its deeper and speculative parts." But we now know the Japanese can become accomplished mathematicians.

As to their native conservatism, the history of early Japanese contacts with Korea, China, and Europe only proves the contrary. They learned from these foreign peoples everything they could learn, not excluding things affecting their social, political, and religious institutions. In recording the success of the Jesuits in Japan,¹ Sansom said: "Though a number of their converts were beyond all doubt genuine to the point of fanaticism and adhered to their new faith in the face of great danger, one cannot but suspect that it had, by one of those crazes which have often swept over Japan, become the fashion to ape the customs of foreigners, including their religion. We know that rosaries and crucifixes were eagerly bought and worn by many who were not Christians, even, it is said, by Hideyoshi himself; and it was modish to wear foreign clothes and to be able to recite a Latin prayer."

I cannot therefore escape the conclusion that it will be the element of freedom that may yet some day break down the "solid core of ancient habit" in Japan just as it has already broken it down in China.

¹ In the sixteenth century.

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FREEDOM IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATION¹

THE question of the quality of freedom in a special historical period has meaning only if freedom is subject to historical change. Such an assumption, however, is difficult. Of course, every historical period creates different forms, institutions, and ideas in which freedom is realized. This kind of change is so obvious that it need not be mentioned. But the problem is whether the historical change of the forms of freedom also entails an essential change in the nature of freedom. Furthermore, if freedom is considered to be an essential, perhaps the most essential, characteristic of man, a change in the very nature of freedom would involve a change in the very nature of man. It would mean that man not only has history but that human nature as such, the very essential character of humanity, is subject to history and to historical transformation. Is such an assertion tenable?

In order to answer this question we must first understand the unique nature of freedom. Freedom has an ambiguity in its very nature by which it is distinguished from every other reality. Everything except freedom is determined by its own nature. Its actualization follows its nature by necessity. But it is the nature of freedom to determine itself. Freedom is the possibility of transcending its nature. This utterly dialectical character of the nature of freedom makes the doctrine of freedom

¹ The term "transformation" is taken from Karl Mannheim's book *Man in the Period of Transformation*.

both fascinating and dangerous. A philosophy which ignores the fundamental ambiguity in the nature of freedom is a philosophical attack on freedom; and in being an attack on freedom it is an attack on humanity. For freedom makes man man. Even those who deny it presuppose it. Even those who attack humanity by attacking freedom can do so only in the very name of humanity and freedom. In the act of deciding against freedom one is a witness for it, since one's decision pretends to be true, and this means that it is not dependent on one's individual or social nature, but on objective norms which one is able to accept or reject. This situation has been darkened by the traditional problem of the "freedom of will," a problem which cannot be solved because the form of the question itself is fallacious. Man and not a section of man is free.

From this it follows that it is impossible to formulate a definition of human nature in the ordinary sense of "definition." For man has the possibility of changing the nature which has been defined in such a definition. Man is able to break through the limitations of every definition of man, except that definition which refers to man's ability to change his nature. Therefore, all definitions of human nature and freedom which try to establish a human nature or a nature of freedom above history are impossible. Man's historical existence makes them impossible. Nonhistorical definitions of the nature of man deprive man of his freedom, namely, of his power to determine his nature in history and to become something new through history. Consequently, if we attempt to formulate a definition of man we should say: Man is that being who is able to determine his being in freedom through history. And if we attempt to formulate a definition of freedom we should say: Freedom is that faculty of man by which he is able to determine his being through history. And if we attempt to formulate a definition of history we should say: History is that happening through which man determines his own being, including his freedom.

Freedom is the condition of history, and history is the condition of freedom; they are mutually interdependent. There is no history without freedom. There are natural processes, going on with natural necessity. Denying freedom of history means mak-

ing history a natural process, depriving it of its uniqueness and its meaning. Conversely, there is no freedom besides history. Freedom which has ceased to be the power of determining itself in history has ceased to be freedom, and men who have lost this power have lost their full humanity. They are dehumanized. They have mere ideology, designed to cover the lack of real freedom in the interest of enslaving groups if "freedom above history" is praised. Freedom must *appear* in history, must *embody* itself in history, or it is not freedom.

I I

If man is that being who determines his being in freedom through history, only those can be called men who possess this freedom and participate in the self-determination of man through history. Ancient political philosophy agrees with this view: man is he who is free, and free is he who participates in the self-determination of the historical group to which he belongs. Citizenship, freedom, and humanity are identical.

The slave is a "human being" but not "man" in the full sense of the word because he is not free. The decision as to whether someone is a god or a human being or an animal depends on fate. And whether a human being is *man* in the full sense of the word or is excluded from full humanity is a matter of destiny. Freedom is a quality of human nature and, at the same time, a fact of historical destiny. These two aspects can contradict each other. He who is free by nature can become a slave by destiny. This was a very practical philosophy: the entire social system and the entire foreign policy of classical Greece were dependent on this idea. It was the justification of slavery, and it was the justification of the contempt for the "barbarians." For, man is he who is free; free is he who is citizen; citizen is he who is Greek; consequently the Greek citizen alone is man in the full sense of the word. Outside of Greece are human beings. The Greeks alone represent humanity. In this attitude the one great solution of the problem "freedom and history" is given.

The later ancient development, represented by Stoicism and Epicureanism, brought about another solution. When the politi-

cal self-determination of the Greeks was destroyed by Alexander and the Romans and many of the Greek citizens became slaves of the conquerors, the historical element in the concept of freedom became weakened. Freedom was considered a natural characteristic of man generally which cannot be lost by fate, although fate excludes the majority of men from political self-determination. The Epicureans even suggested that freedom can be maintained only through retirement into a completely private life. But at the same time the Roman emperors, influenced by Stoic philosophy, extended freedom and Roman citizenship more and more, to the point that it became a kind of universal citizenship. Those who were considered essentially free as human beings should receive historical freedom as Roman citizens. Stoicism tried to approximate freedom by destiny and freedom by nature. But this, of course, did not mean the political self-determination for the overwhelming majority of people. The government was in the hands of a few. A non-political citizenship developed, implying equality before the law and the acknowledgment that all human beings have a natural claim to become man in the full sense.

Even less political was the Christian idea of freedom. Political freedom was considered as irrelevant to the state of being a Christian, and that means to having the "freedom of the Children of God." This freedom is the only possible fulfillment of man's natural freedom. It is the liberation from man's transcendent servitude, from the servitude under sin, guilt, and demonic powers. Political freedom cannot provide this liberation and political enslavement cannot prevent it. It is a work of God and of God alone. But even this transcendent freedom has historical implications. The work of God is realized in history, in Christ and in the Church, that is (as the original Greek word indicates), in the "assembly," namely, the "assembly of God" which replaces the city—assemblies of importance and dignity. Therefore freedom and active "citizenship" in the assembly of God are identical. The free citizen of the Greek city state is replaced by the free member of the universal Church. And the Church is not only a mystical body, it is also a historical community. He who belongs to it as a true Christian has not only

transcendent freedom but also historical freedom. For as a member of the Church, he participates in determining history, not directly but indirectly, through the regenerating power of the Christians in all secular communities. As a member of the Church he is equal to any other member even if the hierarchical order excludes him from leading functions within the Church.

In this respect Protestantism carries through the original Christian impulses. It puts the layman, not only before God, but also in the actual life of the Church, on an equal basis with the minister, or more exactly, it makes the minister a layman and the layman a minister, giving the actual freedom of determining the history of the Church to every member. So the hierarchical limitations of historical freedom in Catholicism are overcome in Protestantism. Freedom before God involves historical freedom, although within the boundaries of the Church.

Further development removed even this limitation. Freedom before God, which was originally freedom from guilt by salvation, became more and more identified with the natural freedom of every human being, the freedom of self-determination through history. The "rational" man of Stoicism and the "saved man" of Christianity were merged into each other. The democratic doctrine of freedom emerged. Modern democracy combines the classic ideal of political freedom as the actualization of natural freedom with the Stoic doctrine of freedom as the general character of human beings and with the religious universalism of the Christian idea of freedom. It implies elements of all of these and makes something new of their combination. This comes out very clearly in a document such as the Bill of Rights. In the democratic constitutions the identity of natural and political freedom is apparently complete. The freedom of man cannot be separated from his freedom to determine his historical fate politically. Every human being, that is, everyone who has reason, is naturally and, consequently, politically free. He belongs to those who determine the nature of man and the nature of freedom by determining human history in political acts. Those who are deprived of their democratic rights are deprived of the human characteristic to be free.

From this the life-and-death struggle for the "rights of

man" in many countries, the religious enthusiasm for democracy, for instance, in the United States, the unrestricted affirmation of democracy by the churches in some democratic countries, are comprehensible. This struggle is felt as the struggle for essential humanity, for the maintenance of man as man against the distortions of humanity and human freedom. The World War as a "crusade for democracy" was a consequence of this kind of thinking; it was a consequence of the radical identification of natural and political freedom and of both of these with the freedom before God.

It is doubtful whether the present war will create the same ideology. It may be that the criticism of these identifications during the period between the two wars has destroyed the possibility of their revival.

This survey shows that the interdependence of natural and political freedom always has been acknowledged, directly or indirectly; it further shows that there is a trend in history to enlarge the realm of political freedom towards its full identification with natural freedom or towards universal democracy. The fact that man is free by nature makes him restless until he has become free in history.

But this trend is contradicted by another which idealizes the aristocratic and hierarchical systems of the past and tries drastically to limit those who are free to determine history by political actions. Political freedom shall be reserved to a comparatively small number of leaders, to the so-called élite, to privileged classes, to educated persons, to landowners, to military or bureaucratic powers. In these theories, of which the élite doctrine is the most recent expression, and all kinds of fascism its most important application, a condition is established beyond natural freedom on which political freedom shall depend. Political self-determination is permitted only to those who have superiority in natural gifts, heredity, tradition, environment, in brief, in historical fate. Freedom needs something beyond freedom in order to become political reality. The democratic identification of natural and political freedom is denied. As in some religious doctrines transcendent predestination determines the eternal fulfillment or the eternal destruction of

man, so in these doctrines historical predestination decides whether a human being is destined to be a man in the full sense of humanity or not. The consequence of this doctrine is that the natural freedom of the majority of men never becomes actual as political freedom. And this has led in all human history to a dehumanization of the masses, to a situation in which the natural freedom of man is destroyed by the lack of historical freedom. Nevertheless, this theory has arisen again and again. It has not only been powerful in the past, before the democratic development began, but it became powerful again at the very moment when the democratic idea of freedom seemed to be victorious all over the world. And it is pathetic to see that not only ruling groups and new "élite" supported this tendency but that the masses themselves helped to destroy their own political freedom. The democratic identification of natural and political freedom seems to be inadequate to human nature.

Religion as well as idealism very often has supported this view by making a strong distinction between external and internal freedom, and by laying every religious and ethical emphasis on the internal freedom which everyone is able to maintain, even as a slave. Free is he who acts as a moral personality or as a saved child of God, even if he is in chains. "Freedom in chains" is possible in every political system, in democracy as well as in tyranny. Only the interior freedom is ultimately significant. One can live under a bill of rights or in a totalitarian and collectivistic system, one can be free in both of them, one can be free in chains and without chains. There is no historical circumstance in which one could not develop one's natural freedom to full humanity.

And arguments from the historical and political realm are added to these religious and ethical arguments. It is emphasized and it cannot be doubted that human history is shaped in a much more profound way by nonpolitical men than by any kind of politician. There are innumerable proofs of this. These proofs exist not only among those who are considered the great creative men in human culture but in every man who participates in shaping human history. Political creativity is a special

gift, embodied in a few people who under favorable conditions become political leaders and who determine history in their special way. But it is as much nonsense to demand that everyone participate in political creativity as it would be to demand that everyone participate in mathematical or musical creativity. Therefore political responsibility should be reserved for those who are able to carry it. And it is by no means a deprivation of freedom and full humanity if the large majority of people are excluded from political self-determination.

These arguments must be taken very seriously. They establish a simple identification of natural and political freedom, such as modern democracy has assumed to be impossible. *The freedom of historical self-determination is not identical with the freedom of political self-determination.* There is a direct relationship between them but not a simple identity. Political self-determination is a special and extremely important section of historical self-determination; but historical self-determination goes far beyond it. Historical freedom is not bound to a system of voting, of majority, parliamentary representation. It is not bound to democratic institutions in the technical sense of the word. But historical freedom is bound to a realm of free creativity by which history is shaped and transformed. They are not excluded from full humanity who are excluded from participation in direct political activity, but only those who are excluded from any realm of creative freedom and, therefore, from historical self-determination. If this is taken for granted, if the distinction between historical and political freedom is established, the aristocratic and idealistic arguments can be answered in this way: Man's natural freedom, his complete humanity, does not exist except in different forms of historical freedom. Any attempt of religion and idealism to restrain freedom to the so-called "inner freedom" must be rejected. Inner freedom cannot even be imagined without historical freedom. Of course, the "free man in chains" may represent human freedom better than a mass of voters. But in order to represent freedom he must have experienced freedom, he must have lived under a political system which makes freedom a subject of possible experience. There is a political suppression which dehu-

manizes nations and generations in such a way that not even the free man in chains can be found. The freedom in chains is dependent upon the experience of the freedom without chains. Even the freedom of the "Children of God" is a meaningless phrase if freedom never has been a subject of historical experience. As the religious and idealistic language is derived from the concrete language of daily life which gives the realistic basis for even the highest and most removed symbols, so the experience, expressed in these symbols, must keep its roots in the concrete experiences in which they first appeared. Inner freedom without historical freedom is an abstraction which, taken for a reality, surrenders historical freedom and, finally, destroys itself.

III

Historical freedom is not political freedom. But the question is whether historical freedom is possible without political freedom and, if not, what kind of political freedom is necessary to guarantee historical freedom. In order to answer these questions we must qualify the nature of historical freedom. Freedom exists only if there is a realm of free creativity, a realm within which everyone is able to determine history and to transform human nature through history.

Creative freedom has three conditions: Freedom for *meaningful* creativity, freedom for *autonomous* creativity, freedom for *self-fulfilling* creativity.

The first condition is the freedom for meaningful creativity, that is, the freedom to decide about the meaning and purposes of one's creative actions. No one has historical freedom who acts for a purpose, the meaning of which he denies. It is not necessary that he himself discover and set up that purpose, but it is necessary that he agree with it. If he does not agree with it and must work for it in order to maintain his physical existence, he is enslaved. Large masses of people are enslaved in this way. They are not enslaved because they are working for the profit of someone else. One can work for the profit of another without losing one's freedom, if the meaning and the purpose are accepted and the other elements of freedom are

guaranteed. And one can work for one's own profit and feel at every moment the meaninglessness of one's work. Working for oneself can be the slavery of toiling for infinite profit and infinite economic power without any meaningful purpose beyond this. It is more than a nice phrase when socialists emphasize that the salvation from capitalism is not only the salvation of the exploited masses but also the salvation of the exploiting rulers who are deprived of this freedom of meaningful creativity by the tyrannical laws of competition. No romantic glorification of the freedom of competition should conceal the dehumanizing and enslaving consequences it can entail. The important question is not whether man works for himself or for someone else or for the group to which he belongs. The problem is whether his work is supported by the freedom of meaningful creativity, the first condition of historical freedom.

The second condition is the freedom for autonomous creativity (autonomous in the traditional and only meaningful sense of following the laws embodied in things themselves without any encroachment either by authorities or by one's accidental nature), that is, the freedom to follow the objective demands involved in the nature of one's work, unrestrained by heteronomous demands coming from outside. Every creative work has its structural necessities which follow from its special nature. An artist, for instance, has the freedom for autonomous creativity only if he is free to follow the structural demands, first of his material, second of the forms of his art, and third of the special style he represents. In the same way the scholar must be able to follow the methodological demands of his material without restriction by religious or political powers. And the technical worker must be able to follow the principle of the greatest effect with the smallest means and must not be obliged to suppress or to disturb creative possibilities under the urge of political interests. Wherever this freedom is denied, man is deprived of his self-determination through history. He is enslaved and dehumanized. A judge who is not able to follow his judgment about the law and the special case to be judged has no freedom. He becomes a dehumanized tool of political tyr-

anny. He has lost his historical freedom by losing his autonomous creativity.

The third condition of historical freedom is the freedom for self-fulfilling creativity. Freedom is destroyed if the vital power and joy which belong to creativity are lost. The freedom of the self-determination of human nature through history cannot be separated from self-fulfillment in the sense of the Greek word *eudaimonia*. *Eudaimonia*, or happiness, is that stage of man in which the potentialities of his nature are fully actualized. *Eudaimonia* is self-fulfillment. It is distinguished, although not entirely separated, from *hedone*, pleasure, which is a secondary consequence but not an essential element of happiness. Ordinarily it should be connected with happiness but it can be lacking. Happiness is possible even in pain and suffering. But pleasure alone can never create happiness. The fact that in the course of occidental thought the Greek principle of *eudaimonia* has been confused with the principle of *hedone*, that happiness and pleasure have not been strictly distinguished, that Christian ethics denied not only pleasure but also happiness in the sense of *eudaimonia*, has greatly disturbed personal as well as social ethics in the ancient and modern world. When socialism demanded happiness for everyone, the foes of socialism attacked it as the establishment of the pleasure principle and used the religious or idealistic arguments against the pleasure principle as arguments against socialism. And since creative self-fulfillment is essential for human nature, the process of the dehumanization of the masses in industrial society was supported by this kind of argumentation. Freedom of self-fulfillment cannot be maintained if the joy and the vital courage of creativity are destroyed. There is no historical freedom if the vital condition of creativity is undermined by insecurity, anxiety, fear, and suppression of the most vital impulses by the lack of means to satisfy them. There is no historical freedom if happiness through creative self-determination is extinguished by a social structure and technical procedures which make man a part of a machine or a quantity of working power, to be bought and to be sold. This means that freedom is dependent not only on political forms but also on a social structure in which the

self-fulfilling creativity or the creative happiness of everyone is guaranteed in order that complete fulfillment of man and society may be achieved.

Summing up we can say: Human nature demands the freedom of historical self-determination. Historical self-determination demands a realm of creative freedom. Creative freedom presupposes the freedom of meaningful creativity, the freedom of autonomous creativity, the freedom of self-fulfilling creativity.

Political freedom is a status of human society in which the historical freedom of human self-determination is guaranteed to everyone by political institutions. Political freedom is the guardian of historical freedom. A political system is free in the measure in which it is able to guarantee and to promote the free creativity of everyone in determining human history. The question whether in a political system freedom is embodied cannot be answered by the legal character of its constitution and its laws. Legal and constitutional freedom does not necessarily imply historical freedom. The form of freedom does not necessarily involve the content of freedom. Democracy is that system which from the legal and constitutional points of view embodies more freedom than any other political system. The participation of everyone in the government in voting and the equal right of everyone before the law are the strongest expressions of the will to freedom which can be imagined in a world in which government and power cannot be avoided. But even such a system can become a tool for suppressing free creativity. The very dialectical history of liberalism, the system which bears the name of liberty, shows clearly that the constitutional form alone is not able to guarantee historical freedom. It may be necessary to transform the legal form of liberty into something which appears to be a strong restriction of freedom in order to save historical freedom. This is the present situation in all countries in which liberalism has become predominant! *And this is the reason why we face a long and catastrophic period of transformation in which constitutional freedom probably will be doomed to a tremendous extent and in which historical freedom, free creativity, and the right of man to determine his own nature*

through history will be, and even is at present, utterly endangered.

Facing this situation we must ask ourselves how far historical freedom is dependent on constitutional liberties. If it were entirely dependent, no hope would be left for the salvation of historical freedom in the period of transformation. But there is such hope because historical freedom is not identical with a special form of political liberty and consequently with a special form of constitution and law. There were situations in human history in which historical freedom was comparatively safe in authoritarian systems. Monarchy, for example, in some cases can balance the contrasting class interests better than highly developed forms of democratic capitalism. This is possible but not necessary. And monarchy always has the disadvantage that the lack of constitutional correctives may lead to an arbitrary use of power by which the largest number of people are excluded from the realm of historical self-determination. From this point of view democracy provides more guarantees against the abuse of governmental power. But on the other hand it makes a situation possible in which private groups, without public responsibility, control the masses by their economic power to such an extent that historical freedom is doomed, under cover of democracy. Therefore neither an authoritarian system in itself nor democracy in itself can offer a guarantee for historical freedom. No system in itself can do this. Nevertheless, a "synthetic system" in which a strong, uniting, and determining governmental power is checked by democratic correctives must be considered as the ideal form of political freedom.

But there is not much probability that such a system will be the outcome of our present situation. It seems to be an incapable law of human history that the historical existence of the ideal form of political freedom is only a favorable accident, a chance which sometimes occurs but which has a very transitory character. *Historical freedom, guaranteed by an ideal form of political freedom, is as rare as all great things in human history.* Therefore our actual task is to find a way in which man's historical self-determination is saved in the period of transformation. This period which in economic terms is a period of

mass collectivism, in intellectual terms a period of heteronomy, in political terms a period of unrestricted authority, affords no opportunity for an ideal constellation. Freedom in this period must have the character of "in spite of," namely, meaningful creativity in spite of superimposed purposes; autonomous creativity in spite of collectivistic authority; self-fulfilling creativity in spite of destructive social conditions. How is this possible, if it is possible at all?

It is my task to analyze the present economic, sociological, and intellectual conditions which inescapably lead either to another creative period of history or to chaos and the rebarbarization of large sections of mankind. There are three interdependent reasons for this development: first the self-destructive tendencies in the economic structure of later capitalism; second the dehumanizing force of an all-controlling nationalism; third the disintegrating power of a mechanized and secularized technical civilization. Each of these causes would be strong enough to enforce a fundamental transformation of the structure of human life. Together they are irresistible. It could be said that every period in history is a period of "transformation." This is true if transformation is used in the superficial sense of mere change, but if it is used in the sense of a fundamental structural disintegration in all realms of human life, it must be applied emphatically to our period. It is a transformation through catastrophes and revolutions but it is more than catastrophe and revolution. Something really new is forthcoming, something new which can be utterly creative but which also can mean the end of any creativity in many parts of the world. It is not necessary to argue further for this interpretation of the present situation. The arguments for it are known to everyone and have become cheap slogans, used and abused in daily life. Things which some decades or even years ago were treated as esoteric wisdom, venturing prophecy, and audacious radicalism, have become normal articles, bought and sold at every market. Cassandra's prophecies, voiced through Spengler's mouth, have become a matter of routine for newspaper editorials. But even so, what was true as esoteric wisdom is still true as exoteric talk. A period of transformation, in the most radical sense of the term, has be-

gun; we are in the midst of it, asking whether its outcome for our generation and for those following will be creation or chaos.

What is the place of freedom in this stage of society?

First, what is the place of the freedom of meaningful creativity in spite of purposes forced upon individuals and groups by foreign powers or by the trend of the historical development? An outstanding example of the former is the subjection of the industrial masses to the arbitrary purposes of the economic rulers, while the destruction of the middle classes and their proletarianization is an important example of the latter. In both cases people are deprived of their freedom of meaningful creativity, of historical self-determination and consequently of their full humanity. The period of transformation will increase the loss of meaningful creativity. A few people—economic or political leaders, civil or military dictators, newspaper, radio, or movie czars, members of the inner cabinet in so-called democracies—will determine the purposes of hundreds of millions of people. The concentration of power which is rooted in a mass society, its technical means and its social and national contrasts will make meaningful creativity more and more difficult and even impossible. Very often, of course, the subjection to foreign purposes is voluntary and requires no coercion. The subjection can be outspoken or silent, it can express itself in noisy praise or in silent acceptance of the purposes established by the ruling group. As long as this is the case the freedom of meaningful creativity is not lost. But in a system in which democratic outlets are lacking, a situation must unavoidably arise in which the purposes of the ruling group and of the ruled masses become opposed to each other. In such a situation, meaningful creativity is severely endangered. There are only two ways to maintain it, the religious and the revolutionary, and both must be adopted at the same time. The religious way can save the consciousness of man's essential freedom, of his humanity and dignity, even in an epoch in which the process of dehumanization has gone very far and historical freedom has almost disappeared. The religious question is the question of the ultimate meaning of life, expressed in religious or in philosophical terms. Whether the consciousness of man's natural freedom is saved

in Christian or in Stoic concepts, whether the "freedom of the Children of God" or the "freedom of the wise man" is the symbol in the name of which humanity is maintained—if it is maintained—does not depend upon the religious way alone. If historical freedom disappeared completely, man's essential freedom would perish in spite of faith and heroism. But there is a way in which historical freedom can be maintained even in a period of its suppression: the way of revolutionary resistance. This does not necessarily mean actual revolution. Generations of revolutionaries may wait for it in vain. But it *does* mean the way towards revolution, it *does* mean latent resistance before and manifest resistance when "the day" comes. In the period of the suppression of historical freedom the revolutionary attitude is the refuge for meaningful creativity and humanity.

The second question is: What is the place of the freedom of autonomous creativity in spite of collectivistic authority, forced upon every realm of life by totalitarian claims? There is no doubt that the period of transformation, at least in its first part, must lead to collectivistic and authoritarian systems with more or less totalitarian claims. The example, laid down by the Fascists, and—on the basis of the opposite principle—by the Soviets, will be followed (although with important moderations) by the democracies. The tremendous task of a fundamental transformation of the world, politically and socially, will permit no other way. The consequences for the freedom of historical self-determination, especially for the freedom of autonomous creativity, will be very grave. An outstanding example of what will happen is the suppression of the freedom of the universities and of many other institutions of science and learning in the totalitarian countries. Men are deprived of their right, and in the long run of their ability, to ask for the objective structure of reality and to act in accordance with their knowledge of things. A process of deterioration in all realms of cultural creativity is initiated, which finally endangers the totalitarian systems themselves.

How can the freedom of autonomous creativity, the second condition for historical freedom, be saved in such a situation? Two answers, again, must be given, a suprahistorical one on the

one hand, and an historical one on the other. These are of vital importance in considering the problem of freedom. Starting with the second we suggest: *In a totalitarian period the freedom of autonomous creativity can exist only in an esoteric form.* In order to explain this proposition it is necessary to mention the different types of esoterism and to ask what bearing they may have on cultural creativity in the period of transformation. There is a *natural* esoterism which always has existed and always will exist because it is rooted in the differentiation of human abilities. This natural esoterism is entirely compatible with the most liberal management of intellectual freedom. The esoterism of higher mathematics or of the knowledge of foreign languages or of the work of the physicians or industrial leaders is not exclusive in principle; it is a natural, not an intentional, esoterism. Everyone who is able to understand the material is a potential member of the esoteric group, which is not a group in any sociological sense. There are no protective measures to safeguard this kind of esoterism because it is protected by its very nature.

Another kind of esoterism is just the opposite of the first; it is entirely *artificial* and is not grounded in the material itself. It can be found in groups which create a mystery around themselves in order to be more attractive or in order to maintain exclusiveness and social prestige. Ruling classes often protect themselves by esoterism of this kind in order to keep down the controlled classes. Religious and nonreligious sectarians use esoterism as a means to enhance their own self-consciousness and their esteem by those excluded. Priests, scholars, physicians, sometimes abuse the natural esoterism, implied in the difficulty of their material, by augmenting this difficulty artificially in order to increase the superiority and exclusiveness of their profession.

The third type is the *mystical* esoterism. It is rooted in the fact that some religious and psychological experiences are impossible without strict preparations. In this instance, mystical esoterism is related to natural esoterism. But since the initiation into the mystery group is often dependent on some more or less arbitrary rules, the mystical is related to the artificial

esoterism. In many cases it is difficult to draw the line between the two.

The fourth type of esoterism is the *educational*. It is rooted in the idea that not everything can be said to everyone at every moment, that some things can be said only at the right time and in the right place, and some things cannot be said at all to some people. There is a truth which ceases to be truth if it comes to people who necessarily misunderstand and abuse it. This is the reason why educational esoterism is used practically by every educator at all times and can never be omitted. Even the most autonomous method in education must adapt itself to the different degrees of maturity in the object of education. The fact that many educators intensify educational esoterism in order to enhance their authority over their pupils does not refute the essentiality of educational esoterism.

Very close to educational esoterism, and to a certain degree identical with it, is the fifth type, the *political* esoterism. We exclude from this term all kinds of revolutionary movements which are forced to conceal themselves in order to escape persecution by the ruling powers. In such "catacomb groups" esoterism of the mentioned types may develop. But the fact of flight from persecution is not esoterism in itself.

Political esoterism is the attempt to keep in some kind of seclusion knowledge or ideas which are considered to be dangerous for a political and social system. The problem, faced by every government, even the most democratic, is: How much truth and how much error can be admitted, without dangerous consequences for the group, as a matter of public knowledge and public discussion? Truth is dangerous for people who are not able to understand the whole truth, namely, the totality of implications in a special truth. Therefore the pronouncement of a special truth can lead to actions that contradict the whole truth and entail destructive consequences. The danger of error is obvious. But the difficulty is that there is no truth without possible and even unavoidable error. Truth lives in the process of finding truth, and this process involves error, often extremely dangerous error. If everyone participates in the process of finding the truth, it can happen that the masses are grasped

by an error strong enough to destroy a whole system of life. In former centuries natural esoterism prevented the uneducated masses from participating in political, social, and intellectual decisions. The problem of esoterism was actual only for narrow groups. And even within the small stratum of educated people, only esoteric groups were allowed or allowed themselves to discuss the fundamental problems of religious and political life. Public discussion of these problems involved the danger of inquisition and condemnation by Church and State. In the later Middle Ages the doctrine of the "double truth" was an attempt to enlarge the esoteric groups without surrendering the principle of esoterism. First with the rise of Protestantism and enlightenment, esoterism as such broke down. Liberalism, supported by the new means of mass education—newspapers, popular magazines, radio, movies, etc.—narrowed down more and more even the realms of natural esoterism. Today esoterism in every form seems to have disappeared. But actually it has not. Those who control mass education and mass propaganda are protected by a new type of esoterism—the esoterism of political power without public responsibility. It was easy for the totalitarian systems to take over this esoterism and to apply it to the dictatorial form of government.

Dictatorial esoterism is determined by the political interests of the ruling group. It can and must admit some freedom of autonomous creativity within the limits of this interest. But it can never go beyond these limits. Therefore, dictatorial esoterism necessarily creates revolutionary esoterism. Not the fact that it has to conceal itself makes it esoteric, but the fact that only small groups are able to participate in the creation of something which is able to stand the test of the future. Only people with courage and patience, vision and rationality, at the same time, can constitute this "esoterism of political vanguards." It seems that these groups will be the main bearers of the freedom of autonomous creativity in the period of transformation. It would be necessary that they remain esoteric even if there were no persecution, because the dictation of truth into slogans while the generation of a truth is still going on destroys its creative power completely. But at the same time it is obvious

that esoterism is not purpose in itself for these groups. Revolutionary esoterism, as directed against hidden or manifest dictators, has the tendency to make itself unnecessary by creating a fundamental conformity on the basis of which free discussion and the freedom of autonomous creativity are possible. The aim of revolutionary esoterism is democratic exoterism.

People who belong to the political vanguard need a faith that cannot be destroyed, either by force from without or by skepticism from within. Everyone who belongs to such a group needs a realm in which he is beyond his own skepticism and his own weakness. This realm is not necessarily a special religious doctrine or a special philosophical principle. It is faith and heroism with respect to truth in whatever terms truth may be expressed. In some epochs it is not a disadvantage that only people who are willing to stand sacrifice and persecution are able to maintain truth and autonomous creativity. The creative spirit, after a period of practically unlimited freedom, may need the hardships of suppression and persecution in order to become more serious, profound, and vital than it was in a period of safe and unhindered self-expression. Nevertheless, the freedom of autonomous creativity and self-determination must be the final aim of revolutionary esoterism.

Finally we ask: What is the place of the freedom of self-fulfilling creativity in spite of the destructive social conditions that will prevail in the period of transformation? These conditions are unavoidable because of the heavy losses connected with radical changes, because of the catastrophes inescapably resulting from these changes, and because of the pressure, exercised by the dictators, those hidden as well as those manifest, on all groups of people. There is and there will be a tremendous amount of suffering and destruction of vital power in large masses. Self-fulfilling creativity will become more and more the reservation of a few leading groups while all the others must toil as parts of a mechanism, unable to reach happiness in their work and continuously threatened by insecurity through the possible loss of work. How can the freedom of self-fulfilling creativity, how can happiness, be saved in such a situation? Again two answers must be given. It is the greatness of reli-

gion and the reason for its power over the human mind in all periods of history that it can provide a happiness of a different type, called, by religion itself, "blessedness." Religion as well as those who attack it has very often distorted the meaning of blessedness by interpreting it as the promise of a happy life after death! But this is only its mythological expression. Its real meaning is the presence of blessedness in a situation of deepest distress and in the extinction of normal happiness. The religious concept of "eternal life" points to a freedom of self-fulfilling creativity which is dependent on an ultimate source of happiness beyond the contrasts of normal happiness and normal unhappiness. Therefore religion and philosophy as far as they maintain the idea of "eternal life," as present in the temporal and transitory existence, are able to give the first answer to the "quest for happiness." It is an answer which in some situations of human life, and certainly in many situations in the period of transformation, will appear as a mere paradox. It is a paradox, but nevertheless it is true and witnessed by philosophers and prophets.

But the suprahistorical answer alone is not sufficient. It must be completed by an historical answer. Happiness as a paradox alone is impossible. It must also become an actuality. How is this possible in the period of transformation? It is possible only if the transformation is taken in a revolutionary sense. The happiness which cannot be drawn from the present reality must and can be drawn from the anticipation of a future reality. *Freedom of self-fulfilling creativity in the period of transformation can be saved only through anticipating creativity.* There is a happiness of anticipation without which the life of the masses would be utterly meaningless and desperate. It is probably the greatest achievement of the socialist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that they have provided "happiness by anticipation" for those who struggled with them for a new order of life. Today the active power of these movements is almost broken. But it does not follow that the creative impulse is broken! It can be renewed in small groups which are able to anticipate future fulfillment, to struggle for its realization, and to maintain happiness by anticipation. Although the

weapon of these groups in the period of transformation is not aggression but resistance, it implies creativity, self-fulfilling creativity by anticipation.

Many aspects of the problem of freedom are not even mentioned in this essay. The problem of national freedom in a world which becomes narrower every day and urgently needs some form of supernational unity is not considered. The freedom of economic liberalism is only implicitly considered. Its breakdown in all countries is one of the three fundamental causes for the period of transformation. No utopian description of the freedom after the period of transformation is given. The possibility that this "after" will be the "chaos" has prevented such an attempt.

Our question was: How can freedom be saved in a period in which it is becoming more and more a matter of defense and retreat. A tyrannical collectivism denies man's essential freedom. But freedom, historical freedom, must be saved if humanity is to be saved. Servitude is dehumanization. What we have tried to show is the way in which freedom can be saved in the coming period. It is a narrow one, not spectacular, but profound.

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THE BALANCE OF PROGRESS OF FREEDOM IN HISTORY

“IT has always been a grave question,” says Abraham Lincoln, “whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people, will be strong enough to maintain its existence in grave emergencies.” This remark goes to the root of one of the most important problems of human history. There is a balance between cultural freedom and freedom in the political and economic spheres. There is a balance between the independence of the individual and the power of the State. To strike the balance which secures sufficient stability without checking progress in freedom has been the greatest problem of statesmanship from the dawn of history to the present day.

There is a great factor to be considered in the obvious slowing up of the progress of mankind. There are conditioned reflexes which not only govern the psychology of the individual but also that of the social group at large. Not only the individual habits are built upon them, but also the customs and mores which rule the habits of group life. If progress routs out one evil habit, it throws into jeopardy at least ten indifferent and perhaps a certain number of good ones. It is due to our psychological nature that we must act by the use of conditioned reflexes, partly in the unconscious sphere, and only to a very small extent through conscious choice under the rule of reason.

Any progress really made by mankind cannot endure unless it becomes thoroughly anchored in the existing culture so that its processes can be performed largely through unconscious con-

ditioned reflexes by the great mass of the people. It is for this reason that much progress attempted and successful for a short span of time, but not sufficiently anchored in the minds of the people, has been subsequently lost. And at any time that progress has been lost, an older but more stable equilibrium has reappeared. The fate of all religious reformers who tried to erect a totalitarian religious state lies buried beneath this simple truth. But also the fate of the French Revolution, as a political, not a spiritual, movement, can be described in these terms.

What did liberty, equality, fraternity mean to the degraded impoverished populace of Paris after one century of oppression? Adapted to a slave existence, they lost together with the oppressive regulations the conditioned reflexes with which the normal functioning of their morality was bound up. The effect could only be a release of the unbridled instincts of animal life, out of which no higher organized social life could be formed. The historical results are well known. On the contrary, the frontiersman of the American commonwealth at the same period in history already enjoyed the benefits of unregimented liberty, of personal equality, of co-operative fraternity. The American Revolution only confirmed his way of life and sanctioned and hallowed his practical convictions. It is no wonder that the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights completely failed to unleash such excesses as France exhibited to a stunned world.

Nevertheless, the French Revolution did not end in complete retrogression. In the July Revolution of 1830 the democratic France was born. But this revolution aimed at much less than the great revolution of 1789. It meant the ideological confirmation of the way of life of the French *bourgeoisie*, as it had developed in the period from 1789 to 1830, and it brought the ethical principles of cultural and political freedom of that period to domination.

The great French Revolution meant the end of a period of a disproportionate civilization. Sorel, influenced by Taine's esthetic resentments, tried to prove that the revolution could have been halted if only the leading classes would have resorted to force. This thesis, taken up by Pareto, has had the unfortunate con-

sequence of giving rise to the fascist creed and its glorification of force. Let us therefore examine the case fairly.

Under Louis XIV the feudal system of medieval France had been destroyed by the King, who tried to centralize all power by making the court the only place of life for the ruling class. Cultures of this kind make prestige the dominating power of life, prestige in this case to be won only under the shining rays of the central royal sun. We know from the observation of the disproportionate culture of the Northwest Indians today, in their potlatch game, whose essence is not to have but to squander, to what consequences such a distorted culture leads. The dominating psychological tendency in time swallows up all others. La Bruyère in his *Caractères* has sketched the most lively picture of the psychological effects of such a situation. At that time the unavoidable reaction ensued not in France, but in the rest of Europe under the leadership of William of Orange. While in France the young nobility was completely absorbed in playing the game of prestige—very much like the Nazi Fuehrer—William of Orange and the Burgomaster of The Hague formed for the defense of independence and Protestant cultural freedom the formidable League which broke the power of Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession.

That war lasted for approximately eleven years, and for nearly a century longer the broken and defeated system dragged on its cadaverlike existence. Why did the aristocrats of 1789 not use force against the revolution—as Sorel and Pareto believe they could have done? Simply because a system based on prestige cannot last, if it has lost that prestige. The prestige was based on military and kingly glory. It had been challenged by a modest king and a kingly burgher of a small Protestant country which had won its freedom from the domination of the Spanish autocrat. And again the small country of freedom had won against overwhelming odds. This was the verdict against that French culture of prestige, and late but inevitably that culture died under the blow. This is the answer to the question why the French aristocrats did not fight. They could have fought only for a restoration of the kingdom of Louis XIV, for a renewal of its prestige, for a destruction of the vic-

torious civil liberty in Holland, and in the whole Protestant world. Since such restoration of prestige, like that of the Sun King, was impossible, they could not fight. What they could hope for at best was what Mirabeau tried: to cross the bridge to a democratic world before it was too late. It is correct to say that if Mirabeau had not died, this possibility might have become a reality and the French Revolution might have taken a constructive turn, bringing to France that freedom which Holland owed to its decisive victory over the French system nearly a century before.

Let us view another example of our thesis, namely, that progress in freedom not sufficiently anchored in the culture of the people must fail. Prussia, the Prussia of Frederick the Great, could continue the feudal system until the World War because it had under Frederick's father blended carefully the centralizing system of Louis XIV with the cultural liberty of Holland. This blending of traditions made possible the complete separation of justice from executive power under the great King. In Prussia one could sue the sovereign without his consent, a right not conceded to the American citizen by the Constitution, and the miller of Sans Souci in doing so saved his mill from condemnation by the King himself.

Prussia in this blending of power with right could develop during the nineteenth century, with some oscillations, a system of cultural progress in which academic freedom was paramount. Through the defeat of the World War, however, the element of historic prestige in this blended culture was wiped out. Certainly the democratic Republic achieved progress in freedom. However, the republic then erected through defeat, in contrast to the republics in Switzerland and in the United States founded on victory, lacked a necessary element of prestige from its very beginning. It entirely lacked emotional appeal. A monarchical reaction, if a suitable pretender had existed, might have meant a milder retrogression, bringing back the stimuli which were lacking in every field because of the disappearance of a power of prestige such as the former monarchy had represented.

There came instead an attempt, grown out of the World War and first seen in Italy, to create a system of democratized

prestige, namely, the Nazi system in which the prestige was flowing from one central source in an unheard of ramified system of smaller and smaller channels. The destruction of democratic freedom, therefore, was due to the fact that it did not fill the void left by the fall of monarchy. This lesson must be drawn: that progress in human freedom cannot be made, that restraints to political or economic or cultural freedom cannot be removed, if these restraints satisfy cultural and political needs which are imperative and contribute to the stability of society.

Only by winning a great prestige, for instance, by establishing a union of Germany with Austria, which Chancellor Bruening attempted, could the freedom of the German Republic have been saved and the progress in freedom have been preserved. And what is true for progress in political freedom is not less true for economic freedom, and also to a certain extent, for cultural freedom. As soon as too many restraints are removed at the same time, the cycles of conditioned reflexes break down in an unexpected manner and the gain in freedom is not preserved. The sum of progress in freedom at any time in history is limited by the very psychological nature of man.

It was advantageous for the building of the system of political freedom in the United States that the economic and cultural field at the time of its growth was relatively problemless. This, of course, only means that the restraints present were little felt. Puritanism was still so powerful that men did not yearn for a life which was abundant in the European way. Not all taboos were respected by all at all times, but this was a private, not a public, problem. Hence the possibility arose of removing further and further the restraints of political freedom. It was characteristic that the problem of slavery, though well before the minds of the fathers of the Constitution, was not touched at the time of its creation.

Let us still consider a final example, where the overemphasis on cultural freedom destroyed the freedom in the economic and the political sphere: the example of the Greeks in the classic age and in Byzantium. The Greeks had by indulging in personal cultural refinement prematurely weakened their will to defend their independence. The result of this pitiful develop-

ment was the educated Greek slave of the rough but brave Roman master, and in the Orient the unhappy Byzantine serf of the barbaric system of the Turks. To blame some unique characteristic of the Greeks for this is entirely misleading. As long as they were independent, the Greeks were in no way of a different character from other independent people. But the rapid emancipation of the mind as visible in character destroys the stability of character on which independence rests. And with the loss of independence the ethical character of Greek culture completely disintegrated.

From these observations the consequence can be drawn that the Marxian contention that political freedom without economic freedom is worthless is incorrect. We see, in fact, that the practical attempt to achieve the Marxian economic freedom has first destroyed cultural freedom and has not produced political freedom. Grave doubts must prevail whether they will be regained in any foreseeable future. Perhaps a further example, analogous to those we have mentioned, will be developed illustrating that any disproportionate progress in one direction will cause a complete loss of liberty and independence in another. The safer way for progress in freedom is the way of the gradual removal of barriers and restraints one after another with the full conservation of all gains already made. In the United States political freedom does not need further improvement at this time, in our opinion, but economic freedom and cultural freedom call for progress. The unequal distribution of opportunity for economic rise is probably the very reason for the present stagnation, and it is in this field that greater freedom must be achieved in the near future.

The Historic Position of the Problem of Freedom

We are at the end of this discussion, and in conclusion we may call attention to the fact that no matter how successfully the empirical science of the nineteenth century has increased positive knowledge, the synthesis leads back to the speculative thought of the eighteenth. Such romantic ideas as those of Rousseau that man must only be freed from the shackles of

culture to be perfect find no justification in our present-day knowledge. We know that man freed from some shackles will produce new ones for himself. Human nature has no natural equilibrium which is strong enough to support itself. Reason and morals are necessary to support social equilibrium and to prevent society from becoming a disproportionate structure with eventually Hippocratic traits.

Cultural anthropology has shown that many a culture which we believed primitive is full of exaggerated social growth and has become self-blocked against progress. But in one respect, the standpoint of the eighteenth century was correct, the potentiality for progress in freedom is everywhere present in human nature. With a slight modification in the formulas of the thinkers of that period who used the language of Deism, we can establish the principles of freedom on nearly the same basis. The fundamental difference consists only in the position of evolution. But it is noteworthy that the German thinker G. E. Lessing aimed at something quite comparable when he tried to synthesize the liberal principles of the century by the idea of a cosmic education of mankind. Say evolution instead of education, and the difference in standpoint becomes infinitesimal.

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MEDIEVAL UNIVERSALISM AND ITS PRESENT VALUE IN THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

THE aim and purpose of this communication is to describe a certain aspect of medieval thought and medieval culture that can be rightly considered as typical of that period, and whose lasting value is so high that everything should be done in order to revive it under some form suitable to our own times. I am thereby alluding to the deeply rooted medieval conviction that though the various expressions of truth unavoidably bear the mark of their local origins, truth itself, both in the speculative and in the practical order, is not true for a certain civilization, or for a certain nation, but belongs to mankind as a whole. In short, truth is universal in its own right.

Commonplace as it may be, such a statement would certainly not be allowed to pass unchallenged by some historians, especially in the field of medieval philosophy. They would rather favor the contrary view, that before anything else, medieval civilization was the work of a new race, whose specific qualities were for the first time expressing themselves in theology, philosophy, literature, and fine arts. These historians do not always agree on the exact nature of the message brought by that new race to the medieval world, but they seldom think of questioning its existence. For instance, in his famous *Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*,¹ Heinrich von Eicken has suggested that the German genius brought to the

¹ Stuttgart, 1887; ed. of Berlin, 1917, p. 168.

Middle Ages a hitherto unknown feeling for the value of individualism. According to a more recent philosopher and historian, Dr. H. E. Lauer, things were slightly more complicated. What strikes him as typical of medieval culture is the outstanding part that was played by France in its development. All that was of really vital importance in medieval thought and art, Dr. Lauer says, first originated in France: scholastic theology, scholastic philosophy, poetry, polyphonic music, and Gothic architecture. If we were now to ask him why French philosophers and artists were the first to create new forms of thought and new artistic styles, his answer would be that the French were but a particular branch of the German stock which, being slightly more precocious than the rest, were naturally the first to express the fundamental tendencies of the German race—not individualism, nor a mystical feeling for the unspeakable depths of reality, but something quite different, which Dr. Lauer calls a *Bewusstseinseelenanlage*. Instead of being characterized, as had been the Greeks, by exceptionally brilliant dispositions for intellectual creation, the Germans had an exceptionally fine feeling for moral conscience and its many problems. Let us then suppose that the French were the first among the Germans to develop that disposition, and it will become clear that nobody but they could have created the medieval forms of theology, philosophy, literature, and art.²

Such generalizations are always impressive. It is very tempting to reduce an enormous amount of various facts to a single cause, yet as soon as we try to reconcile facts with their supposed cause, there usually arise a few difficulties. Even granting that there are such things as races, and that races are characterized by some psychological features scientifically describable, the problem of finding out what psychological features are typical of such and such a race would raise huge difficulties. For instance, without questioning the intellectual ability of the Greeks, it is rather hard to think that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans had no special feeling for the nature and exigencies of moral conscience. As to the medieval

² H. E. Lauer, *Die Volkseelen Europas, Grundzüge einer Völkerpsychologie auf Geisteswissenschaftlicher Basis*, Vienna, 1936, pp. 54-58.

Germans, I would not at all deny their exceptional ability to deal with moral and religious problems, but it is difficult to forget that they were greatly helped in realizing the importance of such problems by their knowledge of the Old and New Testaments, that is to say, of the two books that are a complete expression of the moral and religious feeling of the Jewish people. As to the French, their own case would raise an incredible number of similar difficulties. We are asked by Dr. Lauer to consider them as an exceptionally precocious branch of the German stock; but the founder of medieval philosophy in France, Peter Abélard, was born a few miles from Nantes, in Brittany, and we know certainly that he never ascribed his philosophical genius to some exceptional qualities proper to the German race. He used to call himself a *Brito*, that is to say, in Abélard's own words, one of those men who are thus called because they are brutes: "*Brito dictus est quasi brutus.*" In spite of some honorable exceptions, the fact remains that "what the man who coined the name *Brito* had in mind, when he copied it from the word brute, was that the better part of the Britons are fools."³

Of course, it could be objected that Abélard, though a brilliant exception, was but an exception. Let us therefore grant Dr. Lauer that there was in the Middle Ages such a thing as a distinct French nation, that it was a distinct branch of some common German stock, most generously endowed by nature with a special feeling for ethical problems and so precocious that it was able to do pioneering work in that field. After all, if the French really created scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology, to say nothing of the rest, there should be some reason for it. The only question now is: Did they actually do it? And, for that matter, did any particular race, people, or nation do anything of that kind, between the ninth and fifteenth centuries? Strangely enough, not one of those who have resorted to the most brilliant explanations for the spiritual supremacy of the French during the Middle Ages has even dreamt of questioning the fact under discussion. Everything goes in their theories as if a so brilliantly and perfectly explained fact had lost

³ Cf. Ch. de Rémusat, *Vie d'Abélard*, Paris, 1855, Vol. I, p. 3.

all rights not to exist. Yet its existence is an important question and, as it seems, the first one to be asked.

That during the Middle Ages the center of philosophical and theological studies was situated in Paris is an unquestionable fact. A medieval chronicler once wrote that just as Germany had got the Empire, and Rome the Pope, Paris had got the University. But the very wording of that striking formula clearly shows that the problem at stake has nothing to do with the particular interests of a nation or of a race. What we today call Europe was then considered as a loose, but real, moral entity, endowed with a unity of its own, ruled by a common temporal power, a common spiritual power, and quickened by a common intellectual and moral life. It is enough to consider the intellectual activity of the Parisian scholars at the time when their newly founded University reigned supreme in the fields of philosophy and theology, to realize the nonnational and non-racial character of medieval thought.

Who was the first professor of international repute to teach in Paris? Alexander of Hales, *Doctor irrefragabilis*, born about 1170-1180 at Hales, in the county of Gloucester; he was an Englishman. Immediately after him came Albertus Magnus, *Doctor universalis*; born in Lauingen, in 1206-1207, Albertus was a German. The most famous among his contemporaries was the Franciscan saint, Bonaventura, *Doctor seraphicus*; born in Bagnorea, in 1221, Bonaventura was an Italian. During the same years when that Italian was residing in the Franciscan convent of Paris, another Franciscan was writing there his main works; born in England around 1210-1216, Roger Bacon, the *Doctor mirabilis*, was not a Frenchman. As to the most illustrious among those professors, Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, born in 1225 at Roccasecca, near Aquino: he was an Italian. His most dangerous opponent, Siger of Brabant, whose name is honorably mentioned by Dante in the *Divine Comedy*, was what we should today call a Belgian. Saint Thomas's rival in acuteness of mind and metaphysical genius, Duns Scotus, was born about 1265, at Littledean, near Dumfries. Although some of his fellow-countrymen might more willingly forgive me for calling him a Frenchman than an Englishman, the fact remains

that the Subtle Doctor was Scottish—and very much so, at least if what an old commentator says is true, that one of the main reasons why William of Ockham always contradicted Duns Scotus was that the one was an Englishman while the other was a Scotsman, people who seldom agree (*qui raro concordant*). In point of fact, there is not a single European nation, including Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, to which France is not indebted for part at least of her intellectual and moral formation. This is a debt which, I hope, shall never be forgotten. If, as I honestly believe, I have not overlooked a single important Parisian doctor in the thirteenth century, the question how many Frenchmen were there among them can easily be answered: not a single one. Such is the fact, and were we tempted to call it an astounding fact, our very surprise would be a sufficient indication that we have lost the medieval feeling for the universal character of true learning and that the Middle Ages still have something to teach us on that point.

As a matter of fact, there was nothing to surprise a medieval scholar in what seemed to him a perfectly normal situation. In the first place, no medieval professor would have considered himself as representing the particular truth of a chosen people, trusted by God and nature with the mission of teaching it to the rest of the world. On the other hand, if he went to Paris as a student, and often stayed there as a professor, it was not because of some exceptional precocity of the French genius. Like everybody else, he knew full well that Paris was an exceptional and, in a way, a unique place of learning. Schools were there the like of which could not be found in any other part of the world, but neither in the mind of an Englishman, of an Italian, of a German, nor of a Frenchman were those schools a French affair. They were in France, as the Empire was in Germany and the Papacy in Rome, but neither the Empire nor the Papacy nor the University was a local institution. True enough, the question why they were there rather than somewhere else could still be asked; it often was, and in the case of the University it received an answer which I beg to relate, for it is both historically and philosophically significant.

In the first chapter of the famous Chronicle of St. Gall, its

anonymous author tells us how two Irishmen, who had crossed the Channel on an English boat, once landed on the French coast and arrived at a small town on market day. As was to be expected, those foreigners soon found themselves surrounded by people who wanted to know what sort of goods they had come to sell. The answer was that they had brought nothing with them but wisdom and that their intention was not to sell it, but to give it free to anybody who might care for it. The only reward they were asking for such a gift was a shelter and some food, so that they could teach and live. No sooner had the mighty Emperor Charlemagne been informed of their arrival than he summoned the two scholars to his court. To one of them, Clemens of Ireland, he assigned France as a permanent residence. As to the other one, whose name was Albinus, he was directed to Italy, with the special mission of teaching there all those who might choose to study under his direction.

I am quite ready to grant that the Chronicle of St. Gall is not a model of historical accuracy. In point of fact, the man whom it calls Albinus was not Irish, but English; again, he was not sent to Italy by Charlemagne, but was simply met by the great emperor while he was journeying back from Italy to England; last but not least, the old Chronicler does not seem to realize that the Albinus whom he has described as arriving from England at the end of his first chapter is the same whom he is about to describe as leaving England at the beginning of his second chapter. The main point however is not there. What I am now concerned with is much less the historical reliability of that ancient Chronicle than the general meaning ascribed by its author to the epoch-making events which he relates. What he says on that point at least is perfectly clear: "When Albinus, who was English by birth, heard it said that the most pious King Charles so graciously welcomed all learned men, he boarded a ship and went to him. Now, that Albinus was a disciple of the most learned Bede, and his knowledge of Holy Writ far excelled that of any other man in modern times. For those reasons did King Charles always keep him at his own court until the end of his life, save only during such periods when he was making war. The King felt always proud to be

called his pupil, and he himself always called Albinus his own master. He gave him the Abbey of St. Martin, near the city of Tours, so that he could stay there during the King's absences, and teach those who crowded there from all sides in order to hear him." Then comes the final and highly significant statement of the old Chronicler: "Albinus's teaching bore such fruit that the modern Gauls, or French (*moderni Galli, suo Franci*), now stand the equals of the ancient Romans and Athenians" (*antiquis Romanis et Atheniensibus aequarentur*).⁴

This was of course a naïve exaggeration, but the very enthusiasm by which it was dictated is in itself an instructive fact. Besides, there remains in the old monk's historical tale a solid nucleus of truth. There really was an Englishman who called himself Albinus and whose real name was Alcuin. He had been born around the year 735, the son of noble parents, in the neighborhood of York. Trusted by Charlemagne with the special mission of organizing schools and spreading learning in a then practically wild country, Alcuin so well fulfilled the most ambitious expectations of his master that, at his death, France had already become in Europe a universal center of learning. It is hardly exaggerating to say that, without Alcuin's missionary work, the birth of the thirteenth-century University of Paris could not be fully explained; but what is especially interesting for us in that story is something else. It is the fact that, in the eyes of a foreign observer, France had become the main European center of studies, not at all because the French genius had created learning, but merely because, through an Englishman, she had received it from the Greeks. That modest interpretation of facts was never questioned by anybody during the course of the Middle Ages. The French poet Chrétien de Troyes repeated it, in particularly eloquent and moving terms, at the beginning of his rhymed novel *Cligès*, as if it were an obvious and universally recognized truth. We find it quoted again in the *Speculum* of Vincent of Beauvais and in the Great Chronicles of the Kingdom of France. As Chrétien de Troyes had said, what an honor, but at the same time what a respon-

⁴ *Sangallensis Monachi De Gestis Caroli Magni*, Book I, Chap. 1, 2, in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia* (Latin), Vol. XCVIII, col. 1371-1373.

sibility! Having fallen heir to Greek and Latin learning, those men felt that it was their solemn duty to keep it, to foster it, and when such would be the will of God, to pass it in due time to other nations, just as they themselves had once received it. They certainly felt proud of having been selected by God for such a mission, but to the best of my knowledge not a single one ever claimed the privilege of having created out of nothing a new truth and a new culture, either for himself or for his own country.

Unless we see it in the light of that intimate conviction, such an extraordinary institution as the thirteenth-century University of Paris ceases to be an intelligible fact. The slightest pretension, on the part of any nation, to be the independent source of a merely local truth would have made life unbearable to that crowd of Englishmen, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Spaniards, Danes, Swedes, and so on, who were teaching and working together in Paris. Seen from afar, and quite especially from our own times, a university of that type seems so incredible a phenomenon that many historians have tried to account for it by a certain lack of national feeling in the members of the University. I cannot help thinking that there is something wrong in that explanation. Those men were not different from us by reason of something we have, and which they did not have, but rather by something they had and which unfortunately we have lost.

When the English humanist, John of Salisbury, went to France in 1166, his personal reactions to that new environment were most distinctly English. His letters show that he was quite disturbed by the fact that, though he was there on a secret mission, practically everything related to it seemed to be already known in France. Those French, he writes to Thomas of Canterbury, must have very clever spies, be they English or French, for the most private things that have been said in our own deliberations are known by them in the smallest details. The Count of Soissons, for instance, talks about it as though he had personally attended all the meetings. Yet, as soon as that Englishman arrived at Paris and saw its schools, the stupendous sight brought his indignation to an end. "When," John says, "I first

descried that ladder of Jacob whose top reached up to heaven, and it was as a way for the Angels of God ascending and descending on it, I felt compelled to confess at the sight of their joyful intercourse that truly the Lord was in that place, and I did not know it. And the famous poetic saying then occurred to my mind: *Felix exilium, cui locus iste datur!*"⁵

What can be said of such great scholars as John of Salisbury was no less true of common students. As everybody knows, each of them belonged to a definite group that was called a "nation," and those so-called nations were not overfond of each other. There was a good deal of national rivalry between them. As Jacques de Vitry tells us: "They wrangled and disputed not merely about their various sects or about some discussions, but the differences between the countries also caused dissensions, hatreds, and virulent animosities among them, and they impudently uttered all kinds of affronts and insults against one another." They affirmed that the English were drunkards, and had tails; the sons of France proud, effeminate, and carefully adorned like women; they also said that the Germans were furious and obscene in their feasts, and so on, until at last, reaching the end of his long catalogue of various abuses, Jacques de Vitry coldly concludes: "After such insults, from words they often came to blows."⁶ Since, in spite of their national feelings, those students and masters succeeded in living and working together, there must have been in their minds some other ideal, high and strong enough to hold in check national pride. What was it?

It was, before anything else, a religious ideal. Some historians have attempted to describe medieval Europe as endowed with a political unity of its own. It is partly true, and partly an illusion. In a way the Holy Roman Empire always remained a more or less abstract myth; it was a dream that never came fully true, except, perhaps, much later, in the books of its his-

⁵ Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris, 1889, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.

⁶ As translated by D. C. Munro, *The Mediaeval Student*, Philadelphia, 1895, p. 19; also quoted by C. H. Haskins, *The Rise of Universities*, New York, 1923, pp. 25-26.

torians. In the same way, it would be just as correct to say that even medieval Christendom never quite succeeded in becoming a concrete and tangible reality. Christendom, that is to say a universal society of all Christians, tied together, even in the temporal order, by the bonds of their common faith and common charity; men thinking, feeling, and behaving as true Christians should do, loving and helping each other as true children of the same Father who is in heaven—all those magnificent virtues were perhaps not much more common in medieval societies than they are now. The main difference between our medieval ancestors and ourselves does not lie there, it rather rests with their belief in the absolute value of those virtues. The best among them were fully convinced that there was an order of absolute religious truth, of absolute ethical goodness, of absolute political and social justice, to which differences had to submit and by which they had to be judged. In other words, besides being members of various political and racial groups, those men felt themselves both members of the same Church and fellow-citizens in a temporal community whose frontiers were the same as those of Christian faith itself. Irrespective of their various countries, two Christians were always able to meet on the same metaphysical and moral grounds, with the result that no national considerations could ever be allowed to interfere with such questions. Religious life being the same for all, there was no reason why John of Salisbury should not have been appointed as a bishop of Chartres; and why indeed should French people have been appointed as professors at the University of Paris, since better men coming from foreign countries were at hand? They were not asked by the University to teach what was French, but what was true. Thus did it come to pass that, viewing themselves as members of the same spiritual family, using a common language to impart to others the same fundamental truth, those medieval scholars succeeded in living and working together for about three centuries, and so long as they did, there was in the world, together with a vivid feeling for the universal character of truth, some sort at least of occidental unity.

Is it now possible for us to recover it? I feel inclined to think

so, at least to some extent and under certain conditions, the first of those conditions being not to dream of the Middle Ages as of some lost paradise, or a golden age, to which it would be our imperative duty to go back as fast as possible. For better or worse, we are now living in the twentieth century, and the only thing for us to do is to make the best of it. The disruption of medieval Europe into national groups, attended by the growth of more and more nationalized educational institutions, has been, as far as we can judge, a practically unavoidable fact. Let it be added that the multiplication of national centers of culture, first in Europe and later in America, cannot be considered as in itself an evil. On the contrary, much good has occurred in the past, and much more will no doubt follow in the future, from the fact that many human groups, working in different conditions and developing different mental habits, are co-operating in the same effort for the advancement of learning. Let us therefore quietly accept our own times, with the firm conviction that just as much good can be done today as at any time in the past, provided only that we have the will and find the way to do it.

A second illusion to be set aside is that the present lack of religious unity unavoidably condemns the modern world to live in a state of complete dispersion, both in the moral and in the intellectual order. It is true that the Middle Ages were powerfully helped by their faith in the unquestionable validity of the Christian truth; medieval unity, in so far at least as it was a reality, was essentially the unity of the common faith. Yet it was at the same time something else, which, closely related to it and even rooted in it, was nevertheless distinct from it. When Alcuin died, on the nineteenth of May, 806, his long-cherished dream was already beginning to materialize; to use his own words, a new Athens had been erected in Frankland, "nay a more excellent Athens . . . which being ennobled by the mastership of Christ our Lord, would surpass all the wisdom and learning of the Academy." With a remarkable insight, Alcuin had soon perceived that religious unity could not live, and still less quicken political bodies from within, unless it found in them, already established by literary

and scientific culture, some sort of natural unity. As he himself once said, in the new Athens the seven liberal arts would be there to support the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The whole intellectual history of the Middle Ages was to justify Alcuin's own position on the question. In those times the central problem that spiritual authorities had to solve was, how to universalize Christian faith? A very hard problem indeed, for they were in charge of the Catholic Church, and catholic means universal; but faith is not universal in its own right because, strictly speaking, it cannot be logically nor experimentally proved. The acute feeling of that difficulty can be rightly considered as the psychological origin of the extraordinary development of philosophical culture in the Middle Ages. Since faith could not possibly be proved by reason, the only hope of universalizing it was to make it at least acceptable to reason. Hence the remarkable emphasis laid by medieval theologians on the rational aspect of religious truth, as well as on the universal character of rational truth itself. To most of them the necessary foundation for solid theological studies was logic; to some of them, it was mathematics and experimental science as it was known in their own times; but all of them were of one mind on the fundamental principle, that since there was a philosophical, moral, and scientific truth, it could not but be one and the same for all races and all nations. In short, coupled with their belief in the universal character of religious faith, there was in those scholars an equally strong belief in the universal character of rational truth.

This part at least of their ideal could be fruitfully upheld and, if need be, revived in our own days. The problem of religious unity essentially belongs to the theologians, but the problem of philosophical unity is in itself an essentially philosophical problem, and unless philosophers tackle it, somebody else will solve it for them, and probably against them. This indeed is a point in which each and every one of us should feel vitally interested; culture and learning themselves are at stake, and with them the very freedom of the mind which is their only conceivable source. Whether we like it or not, the sad fact is that after losing our common faith, our common philosophy,

and our common art, we are in great danger of losing even our common science and of exchanging it for State-controlled dogmas.

Such a development was to be expected. A good many years ago, at a meeting of the Société française de Philosophie where the notion of democracy was under discussion, the French philosopher Jules Lachelier made the casual remark that the only conceivable form of democracy was theocracy and, he added, that very kind of theocracy which William Penn had once established in the forests of Pennsylvania.

Both Lachelier and Penn were no doubt alluding to the Book of Judges (21:25), where it is written: "In those days there was no king in Israel, but everyone did that which seemed right to himself." Strangely enough, the Book adds, those free men grew weary of their freedom, and as Samuel himself was getting old, they went to him and said to him: "Make us a king, to judge us, as all nations have." And the word was displeasing in the eyes of Samuel; for he had been a good judge; he had always enforced the law of the Lord, but he was afraid lest, by some fault of his, he had induced the people of Israel to reject that law. The Lord knew his thoughts, and he said to him, "Hearken to the voice of the people in all that they say to thee. For they have not rejected *thee*, but *me*, that I should not reign over them."⁷ Yet, before granting the Jewish people what they wanted, God clearly told them what the right of the King was going to be: "He will take your sons, and put them in his chariots, and will make them his horsemen, and his running footmen to run before his chariots. And he will appoint of them . . . to plough his fields, and to reap his corn and to make him arms and chariots. Your daughters he will also take to make him ointments, and to be his cooks. Moreover, he will take the tenth of your corn, to give his servants."⁸ We have seen all those things, and worse; but since men have declined to be ruled by God, and now that there is nobody to arbitrate between them and the State, who is going to judge the King?

⁷ I Sam. 8:7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 11-15.

It thus appears that despite its paradoxical appearance, Lachelier's statement was fundamentally sound, in this at least, that as soon as men refuse to be ruled directly by God, they condemn themselves to be ruled directly by man; and if they decline to receive from God the leading principles of their moral and social conduct, they are bound to accept them from the King, or from the State, or from their race, or from their own social class. In all cases, there will be a state-decreed philosophical, moral, historical, and even scientific, truth, just as tyrannical in its pretensions, and much more effective in its oppressions of individual conscience, than any State religion may have ever been in the past.

Against the encroachments of the totalitarian state in its various forms, our only conceivable protection, humanly speaking at least, is in a powerful revival of the medieval feeling for the universal character of truth. I say feeling, because it is a natural temptation for every one of us to coin a truth of his own, made after his own image and likeness, so that its contemplation may give us at the same time the selfish pleasure of self-contemplation. We have so often thought and written that the *discovery* of truth is a personal affair, that we have come to think that truth itself is a personal affair. Yet the most commonplace truth is infinitely better than a whole system of the most original errors. Now, perhaps, is for us the time to remind ourselves and to teach others the old Greek principle, that unity is better than multiplicity. Not uniformity, which is the mere lack of diversity, but unity, that is to say, the rational ordering of a manifold reality. Do we believe that truth is one? Are we convinced that truth consists in finding out an order where there is one as in nature and putting it where there is none, or not enough of it, as in moral, social, and political life? Upon our answer to that first question hangs the future of the mind and of what is left of its liberty.

Should we answer it in the affirmative, it would then become necessary for us to go a few steps farther. If it is our honest conviction that truth is one, it will be our absolute duty to stick to rationalism as the only sound form of philosophy. Humanly and naturally speaking, there is no unifying power

above reason. It could even be said that, absolutely speaking, it really is the only unifying power. What is rationally true is universally true, for the only thing that lies behind truth is reality itself, which is the same for all. Not so with feeling, be it moral, social, or national feeling; not so with intuition, be it the highest form of esthetic or metaphysical intuition; and still less than with anything else with the will, its passions, desires, or interests of any kind. Every time philosophy yields to the temptation of giving up reason as an organizing power, it regularly brings about the triumph of those obscure forces whose self-assertion is the only possible justification. Deep intuition is always my own intuition; good taste is always my own taste; sacred feelings are my own feelings, and, in the long run, lawful interests are always my own interests. Where those forces do not serve individual selfishness, they serve the still more tyrannical selfishness of social and national groups. The only thing in the natural order that is unconditionally and unreservedly neither mine nor yours, but ours, is reason. But what is the proper use of reason?

Medieval philosophers would answer that it consists in using it according to its own nature, which is to judge things according to what they are. Every sound rationalism is at the same time a realism. In spite of their many differences, all varieties of idealism agree precisely in this, that nature is determined by the laws of the human mind. Medieval realism, on the contrary, always stood firm on the Greek platform, that the human mind is right when it conforms to reality. In other words, medieval rationalism, taken in its purest forms, always went hand in hand with some sort of realism. Now it is a fact that ever since the seventeenth century realism has been considered by most philosophers as a naïve and antiquated philosophical position. Until the realistic reaction that has recently taken place, particularly in England and in the United States, scholasticism remained the only upholder of a seemingly lost cause. We are now beginning to realize what vital interests were at stake, in the most concrete order of reality, behind those academical discussions. When it is pursued to its ultimate conclusions, a rationalism of the idealistic type always con-

siders itself as justified in prescribing what reality ought to be. As he rejects all material and external criteria of what is true or false, the idealist usually ends in establishing what is his own individual truth as a universally valid dogma. Reason itself then becomes the very reverse of what it should be; instead of a unifying force it acts as a principle of intellectual and social division.

It is a common experience to every one of us that we are easily satisfied with our own ideas. We are strong on building theories, or a general interpretation of an enormous number of facts, on the knowledge of a very small number of facts. And once our convictions have been formed we stick to them, in spite of all that other people, equally satisfied with their own convictions, may say to the contrary. What does this mean, if not that we are naturally, normally, the prisoners of our own convictions? What is true of our everyday convictions is equally true of philosophy and of science. By deciding that the human mind is free to prescribe its own law to things, idealism has, under pretense of liberating the human mind from those things, enslaved the human mind to itself. This is the reason why we are today confronted with several scientific interpretations of the world, each of which is equally dogmatic in itself and contradictory to the others. As to philosophy, it is strictly true to say that today each philosopher has his own system, and that far from being disturbed at the idea that his system is not accepted by anybody else, he rather rejoices in it. If he were satisfied with accepting as true what everybody else holds to be true, he would not consider himself as original; nor would he be considered as such by the others. As a rule, modern philosophers disagree; it is their dignity, or rather, it is their very essence, because they are idealists, while the only thing that can reconcile different human minds is the recognition of an independent reality upon the existence and nature of which they can agree. True, in the thirteenth century, as in our days, there were many doctrinal oppositions, and many philosophical divergences, but, at the same time, there was a common agreement on a certain number of fundamental doctrines, because all philosophers admitted the existence of an order of things

and tried to express it. As the things were the same for all of them, what they could say about things was at least comparable, and what all of them were saying represented at least an effort to express the same reality. Today, the effort of an idealist has no other object than to express his mind, and as all our professors of philosophy in all the colleges and all the universities where idealism is prevailing are teaching their students to express their own minds, to describe, not the world as it is, but the world as they see it, the result is that we have as many philosophies as we have minds; rather, the result is that we have so many philosophies and so few minds.

For indeed, what is a mind that feeds upon itself? It is empty. As St. Thomas Aquinas used to say, the human mind is made to say that that which is, is; and that which is not, is not. Thus centered upon things, the mind feeds upon them, by assimilating them and conforming its own thoughts to their nature. When our knowing power is filled up with things, it is a mind, and then it can express itself, because it is. But it cannot do it unless it first gathers within itself that knowledge which it finds only in the external world. This is the reason why, when a professor of philosophy asks his students to evolve, each of them, an original conception of the world, he forgets that the only real originality for a human mind is not to describe things as it sees them, but as they are, and that unless a man believes that his mind is regulated by things, he will never have anything true to say.

Let us therefore frankly state that we are realists; that we do not care for a system of philosophy so personal that nobody save ourselves would be ready to accept it. The true freedom of mind is to yield to the teaching of facts; to reject our own preconceived ideas every time somebody else is able to show us that they are wrong; in short, mental liberty consists in a complete liberation from our personal prejudices and in our complete submission to reality. This is the true spirit of scholastic realism. And besides, it is Christian. The Gospel does not ask us to say: "It seems to me, hence it is"; or, "I do not think so, hence it is not so"; but, "Est, est; non, non: that which is, is; that which is not, is not." Either we shall be free

from things, and slaves to our minds, or free from our minds because submitted to things. Realism always was and still remains the source of our personal liberty. Let us add that, for the same reason, it remains the only guarantee of our social liberty.

For it is a last and all-important feature of medieval philosophy that its rationalism was not only a realism, but a personalism as well. Just like trees and any kind of living things, men are individualized and distinct from each other by their bodies. Such is the metaphysical reason why, grounded as it is on matter, individualism is always a source of divisions and oppositions. When men consider themselves as mere individuals, the so-called liberalism is bound to prevail, until political disorders and social injustice make it unavoidable for the State to become totalitarian. Individualism always breeds tyranny, but personalism always breeds liberty, for a group of individuals is but a herd, whereas a group of persons is a people. Just as they are individuals by their bodies, men are persons by their intellects. Now it is a remarkable character of intellectual knowledge, at least as medieval philosophers understood it, that it is in us both strictly personal and wholly universal. As a rational being, every one of us is a person, that is to say an original source of true knowledge and of free determinations. Yet, precisely because and in so far as our knowledge is rational, it is universal in its own right. Human reasons and human wills are bound to agree, to the full extent that every one of them keeps faith with its own nature, which is to be rational. Our only hope is therefore in a widely spread revival of the Greek and medieval principle, that truth, morality, social justice, and beauty are necessary and universal in their own right. Should philosophers, scientists, artists, make up their minds to teach that principle and if necessary to preach it in time and out of time, it would become known again that there is a spiritual order of realities whose absolute right it is to judge even the State, and eventually to free us from its oppression.

Rationalism, realism, personalism, such were the philosophical foundations of medieval universalism, such also are today

the philosophical conditions for its revival. No nations, no races, no learned bodies have anything to lose by favoring such an attitude; never was the French influence more warmly welcomed or more universally felt than in the thirteenth century, when it exerted itself through that strange University of Paris, where not a single one of the most famous professors was French. This is one of the most useful lessons we can still learn from the Middle Ages, and one that should remain before our minds as a safeguard against the worst kind of slavery to which mankind is now being submitted by totalitarian states—mental slavery. In the conviction that there is nothing in the world above universal truth lies the very root of intellectual and social liberty.

2. FREEDOM FOR THE MIND

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SCIENCE, FREEDOM, AND THE WORLD OF TOMORROW

EVEN though "prophecy is the most gratuitous form of mistake," and even though there is obviously the possibility that something so completely foreign to my thinking may happen as to make any prognosis that I may hazard now appear ridiculous in the years to come, yet I am going to be foolish and rash enough to forecast that, barring the return of the dark ages through the triumph the world over of tyranny over freedom, of the spirit of world conquest over the spirit of reason and peaceful change, life in America fifty or a hundred years hence will not differ nearly as much from the life of today as the life of today differs from that of a century or even a half century ago. The processes and techniques that have been responsible for the enormous changes of the last century will continue to improve our economic and social well-being, and to assure potentially a state of freedom for man, but the main changes will come from a more general understanding by the voting public of the nature of these processes and a more intelligent use of them. This will mean the gradual elimination of the effort to violate natural and social laws or, arithmetically stated, to make two plus two equal six, as we have been so ignorantly and so disastrously trying to do in much of our social floundering of recent years.

So long as one is considering only the physical or biological basis of change the informed and competent scientist has some reason for confidence in his analysis as to the general direction

which progress can and must take. He at least knows a great many sorts of things that will *not* happen, and these are in the main the very things that the uninformed dreamers and wishful thinkers—the emotional pseudo reformers, not the real ones—hope and expect to see happen. Thus, we shall never be able to transform the energy released in the burning of coal or in the absorption of the sun's rays directly and completely into electrical energy. Indeed, we shall never be able to go very much farther in this direction than we have already gone.

Today the most efficient internal combustion engines transform into work 35 per cent of the heat energy released in the burning of the fuel, and it is safe to predict that in continuous operation we shall never be able to make very great advances beyond this limit. By that I do not mean that through improvements in details efficiencies in the neighborhood of say 50 per cent are completely out of the question. But in any case, the so-called second law of thermodynamics, which has now taken its place as a part of the core of established knowledge in physics, stands in the way of the realization of the dreams of the multitude of inventors and magicians who still want to transform the sun's heat rays directly and completely into work. Though the knowledge that it cannot be done is less than a hundred years old, it is about as firmly established as is the law of gravitation.

I have chosen the foregoing illustration because it lies at the very base of any correct analysis of what science has done and of what it is capable of doing in the future in bettering man's lot on earth. Let us look first at what it *has* done, for this will enable us to understand better what it can do. When in 1825 my grandfather loaded into a covered wagon his young wife, his Lares and Penates, and all his worldly goods, and trekked west from Stockbridge, Massachusetts, first to the Western Reserve in Ohio, and again in 1838 to the banks of the Rock River in western Illinois, the conditions of that migration, the motives prompting it, the mode of travel of the emigrants, their various ways of meeting their needs and solving their problems, their whole outlook upon life, were extraordinarily like those which existed four thousand years

earlier when Abraham trekked westward from Ur of the Chaldees. In a word, the changes that have occurred within the past hundred years not only in the external conditions under which the average man, at least in this Western world, passes his life on earth, but in his superstitions, such as the taboo on the number thirteen or on Friday sailings (why, my own grandmother carried a dried potato in her pocket to keep off rheumatism), in his fundamental beliefs, in his philosophy, in his conception of religion, in his whole world-outlook, are probably greater than those that occurred during the preceding four thousand years all put together. Life seems to remain static for thousands of years and then to shoot forward with amazing speed. The last century has been one of those periods of extraordinary change, the most amazing in human history.

If, then, you ask me to put into one sentence the cause of that recent, rapid, and enormous change and the prognosis for the achievement of human liberty, I should reply, *It is found in the discovery and utilization of the means by which heat energy can be made to do man's work for him.* The key to the whole development is found in the use of power machines, and it is a most significant statistical fact that the standard of living in the various countries of the world follows closely the order in which so-called laborsaving devices have been most widely put into use. In other words, the average man has today more of goods and services to consume in about the proportion in which he has been able to produce more of goods and services through the aid of the power machines which have been put into his hands. In this country there is now expended about 13.5 horsepower hours per day per capita—the equivalent of 100 human slaves for each of us; in England the figure is 6.7, in Germany 6.0, in France 4.5, in Japan 1.8, in Russia 0.9, in China 0.5.¹ In the last analysis, this use of power is why our most important social changes have come about. This is why *we* no longer drive our ships with human slaves chained to the oars as did the Romans and the Greeks. This is why we no longer enslave whole peoples, as did the

¹ These figures are substantially as given in Read, *An Economic Review*, 1933, p. 58; and in Hirshfeld, *Toward Civilization*, 1929.

Pharaohs, for building our public structures and lash them to their tasks. This is why ten times as many boys and girls are in the high school today in the United States as were there in 1890—more than five million now, half a million then. This is why we have now an eight-hour day instead of, as then, a ten, a twelve, or sometimes a fourteen-hour day. This is why we have on the average an automobile for every family in the country. This is why the lowest class of male labor, i.e., unskilled labor, gets nearly twice as much in real wages in the United States as in England, three times as much as in Germany or France, and thirteen times as much as in Russia, and this is why the most abused class of labor in the world, domestic service, is even better off relatively in this country though completely unorganized, i.e., through the unhampered operation of economic laws, than is any other class of labor, skilled or unskilled, in other countries.

Do not think that these are the one-sided pronouncements merely of an enthusiastic scientist. Anyone can check them who will begin to study them. Listen to President Karl Compton's formulation of the results of his similar historical studies.² He says, "From the days of the cave man, all through history up to the modern era of science, there were only two primitive recipes for securing the materials desired for the more abundant life. One was to work hard and long in order to produce more, and the other was to take the good things of life from some one else, by theft, conquest, taxation or exploitation.

"To get the good things of life by taking them from others is a primitive instinct, undoubtedly developed by the age-old struggle for existence. We have all seen monkeys, or seagulls, or wolves, or pigs snatching food from each other, fighting to possess it, or shouldering each other away from the trough. When human beings carry this philosophy too far beyond the accepted standards, as did Jesse James and John Dillinger, we call them 'public enemies.' But this same philosophy of taking what we want from others, by violence and trickery, or by

² *The Social Implications of Scientific Discovery*, delivered at the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, March 15, 1938 [Lancaster, 1938].

legalized strategy and force, has run all through human history.

"But, in recent times, modern science has developed to give mankind, for the first time in the history of the human race, a way of securing a more abundant life which does not simply consist in taking away from someone else. Science really creates wealth and opportunity where they did not exist before. Whereas the old order was based on competition, the new order of science makes possible, for the first time, a co-operative creative effort in which every one is the gainer and no one the loser.

"For this reason, *I believe that the advent of modern science is the most important social event in all history.* It marks the point at which men have come to understand themselves and the world they live in well enough to begin systematically to control the hidden forces of nature to their advantage. Already science has done wonders to raise the standard of living and of knowledge, but these hidden forces are so great that we are assuredly only at the beginning of things possible.

"Some significant facts regarding the effect of the machine on the wages and employment of the worker are these: Counting 1840 as about the year in which power machinery came to be important in the United States, we find a steady increase since that date in the ratio of average wages to average prices of commodities, so that it is now about seven times what it was in 1840. In other words, the average wage earner in America can today buy seven times as much with his wages as he could in 1840; or more than twice as much as he could in 1910. Also despite increasing population and increasing use of labor-saving machinery, the percentage of our population gainfully employed increased 25 per cent between 1870 and 1930.

"More material progress has been made during the past one hundred and fifty years under the American system of business enterprise than during all the preceding centuries in world history. This record of achievement is a challenge to those who would radically change that system. . . . Under this system, the United States with a population of less than

7 per cent of the world's total controls about 40 per cent of the wealth of the world. One hundred years ago the average person had about 52 wants of which 16 were regarded as necessities. Today the wants number 484 on the average, of which 94 are looked upon as necessities."³

These facts, with their primary cause, are basic in enabling us to forecast the possibilities of improvement and of acquiring a state of true democratic liberalism in the century that is ahead. They make it well-nigh certain that we shall increase in economic well-being and in potential liberty in the future just as we have in the past in just the proportion in which we continue to apply science and engineering to our industries and thus produce more and more in goods and services per man hour, thus freeing more and more men, more and more time, and more and more brains for education, for research, for art, and thus for human freedom. There is a saturation point for automobiles and radios, but there is no such thing as saturation in education, in the service industries generally, or in liberty.

Civilization consists in the multiplication and refinement of human wants. It is a simple historical fact that these wants have actually developed with great rapidity wherever and whenever laborsaving machines have been rapidly introduced. In 1900 60 per cent of our population was on, or supported immediately by, the farm; in 1930 not over 25 per cent. Without serious unemployment in that period the millions of displaced farmers found their way into garages, service stations, newly created secretarial jobs, news reporting, a newly created telephone service, advertising, insurance, gardening, domestic service, and a thousand other service industries, and no serious or prolonged unemployment occurred until the enterprisers who normally create the new positions began to be suppressed, legislated against, and intimidated by unwise financial and political policies. The faster science and engineering are applied to industry the faster we ought to progress. There is literally no other way of comparable effectiveness to raise the standard

³ This last paragraph of the quotation from Compton he in turn takes from a pamphlet distributed by the First National Bank of Boston.

of living, and the chief element in its effectiveness is in getting more power into the hands of the laborer so that he can produce more for himself, for in the last analysis the laborer taken as a whole gets under almost any modern social system practically all that he produces. According to the United States Department of Commerce, in 1936 labor received directly 66.5 per cent of the national income. Indirectly, it received nearly all the rest of it, since the idle rich represent an insignificant fraction of the population and they pass on practically all that they receive to workers of some kind.

My forecast of the future, then, must depend on what the future's sources of power are to be and on the cost of that power. That is why I began with a consideration of the possibility of getting more work out of a pound of coal. At present the main sources of power are coal and oil, with water playing a minor role and being in general more expensive. This situation will continue for a thousand years, for though the oil will perhaps be gone in fifty years, the coal will last for at least another millennium. The big steam plant is now nearly or quite as efficient as the best Diesel motor, but for small power purposes, motor vehicles and the like, the internal combustion engine is and will continue to be indispensable. However, we already know how to make liquid fuel from coal, so that when the oil is gone we shall still be able to get liquid fuel for our internal combustion engines. There are, I think, no other possible sources of power of comparable cheapness. When the oil and the coal are gone we shall get our power either directly from the sun through solar motors or windmills or tidal machines, or else indirectly through growing and burning plants; but it will then cost us more than it does now. So far as tapping the energy "locked up in the atoms" is concerned, we can dismiss that possibility. We can of course do it now in principle through radioactivity, but I see no possibility fifty years from now of supplying the world's power needs, or even a minute portion of them, from any such source.

For the foregoing reasons, then, fifty years from now the world will look to us, from the point of view of power, not so very different from what it looks now. Air travel will of

course have increased, but the great bulk of the freight will go as now by surface vehicles or by steamships propelled in the essential particulars much as they are today. The art of communications, too, is already a pretty well perfected art, and though it may be considerably cheaper than now, more messages being simultaneously carried over a given cable, so far as the techniques used are concerned I do not expect any very radical or startling change.

Among the natural sciences biology has the opportunity to do the big new things so far as their immediate effect on human living is concerned, and I have no doubt that in the field of public health, the control of disease, the cessation of the continuous reproduction of the unfit, etc., big advances will be made, but here I am not a competent witness, and I find on the whole those who are the most competent and informed the most conservative.

The most burning and most uncertain situation about the future has to do with social and political matters, and it should be remembered that all the preceding forecast was based on the assumption that our present civilization would not be destroyed by man's present or prospective international wickedness, stupidity, and folly. I know of no direct way in which science can prevent that, for I see no prospect of our ever being able to turn some new type of ray upon a dictator filled with the lust for power and conquest and thus transform him into a humanitarian. Indirectly, however, the sciences of explosives and poison gases, of aerodynamics, of communication with its corollary, the rapid spread of knowledge among the people, are doing the work. The fact that the ultimate resources are in the democratic countries, as the science of geology has shown, something like three-fourths of the coal and the metals, the ultimate sources of power, being in these countries and that these countries can be and have already been roused to arm to defend themselves, that is the great influence that gives promise that a permanent method of assuring peace may ultimately be worked out. But these countries must have the intelligence, the long-range selfishness to see the hopelessness, the folly at a time like this, of a policy of division and isolation. They must obvi-

ously, it seems to me, join their powers in time to show the international bandits the hopelessness of their spring at the throat of the world. If they, including ourselves, will do this then I stand by my prognosis of a golden age of human liberty and human dignity ahead through the further growth of science and its application to the well-being of mankind.

Edwin Grant Conklin

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INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

IN the old Castle at Nuremberg in Germany is a museum containing a "torture chamber" where are preserved the instruments by which heretics and freethinkers were formerly tortured with hot irons, thumb screws, racks and wheels on which bodies were disjointed, and the famous Eiserne Jungfrau within whose embrace the bodies of victims were slowly pierced by iron spikes. These old-time martyrs for intellectual freedom were generally theological heretics, though some of them were searchers for scientific truth. Of late the vast number of martyrs have been victims of political or racial intolerance, but the spirit of intolerance is essentially the same whether theological, political, or racial. Such intolerance is directly opposed to intellectual freedom and to the true spirit of religion, science, social harmony, human brotherhood, and the dignity of man.

I have been asked to write about "Intellectual Freedom." It is enough to say that without such freedom there can be no continuing progress in science. The very foundation of science is intellectual freedom: freedom to seek the truth wherever it may be found; freedom to experiment, to "try all things and hold fast to that which is good"; freedom to criticize, modify, and verify; freedom to hold and teach any conclusion for which there is verifiable evidence. The man of science recognizes that knowledge is incomplete and subject to revision, that there is no legitimate compulsion in science except the compulsion of

evidence, and that truth can never be established by authority or compulsion but only by the appeal to facts and by rational persuasion.

The aim of science is to know the truth rather than to support creeds or dogmas, whether these be theological, political, or scientific, in the conviction that even unwelcome truth is better than cherished error, that the continued welfare of mankind depends upon the increase and diffusion of knowledge and ethics among men, and that such truth alone can make us free.

For many centuries the search for truth has been hampered or stopped by those who assumed that they knew the whole truth and that it could be established by force. They compelled acceptance of their ideologies by death, torture, or "protective isolation" and so far as possible they put an end to free inquiry and genuine science. But always the free spirit of some men has refused to be bound by such limitations. In some of the world's greatest heroes the flame of intellectual freedom could not be quenched, and they have kept alive for us the most noble and precious heritage of man.

Science should be the supreme guardian of intellectual freedom, but in this world-crisis few individual scientists have fought the foes of freedom, and organized science in the countries most affected has done little or nothing to oppose tyranny. When academies of science are regimented for certain political creeds, when biology as well as sociology must adopt the creed of Marx, science has committed suicide. Dictated science is pseudo science. Dictators seek to control men's thoughts as well as their bodies, and at present intellectual freedom is stifled in certain great countries of Europe with "a cruelty more intense than anything Western civilization has known in four hundred years." We may not be able to help our brother scientists in other lands by direct action but we can by such a co-operative effort as the synthesis of ideas in this volume depicts—the effort to clarify the confusion that exists in values—convince them that the spirit of science still survives here, and thus bring to them our sympathy and the assurance that freedom has not perished from the earth.

What can we do to stem the tide of intolerance which is rolling over the earth? How can we most effectively maintain our freedom? These are the most important problems that confront us today. First of all it is most important for us to remember that freedom is not a gift of nature or of God. It has been bought with a great price. Through long centuries of struggle and martyrdom men have been winning freedom from the rigors of nature and the tyrannies of men, from slavery of the body and of the mind, and it is most important for us to remember that this freedom which has been hardly won may be easily lost. Unless we are willing to pay the price which our ancestors paid we also may lose our freedom, as so many others have done in these times.

But it would be a sad conclusion if such endeavors as the one of this volume were to end only in eloquent, rhetorical phrases and emotion. Other things than emotion are needed if we are to meet the dangers which threaten. It behooves us to consider the causes that have led to suppression of freedom elsewhere and as far as possible to avoid those conditions here. Science seeks the causes of phenomena and would control them by controlling causes.

Chief among those conditions, strange to say, was individual freedom carried to such extremes that it led to social anarchy. A free society is based upon compromise and adjustment. Life itself is such a compromise or balance between opposing forces, and a free society is based upon compromise among antagonistic opinions. All social freedom is lost when intolerance of opposing opinions of individuals, labor unions, political parties, social classes, leads to anarchy. In the establishment of this government the clashing views of many of the founders nearly led to the failure of the entire enterprise. But the spirit of compromise, so notably represented by Benjamin Franklin, finally led to adjustment of differences and the adoption of our Constitution. The particular danger that threatens reformers of all types is the inability or refusal to make adjustments among opposing opinions, stubbornly to insist that their views are the only true ones. If only idealists, reformers, parties, and nations had more of the spirit of genuine science

they would know that human knowledge is relative and not absolute; they would conceive it possible that they might be mistaken, and most of all they would be willing to make temporary compromises and adjustments in the interests of social harmony in the conviction that time which tries all things would sooner or later establish the truth.

Intolerance breeds intolerance not only in Russia, Italy, and Germany, but also in America. That way lies the loss of all freedom. Let us avoid in America the causes which have led to the loss of freedom in these countries of Europe.

I I

We turn now to the scientific basis of freedom and democracy. In the discord, suffering, and terrors of these troublous times it is comforting to get the long and wide view of human evolution and history. In a famous passage in Sir George Trevelyan's *Garibaldi* he pictures a visitor on the Janiculum Hill overlooking Rome and the valley of the Tiber and reviewing the drama of human history that had been enacted on that world-compelling stage. In such a grand drama, minor characters and events, however important they may have seemed at the time, are subordinated to the main course of human history throughout the ages.

In similar manner science affords a large, timeless, Olympian view of the course of human evolution. Viewed from this standpoint, what do we learn regarding the principles of democracy? Are these principles minor and fleeting events in the drama of evolution, or do they represent major achievements and trends, both individual and social?

The birth and growth of freedom from fixed mechanical responses may be witnessed by comparing the behavior of the lowest animals with that of the higher ones, or by contrasting the responses of germ cells with those of developed organisms. We do not need to go back five hundred million years in evolution to study these earlier forms of life; we can study the earlier stages of development in the individuals of today, the reactions and responses of germ cells and early embryos, and

contrast them with the behavior of adult forms. We find in the earlier forms, whether in evolution or in development, that responses are fixed and mechanistic to a very large extent, but as development progresses, both in evolution and in individual development, we find increasing freedom from fixed mechanical responses.

In protozoa and germ cells responses are relatively fixed, although even here behavior may be modified under repeated irritation and failure of the stereotyped response to bring relief. In higher animals and in later stages of development there is still greater ability to modify behavior in order to avoid injury or find satisfaction. Finally in the highest animals and especially in man we find increasing ability to regulate behavior in the light of past experience and thus to attain a certain degree of freedom from rigidly fixed behavior. Here, in this manner, we have the dawning grace of a new dispensation, the open door into a life of freedom, choice, purpose.

Animals seeking satisfaction—and they all do—learn by trial and error to avoid unfavorable environments, to find favorable ones, to escape from or dominate other animals, to protect their young, and often to render mutual aid to one another: in short, they adapt themselves to their environments and conditions of life. Man alone is able to control his environment and adapt it, at least to a certain extent, to his needs, rather than adapt himself to environment. Through long centuries of discovery and invention man has been achieving freedom from the rigors of nature, so that he is now able, in large part, to control his sources of food and clothing, to provide for himself not only shelter from the weather, but artificial climates by means of heating, illumination, and air conditioning. He is no longer wholly dependent for food and clothing upon the bounty of nature, but by means of agriculture, transportation, and refrigeration he can levy tribute upon the whole earth for his needs. He no longer relies solely upon his own muscular effort, nor upon the labor of human slaves, in carrying out his plans and purposes, but he harnesses the illimitable forces of nature, water power, steam, and electricity, to do his work. He is no longer limited in habitat to a single locality,

but by means of rapid transportation and communication he has become a citizen of the entire earth.

But even more important than this conquest of material nature and the freedom it brings is the winning of the freedom of body, mind, and spirit from the tyrannies of other men. Through long centuries of struggle and martyrdom man has been winning freedom from slavery of body. In all former civilizations slavery was accepted as a necessary and even a divine institution. In ancient Egypt and Assyria hundreds of thousands of miserable slaves toiled under the lashes of their masters to build great cities, monuments, and tombs, and to wage wars for the glory of rulers and kings. Even in Greece, in its golden age, only one-fifth of the population were free persons, and the grandeur that was Rome was founded on the labor and suffering of multitudes of slaves. Through all the centuries down to recent times slavery has persisted, but within the memory of many persons now living slavery as a legal institution has been abolished everywhere.

More slowly, and yet more significantly, the passing centuries have witnessed the gradual emancipation of the minds and spirits of men from the domination of overlords. The spread of education through free schools, free assemblies, free press, and now the radio, is bringing information and enlightenment to more and more people, and is correspondingly weakening the bonds of superstition and authority. No longer do free men think only what they are told to think, believe all they are told to believe, and submit without criticism to the orders of dictators. For many people, alas, this freedom of mind and spirit is still abridged and denied, but who can view this main course of history and doubt that it is leading to ever more intellectual and spiritual freedom for the common man?

The scientific evolutionist reviews a billion years of past evolution and looks forward to perhaps another billion years of evolution in the future. He knows that evolution has not always been progressive; that there have been many eddies and back currents in the stream of progress, and that the main current has sometimes meandered in many directions; and yet

he knows that on the whole it has moved forward. Through all the ages evolution has been leading toward wider and freer intellectual horizons, broader social outlooks, and the more invigorating moral atmosphere of the great sea of truth.

And yet there is no possibility of attaining absolute freedom for the individual or for society. As individuals we are hedged about by limitations of heredity and environment beyond which we cannot pass. No human beings, not even rulers or autocrats, are absolutely free in body, mind, or spirit. Freedom has its necessary limitations, and yet within those limits mankind has been, through all the ages, attaining to the largest possible degree of personal freedom. In similar manner, no society is perfectly free; indeed, society is possible only by placing limitations upon personal freedom in the interests of the general welfare, and different social organizations can exist only by recognizing the rights of other organizations.

Life itself is possible only by preserving balance between the organism and its environment, between anabolism, or building-up processes, and catabolism, or breaking-down processes; between heredity, or that which is inborn, and environment, or the conditions under which we develop. Every living thing is as delicately balanced between contrasting principles or opposing forces as a tightrope walker passing over Niagara Gorge—loss of balance means death, and all death is due to loss of balance or adjustment in this perilous business of living. In similar manner, intellectual life depends upon the preservation of balance between instincts and intelligence, emotion and reason. Social life and progress consist in preserving a proper balance between the individual and society, liberty and duty, freedom and responsibility. We forever sail the narrow sea between Scylla and Charybdis, and on either coast lies destruction of life, sanity, society. The only way of safety is the *via media*. Extremes of individualism or socialism, of democracy or autocracy, of anarchy or slavery, are equally fatal to social organization and progress. We hear much of late about the equalization of opportunities for individuals in our society, but little about the equalization of responsibilities; much about the rights of man and little about the duties of

man. The American Revolution emphasized the rights of man; we need a new revolution to emphasize the duties of citizens.

Everywhere organization means differentiation and integration, that is, specialization and co-operation. These are the companion principles of all progress, whether it be the development of an animal from an egg or the development of society from separate individuals. In the development of an egg differentiated cells, tissues, and organs appear, but all of these are integrated so that they work together in the larger life of the animal. Such a biological individual is the most perfect type of organization known to man and hence it is called an organism. The association of individuals in society is a much more recent product of evolution and a much less perfect form of organization. Therefore the organization of the animal body has always been regarded as the ideal for the organization of society. This was the theme of the ancient fable of the quarrel between the belly and the members, and it is the basis of Paul's exhortation to the Romans and the Corinthians regarding what the biologist today calls "the organism as a whole," or holism:

Now are they many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary. . . . And whether one member suffer, all members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it.—I Cor. 12:20-26.

This integration of the members is brought about in our own bodies by the fact that all parts of our bodies are developed from a single germ and have never been completely separated; also by the fact that all parts are bound together by common circulation of food, oxygen, and hormones or chemical messengers, as well as by a common nervous system.

Such a perfect organization as that which is found in the human body, where all the parts co-operate to serve the individual as a whole, has never been attained in any society, though it is approximated in the societies of ants, bees, and wasps, where the social bonds are largely instincts and hor-

mones. These are also the fundamental bonds in human society, but here the instincts have been weakened by intelligence and reason with resulting freedom from rigid mechanical responses of the organism to the various conditions of life. But while this leads to a less perfect social union than in the case of the ants and bees, it is also much more flexible and adaptable. For example, the colonies of ants have not improved during the past three million years of which there are records in the fossil amber from the Baltic; whereas human societies have undergone vast increase and improvement during the eight or ten thousand years of recorded history. Intelligence is much more variable than instinct—"Many men have many minds"—but this variability is a great factor in progress by the methods of trial and error and finally trial and success. The method of experiment, made possible by this very flexibility and adaptability of the bonds of society, is the best assurance of future progress.

Democratic freedom in society does not mean absolute freedom, for this would be anarchy. The normal cells of the body are free to do that which they are capable of doing under the integrating influence of hormones. When such integration is lost, cells grow and increase without limit, and thus tumors and cancers are formed, which lead to the death of the whole body unless such lawless cells are eliminated. Social anarchy, no less than cell anarchy, leads to the death of society if uncontrolled. Social freedom does not mean "freedom from law," but "freedom under law." A free society is based upon the free expression of the will of the majority. "Free governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The founders of this government recognized fully the dangers of popular rule, and they hedged about the possibilities of autocratic rule by a system of checks and balances between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the government. They recognized the dangers of an ignorant majority, and therefore they provided for free, and later compulsory, education of citizens. In spite of these precautions, free government does not always work successfully. The rule of the masses

is often relatively slow and inefficient as compared with the rule of a single autocrat. If the major purpose of government is war, aggression, conquest, or even if it is just mere order and efficiency, then democracy and liberty are at a disadvantage. But is this the main function of government? Is it not rather to equalize, as far as is possible, the opportunities and responsibilities of individuals in society? Is it not one of the main functions of government to educate individuals for self-government? Certainly this is the ideal of the government of children in the family. It is not to impose the will of an autocratic parent, nor to prevent children from making mistakes, but rather to train them for self-government. And the ideals of a free government are to train its citizens for the wise use of freedom. Its methods are those of persuasion rather than compulsion, of education rather than of dictation. Democracy is educative for all who share in it. How much we felt this some time ago, in the conflict regarding the Supreme Court; the whole country became better acquainted with our system of government, if it had not been fully acquainted with it before. Democracy is educative for all who share in it, and it is for this reason that "a free government is better than a good government," as Lincoln wisely said. Autocracy does not train the masses for intelligent participation in society. By suppression of free thought, free speech, free press, it denies to the people the information necessary to the formation of intelligent opinion, and by propaganda and war psychology it promotes hatred of other races and nations. By force, terror, wholesale murder, it compels conformity, and it is therefore the very antithesis of free government.

III

And now I pass on to the second of these fundamental principles of democracy and freedom; namely, "equality." Let us consider the idea of democratic equality as contrasted with the natural inequalities of men. There is nothing more evident than the inherited personal inequalities of men. They are born

white, yellow, black, with great or little mental capacity or value to society. When the Declaration of Independence held this truth "to be self-evident, that all men are created equal," it certainly did not overlook this other self-evident truth, that men are by nature not only different but also unequal. How, then, can we harmonize this apparent contradiction between democratic equality and natural inequality? I have sometimes been asked: "Do you believe in democracy; how then can you believe in heredity? Do you believe in heredity; how then can you believe in democracy?"

Heredity has always been the strong fortress of aristocracy. Privileged classes have insisted that they are by nature—that is, by heredity—superior to others and that this superiority, with all the privileges and emoluments that go with it are passed on by heredity to their offspring. But this is an obsolete and abandoned view of heredity. It confuses the law of the inheritance of property with that of the inheritance of personality; the law of entail with the law of Mendel. A son may inherit the property of his father but not his personality. Under the law of primogeniture the oldest son inherits the kingdom, titles, privileges of his father in their entirety, but not his intelligence, character, or personality. In biological inheritance the germinal factors, or determining causes of the traits of the parents, are separated one from another and redistributed to their offspring, so that the latter are mosaics of ancestral traits. These germinal causes of traits, which are called "genes," are usually transmitted unchanged from parents to children, except that before the union of the male and female cells in fertilization one-half of the genes of each germ cell is discarded, and at fertilization the half in the egg and the half in the sperm come together in a new combination of genes. So numerous are these genes and so varied are the results of their reduction by half in each germ cell and their new combinations in fertilization that no two individuals who are sexually produced are ever alike. Every individual in the world—and there are nearly two billion human beings on this earth—every individual differs from every other one

hereditarily, unless they happen to have come from a single fertilized egg. Sometimes it does happen that the fertilized egg divides into two or more parts having precisely the same genes and the same inheritance; and these then develop into what are known as "identical twins." But with that single exception, no two individuals in the world, of all the two billions that exist, are identical. Every individual is unique. What a marvelous thing it is! This is true not only of human beings; it is true of all sexually produced organisms. It is the main purpose of sexual reproduction to produce unique individuals. So complex is the influence of the genes on one another and upon the whole process of development that no two individuals are alike. Consequently the best traits may appear in parents and be lost in their offspring; genius in an ancestor may be replaced by incompetence in a descendant. As each generation must start life anew from the germ cells, so in every person there is a new combination of inheritance factors. In the process of reproduction every person gets a "new deal," if not always a "square deal."

When we remember that some of the greatest leaders of mankind came from humble parents; that the greatest genius has often had the most lowly origin; that Beethoven's mother was a consumptive and his father a confirmed drunkard; that Schubert's father was a peasant and his mother a domestic servant; that Faraday, one of the greatest scientific discoverers of any age, was born over a stable, his father a poor, sick blacksmith, his mother unable to read or write, and his early education obtained in selling newspapers on the streets of London and later in working as an apprentice to a bookbinder; that Pasteur was the son of a tanner; that Lincoln's father was a ne'er-do-well and his early surroundings and education most unpromising; and so on through the long list of names in which democracy glories—when we remember these, we may well ask whether biological heredity is not essentially democratic.

Old Thomas Fuller wrote many years ago in his "Religious Meditations":

I find, Lord, the genealogy of my Saviour is strangely checkered with four remarkable changes in four immediate generations:

Roboam begat Abia, that is a bad father a bad son.

Abia begat Asa, that is a bad father a good son.

Asa begat Josaphat, that is a good father a good son.

Josaphat begat Joram, that is a good father a bad son.

I can see from hence that my father's piety cannot be entailed; that is bad news for me. But I see also that actual impiety is not always hereditary; that is good news for my son.

It may be objected that I have ended by denying that there is any inheritance of mental or moral traits, but that is not the case. While it is true that good and bad hereditary traits are widely distributed among all men, they are not equally distributed. On the contrary, the chances of good or bad traits appearing in offspring are much higher in some families than in others, but no family has a monopoly of good or bad traits and no social system can afford to ignore the great personages that may appear in obscure families or to exalt nonentities to leadership because they belong to great families. In short, preferment and distinction should depend upon individual worth and not upon family name or fame. This is orthodox democratic doctrine, but not the faith or practice of aristocracy.

Moreover, democratic equality does not now mean and has never meant that all men are equal in personality, but rather that they were created or born equal in their rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." They may later in life lose this inborn equality of rights by crimes against society, but democracy and liberty hold that they were born with these inalienable rights. Democratic equality does mean "Equal Justice Under Law," as the motto over the entrance to the Supreme Court Building in Washington reads; it does mean no special privilege due to birth; it means freedom to find one's work and place in society. It is not a denial of personal inequalities, but the only genuine recognition of them. On the other hand, rigid family and class distinctions are denials of individual distinctions. In short, democratic equality and liberty mean that every man should be measured by his own merits and not

by the merits of some ancestor whose good genes and traits may have passed to a collateral line.

I V

And finally, what has biology to say in regard to "democratic fraternity" and its relation to freedom? Biology proves that we are all cousins, if not brothers. The lines of descent from innumerable ancestors converge in us and, if we are fortunate in having children, they will radiate from us to innumerable generations in the future. If the number of our ancestors doubled in each ascending generation, as it would do if the marriage of cousins of various degrees did not take place, each of us would be descended from more than a billion ancestors of a thousand years ago. Of course, there were not that many people in the whole world a thousand years ago and consequently there must have been many intermarriages of relatives, which would greatly reduce the number of ancestors. Furthermore, many of the general population of that time left no descendants, so that the possible number of ancestors was still further reduced. Allowing for numerous intermarriages of relatives and for many lines that died out, it is highly probable that all the people of English, French, German, and Scandinavian stocks today are descended from one or many common ancestors of a thousand years ago, and a thousand years is a relatively short time as measured by the clock of biology. We are probably no more distantly related than thirtieth cousins and most of us are much more closely related than that.

In length of descent we are all equal. Tennyson wrote:

The gardener Adam and his wife
Smile on the claims of long descent.

And in community of descent we are all cousins, if not brothers. Our lines stretch out to all our race. Each individual or family is not a separate and independent entity, but rather a minor unit in the great organism of mankind. Biology and the Bible agree that "God hath made of one blood all nations

of men." And not only of one blood, but we know that all men have the same number of chromosomes, namely, forty-eight, and very many of their genes are identical, although some, of course, are different. As a result of this common descent, the resemblances between human beings are much more numerous and important than their differences. This fact is especially evident to the biologist, for even the types which differ most widely, such as the white, yellow, and black races, are only varieties or subspecies of *Homo sapiens*, while no other living creature can be classified in the same genus with man, or even in the same zoological family.

Racial and varietal differences represent a natural classification based upon physical characteristics. There are also undoubtedly intellectual and social differences between these major subdivisions of the species which tend to cause a natural and desirable social segregation of the races, but while our instincts lead to such segregation, they do not justify racial antagonisms. The fundamental instincts of all types of men are so essentially similar that all may, and often do, live together in harmony; and the co-operation of all types of men in organized society is so much a matter of education and environment that it has been demonstrated again and again, and nowhere better than in this country, that persons of the most distinct races may have the same social ideals and may co-operate in mutual helpfulness in the realization of those ideals and in the achievement of freedom.

When we come to those minor subdivisions represented by the so-called "races of Europe," the natural distinctions are usually so slight that they form no barrier to the most intimate association and co-operation, unless these races have been taught to believe the reverse. Most Americans represent a mixture of English, French, German, Scandinavian, and other European stocks. I do not know how many of these various stocks each of you readers can trace in your ancestry, but I have had some of each of them among my ancestors, since the time when they came to this country in the early eighteenth century. In general the results of the mixture of these stocks have been good, not only physically but also intel-

lectually and socially. The inherent antagonisms between these stocks that agitators and designing politicians tell us about are really not inherent; they are not born in us but are largely created, cultivated, and magnified by education and environment for national and selfish purposes.

Finally, when we come to social class distinctions which are based only upon occupation, wealth, or social position, we have the most artificial and unnatural classification of all; and the antagonisms between these classes, which are engendered and fomented by designing agitators, are not only noninstinctive, but usually anti-instinctive and utterly irrational. This is not to say that men should not associate in congenial groups which have common interests and ideals. Such associations are natural and inevitable. But when attempts are made to array one group or class against another and to make these classes permanent and hereditary, an artificial disharmony is introduced into society which has no basis in biology, and can work only disastrously and enslave mankind.

Because of the fundamental resemblances among all classes and races of men, and especially because of similarity of their emotions, education and environment can make it possible for all men of good will to understand and sympathize with one another. No more effective means of promoting social harmony and freedom is possible than this ability to understand and sympathize and, in thought, to put one's self in another's position. If this teaching of biological fraternity were to be generally appreciated and practiced, it would largely end the social conflicts that afflict mankind. The three democratic graces are liberty, equality, fraternity, and the greatest of these is liberty.

V

No reasonable person can deny that real, as contrasted with ideal, democracy often falls short of these high ideals, and that freedom is often unachieved. No doubt democracy is often disorderly and inefficient, and is sometimes betrayed by selfish politicians and grafters, but sooner or later—where we have freedom of criticism, freedom of the press, freedom of educa-

tion—sooner or later we “turn the rascals out.” Dictatorships do not escape these evils and they do not train the masses for intelligent participation in government. Democracy rests upon a broad base and is relatively stable; autocracy is like a pyramid balanced upon its apex, and sooner or later it ends in disaster. Democracy contributes more than any other social system to the lasting peace, progress, and freedom of a people. It brings a message of hope and inspiration to all classes and conditions of men. It inspires youth with visions and living examples of

“Some divinely gifted man
Whose life in low estate began
And on a simple village green.”

This is the faith which fired the souls of our fathers and led them to establish this great republic, and these are some of the reasons for concluding that there are no sufficient biological or social evidences that democracy and liberty have been outgrown and must be abandoned. On the contrary, in the present crisis in the history of the world, it is for us who have experienced the blessings of liberty highly to resolve that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

Alvin Johnson

Director of the New School for Social Research

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

ACADEMIC freedom is the youngest born of human liberties. Classical antiquity knew nothing of it, although freedom of speech, freedom to inquire and write, even the private person's freedom to teach, were appreciated and struggled for in Greece as early as the time of Pericles. Organized institutions for the instruction of the child and adolescent existed throughout the Hellenistic world and later, the Roman Empire. There could, however, be no question of freedom for the teacher, as he had set ideals to inculcate, set accomplishments to achieve. Indeed, neither Greeks nor Romans found anything unnatural in manning a school with teachers who were slaves.

Nor could there be any question of academic freedom in the medieval and early modern universities. They were primarily theological schools, and every teacher, however learned, had to be on his guard against charges of heresy. Since the theologians took all knowledge for their private domain, any departure in any field might give rise to the charge of heresy—witness Galileo. The assertion of academic freedom had to await the secularization of knowledge, and had indeed to follow this secularization from afar. The enlightenment of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries was the work of laymen, not holders of university posts—Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists. Kant was an exception to this rule—under the enlightened despotism of

Frederick the Great. Frederick was himself an amateur of the Enlightenment, and by his example a limited sphere of academic freedom became traditional in Germany. In the British universities of the later eighteenth century the professors escaped oppression by the effective device of aloofness from burning issues, an aloofness that maintained itself far into the nineteenth century and left it to laymen like Ricardo, Bentham, the Mills, Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, to advance the revolution in thought that brought the modern scientific age to maturity. Neither had America, in spite of her enthusiasm for liberty, any concern for academic freedom as such. Well past the middle of the nineteenth century the colleges remained chiefly under the domination of the churches. Academic security of tenure depended on conformity and innocuousness, and the infiltration of modern scientific conceptions into the American mind came by way of lay reading circles and lyceums, not by way of the institutions of learning. The ideal of academic liberty first took root with the establishment of the Johns Hopkins University in the seventies. It was an ideal imported from Germany, and many years were to pass before it could become even fairly acclimated.

The essence of academic freedom is the right of the duly qualified scholar to carry on research, teaching, and publication without restraint or interference by the institution which employs him. As citizen of a free state he has indeed the right to carry on these activities without restraint or interference on the part of the public authorities; but the civil guaranties alone are insufficient to make the scholar free in his pursuit of the truth. His ability to function as a scholar depends as a rule upon his continued occupancy of his academic post; hence, without specific guaranties against arbitrary or disciplinary dismissal his civil liberties are nugatory. It is therefore not strange that the movement for academic freedom centers in security of tenure, nor that to many who view the matter cursorily academic liberty and security of tenure mean the same thing, even though the establishment of security of tenure in itself is virtually the creation of a property right rather than the realization of a form of personal liberty.

Like all emerging rights academic freedom is premised upon social utility. From the time of the Enlightenment faith in science as a solvent of human problems remained all but universal among intelligent men, until the schism inaugurated by the precursors of Fascism, Nazism, Bolshevism. Apart from the political-mystical schismatics of Germany, Italy, and Russia, all intelligent men still recognize that the realm of science is as wide as human experience and human life. If it is to fulfill its mission science can recognize no limitations, no reserved areas. It follows that no restrictions may be placed upon the scientist in his pursuit of truth without endangering the whole structure of science, and threatening a retrogression toward primordial ignorance. Anyone who is alive to the achievements of science in the past, and aware of the immense unexplored fields lying ahead of us, will necessarily demand for the scholar the fullest measure of academic freedom.

As indicated above, academic freedom is often confused with academic security of tenure as such—a property conception. The distinction turns on the purity of devotion of the scholar to the principles underlying scientific advance. The scholar who has ceased to function in his pursuit of truth, the scholar who accepts extraneous and irrelevant considerations in the selection and promotion of colleagues, the scholar who binds himself to subject his opinions and expression to the pronouncements of a party or sect, have placed themselves outside of the realm in which they can properly invoke the defense of academic liberty. There may be valid reasons why they should still enjoy security of tenure, but these are of another order, analogous to other property rights.

Academic freedom, like all other liberties, implies a corresponding responsibility: the responsibility for advancing science by whatever means are available. It implies further the willingness to make sacrifices. The man who is prepared to serve the Lord if the Lord will assure immunity is no special asset to the Lord's cause. The man who will stand for academic freedom if he is guaranteed against all risk is not an able seaman in this voyage into an unknown sea of rights and duties.

In the totalitarian states academic freedom has been abol-

ished. The single-minded pursuit of science has given way to the prostitution of science and teaching to the needs or fancied rules of the all-pervading political power. In the democratic-liberal states academic freedom is accepted, at least formally, by the leaders of the intellectual world. It has not, however, been accepted in all its implications. In our greater universities security of tenure is nearly absolute, for those who have attained to professorial position. There is unfortunately no Hippocratic oath binding upon faculty members and administrators alike that compels them to follow the ideals of academic freedom in the selection of new members. Considerations wholly irrelevant to scholarship—considerations of social status, political inclinations, religion, race—are almost universally given weight. Such considerations are also often controlling in the promotion of faculty members, in the provision of laboratories, libraries, and other necessary instruments of effective research.

The confusion in American educational thought as to the character and meaning of academic freedom is in part due to the failure to differentiate clearly between the education—or training—of the child and adolescent, and the education of research worker and scholar. The American tradition, wisely or unwisely, insists upon a specific pattern of training for the young, a specifically selected material. A sturdy and tenacious common sense holds it as self-evident that many of the problems with which science must deal are not proper pabulum for babes and sucklings, nor yet for adolescents. In so far as university education—essentially the education of apprentices in scholarship—is merged with adolescent education, school with college and college with university—it is difficult to apply the principles of academic freedom in all their purity.

More important, however, as a source of confusion is the invasion or threatened invasion of academic freedom by non-academic forces indifferent to the principle and its social significance. Every educational institution suffers from weak defenses on the side of its finances. Whether it derives its revenues from private endowments or from government, it must frequently tremble before the power of the purse. Often it trembles even when the purse lies quiescent in unabated

benevolence. A university may often ease out of his position a provocative professor, or refuse to appoint an able and distinguished man, because the administration fears, without foundation, that a wealthy donor might be repelled or a state legislature alienated.

As against the forces making for restrictions upon academic freedom we may note the forces making for its defense. There is a growing *esprit de corps* among the professors of most universities that makes trouble for the board or president who attacks the academic freedom of any faculty member. Still more important, there is an interuniversity organization of professors that investigates, reports, and condemns in case it finds that academic freedom has been violated. Such a condemnation may not save a professor who has been unjustly threatened with dismissal, but it affects severely the prestige of the institution in which the outrage occurs, lames its ability to secure first-rate men, and weakens its hold upon the general public. Few university administrators will lightly incur the infamy of a clear-cut violation of academic freedom. In some cases an unwelcome professor may be got rid of on charges of personal conduct which in the ordinary case would pass unnoticed; but even such cases are relatively rare. The main reliance of academic oppression is upon selection. Few men may expect university appointment unless they can present a clean bill of health for "safety and sanity." And at the age when men secure professorial appointment, future behavior may be predicted with a high degree of certainty.

Recognizing as we must that academic freedom is too new a conception to have gained such general acceptance as most civil liberties, that it is often not clearly understood even by those who invoke it, that it is too often honored in the breach, yet one whose memory encompasses even three or four decades of American educational history will agree that the scope of academic freedom has extended steadily, allowance made for setbacks in time of war and threatened war. It may be anticipated that more and more universities will codify their practice into charters which will establish academic freedom upon a sound footing. It may be in point to cite here, by way of illus-

tration, the most recent constitution of a faculty, the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research:

I—The Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research is founded upon the principles of academic freedom and the rights and duties implicit in freedom of thought, inquiry, teaching and publication. Among the implications of these principles the following are especially acknowledged by the Faculty and its members as binding upon them:

- (1) Every member of the Faculty as a scholar accepts the obligation to follow the truth wherever it may lead, regardless of personal consequences.
- (2) No member of the Faculty can be a member of any political party or group which asserts the right to dictate in matters of science or scientific opinion.
- (3) The Faculty and its individual members bind themselves, in all official action, especially in elections to the Faculty or in promotion of members, to be guided solely by considerations of scholarly achievement, competence and integrity.

It is agreed that in the decisions of the Faculty scientifically irrelevant considerations such as race, religion or political beliefs shall be given no weight whatsoever, so long as these represent no bar upon individual freedom of thought, inquiry, teaching and publication.

II—The Faculty shall consist of Professors and Assistant Professors, whose tenure runs for two years or more and who serve full time through the academic year. The Faculty may also appoint Visiting Professors and Lecturers, with or without salary, and may grant them a seat in the Faculty, with or without voting power.

III—The Faculty thus constituted shall be a self-governing body, under the educational laws of New York and under the principles set forth in Section I. It shall vote its own by-laws, elect its own Dean and other officers and lay out a curriculum not inconsistent with the educational laws of the State of New York. The Faculty shall elect all Professors, Assistant Professors, Lecturers and other staff members. Within the budget all salaries shall be fixed by the Faculty. The Faculty alone shall have power of dismissal of members of the Faculty and staff, but only on grounds of non-fulfillment of their academic duties, of repudiation of the principles set forth in Section I or on grounds touching upon scientific honor and integrity.

IV—The Graduate Faculty shall be empowered to raise funds by the solicitation of contributions and by tuition charges. Such funds shall be held in the custody of a special body of trustees, created by the Board of Trustees of the New School for Social Research, and shall be disbursed upon the order of such officer or officers as the Graduate Faculty may elect from time to time for such purposes.

It will be noted that in this constitution equal stress is laid upon the rights and duties implicit in academic freedom. The faculty member binds himself, as by a Hippocratic oath, to follow the truth regardless of personal consequences; to hold aloof from organizations that would curtail his freedom; to disregard considerations irrelevant to scholarship in every decision affecting his colleagues. Instead of having a tenure established by a nonacademic board, members of the Faculty are appointed, promoted, or dismissed by the Faculty itself. The power of dismissal, however, may be exercised only on charges pertinent to scholarship. The Faculty itself is endowed with the power to raise funds, a power that would be exercised in case the trustees sought to invade the academic freedom of the Faculty.

The Graduate Faculty has operated under this constitution for only six years, a period too brief for a test under severe stress. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that a body of scholars of highly individualistic personalities has operated through six years frictionlessly and co-operatively, and that the rights and duties set forth in the constitution have been scrupulously observed. They have become an essential part of the moral life of the Faculty. Every member is prepared not only to observe them, but to fight for them, suffer for them. And these are the tests of a right that really lives.

Frank Kingdon

President of Newark University

FREEDOM FOR EDUCATION

THE whole process of evolution has been marked by casualties as organisms developed at certain stages have not been able to adjust themselves to environmental changes. In other words, the mere existence of a certain species is no guarantee of its survival. There has to be maintained an equilibrium in the rhythm of adjustment or an inhospitable change in the environment destroys the organism. When species lose their capacity for modification they are destroyed. When they are slower at change than their environment, they either begin to degenerate or have to take a lower place in the organic hierarchy or pass away. An organism that does not keep pace in itself with environmental change is lost.

Left to its own devices, nature has produced at every stage of the universe's history those organisms which were adapted to each stage. The process of rejection has been a ruthless one, but at any given moment, the whole picture has been harmonious. The forms of life that fit the world as it is are the ones that exist in the world as it is.

I

The emergence of man precipitates a new factor into the situation. He does not leave nature to itself. By the intervention of his intelligence he changes his own environment. He speeds up the processes of change in the world to which he

must adjust himself. This means that he creates a new hazard for his own survival. If he himself does not change at a pace that keeps him within hailing distance of the changes he is making in his world, his own success in mastering that world will destroy him.

Education is an instrument of survival. It is man's attempt to keep individuals up to date with their world, to make individuals adequate to living in and dealing with their environment. It is society at any stage engaged in molding individuals to fit the current social forms.

One difficulty is that, while the intelligence initiates social changes, it cannot comprehensively forecast their effects. They have their own momentum and work almost as impersonally and as independently as natural forces. The intelligence gives the impetus, but it sets in motion forces that then work out their own nature and take their own heads to achieve their own results. Man finds himself confronted by a dual task, that of understanding and controlling nature, and that of understanding and controlling the social complex which he himself has created as his own environment. At the moment, the second control is even more difficult than the first, because we have not yet been able to devise an intellectual method for reducing social dynamics to scientific formulas. We know that social forces work by their own laws, but we cannot yet define those laws. We have not reached the point where we can accurately and comprehensively predict the social effects of any given invention, of any political policy, or of any major social event. This makes both social decision and education essentially opportunistic.

An important factor that complicates social interpretation is the potentially powerful one of individuality. It is true that every man is a social product, but it is also true that each is unique, and while the area of uniqueness in all men may be a restricted one, in some it is large enough so that their distinctively unique individualities become powerful agents of change. It may be possible to show that every genius is a combination and expression of ideas and tendencies prevalent in his time, but it still remains a fact that they were precipitated in him at

just the time and place they were because he was the individual he was and not another. We have no way of knowing when this kind of individual will appear, or where. Nature and society are continually surprising us by presenting us with unexpected human talents from unlikely places.

Another difficulty is that between periods of major social crisis our social forms become organized into institutions that are comparatively rigid in practice and dogma, and that accumulate to themselves extraordinarily powerful prestiges. They represent both tradition and vested interests. Powerful and selfish men have a stake in their continuance, many people have an emotional attachment to them, and all the strength of our natural apathy tends to maintain them. Consequently, when a period of major social reconstruction comes, they gather all their resources to resist it. The forces of change cannot be stopped, however, and so a period of intense struggle ensues in the course of which institutions are either modified or smashed. As the rate of social change is accelerated, it becomes more and more difficult for more and more institutions to adjust themselves to it. Consequently, in a society growing steadily more complex we have wars and revolutions on consistently greater scales. The increasing magnitudes of events of violence are symptoms of the more comprehensive extensions of social dynamics.

This is an important comment because it indicates one fact that is clearly characteristic of our current social trends. They are making our social units, in terms of which we have to think consistently, more inclusive. Every fresh experience pushes out the boundaries of our common interests. For five thousand years our key institutions have been enlarging. The family has merged into the tribe and the city; the tribe and the city have grown into states and principalities; states and principalities have been combined into nations; and nations have expanded into federations and empires. These enlarged units have been not merely political contrivances, but vital foci of cultural development.

More and more inclusive units of society, however, demand more and more expansive individuals to operate them. Men

cannot stop with tribal loyalties and yet keep a nation going, for the larger unit will split on rivalries among the lesser units. Individuals must extend their intelligences and imaginations to identify themselves with the expanding borders of their social unities.

Such an extension on the part of men does not come naturally. Each of us is essentially provincial. It has always required an effort to lift men out of their local loyalties into wider ones. A man can always be interested in himself. He can identify himself with his family, but even here he does not maintain the same intensity or consistency of interest that he does in his own personal affairs. Beyond the family, his identification is spasmodic. Its intensity is proportionate to his feeling of emergency. He will rally to his city and his nation if he feels that they are in danger or on the threshold of glory, but for the rest of the time he is comparatively indifferent, and even critical and restive. Our emotional reserves seem to be limited, and therefore to be exhausted by our immediate preoccupations. We are left with the question whether men can go beyond a certain provincialism of outlook, but we at least have the encouragement of knowing that when they are convinced that their interests demand their identification with a group as large as a modern nation they have been able to achieve it.

The achievement of extension also runs into the obstacle of man's natural apathy. Something in us resists change. We are sufficiently of the physical world so that its tendency to inertia is characteristic of us. There are always those who anticipate what is coming and seek to prepare men for it; but the mass of humanity does not move until events leave no alternative. Consequently, we go along on a series of sharply distinguished plateaus instead of a steady rise of change. We maintain a level of life as long as we can, and then we have to go through some sort of crisis of effort to establish a new one. At each level we pitch our tents and act as though we had found our final establishment. No easy answer can be given to the question whether men can throw off their natural apathy, become intel-

ligently aware of their changing environment, and act consistently to modify their own outlooks and their institutions to meet the demands of change.

I I

In our contemporary world man has made the whole planet one unified environment. Communications have erased boundary lines from our nonpolitical experience. We actually live our days and do our thinking against the wide perspective of the whole round earth. Nothing happens anywhere that is not at once reported to us. The widening circles of social relationships that have carried us from family to tribe to nation to empire now embrace the whole company of mankind and present us with the fact that every child now born has the whole world for his stage. As a fact in experience, we are citizens of one city of planetary dimensions knit together in a web of transportation and communication that makes any movement anywhere felt throughout the entire social structure even to the ends of the earth.

To illustrate what this means let us think of the cultural forces that have been most powerful in our American life over the period of the past twenty-five years. I think that a strong thesis could be maintained on the proposition that the most influential stimulants of our creative thinking have been not native but foreign in their origins. Such names as Kagawa of Japan, Sun Yat Sen of China, Lenin of Russia, Marx of Germany, Croce of Italy, Bergson and Stendhal and Proust of France, Gandhi of India, Shaw and Wells and Barrie of Britain, Joyce and Yeats and Moore of Ireland, immediately come to mind as active ferments in our thinking. Men like Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek, Mussolini and Hitler, are so much a part of our experiences that even their gray shadows flickering on a screen in a dark theater divide a crowd into cheering and hissing partisans. Men and ideas are no longer remote because they are foreign. They are emotional symbols quick in the blood of the actual world in which we choose our friends and select our parties. The planet is our field of force.

Meanwhile, however, our institutions remain parochial. They were established in the days when boundaries actually shut men in by keeping strangers out. Economically, educationally, religiously, and militarily we are organized on provincial lines. Our currencies are national. Our business organizations are "American companies" or "British" or "French" or "German" firms. Our schools are organized around specific nationalistic traditions. Churches are shaped to the national societies that they serve. Armies and navies are almost by definition weapons of provincial groups. The powerful institutional patterns, including, be it noted, the effective learned societies, of our social behavior are all molded into the forms of those divided group interests that come to us out of the days before the world had become one community.

As we have indicated, the most commanding of all our institutions is the sovereign national state. It puts its stamp upon practically every one of our activities. So great is its prestige that it has become virtually sacred, demanding undivided allegiance from its citizens, and thundering anathemas upon any who question its dogmas. It seems so normal to us for the world to be organized into nations that we may wonder why anyone should even raise a question about it. This simply emphasizes the almost incalculable strength that this comparatively young institution has acquired. Men have in the past thought about the Emperor, the Church, or the City, as we now think about the Nation. It is at this moment the most strongly entrenched social unit, carrying over into our cosmopolitan environment all the emotional and institutional investments it stored up in a more provincial era.

Here, then, is the basic tension of our times. In actual experience we are world-citizens but the institutions by which we live are provincial. We are like children growing up in a home that speaks a language foreign to that of the surrounding community. Within our institutions we use the tongue of our restricted group, but when we cross their thresholds we find ourselves facing conditions for which our provincial speech has no meaning. Either we shall have to adjust our traditional

organizations to the new dimensions of experience or else the course of events will smash them.

An excellent parable of what this means is the story of Japan. For centuries this island empire lived its exclusive life in a world divided into neighborhoods having restricted dealings one with another. In the middle of the last century, however, boats driven by steam turned the oceans into convenient highways, and the restricted neighborhood known as Japan found its waters invaded by continually increasing numbers of visitors. It could not shut them out. They were emissaries of a new age that automatically suspended traditional relationships. The proud nationalism of Japan, rooted in religious concepts and absolute in its assumptions of superiority, had to come to terms with the world-community. The Son of Heaven could no longer enjoy his disdainful isolation. What has happened so obviously to Japan has actually happened to the whole institution of nationalism, even though we have not seen it so clearly. Just as the world of the Renaissance moved in upon the medieval Church and shook it to its foundations, so the international community has advanced upon nationalism in our day, forcing us to a new orientation of all our institutions in the light of our new experiences. The origin of our contemporary chaos is the fact that our traditional patterns of social organization are incapable of solving our problems on the scale of our new frames of social experience. They carry over provincial imperatives into a community of planetary dimensions. Either they will be refashioned by intelligent planning or else they will be destroyed by revolution.

The difficulty with planning institutional change is that institutions are habits and vested interests as well as social tools, and so they gather to themselves the almost imponderable support of apathy. When change threatens, men rally to the support of the traditional. This is happening now. In a period when we are obviously becoming more cosmopolitan we are seeing a resurgence of almost fanatical nationalism. At first glance, this may seem paradoxical. It really is not. It is a phenomenon as elemental as the clustering of sheep in their fold when a thunderstorm threatens. We naturally retreat from

the novel into the familiar because the novel is a threat and the familiar is assurance of security. Trained to provincial thinking we literally do not know what to do with a unified world. In our bewilderment we seek refuge in exalting old patterns of life. Institutions menaced by unprecedented forces mobilize to perpetuate themselves. Nationalism is now doing just this. Fascism is nationalism making its last desperate stand against the tide of events. In its emergency it gets the support of businessmen, of the military, of the majority of churchmen, and of most educators, because all these live by activities themselves rooted in nationalism. Scenting the approaching storm the sheep herd in the fold. They are grateful to the shepherd who speaks the bold and encouraging word, and they follow him without question whithersoever he leads them.

Ours is the generation that is consummating the end of the era of exclusive nationalism. Our whole society is in the throes of giving birth to a world order. The beginning of the end of the old epoch came with the outbreak of the Great War, significantly called the World War, in 1914. November, 1918, produced what has been truly called the Armistice, for it was no cessation of hostilities; these have been continuing in scattered areas of the earth through the intervening twenty years and are now apparently gaining force for another concentrated struggle involving all nations. Dimly the spirit of the new day shadowed itself forth in the League of Nations, but the incubus of old forms was too heavy for it to carry, so that it broke down under the strain of rival national claims. We have already had a war for twenty-five years, sporadic and scattered but continuous. Every sign indicates that, as in past crises, our world reorganization will require a thirty years' war. All that this means is that it takes thirty years for an old generation wedded to traditional forms to pass away, and a new generation to rise in its place facing its own environment in its own terms.

Thus our struggle is more profound than most of us realize. We have upset the historic equilibrium of countries, races, and continents. Ours is more than a contest between traditional democracy and fascism or communism. It is the death of an old order and the birth of a new. The Hitlers, the Mussolinis, and

the Stalins are symbols of a vanishing day, resolutely and ruthlessly using all its accumulated reserves of material and emotion to fight off the annihilation it bitterly fears. They are incidents, and events are more than they are. Society is on the march toward a new stage of comprehensive organization, a stage as definite as the emergence of tribe from family, of nation from tribe, of empire from nation. We are on the threshold of a federation of the world. Our institutions are persistent but out-dated, and their vigor in resisting change is the measure of the intensity of our struggle.

III

Two questions clearly emerge from our analysis. Are individual men capable of identifying themselves with the whole race of mankind in the common quest for life? Is mankind able to develop institutions capable of supporting the new world structure of experience? Neither can be answered simply.

As individuals we are not fully contemporaneous with our own world. We have not caught up with our technical achievements. Man has learned how to change his environment but not himself, so that we have no modern men to match the modern world. Perhaps we can put it in another way. The characteristic of our technical advance has been extension, the inclusion of wider and wider areas within interdependent units, but the chief trait of individual men is still preoccupation with egocentric interests, the exaltation of the premise of the provincial. In an environment that is continually approximating an organic pattern of mutually dependent cells, individual men are still thinking and acting as though they, the cell units, were independent entities sufficient unto themselves and answerable to no law save that of self-interest narrowly defined. We have not learned to include the fact of mutual dependence and the desirable virtue of mutual aid as effective motives in our behavior. Man impoverishes man, class exploits and hates class, nation rises against nation, race persecutes race. In human relationships we perpetuate and even exacerbate our divisions while every technical advance draws us physically closer together in a shrinking world.

We are not emotionally prepared for our new proximities. The lion and the lamb are being forced to lie down together before the lion has learned to eat straw like the ox.

In a sense, we are not even contemporaneous with ourselves. On the technical side we are twentieth-century men and from a strictly rational point of view we can perceive the implications of our new devices. We are not exclusively rational beings, however, and in the recesses of our complex inheritances move impulses of the long past. Nineteenth-century ideas are obviously powerful in each of us, and few can deny the active presence of medieval superstitions in certain kinds of decisions. We are not fully up-to-date with ourselves, for part of each of us is still untamed. Our highly technical success, as a matter of fact, has made this extraordinarily clear to us. The work of a man like Freud, for example, is an expression of the way in which the continuing savage in man has been thrown into bold relief by the demands of an increasingly complex society. An essentially primitive man can use the radio, the automobile, the aeroplane, with a skill at least equal to that of a man of culture, but none of them will add one cubit to his spiritual stature. There is a realm of technical achievement and there is one of cultural insight, but there is little evidence that progress in one means advance in the other. This truth has its own poignancy at this moment when we see civilization exercising an unprecedented power over the physical world, and yet reverting to virtual barbarism in the group relations within its own structure.

Having said this, however, we have to balance it by remembering that men have shown the capacity to enlarge their loyalties effectively enough to give periodic stability to broadening social units. The citizen of San Francisco feels himself one with the citizen of New York in the bonds of a common country. The man of Toronto identifies himself with the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. These mark unpredictable advances beyond the family loyalties of early men. I have occasionally met Christians deeply conscious of the spiritual ties that unite them to all "members of the Body of Christ"; and I know individuals who identify themselves completely with the worldwide proletariat. These may seem delusions to such as do not

understand them, but they show that human beings are capable of finding satisfactions in human fellowships convincing to them, even though founded upon almost nebulous areas of common interest.

Our answer, then, to the question of man's ability to identify himself with mankind is that there are obvious inherent obstacles but that his power of emotional extension has already been proved to be so great that we are not justified in believing that it has been exhausted. I should sum up my conclusions in the matter in two statements and a comment. First, the mere success of techniques will not automatically produce men morally capable of handling them; the two kinds of success are distinct. Second, this being so, we must face the problem of producing comprehensive men as an essential one upon the solution of which depends our whole social success; we might go so far as to say that the necessity of the case demands that the next field of knowledge to be explored shall be man's knowledge of himself, and that we cannot claim to be genuinely scientific until the science of humanity is brought to the level of our knowledge of the physical world. The comment I should like to make is that a critical social emergency may make it so clear to us that the mutual advantage of all is the personal advantage of each—though the realization is more likely to come as a general disaster plainly a threat against personal security—that we shall be shocked out of our provincialism and find personal interest allied with collective good so plainly that we shall be forced to stand together. Where slow persuasion fails an emotional panic may succeed.

The possibility of refashioning institutions depends somewhat but not altogether on what we have just discussed. Men must think of themselves as world-citizens before they will give attention to designing the machinery of a world-state, but our social organizations have their own vitalities and rhythms of metamorphosis. At certain points they act like entities in their own natures, and at some stages they mold men more effectively than men affect them; Frankenstein may be a caricature but he is not a myth.

The aboriginal tribalism in all of us dies uneasily, so that there

is a tendency in every articulated group to take to itself the ancient prerogatives of the tribe. Each has its totem, its vows, its peculiar patois, and its formula for its own justification. Given any length of life the tradition of any group lends it an aura of sanctity, which means a command of the emotional investments of its members. This produces powerful resistance to criticism and rejection of proposals for change as though they were utterances of blasphemy. This emotional tenacity of institutions is the source of their social lag. They continue until they become slums of the spirit in a transformed society, and even then all housing projects that would displace them are rejected by their inhabitants, who cannot bear to see the old premises dismantled.

Intellectually, it is not too difficult to draw the blueprints of an orderly world community. Here are two thousand million people living on one of the lesser planets of a comparatively undistinguished stellar system. At their command are certain computable resources which, with their labor and knowledge, they could exploit to assure food, clothing, shelter, and a degree of comfort for all. The technics of production and communication are already here. A federation of states within a code of law is not only imaginable but clearly definable. A fellowship of faiths can be conscientiously designed. Education as a worldwide partnership of eager minds is theoretically plausible.

When plans for such a federation of the world are so engaging, why do we not proceed at once to put them into effect? Because the past is so entangled in our emotions and our moral judgments that we cannot bring free minds to our task. And our institutions are the skeleton of the past on which we have to hang the life of the present. They must grow as the bones of a child grow or our civilization will be crippled and in pain. They must submit to the disciplines of extension in a day when social experiences are increasingly inclusive.

In the past men have modified institutional forms either through compromise or catastrophe. Compromise is evidence of flexibility. Catastrophe is the breaking point of rigidity. There is no reason to believe that these alternatives have been suspended.

We are not living in the twilight of civilization. We are at the end of one of its phases. But that is another way of saying that we are on the threshold of a new phase. The story of progress from epoch to epoch has been like the myth of the phoenix; society has passed through the fires of war and revolution periodically, and institutions grown old have been destroyed, but it has risen from the flames renewed in youth and with institutions modified to new conditions but still essentially valid for the unchanging characteristics of human life. We are passing through the flames. The inevitable workings of change will refashion our social forms. It is perhaps not too late even now to do what no generation has ever yet been able to do, to mold the shape of a new epoch through intelligent compromise rather than through social catastrophe. It is banal to say that a new era comes not to destroy the old but to fulfill it; yet this very statement emphasizes the fact that we cannot think of such fulfillment without an echo of destruction sounding in our minds. The paradox of progress is the paradox of birth: fresh life emerging from the threatening shadow of death.

IV

When we try to define the place of education in the processes of experience through which we are passing, we realize that what we mean by such a definition is what we are going to do about the mind. Education is an activity as engineering or manufacturing are activities. It is the application of methods to raw materials to produce planned results. We believe that certain types of individuals are desirable and that human beings can be molded into these types by certain kinds of training, one of which is the specifically educational, the inculcation of the right ideas in the right combinations.

The moment we say the "right" ideas, however, we indicate the predicament of education. People differ about what is "right." And a difference about what is "right," unlike some other differences, is almost incapable of compromise, for what is not "right" is "wrong," and when discussion moves in such antitheses obstinacy of opinion is called conviction, and that is a

fighting word. Education naturally becomes the battleground of conflicting convictions.

The school occupies an unusually sensitive place in our society. It is a community enterprise, subject to public control and necessarily responsive to public opinion; this characteristic inevitably makes all school administrators jealous of public approval, an attitude that tends toward timidity, an overcautious safeguarding against easily misunderstood experimentation. On its other side, the school touches the home with unique intimacy: it is personalized for every parent in terms of what it is doing to beloved sons and daughters; thus it becomes emotionalized, and discussion of its work takes on a tone of intensity that no other public activity has to meet on so general a scale. Moreover, practically everybody has been to school and so feels that he knows about education; this means that the professional educator is not conceded the acknowledgment of expertness that is given to those who work in more mysterious fields—a citizen who would not think of questioning a treatment prescribed by a doctor has no hesitation in passing final judgment on school methods and curricula. Again, every individual or group that has an idea to propagate or an interest to defend turns to the school as a convenient tool for its propaganda, so that educators are being continually bombarded with requests to include this or that course of training in their programs; on the one hand voices denounce the schools for neglecting the essentials, and on the other they condemn them for not including particular pet nostrums. All this means that every social conflict reports contentiously in educational institutions. In a day like ours, when fundamental social adjustments are in the making, education is naturally a focus of our bewildering uncertainty.

This reflects itself in the differences among educators. There are, for example, those who maintain the traditional attitude that the business of school and college is to teach certain approved subjects in a factual way, and no more; while there are others who insist that the school must reproduce in itself the environment of the society into which the young people will later enter, and that it has failed if it does not train them in effective social attitudes. On another front, there are some who

believe that it is the school's business to present the local philosophies of government and to ignore all others; while some others hold the idea that conflicting political and social theories of all kinds must be expounded fairly if the school is to keep faith with expectant minds. There is probably no field where the experts are indulging in such severe self-examination as in education. This is a sign of health. It is also an indication, however, of how energetically our current confusion is registering in the whole educational enterprise.

Confusion, however, is no adequate ground for inaction. We are like Athens sending its yearly tribute of young men and maidens into the labyrinth to lose their way and be devoured by the Minotaur; nevertheless, like it, we must seek our Theseus, who, with the thread of Ariadne and his own sword, can make his way through the maze and slay the monster. Education cannot relinquish its obligation to emancipate growing minds.

However hampered by community pressures and administrative timidity, educators must define and work toward their goal of liberating human minds and equipping them for new dimensions of experience. They must consciously sharpen the intelligence as an instrument of adjustment. The majority of people still think of education as a routine for teaching young persons to read and count. The idea of teaching them to think has an uneasy suggestion of the subversive about it. Even higher education is popularly looked upon as either a vocational advantage or a pleasant reverie over the provincial and dead cultures of the past. We hardly dare to talk aloud about an educational program geared to the machines of modern communication and planned as a guide to the general mental operations of the entire world community. We certainly have no international fellowship of educators devoted to reconditioning the mental life of mankind to match our cosmopolitan relationships.

The result is that education has fallen victim to the aggressive provincialism of our traditional social groups. Resurgent German nationalism has seized the universities and turned them into mechanical sounding boards for state propaganda, overtly enslaving them, dictating their teaching, emasculating their

originality, and exiling their nonconformists. Not as openly, but relatively as effectively, politico-economic units elsewhere are forcing schools and colleges to espouse the status quo. Frightened parochialism in all lands is concentrating on checking educational experimentation.

Educators—administrators and teachers by their own respective methods—must resist such pressure. The necessity arises neither from pride in eccentricity nor any sense of intellectual superiority, but from the reasonable assurance that the free mind is a social asset. Society is an expression of intelligent co-operation. Because it is made up of human beings it is dynamic, that is to say, it carries the forces of change within itself; one of its unchanging characteristics is that it is always changing. The mind recognizes and interprets these changes, and devises new machineries for new emergencies. If the mind is fettered by old forms it cannot exercise its inherent elasticity to compass new needs, and so the whole process of orderly adjustment breaks down. The only guarantee of adequate rational flexibility is intellectual freedom controlled by social responsibility.

We have to recognize that such freedom will produce manifestations of unsound criticism. Even the best minds have their aberrations. We cannot help that. The nature of the intellect is what it is. Whatever its weaknesses, it is the most skillful equipment for adjustment that we have, and it works most effectively in an atmosphere of free exchange. Indeed, this is its safeguard. The play of mind on mind checks and purges individual eccentricity. No one's thinking is fully convincing to another. Therefore the most assured way to average conclusions, which are obviously not always brilliant ones, is through the free expression of the opinions of all. Inarticulate people are apt to doubt this because of their almost instinctive distrust of the articulate, and the articulate are apt to be impatient of it because of their unwillingness to credit the inarticulate, but in the end each has his authority and both the pace and content of decisions are benefited by their interaction.

In a critical period like ours, when all philosophies are being subjected to searching scrutiny and all institutions tested for essential stability, it is natural for every impulse to caution

among us to assert itself. So we have a strong tendency to feel that we must be careful what we say, and to resent the free utterance of others to the point where we are ready to agree that actual restriction must be imposed. Yet it is in precisely such a time that we need all the light we can get, and the only way we can get light is through shared thinking. This means frank utterance, frank criticism, and courageous debate. It is the method of social wisdom in a decisive hour.

In the light of man's needs and of unfolding events, we are justified in declaring that education must mold its forms to serve four clear ends. It must train minds to think in cosmopolitan terms that will enable them to see local cultures against the corrective perspective of world experience and so fit them for the creative emergence of a comprehensive culture of mankind. It must maintain an active international fellowship of free minds meeting and sharing each other's research and discoveries in the assurance that facts and their implications know no boundaries of parish or nation or race. It must courageously act upon its own premise that reason is man's most expert instrument for mastering the physical world and organizing his own society, and when the processes of thought are threatened by the restrictive dogmatisms of any political forms it must at any cost refuse to surrender the independence of the mind. It must recognize that its full task consists not only in training people in freedom but also in preparing them for freedom, which means for control of themselves as well as of their world, and includes educating them consciously for change and, at the same time, for responsibility.

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INTUITION, REASON, AND FAITH IN SCIENCE, AND MAN'S FREEDOM

FROM the earliest times scientific ideas even when crudely conceived have been of immeasurable importance, not only for man's material advancement and control over nature, but also in modifying and expanding his philosophic and religious outlook. In the effort to obtain a better understanding of his place in the cosmos, he is compelled to proceed largely by considerations of analogy based upon supposed or actual fact. And so he turns more and more toward the ever widening vistas suggested by science in its continual discoveries of new truth and freedom.

Today the significance of science as a principal source of revelation is almost universally recognized. Thus, on behalf of Pope Pius XI, Cardinal Pacelli (now Pope Pius XII) spoke before the Pontifical Academy of Sciences concerning the enlightenment that comes from "the potent streams of the natural and rational sciences and the great river of revealed wisdom." He said that the former are found "wherever man looks for and finds truth." As for "the great river of revealed wisdom," is it not to be found in all the absolutely sincere utterances of poets, philosophers, and prophets, based on the relevant knowledge of their day and made after deepest meditation? It would seem that such utterances are in essence similar to the pronouncements of the scientist. Is not the vague, prophetic conjecture of Pythagoras that nature is mathematical as true as Newton's more precise law of gravitation? From this point of

view, the great streams of revelation seem to merge insensibly into one.

Nevertheless, the immediate effect of scientific advances is often very disquieting. The strong opposition long shown to the Darwinian theory of evolution bears witness to this fact. Similarly at the present day the ever increasing number of unco-ordinated theories and mechanical inventions confuses and chills many of us. Man is felt to be a mere tragic detail in a vast incomprehensible whole, and our old sense of values seems to become less and less real.

To persist in such an attitude of discouragement is unjustified. Every individual has implanted within him the desire to understand his role in the existing order. He feels an inalienable right to find out his duties and privileges as a citizen of the universe. By the light of any new knowledge he is always certain to gain deeper insight into his position. The wise advice of our own great Emerson comes to mind: "Fear not the new generalization. Does the fact look crass and material, threatening to degrade thy theory of spirit? Resist it not: it goes to refine and raise thy theory of matter just as much."

What, then, are some of the larger points of view in the pursuit of freedom which are suggested by science today? In attempting a reply I can of course only offer a personal interpretation, inevitably reflecting the fact that I speak as a mathematician having some acquaintance with physics.

Let us observe in the first place that the universe presents antipodal aspects—the objective and the subjective, the impersonal and the personal. If we take the objective aspect as more fundamental we put our emphasis on the notion of reality; and if we start from the subjective, we prefer to speak of knowledge. In either case we are able to discern a kind of nature-mind spectrum; for there appears a roughly given hierarchy of five ascending levels—mathematical, physical, biological, psychological, and social. Each level has its appropriate special language. The basic corresponding concepts are respectively: *number* at the mathematical level; *matter* at the physical level; *organism* at the biological level; *mind* at the psychological level; and *society* at the social level. If we choose to select one

of these as somehow more real than the others, a great distortion arises in our point of view. For instance, if we regard the physical level as the most fundamental, we become materialists. But why make such an unnecessary choice? The languages of the various levels are essentially independent of one another, and the observed laws are best expressed in their own natural terms. Why mix up the levels of knowledge unnaturally? Does it clarify our ideas of social justice and of freedom to try to explain them in terms of the reactions between protons and electrons in the brain?

These considerations bring us to a first general point of view towards the levels of knowledge: It is desirable to accord reality in equal measure to all kinds of knowledge everywhere, and so to view the universe as broadly and impartially as possible.

Another very important observation is that in order to understand the various facts and their interrelations we must always use abstractions, that is, conceptual tools of a logical or mathematical nature. Contrary to opinions which prevailed until recently, any abstraction serves only limited specific ends. At best it will enable us to grasp more clearly some small fragment of reality. For example, by use of the abstraction of Euclidian geometry, and in that way alone, we understand the nature of space with a considerable degree of exactitude; and yet today scarcely any physicist would ascribe objective reality to space in itself. It has been Einstein more than anyone else who has taught the scientific world the true role of Euclidian geometry by means of his theories of space-time and relativity. More generally, we have come to realize that our only approach to a better understanding of the world is by means of a widening succession of abstract ideas, each explaining imperfectly some aspect of the stupendous whole. This is a second synthesis deserving of especial emphasis.

Thirdly, I would state a fundamental truth about the social level, which in some sense is the highest level of all: The transcendent importance of love and good will in all human relationships is shown by their mighty beneficent effect upon the individual and upon society.

Thus I have begun by presenting very briefly three impor-

tant articles of my personal faith. These are not verifiable experimentally or strictly demonstrable, so that anyone is free to agree or to disagree. Against my belief that the levels of knowledge are to be taken as equally real, one may set for instance an opposing belief that every fact is ultimately expressible in purely physical terms. If my position is natural for the mathematician with his abstract point of view, the other may be preferred by the tough-minded physicist, the biologist with mechanistic inclinations, and the psychologist with a behavioristic outlook. The future will probably show that both of these beliefs are partly true and partly false.

Similarly, against my conviction that any particular abstraction is merely a useful tool enabling us to understand certain facts, some will contend that one particular abstraction will prove to be final and absolute. Here my attitude springs from an extensive acquaintance with mathematical abstractions and their numerous applications, whereas the theoretical physicist, for example, tends to believe that the ultimate theory of atomic structure is soon to be obtained.

Likewise some will declare that, much more than love and good will, it is devoted loyalty to the State which is important; and I can imagine that under certain conditions such an assertion might be justified.

It is my especial purpose to show how this phenomenon of faith arises inevitably in the mind of the scientist whenever he tries to evaluate technical conclusions in his special field. In doing so I shall discuss the role of intuition, reason, and faith in science in the pursuit of freedom, first at the mathematical and physical levels, and then more briefly at the biological, psychological, and social levels.

By way of definition it must be indicated first what is meant by intuition. There are certain elementary notions and concepts which come spontaneously to the minds of all who observe, experiment with, and reflect on a specified range of phenomena. Such generally accepted ideas or intuitions constitute the consensus of reaction of intelligent men to a definite part of the world of fact. John Stuart Mill has said, "The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others

are inferred." It is in this sense that I shall refer to intuition. By reason I shall mean the rational superstructures which may be erected upon the basic intuitive ideas by means of deductive or inductive reasoning. These superstructures will also be accepted by all who are able to follow the sequence of logical steps involved. By faith I shall mean those heuristically valuable, more general points of view which are beyond reason, and sometimes in apparent contradiction with one another, but which to the individual concerned seem of supreme importance as he endeavors to give his conclusions the widest possible scope.

It is clear that in this way we obtain a basic classification of knowledge into three easily distinguishable types. Let us consider the occurrence of these types at the various levels of knowledge.

By continual crude experimentation with classes of concrete objects, man has come gradually and inevitably into the possession of certain numerical ideas. In particular he has been led to think of the positive integral numbers 1, 2, 3 . . . as entities which exist in almost the same sense as the objects themselves. This concept finds its realization in the designation of the integers by corresponding marks 1, 2, 3 . . . Such integers are found to be subject to certain simple arithmetic laws, and these laws are regarded as intuitively true.

The integers form the basis of a great part of mathematics. For it is found that with their aid one may construct fractions and, more generally, real and imaginary numbers. In the course of the centuries mathematicians have thus built by processes of pure reason the elaborate structures of algebra, the theory of numbers and analysis. An extensive array of beautiful and useful theorems has been deduced.

Similarly in geometry—which in its origin may be regarded as the most elementary branch of physics—we experiment with rigid material objects and arrive readily at the notions of idealized small rigid bodies or "points" and of idealized "lines" and "planes." Then we observe that certain postulates hold, such as the familiar ones of Euclid. By means of these postulates, which embody our intuitions, we are able by deductive reasoning to arrive at other geometrical theorems, including such

results as the celebrated Pythagorean theorem which shows us in particular that a right triangle with legs of 3 units and 4 units in length has a hypotenuse of exactly 5 units in length. The vast mathematical domain called "geometry" has arisen from these elementary geometrical facts as a primary source.

There are many other abstract mathematical structures besides those just alluded to. In all cases it is found that they are made up of certain accepted intuitions (or postulates) and their logical consequences.

Now what I desire particularly to point out is that the mathematician goes far beyond such generally accepted clean-cut assumptions and conclusions, in that he holds certain tacit beliefs and attitudes which scarcely ever find their way into the printed page. Yet these form none the less part of a considerable oral tradition. For instance, he believes in the existence of various infinite classes such as that made up of all the integers. He believes also that the whole body of strict logical thought called mathematics is self-consistent: in particular when he finds that the number π admits of diverse forms of expression, as, for example,

$$\pi = 4[\frac{1}{1} - \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \dots]$$

and

$$\pi = 2\sqrt{3}(\frac{1}{1} \frac{1}{1} - \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} \frac{1}{5} - \dots)$$

he feels absolutely certain that if the unending calculations could be fully carried out, the results would be exactly the same in all cases. Furthermore, when he recalls that in the past the most difficult mathematical questions have been ultimately answered, he is inclined to believe with the great German mathematician, Hilbert, that every mathematical fact is provable. Besides all this, he attributes certain values to his results and their mathematical demonstrations: some theories seem important; some proofs are regarded as elegant, others as profound or original, etc.

Such somewhat vague ideas illustrate what I would call mathematical faith. Nearly all the greatest mathematicians have been led to take points of view falling in this broad category and have attached the deepest significance to them.

What I wish to emphasize concerning this generally over-

looked aspect of mathematical thought is that, on the one hand, the beliefs involved have been of the utmost heuristic importance as instruments of discovery, and, on the other hand, when examined in detail they generally turn out to involve ideas which are held true or false, according to the specific definitions which may be subsequently adopted.

Suppose, for instance, that we turn to the first question, that of the existence of infinite classes. There was no hesitation about the unconditional acceptance of such classes until within recent decades, although there were those, like the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno and the German algebraist Kronecker, who profoundly distrusted the use of the infinite in mathematical reasoning. Today, however, owing primarily to the theory of transfinite aggregates created by Georg Cantor about fifty years ago, mathematicians have come to realize that such an infinite class may exist in the so-called "idealistic" sense but not in the sense of explicit constructibility. Thus the class of all collections of positive numbers less than 1 exists in the idealistic sense, but not in the alternative, more concrete sense.

A similar situation has arisen in the detailed study of the self-consistency of mathematics. It has appeared that very limited parts of mathematics can be proved self-consistent. But such a general assertion as that "the whole of mathematics is self-consistent" would be considered today not to be sufficiently precise; and each time that the proof of self-consistency is extended further, a definite logical price has to be paid in that certain so-called metamathematical ideas are tacitly employed, which need themselves to be investigated in the same respect. For instance, work prior to the *Principia Mathematica* by Russell and Whitehead (1910) showed that if the notion of class was not restricted, certain logical paradoxes would inevitably result. For this reason a theory of the "hierarchy of types" was devised by them, which limited the notion of class and so avoided the apparent inconsistencies. We are thus entitled to say either that mathematics as of the year 1900 was self-consistent or that it was not, according to the point of view which is adopted. In any case the belief in question has led us to a much deeper insight into the nature of logic.

With regard to the unlimited power of mathematical demonstration, it has been recently proved by the Austrian mathematician Gödel that, if we restrict ourselves to reasoning of an ordinary type, there exist explicit "undecidable" theorems, while from a higher metamathematical point of view such a theorem might be demonstrable. Hence Hilbert's affirmation is in one sense false. But despite this fact the open question on which he focused attention is much better understood than ever before.

Likewise in the question of value in mathematics, such as the importance of theories, or the elegance, profundity, and originality of proofs, it is clear that these obscure ideas depend in large measure upon the momentary state of the science. Thus the theory of functions of an imaginary variable and classical geometry were regarded as extremely important a quarter of a century ago; while today the theory of functions of real variables and the basic kind of geometry called analysis situs have respectively displaced these subjects in general mathematical esteem. It would be hard to explain adequately the reasons for this change, but the increasing role of discontinuous quantity in physical theory and the relativistic point of view towards space and time have certainly been contributing factors.

An excellent instance of the power of individual mathematical faith in bringing about creative freedom has been afforded by an American mathematician, the late Eliakim Hastings Moore. Moore was a thoroughgoing abstractionist who believed that mathematics itself should be reorganized from a still higher point of view, by the dissection of essential common parts out of apparently different abstract fields. And so he was led to create his *General Analysis* in 1906. This aimed to embody his conviction that "The existence of analogies between the central features of various theories implies the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular theories, and unifies them with respect to these central features."

As time has elapsed, the deep truth of Moore's contention has been amply sustained. Indeed one of the most active schools of contemporaneous mathematical thought follows the higher abstract point of view adopted by Moore. But it has been found

necessary to modify Moore's program, in that, instead of a single "General Analysis" serving as an omnium-gatherum, it has been desirable to employ a few typical forms. In this way his faith in the power of higher abstraction has been largely and yet not fully justified.

A good many mathematicians are seriously hampered by lack of the ardent positive faith which Moore showed. This type of deficiency is generally due to a strong development of purely critical powers and to overspecialization.

Let us turn next to the physical level, where the corresponding situation is at least equally interesting.

If we accept the ordinary conceptions of space and time, which seem destined always to play a basic role in workaday physics, we find that the simplest physical ideas are those which arise through the manipulation of massive bodies. As these ideas have become clarified, they have been given abstract formulation in terms of such concepts as those of mass, force, etc. Newton's celebrated three fundamental laws of motion embody the final form of the refined intuitions thus arrived at. With these as a basis and the acceptance of certain further special observed laws, one may deduce by mathematical reasoning the theory of mechanics as applied, for example, in the solar system.

Similarly, through experimentation with electrified bodies, electric currents, magnets, etc., there were developed by Faraday the intuitive ideas of electric and magnetic lines of force which are now generally accepted. Later Maxwell incorporated these ideas in the appropriate electromagnetic equations. Upon this basis all classical electromagnetic theory has been logically constructed. Furthermore, by means of the identification of the light wave and the electromagnetic wave, due to Maxwell, an adequate theory of light has been obtained.

Thus we see the important role which intuition and reason have played in two fundamental branches of physics—mechanics and electromagnetism. A cursory survey of the various other branches of the subject would show that a similar situation holds throughout, except in the rapid developments of quantum mechanics during the last decade or so. In this strange theory the physicist begins indeed with a planetary model of

the atom, reminiscent of Niels Bohr's earlier theory. But a flying leap is made from this temporary scaffolding to what is thenceforth regarded as the only basic reality—the wave equations of Schrödinger and, better still, of Dirac. Once having arrived at these mathematical equations the physical theorist proceeds to show how he can predict innumerable facts previously out of his range by use of this arbitrary *ad hoc* machinery. The process involved somehow reminds me of a record sea voyage made through a fog! I cannot but anticipate that a more intuitive and natural approach to essentially the same results will be found later on. An analogous earlier instance in physics is perhaps to be found in the unmotivated theory of cycles and epicycles entertained by the ancient astronomers. This explained the motions of the heavenly bodies with considerable success, but was destined to be completely displaced by the intuitively reasonable, gravitational theory of Newton.

The fact remains, however, that the recent development of quantum mechanics forms one of the most astounding and important chapters of all theoretical physics.

It is interesting to recall how this great advance came about through the faith of the German physicist Planck at the outset of the present century. His direct experience with the phenomena of radiation had led him to believe that there were discontinuous processes at work, not to be explained by any modification of the timeworn classical theories, and so he was led to formulate his celebrated quantum hypothesis in 1900. It was this daring concept of Planck, more than anything else, that has freed the minds of physicists from the shackles of too conventional thinking about atomic phenomena, and so has made possible the quantum-mechanical quest of which the end is not yet in sight.

There has always been an abundance of faith among the physicists. Everyone knows how Newton and others have found confirmation even for their religious beliefs in the lawful character of physical phenomena. It is not hard to understand why the tendency towards dogmatic affirmation among the physicists has been stronger than among the mathematicians. For the physicist with considerable justice feels that he is exploring the

mysteries of the only actual and very exciting universe; whereas the mathematician often appears to live in a purely mental world of his own artificial construction. A good illustration of this tendency of the physicists is afforded by their changing attitudes towards the wave theory versus the corpuscular theory of light. Over a considerable period the corpuscular theory of Newton held sway; then this was displaced by the wave theory of Huyghens, the Dutch physicist; and nowadays a kind of vague, uncertain union of the two is generally accepted.

In this connection it is especially interesting to recall the scientific beliefs to which Faraday was led in his fundamental work on electricity and magnetism. From his experimental results in this field, he saw that there was obeyed here as elsewhere the law which he called the "conservation of force" and which we today would call the "conservation of energy." He saw that this energy was localized in space, and he could only conceive of it as being propagated in time; and so he was led to the belief that electromagnetic energy is also propagated with finite velocity. Thus in an article, "On the Conservation of Force," published in 1857, he expressed himself as follows: "The progress of the strict science of modern times has tended more and more to produce the conviction that 'force [energy] can neither be created nor destroyed' . . . ;" "*time* is growing up daily into importance as an element in the exercise of force; to inquire, therefore, whether power acting either at sensible or insensible distances, always acts in *time* is not to be metaphysical." By way of justification of the rather mathematical direction in these thoughts, Faraday said further, "I do not perceive that a mathematical mind, simply as such, has any advantage over an equally acute mind not mathematical . . . ;" "it could not of itself discover dynamical electricity nor electromagnetism nor even magneto-electricity, nor even suggest them." But the achievements of the more mathematical Maxwell were later to show that Faraday had underestimated the power of pure reason.

It is thus clear that through an act of faith Faraday attained to a kind of deeper insight; for the existence of the electromagnetic wave has long since been established experimentally.

However, the beliefs of Faraday in this connection cannot be regarded as absolutely true, since according to present-day conceptions the notion of energy which he accepted is only roughly valid as a statistical approximation. Nevertheless, Faraday certainly penetrated more into the nature of electrical and magnetic phenomena than any of his contemporaries; and it is difficult to see how, with the limited mathematical and physical knowledge at his disposal, he could have gone any further in the way of prophetic conjecture.

The intimate relation between philosophical-scientific points of view and actual advances in theoretical physics has been admirably illustrated by Einstein's gravitational theory of 1915. Taking as his starting point the bold but reasonable hypotheses that matter must condition space and time, and that, in parts of space remote from matter, elementary particles move with uniform velocity in a straight line, he arrived at his field equations as the most elegant mathematical embodiment of these ideas. Thus there was obtained a quasi-geometrical theory of gravitation which in certain respects is more natural than the celebrated theory of Newton, while the predicted differences, although excessively minute, are in favor of the new theory. But Einstein's theory cannot be regarded as true in any absolute sense, since it gives us at best a partial, highly idealized view of the physical universe.

It is hardly too much to say that, since the beginning of the present century, the main advances in theoretical physics have been the outcome of a similar kind of mathematical guesswork, in which, however, the mathematician himself has taken little or no part! The guessing of the physical theorist is guided almost entirely by considerations of subtle mathematical analogy.

This peculiar situation has led naturally enough to the feeling that pure mathematics almost suffices without much recourse to the results obtained in the physical laboratory. Sir Arthur Eddington has embodied the extreme point of view in his recent book, *The Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons*, thus taking a position antipodal to that of Faraday. Eddington says: "Unless the structure of the nucleus has a surprise in store for us, the conclusion seems plain—there is nothing in the whole

system of laws of physics that cannot be deduced unambiguously from epistemological considerations. An intelligence, unacquainted with our universe but acquainted with the system of thought by which the human mind interprets to itself the content of its sensory experience, should be able to attain all the knowledge of physics that we have attained by experiment. . . . For example, he would infer the existence and properties of radium, but not the dimensions of the earth."

I would comment upon this mystical conjecture of Eddington as follows. It is no doubt partially true that in some respects we need the laboratory less than we did before, owing to the fact that we live surrounded by all manner of scientific instruments and machines, with whose properties we have become acquainted. In other words, we live in a transformed world which is a kind of huge laboratory. Yet I doubt whether any individual, however intelligent, who was not acquainted with such instruments and machines would be able, through analysis of ordinary sensory experience, to go very far. On the other hand, I should agree with Eddington that the starting point from which known physical laws may be deduced is likely to depend on only a few intuitive ideas; and perhaps a sufficiently powerful mathematical intelligence would realize that the facts of sensory experience could only be simply explained in this way.

Although I have no especial acquaintance with the biological, psychological, or social domains, it seems clear to me that a similar situation prevails in them. In the biological field the intuitions upon which one depends are those associated with the concept of the organism and its evolution. These intuitions cannot be formulated conclusively and completely in simple postulates, as is possible at the mathematical and physical levels. It is rather through an acquaintance with an immense array of interrelated, analogous facts that the biologist finds himself able to deal with novel situations. By means of the geological record on the one hand and the results obtained in the field and laboratory on the other, he acquires a better and better understanding. His principal weapon, with some exceptions, is always inductive reasoning.

It is interesting to remark that the insufficiency of a rigorously deterministic theory of the living organism admits of almost mathematical demonstration in the following manner. A genuinely mechanistic universe would have to be free of any infinite factors. For example, if one accepts a simple Newtonian theory, there might be reaching the earth from infinite space unknown quantities of matter and energy, so as to change arbitrarily the course of events upon the earth. But in any completely mechanistic system, free of such infinite factors, it is not difficult to prove that there will necessarily be a kind of eternal Nietzschean recurrence, which is highly improbable.

Recent advances in the chemical knowledge of large organic molecules seem to indicate an innate hospitality of actual matter toward the evolution of the living organism. In this way a plausible genetic account of the origin of life is suggested, which, however, can scarcely be called mechanistic. It begins to seem possible that we are on the verge of further refinements in our concept of matter, such as Emerson anticipated in the quotation made above.

The situation at the psychological level is even less amenable to precise treatment. All of us have a lifelong experience with ourselves and other human beings. This automatically gives rise to a vast complex of intuitive psychological notions. We all are aware of course that there are concomitant physiological processes going on in the body, nervous system, and brain. Now it is the business of the professional psychologist to give exact definition and interpretation to these crude ideas; and he finds his greatest illumination in the facts of abnormal psychology, with which most of us are unacquainted. However, in the case of either layman or professional the processes of reasoning are mainly by analogy. Even the psychiatrist, familiar with many concrete cases, must treat each new patient by the inductive method. There are too many psychological intuitions and too few exact laws for any imposing edifice of pure reason to be erected.

In certain restricted psychological domains, formalization is to some extent possible. Thus I have ventured to formulate a theory of "esthetic measure," by explicit numeration and

weighting of esthetic factors. This aims to explain certain simple esthetic facts in our enjoyment of visual and auditory forms. The theory has been to some extent substantiated by experiments made at Harvard and elsewhere. But in any case, no matter how successful the theory might prove, it would be wholly absurd to try to set up an elaborate logical structure on the basis of the fairly arbitrary and inexact assumptions involved. Generally speaking, as we proceed from the more objective to the more subjective levels of thought, we find that elaborate logical structures seem to be of less and less utility.

The basic belief of the professional psychologist is in the completeness of the physiological accompaniment of every psychological fact; and he formalizes the observed facts by means of the parallelism. But there is a conflict between the attitude towards mind of the technician, for whom the individual is a complex of neurally characterized components, and that of the ordinary man—equally an expert though of a different kind—who sees all sorts of permanent values in personality, not adequately characterized in neural terms. The second attitude leads nearly all of us to have deep affections and abiding personal loyalties, whether or not we are psychologists!

Here again I think that these apparently opposing points of view are both more or less true; and I incline all the more to this opinion because of my conviction that as yet we know relatively little about the phenomena of personality. For it seems certain to me that the extent of hidden organization in our universe is infinite, outside as well as inside of space and time. Such a conviction is very natural to a mathematician, since the three ordinary spatial dimensions and the single temporal dimension are for him only particular instances of infinitely many other conceivable dimensions! If this be true, any broad conclusions concerning the nature of personality would seem altogether premature.

At the social level the most serviceable intuitive ideas cluster around the concept of societal evolution. It is of course the comparative study of human institutions which furnishes the principal interest. The analogy between forms of society and evolving organisms is a deep-lying one. Here again the useful

logical structure which can be built around the very complicated facts is exceedingly simple. Even in such a formalized field as ethics, dealing with the behavior of the individual as a member of society, logic plays an almost negligible role.

Belief here seems to gather principally around the idea of societal progress. Progress—or its nonexistence—serves as our fundamental tenet. Some believe that society can improve indefinitely, tending toward a perfect society. Such a belief is of course a fundamental one in most religious systems. Others find this idea too naïve. They stress the gregarious instinct in man and tend to think of societal changes as taking place in various directions strongly conditioned by changing physical environment. All would admit, however, that without the concept of dynamical social processes, social theorizing would be stale and unprofitable.

Let us turn now to consider some further conclusions, towards which this brief survey of intuition, reason, and faith in freedom at the various levels seems to point.

As far as intuition and reason are concerned, these are the common property of all competent individuals. The narrow, closely articulated chains of deductive reasoning serviceable at the earlier levels are more and more replaced by loose webs of inductive reasoning at the later levels, as we pass from the objective to the subjective. At the same time the basic intuitions change from the simple and precise types employed in mathematics and physics to the increasingly complicated and diverse forms characteristic of biological, psychological, and social phenomena.

However, it is just as necessary to clarify and to formalize our knowledge at these later levels as at the earlier ones. The processes of systematic reasoning, whether inductive or deductive, have always a definite prophylactic value, and in particular enable us to avoid the dangers of prejudiced and intolerant points of view. It may be observed in passing that the careful application of impartial thoroughgoing analysis is as important for everyday living as it is in the study and the laboratory.

The striving for rational comprehension is one of the noblest attributes of man. In his agelong difficult struggle he has been

able to secure greater freedom only through a better technical mastery of his environment. No other method of liberation has been vouchsafed to him. But this increased mastery has brought with it automatically new intellectual responsibilities and a more complex way of life. In consequence, unforeseen and threatening dangers arise from time to time; and there is thus imposed on him the necessity to advance still further, which is today more urgent than ever before.

A new injunction has been laid upon the spirit of man, to know and to understand ever more broadly and deeply, in order to achieve freedom.

Now along with the increase in scientific knowledge there appear certain crudely expressed, deeper insights, not completely true or false, some in opposition to others, but all supremely valuable nevertheless. These are embodied in beliefs which seem the inevitable accompaniment of all creative thought.

Thus in the daring effort of the scientist to extend knowledge as far as possible, there arises an aura of faith. It is this spontaneous faith and the desire for freedom which furnish the most powerful incentives and are the best guides to further progress.¹

When the preceding philosophical perspective was nearing completion, the word "freedom" seemed to ring in my ears more than once. It was obvious that the scientific outlook which I had formulated bore directly on this subject—a subject never so important for humanity as it is today.

The invitation to contribute to these essays has given me an unexpected and welcome opportunity to present my own beliefs, as a scientist, on this important problem. In fact it seemed to me a personal duty to accept; for, in the present violently divided state of world opinion concerning political freedom, any clarification of this idea will surely diminish differences in "ideological" points of view and so increase mutual understanding.

In trying to aid in this task, I would begin with a very clear and strong affirmation that the concept of freedom, however vague and elusive, is absolutely indispensable in the character-

¹ See my Presidential Address before the A. A. A. S., *Science*, Dec. 30, 1938.

ization of social relations. Defoe's hero, Robinson Crusoe, shipwrecked alone on a desert island, was certainly a free man. With the coming of his man, Friday, whom he had saved from death, there was a society of two on the island, one a free man and the other his slave; and this distinction was a very important one for them both. Crusoe regarded Friday with affection, and tried to enlighten and instruct his untutored mind; while Friday was devoted, body and soul, to his master. This touching (if fictional) relationship between the two men in the simplest possible type of society illustrates not only the importance of the concept of freedom but also its complexity.

Similarly there can be no question that in any actual modern society the condition of freedom or servitude of its members is one of the most fundamental aspects to be considered. In 1923² when I first tried to bring out the general philosophical significance of the five "levels of thought" described above, it proved illuminating to name four fundamental concepts at each level. Those which I selected at the social level were: personality, freedom, value, and ideal. Let us glance for a moment tentatively at these concepts and their interrelation before trying to approach that of freedom in more detail.

As has been stated, "personality" is the most fundamental concept at the highest, that is, the social, level, being its very essence just as abstraction, matter, organism, and mind are the corresponding essential elements at the lower, the mathematical, physical, biological, and psychological levels respectively. Every civilized human being would admit that personality at its noblest and finest is the most marvelous thing of all. It would also be generally conceded that human personality is capable of extraordinary further development. For these reasons it would seem obvious that men should never be treated with cruelty or unmerited indignity; and that those who do mistreat others thereby degrade themselves.

Evidently the degree of "freedom" in any society is somehow measured by the lack of undesirable constraint imposed upon its

² See my Lowell Institute and Los Angeles Lectures: *The Origin, Nature, and Influence of Relativity*, New York, 1925; in particular, see the final lecture.

members. However, this rough attempt at qualitative definition involves a serious pitfall. For how shall that which is undesirable be determined when the idea of the undesirable hinges in turn upon the accepted, antecedent ideology? Because of this difficulty we can only conclude for the moment that, if we could once agree upon what was undesirable constraint for the individual, this type of definition might be of service. In that case the individual in a free society might well be compared to a microorganism in a favorable culture medium.

The idea of "value" is also one of fundamental importance. From our births we are conditioned by means of family life, mother tongue, prevailing social customs, physical environment, and our general social heritage. These external factors in their aggregate produce a social environment in which we develop and by which we are specifically fashioned into units of personality. In the process we become aware of many social values. For example, Western music—an extraordinary achievement of Western civilization as a whole—has acquainted many of us with musical values. There are numerous other esthetic, intellectual, and spiritual values known to us all; and there is a kind of parallelism on a grand scale in the development of such values in every civilization. Witness for instance the diverse forms of Eastern music, each with its unique features. A broad understanding of the nature and scope of such values forms an essential ingredient of any liberal education.

The quest for the "ideal" may be described as the attempt to discover new and deeper values. If we are not somehow engaged in the pursuit of the ideal, our personalities are inactive and incomplete. As was emphasized above, it is always some form of faith which spurs us onwards in this search for the ideal.

Let us now turn to a closer examination of the concept of political freedom. I shall begin by making the basic claim that the ordinary man, chastened and disciplined by sorrow and all the hard facts of life, as well as the leaders of cultivated thought who try to understand the hidden significance of things, are everywhere of the same mental and moral constitution to an astonishing extent. To sustain this claim I will state three facts gathered directly from my own knowledge.

Firstly, to the uttermost depths of profundity and the finest shades of distinction, the mathematical ideas of mankind are everywhere the same. It is true that the mathematical achievements of the West are much more considerable in recent centuries than those of the East, with almost all European nations participating. But India has produced within recent decades the mathematical genius Ramanujan; the Japanese have been building up a substantial tradition in mathematics more rapidly than we Americans did in the comparable period; and I have known Chinese, Indian, and Japanese students of such high ability as to leave no doubt whatever in my mind that China, Japan, and India are destined to contribute strikingly to world development in this domain of thought. The latent mathematical talent is there in abundance. All that is needed to bring this about is that the material conditions of life and educational opportunities improve. Furthermore, since modern scientific thought depends upon the mathematical ideas of order and quantity, I am forced to the conclusion that these great nations of the East are similar in capacity for scientific thought to those of the West, with the presumption of a comparable future development. All the evidence based on their actual accomplishments in various scientific fields confirms unmistakably this conclusion.

But the similarity lies even deeper. In talking with educated men from all over the globe I have always found the deepest and most sensitive appreciation of other cultures than their own. For instance, I recall various conversations with friends of the nations just mentioned in the East, and with British, French, German, Italian, and Russian friends in the West, all showing a thorough understanding of our New England cultural tradition and its values. In other words, men of different races and nations, conditioned by diverse social climates, are readily capable of sympathetic understanding of the varied culture of men everywhere. Thus, not only in the sphere of rational thought but equally in the wider realms of esthetic and spiritual appreciation, men of totally different background are strikingly similar in mind and spirit. This is a second noteworthy fact.

Thirdly—and this appears to me very significant—I have yet to meet an individual respected by his fellows whose ideas of

right and wrong, in concrete instances on which he was free to speak, were not very like my own. In this connection I recall interesting conversations with two admirable and patriotic persons belonging to great nondemocratic powers situated almost at the antipodes. I had ventured in each case to express a fear lest certain specific territorial aggressions might be made by their nations. On both occasions the suggestion was received politely but with the implication that it was a groundless suspicion on my part (although, as it turned out, quite the contrary was true). What interested me most, however, was their tacit agreement with my own judgment that such acts would not be justifiable. Indeed I have generally found a basis for sympathetic mutual understanding, even on controversial questions, except in those rare cases where I was dealing with persons whose personal position obviously affected the objectivity of their judgment. I might add that bitterness and hopelessness as well as selfish motives have exactly the same kind of prejudicial effect in our own country as elsewhere!

If this claim of the essential sameness of human beings everywhere be admitted, it becomes possible to improve our earlier tentative definition of political freedom as follows: the degree of such freedom in a society is measured by the lack of constraint which is obnoxious to the typical individuals composing the society. That is to say, we are now able to interpret our former phrase "undesirable constraint" as meaning constraint which the large majority tend to regard as objectionable.

Now, in every state, governmental power must be intrusted to a ruling group. It is through the decisions of this group that constraints are imposed. There is no inherent necessity that the selected constraints be beneficial or acceptable to the society at large, any more than there is a necessity in a great industrial corporation that the policies enforced by its directors be beneficial or acceptable to the workers or even to the shareholders. In fact the reverse seems frequently to be true in both cases!

As long as the ruling class is chosen by general ballot and changes from time to time, the government is bound more or less to typify its individuals, and there is certain to be a good deal of freedom in the State. But when this power has some-

how come into the hands of a small, ruthless group, careless of human opinion, then political freedom is lost and widespread unhappiness of spirit sets in. When this stage has been reached the body politic is to be regarded as definitely "sick."

Now without question there is a good deal of this malady today in some of the greatest nations of the world. Until recently, however, it seemed that, through a policy of "appeasement" and the natural operation of beneficent forces, recovery would gradually set in. But it is apparent today that, unless there is close watchfulness on the part of the other nations, the malady is likely to spread over all of mankind. A world stricken in this manner would be intolerable to most intelligent human beings.

What is especially cherished by the so-called democratic nations is freedom of speech. We deem it essential that all of us may freely make remarks, whether judicious or not, about those in authority and about political questions, without fear of punishment. Nevertheless this privilege is not absolutely essential for a considerable degree of freedom. There may be nations where the internal turmoil of spirit has been so violent that unlimited freedom of political expression would soon lead to acts dangerous to the well-being of all. In such a situation a limited restraint of speech might not be generally obnoxious, just because the necessity for it would be understood. Unfortunately such restriction often becomes more and more exacting, until at last attempts are made to suppress even "dangerous thoughts."

The scientific approach as well as common sense suggests certain general conclusions whose wider acceptance would tend to restore the peace and freedom which are vital for the well-being and progress of mankind. Those which I would stress follow directly from the principles which were first set forth.

It has become absolutely necessary to cultivate the broad and deep objective study of man and society in order to understand more fully the very difficult problems which threaten us, and to discover the best methods for solving them.


Ideologies—whether democratic or not—are to be thought of as specific attempts to hit off broad social realities by a formula;

and yet, like all abstract formulas, these are strictly limited in their capacity to express the illimitable truth.

Love and good will are fundamentally important for the constructive development of the possibilities of men; and love and good will always connote peace and freedom.

In this way of thought we attain to a profound faith in the unrealized potentialities of the human race and to the understanding necessary to aid constructively in their realization. Having this attitude of spirit and mind, we will certainly oppose to the uttermost any coercion of the individual tending to destroy his freedom!

3. FREEDOM IN THE BODY POLITIC



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FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT

LOGICALLY, freedom and government might seem to be antitheses, since compulsion is of the essence of government. Anarchists, of whom Kropotkin is the intellectually most respectable, have, on this ground, advocated a complete absence of government. They have believed that such collective decisions as are necessary can be adopted unanimously, without any need of powers of coercion vested in a majority or aristocracy or monarch. But history is not encouraging to this view. The two most important examples of its embodiment in a constitution—the kingdom of Poland and the League of Nations—both came to a bad end. Anarchism, however attractive, is rejected as a method of regulating the internal affairs of a State except by a few idealistic dreamers. Per contra, except by a few idealistic dreamers it is accepted as the only method of regulating international affairs. The same mentality that insists most strongly on the necessity of subjecting the individual to the State insists simultaneously on the complete independence of the sovereign State from all external control. Logically, such a view is untenable. If anarchy is bad nationally, it is bad internationally; if it is good internationally, it must be good nationally. For my part, I cannot believe it to be good in either sphere.

Belief in freedom, as a practical force in politics, arose out of two main sources, religion and trade. Religious minorities, wherever they had little chance of becoming majorities, turned

against persecution; and traders objected to the curtailment of their profits by grants of monopolies to courtiers. The liberal philosophy that arose from these two motives was, at first, very moderate and restrained. The degree of liberty demanded by such men as Locke and Montesquieu is much less than exists in modern democratic states. Thus Montesquieu, quoting Cicero, says: "Liberty is the right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would be possessed of the same power." This may seem an inadequate degree of liberty, if it is not supplemented by some principle as to what the laws are to permit. In France, after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the exercise of the Protestant religion was illegal; it cannot therefore be said that the right to do what the laws permitted conferred any effective liberty upon French Protestants.

Nevertheless, the right to do whatever the laws permit is a very important part of liberty. It was secured in England by habeas corpus, which was a barrier to kingly tyranny; it did not exist in France under the *ancien régime*. In our own day, Jews in Germany, kulaks in Russia, and nationalists in India, have been punished by the executive without appeal to the law courts, and therefore without proof of criminality. This sort of thing is forbidden in the American Constitution by the provision about "due process of law." Montesquieu's intention is to maintain that a man should be punished only by the law courts, and that the law courts should be independent of the executive. The American Constitution, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, has made the law courts also to some extent independent of the legislature, and in this respect has gone beyond what Montesquieu advocated in the passage quoted above. In other passages, however, he gave a wider and more constructive definition of liberty, for instance: "the political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another." This definition of political liberty could not be improved upon, and I shall accept it in what follows.

Political liberty, however, is only one species of a genus, and there is no reason to regard it as more desirable than other species of liberty. Political action may promote or restrict other kinds of liberty as well as the political kind; we cannot therefore judge of political action solely with reference to political freedom, even if we consider freedom the sole proper end of politics.

Freedom in general may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires. Complete freedom is thus only possible for omnipotence; practicable freedom is a matter of degree, dependent both upon external circumstances and upon the nature of our desires. Stoicism and all kindred philosophies seek to secure freedom by the control of desires and by confining them to what the individual will can secure. Political theorists, on the contrary, for the most part concentrate on the external conditions of freedom. This may be a source of error if the subjective part of the problem is forgotten. If all the men guilty of crimes of violence were transported to an island and left to form a self-governing community, they would need a much more stringent form of government than is required where men are temperamentally law-abiding. Nevertheless, so long as we remember that we are making an abstraction, it is convenient and harmless to treat the objective part of the problem of freedom in isolation.

We may give the name "physical freedom" to the mastery over nonhuman obstacles to the realization of our desires. Modern scientific technique has increased physical freedom, but has necessitated new limitations of social freedom. To take an illustration that involves no controversial issues, motor traffic has unavoidably brought about a very much stricter control over the roads by the police than was formerly necessary. Speaking generally, the technical changes that have occurred in the world during the last hundred years have increased the effects, both intended and unintended, that one man's acts are likely to have upon another man's welfare. Montesquieu's "tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety" would be by no means promoted by the removal of traffic regulations, and therefore no one protests against them in the name

of liberty. But in other kinds of activity—of which the most important is war—although the same principle is applicable, various interests and passions prevent men from applying it, and lead them still to defend a degree of anarchy which may have promoted total freedom in a former age, but now has the opposite effect.

Many of the most vehement advocates of freedom have been led to more or less anarchic conclusions, because their conception of freedom was aristocratic rather than democratic. Byron's Corsairs and Giaours are free to practice murder and pillage and to allow their broken hearts to inspire a hatred of the human race, but their freedom is of a sort that cannot be generalized, since it is based upon terror. Tacitus can look back with nostalgia to the good old days of the Republic, when Roman aristocrats were free to plunder provinces with impunity. American plutocrats can demand, in the name of freedom, the right to obstruct organization among the men whose labor produces their wealth, while demanding the fullest freedom of organization for themselves. Educational reformers, who endeavor to introduce freedom into schools, require much vigilance to avoid unintentionally establishing a tyranny of muscle, under which all but the biggest children are trembling slaves. One of the strongest impulses of energetic individuals is the impulse to control and subject those who are unable to resist them, and if this impulse is left free the result is a great diminution of the total liberty of the community. When freedom is conceived democratically, the control of the impulse to tyranny is seen to be the essential and most difficult problem. The freedom of prominent individuals must be curtailed if any freedom is to be secured for the mass of mankind.

The promotion of physical freedom may, even in the most freedom-loving communities, in some degree override the desire for political freedom. Take, for example, the construction of roads. Even if everybody wants them, everybody would prefer the expense to be borne by someone else. The only device for distributing the burden fairly is taxation, and a man cannot be allowed to escape taxation by professing an indifference to roads. Yet his objection might be genuine: the philosopher Lao-tse

held that roads corrupt primitive innocence, and there is no reason why he should not have modern disciples. If, however, a conscience clause were introduced to meet their case, it is to be feared that the number of Lao-tse's disciples would increase with inconvenient rapidity when the financial advantages of the antiroad creed became evident. In a democracy, just as much as in a tyranny, taxes have to be paid by those who object to the purposes for which they are collected. It is only by a mystical identification of the majority with the community that democracy can be held to involve liberty. It is a means to liberty if the majority are lovers of liberty; if not, not.

Eighteenth-century advocates of liberty thought always of isolated individuals rather than of organizations; many of them, like Rousseau, were even actively hostile to freedom of organization. In the modern world it is organizations that raise the difficult problems. Legislators have to consider two questions: for what purposes may organizations be formed? And what may they legally do in pursuance of their purposes? These questions have been fought out in connection with trade unions, which at first were everywhere illegal, then were permitted to exist provided they did nothing to further their objects, then, very gradually, were permitted first one activity and then another. At every stage the legal mind viewed the process with grave suspicion, and was only forced to yield by the pressure of democratic opinion. In the case of trade unions, most of those who were most in favor of freedom advocated the removal of legal restrictions, in spite of the fact that these restrictions were defended in the name of freedom by employers who wished to retain their monopoly of economic power. Nevertheless, it has always been clear that the power of trade unions *might* become a genuine menace to freedom.

The rise of fascism brought about, in its early stages, an exactly opposite situation. Here it was the reactionaries who favored freedom of organization and the progressives who opposed it. The first step in a fascist movement is the combination under an energetic leader of a number of men who possess more than the average share of leisure, brutality, and stupidity. The next step is to fascinate fools and muzzle the intelligent,

by emotional excitement on the one hand and terrorism on the other. This technique is as old as the hills; it was practiced in almost every Greek city, and the moderns have only enlarged its scale. But what I am concerned with is the reaction of modern liberal sentiment to this new attack on liberty. Does the principle of free speech require us to put no obstacle in the way of those who advocate its suppression? Does the principle of toleration require us to tolerate those who advocate intolerance? Public opinion, among those who dislike fascism, is divided on these questions, and has not arrived at any clear theory from which consistent answers could be derived.

There is of course one obvious limitation upon the principle of free speech: if an act is illegal, it is logical to make it illegal to advocate it. This principle justifies the authorities in prohibiting incitement to assassination or violent revolution. But in practice this principle does not by any means cover the ground. If there is to be any personal liberty, men must be free to urge a change in the laws. Suppose a man makes a speech in favor of communism, with the implication that it is to be brought about by the ordinary processes of democracy, and suppose that, after his speech, a questioner asks whether he really believes that such changes can be secured without violent revolution. Unless he gives an affirmative answer with far more emphasis than the facts warrant, he will have, in effect, promoted revolutionary sentiment. Or suppose a fascist makes an anti-Semitic speech, urging that Jews should be subject to legal disabilities; his arguments must be such as to stimulate hatred of the Jews, and the more successful they are the more likely they are to cause violence. Imagine Mark Antony indicted for his speech in *Julius Caesar*: although it is obviously intended to cause violence, it would hardly be possible to obtain legal proof of this intention. To prohibit the advocacy of illegalities is therefore not enough; some further limitation upon the principle of free speech is necessary if incitement to violence is to be effectively prevented.

The solution of this problem has two sides: on the one hand, the ordinary citizen, if he is on the whole content with his form of government, has a right to prohibit any organized attempt

to overthrow it by force and any propaganda obviously likely to promote such an attempt. But on the other hand the government must avoid such flagrant injustice or oppression as is likely to lead to violence in spite of prohibition. The Irish secured their liberties by assassination; women in England won the vote by a long series of inconvenient crimes. Such tactics ought not to have been necessary, since in each case the professed democratic principles of the government justified the aims of the rebels, and therefore seemed to excuse their methods. But when, as in the case of the fascists, the aims of the rebels are fundamentally opposed to a governmental theory accepted by the majority, and when, further, it is obvious that violence is intended to be used at a suitable moment, there is every justification for preventing the growth of organized power in the hands of a rebellious minority. For if this is not done, internal peace is jeopardized, and the kind of community that most men desire can no longer be preserved. Liberal principles will not survive of themselves; like all other principles, they require vigorous assertion when they are challenged.

Freedom of opinion is closely connected with free speech, but has a wider scope. The Inquisition made a point of investigating, by means of torture, the secret opinions that men endeavored to keep to themselves. When men confessed to unorthodox opinions, they were punished even if it could not be proved that they had ever before given utterance to them. This practice has been revived in the dictatorial countries, Germany, Italy, and Russia. The reason, in each case, is that the government feels itself unstable. One of the most important conditions of freedom, in the matter of opinion as in other matters, is governmental security. In England, during the sixty or seventy years preceding the Great War, freedom of speech and opinion, in political matters, was almost complete, because everyone knew that no subversive opinion had a chance of success. Gilbert and Sullivan made fun of the army and navy, but the only penalty was the Queen's refusal to bestow a knighthood on Gilbert. Nowadays, they would be shot in Russia, beheaded in Germany, sent to a penal settlement in Italy, accused of violating the Official Secrets Act in England, and investigated by a Sena-

torial Committee in the United States on suspicion of being in receipt of Moscow gold. The change is due to increased insecurity, which is caused by war, the fear of war, and the impoverishment due to war. And modern war is mainly due to nationalism. Until this state of affairs is changed, it is hardly to be hoped that there will be as much freedom of opinion as existed in Western countries fifty years ago.

Freedom of opinion is important for many reasons, especially because it is a necessary condition of all progress, intellectual, moral, political, and social. Where it does not exist, the *status quo* becomes stereotyped, and all originality, even the most necessary, is discouraged. Since freedom of opinion can only exist when the government thinks itself secure, it is important that the government should have the approval of the great majority of the population and should deal with discontented minorities, wherever possible, in a manner calculated to allay their discontent. A government must possess force, but cannot be a satisfactory government unless force is seldom necessary. All the kinds of freedom advocated by liberals disappear when security disappears, and security depends upon a wide diffusion of contentment. This in turn is impossible when the general level of prosperity is falling. Liberalism flourished in the nineteenth century because of economic progress; it is in eclipse now because of economic retrogression.

There can be no widespread liberty except under the reign of law, for when men are lawless only the strongest are free, and they only until they are overcome by someone still stronger. The tyrant in a lawless community is like the King of the Wood, "who slays the slayer and must himself be slain." Whoever, in the name of liberty, impairs respect for the law, incurs a grave responsibility; yet, since the law is often oppressive and incapable of being amended legally, revolution must be allowed to be sometimes necessary. The solution of this problem is not possible in abstract terms. It was solved practically in the American Revolution; but most revolutions have so weakened the respect for law that they have led to dictatorships. Perhaps a revolution can be completely successful only when those who make it are persuaded that they are defending legality against

some illegal usurpation. But this requires a rare combination of fortunate circumstances, and is not possible in the case of revolutions that attempt any far-reaching change in the social structure.

The most fallacious of all the applications of the principle of liberty has been in international affairs. While it has been generally realized that liberty for the individual depends upon law, it has been thought that liberty for nations depended upon the absence of law. This is partly a historical accident, connected with the years that followed the Congress of Vienna. At that time a number of reactionary states, most of which were purely dynastic, established what was in effect an international government of Europe, and devoted their united strength to the suppression of every form of liberalism in every part of the Continent. The opposition to despotic monarchs was bound up, at that time, with the principle of nationality; democracy went hand in hand with the desire to make the boundaries of states coincide with national sentiment instead of being determined by the accidents of royal marriages or diplomatic bargains among the victors over Napoleon. It was thought that, when once national boundaries and parliamentary institutions had been established everywhere, the democracies would co-operate freely, and the causes of war would have been eliminated. In this mood of optimism, liberals completely overlooked the need for any international authority to regulate the relations between states.

But nationalism triumphant has proved, is proving, and will prove, incompatible not only with liberty, but with everything else that intelligent men have considered desirable since the Renaissance. To consider, for a moment, goods other than freedom, especially the eighteenth-century ideals of culture, education, and humanitarian enlightenment: in these matters South-eastern Europe and Latin America have lost much of what they owed to the Hapsburgs; Ireland, from nationalist sentiment, has cut itself off from European culture by Catholic education and censorship; India, from similar motives, is preparing to repudiate everything occidental. I have met Mexican nationalists who wished to obliterate everything that their country had acquired since 1492. The conception of the unity of civilization,

born in the Roman Empire, nurtured by the medieval Church, brought to maturity by the Renaissance and modern science, survives now only, and that precariously, in the Western democracies, where, it is to be feared, it will perish during this war. Elsewhere, in the name of some national hero, living or dead, the State devotes its powers to the inculcation of some national theology as crass and stupid as the superstitions of South Sea Islanders or the cannibalistic rites of the Aztecs.

If stupidity were the only defect of the modern national religions, the philosopher might shrug his shoulders and remark that the bulk of mankind have always been fools. Unfortunately, while the superstitions of savages are harmful only to themselves, those of nations equipped with scientific technique are dangerous to the whole world and, in particular, involve a grave loss of liberty, not only among the devout, but also among those who wish to remain rational. Vast expenditure on armaments, compulsory military service, and occasional wars are part of the price that has to be paid by those nations that will not accept foreign domination. The inevitable outcome of the doctrine that each nation should have unrestricted sovereignty is to compel the citizens of each nation to engage in irksome activities and to incur sacrifices, often of life itself, in order to thwart the designs of other nations. Hitler, in a sense, had already subjugated England and France, since a large part of the thoughts and actions of Englishmen and Frenchmen were determined by reference to him; and Hitler himself is a product of the previous subjugation of Germany by England and France. In a world of international anarchy individual freedom is as impossible as in a country where private violence is not restrained by the law and the police.

A complete international government, with legislative, executive, and judiciary, and a monopoly of armed force, is the most essential condition of individual liberty in a technically scientific world. Not, of course, that it will secure *complete* liberty; that, I repeat, is only possible for omnipotence, and there cannot be two omnipotent individuals in the world. The man whose desire for liberty is wholly self-centered is therefore driven, if he feels strong enough, to seek world dictatorship; but the man

whose desire for liberty is social, or who feels too weak to secure more than his fair share, will seek to maximize liberty by means of law and government, and will oppose anarchic power in all its various forms.

Every man desires freedom for his own impulses, but men's impulses conflict, and therefore not all can be satisfied. There are two kinds of conflict between men's desires. In the first place, we desire more than our fair share of possessions; this can be met, in theory, by decreeing equality of distribution, as has been done by the institution of monogamy. But there is a more essential and deep-rooted conflict owing to the love of power: most human beings, though in very varying degrees, desire to control not only their own lives but also the lives of others. Most forms of control over the lives of others diminish the freedom of those who are controlled, but some increase it. The man who endows a university has power over the lives of those who profit by his benefaction, but his power is such as to liberate their own impulses. Inventors have great power, and the general tendency of inventions is to increase physical liberty. It is therefore possible for power impulses to find an outlet not incompatible with social freedom. To insure that they shall do so is a problem partly of individual psychology, partly of education, and partly of opportunity. A homicidal maniac cannot be allowed any freedom for his power impulses, but their undesirable character may be the result of bad education and lack of opportunity. Cromwell spent the first half of his career in agitation connected with draining the Fens, and the second in making himself a military dictator; in other circumstances, his power impulses might have found only the earlier beneficent outlet. If freedom is to be secure, it is essential both that useful careers shall be open to energetic men, and that harmful careers shall be closed to them. It is important also that education should develop useful forms of technical skill, and that the circumstances of childhood and youth should not be such as to generate ferocity. All these conditions are absent in totalitarian countries, where the principal means to success are sycophancy, treachery, and brutality, and where education is

designed to produce a combination of submissiveness and truculence.

If freedom were the sole political desideratum, there would still, as we have seen, be need of law and government, which, in the international sphere, remain to be created. But individual freedom, however desirable, is only one among the ends of statesmanship. Among innocuous activities we admire some more than others: we praise a great poet, composer, or man of science more than we praise men who are innocent but undistinguished. Education, both general and technical, is generally conceded to be desirable, even at the cost of the liberties of both parents and children. And if we knew a way to produce a community of Shakespeares, Beethovens, and Newtons, we should probably think it worth while to do so. Freedom is too negative a conception to determine the ends of human life, or even of politics. Nevertheless, it is only in so far as the majority of men agree that other ends can be pursued in political action without arousing resistances and violences that are likely to prove disastrous. An unpopular Utopia, in so far as a benevolent dictator could realize it, would prove to be quite different from his dreams. Liberty, therefore, must always remain a *sine qua non* of other political goods.

The transition from individual to social ethics is theoretically far from simple. Most philosophers who have written on ethics have been mainly concerned with the individual. When they have been concerned also with society, they have failed to build a bridge from the individual to the community that will bear logical scrutiny. Take, for instance, the two foundations of Bentham's social philosophy: (1) every man pursues his own happiness; (2) every man ought to pursue the general happiness. Perhaps if we could submit Bentham to a *viva voce* examination, he would expand his second proposition as follows: The general happiness will be increased if every man acts in a manner likely to increase it; therefore, if I am in a governmental position, or in any way owe my own happiness to the fact that I represent the general interest, I shall endeavor to cause others to act in a way that will promote the happiness of mankind, which I can only do by means of institutions that cause

the interests of the individual and those of the community to be identical. This explanation might pass muster in an ideal democracy, where no politician or official could continue to enjoy his salary unless he served the public faithfully. But it does not give any reason why, where an ideal democracy does not exist, any public man should aim at the public good. I dare say Caligula and Nero got more fun out of life than Marcus Aurelius did. One wonders what arguments Bentham would have used to them, and how long he would have been allowed to go on using them. The only argument compatible with his psychology would have been that they would come to a bad end, but they might have replied that they preferred a cheerful beginning and a bad end to drabness throughout. Bentham imagines the legislator to be in some unexplained way an incarnation of the public interest. But this is only because, in fantasy, he is the legislator, and he is in fact a benevolent man. Psychoanalysts show most people that they have unconscious vices, but in Bentham's case it was the virtues that were unconscious. In obedience to theory, he conceived of himself as wholly selfish and remained unaware of his spontaneous desire for the general happiness. Public spirit, he says (in the Table of the Springs of Action), is an absurd motive, which never actuated anyone; in fact, it is a synonym for spite. Nevertheless, he hopes to find a legislator who will seek the public good. He was young in the era of benevolent despots, which perhaps accounts for his failure of logic. However that may be, his individual psychology and his social ethics remain disparate and fundamentally inconsistent.

Of the great religions, Christianity and Buddhism, in their primitive and most vital forms, are concerned only with personal virtue, and show no interest in social and political questions. On the other hand, Confucianism is fundamentally political, and considers all virtues in relation to the welfare of the State. The result is a certain dullness and aridity, which caused it to be supplemented by Buddhism and Taoism among the more spiritually minded Chinese. Confucianism is a religion for the civil service, and gave rise to the most remarkable civil service the world has ever known. But it had nothing to offer

to prophets or poets or mystics: St. Francis or Dante or Pascal would have found it wholly irrelevant to their needs.

Karl Marx, as a religious leader, is analogous to both Confucius and Bentham. His ethical doctrine, in a nutshell, is this: that every man pursues the economic interest of his class, and therefore, if there is only one class, every man will pursue the general interest. This doctrine has failed to work out in practice as its adherents expected, both because men do not in fact pursue the interest of their class, and because no civilized community is possible in which there is only one class, since government and executive officials are unavoidable.

There is one method of making the public good fundamental in ethics which has been favored by many philosophers and some politicians, namely, to endow the community with a mystical oneness and to regard the separate citizens as unreal abstractions. This view may be supported by the analogy of the human body. No man is troubled by the possibility of conflict between the different parts of his body, say the great toe and the little finger. The body has to be considered as a whole, and the interests concerned are those of the whole, not of the several members. A healthy body is a completely integrated corporative State, governed despotically by the brain. There are, no doubt, possibilities of rebellion, such as paralysis and St. Vitus's dance, but these are diseases which are exceptional. Could not the body politic be similarly integrated and similarly devoted, instinctively and harmoniously, to the welfare of the whole? The answer is merely an appeal to the facts. An individual body contains only one mind, whereas the body politic contains many, and there is no psychological mechanism by which many minds can co-operate in the same manner in which muscles controlled by a single mind co-operate. Co-operation among many minds has to be a matter of agreement, even when it is agreement to be dominated by a dictator. A further, but less fundamental, argument against those who regard a human society as an organism is that they almost invariably take a nation, rather than mankind, as the organism concerned, thus merely substituting the strife of nations for that of individuals,

instead of arriving at a genuine public interest which is to be served by the whole human race.

Considered practically, not philosophically, the question is: Can the public interest ever be a force in public affairs, or must politics be always and essentially nothing but a tug of war between the passions of powerful individuals or groups? There are two ways in which the public interest can become practically operative: first, through the impulse of benevolence, as in Bentham; second, through the consciousness of the common man that he is too weak to stand alone, and that he can only secure that part of his political desires which he shares with other common men. An uncommon man can hope to become a dictator, but a common man can hope, at best, only to become a voter in a democracy. Common men are helpless without a leader, and as a rule follow a leader who deceives them; but there have been occasions when they have accepted the leadership of men inspired by benevolence. When this has happened, the public good has become an effective force in public affairs. To secure that it shall happen as often as possible is the practical problem for the man whose theorizing on politics is guided by a desire for the welfare of mankind.

The practical solution of this problem is difficult in the extreme, but the theoretical solution is obvious. Common men throughout the world should be made aware of the identity of their interests, wherever it exists; conflicts of interest which are apparent but not real must be shown to be illusory; real conflicts of interest, where they exist, must be removed by a change of institutions, of which the most harmful are national sovereignty and private ownership of land and raw materials; education and economic circumstances must be made such as not to generate hatred and ferocity and a desire for revenge upon the world. When all this has been achieved, co-operation will become possible with a minimum of coercion, and individual freedom will be increased as well as all other political desiderata.

To sum up: Government is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the greatest realizable degree of individual liberty; indeed, there is need of more government than at present, not less, since an international authority is as much required as the

present national states. But if government is not to be tyrannical, it must be democratic, and the democracy must feel that the common interests of mankind are more important than the conflicting interests of separate groups. To realize this state of affairs completely would be scarcely possible, but since the problem is quantitative a gradual approach may be hoped for. At present the world is moving away from all that is valued by lovers of freedom, but this movement will not last forever. The world has oscillated many times between freedom and slavery, and the dark times in which we live are probably no more permanent than the progressive epoch that rejoiced our grandfathers.

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LIBERTY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE

MISUNDERSTANDINGS commonly arise from the fact that for reasons of linguistic economy a single word is used to carry many meanings. Where, as in the case of "liberty," the word itself is charged with emotional meaning, the effect is to ally parties who really mean different things, or divide parties who really mean the same thing. To clarify such a situation, the first step is to set down the several meanings side by side in order that libertarians may realize precisely what it is that they propose and antilibertarians precisely what it is that they oppose.

There are at least seven meanings of liberty which are relevant to democracy. There is positive versus negative liberty; and there is primitive versus moral liberty. These are all fundamental meanings, prior to government. The introduction of government generates the three additional meanings: legal liberty, or liberty *under* government; civil liberty, or liberty *against* government; and political liberty, or liberty *for* government.

One does not speak of liberty at all unless there is a disposition to perform an act. Given such a disposition, negative liberty implies an external obstacle, as when the child is held in the grasp of an adult, or when some barrier, such as iron bars, is interposed between the prisoner and the place where he would prefer to be. With such an obstacle in mind, negative liberty

means merely its absence or removal. In social relations the obstacle commonly takes the form of a threat—what the individual desires to do is penalized, that is, connected by natural causation or human intervention with a strongly repugnant sequel.

Negative liberty is relative to the specific character of a felt interest, and to its intensity. In an age of religious zeal negative liberty will mean liberty from an oppressive Church; when men aspire to the management of their own affairs, they will covet liberty from a tyrannical State; when they are ambitious to rise in the economic scale, negative liberty will mean escape from the limitations imposed by the existing industrial hierarchy. To writers, liberty means relief from censorship; to drinkers, repeal of prohibition; to pacifists, the absence of compulsory military service; to agitators and minorities, unrestricted speech and assembly. Negative liberty plays a small role in the lives of apathetic men; and will take a high place in the code of men whose desires and ambitions are strong, and who feel the impact of the obstacle with a proportional intensity.

Positive liberty, on the other hand, means that the externally unimpeded interest is *capable* of proceeding towards its realization. A man is not positively at liberty to walk unless he has sound limbs, or to travel unless he has the fare—even though nothing prevents him, and nobody forbids him. Liberty from prison bars is not positively enjoyed except by an individual who is capable of moving his body; the absence of censorship, persecution, or tyranny implies no positive liberty except to those who possess the resources for artistic creation, for worship, or for self-government.

Liberty, positive and negative, is effective personal choice. No one can be said to be an advocate of full liberty, nor can any State or policy be said to promote it, unless liberty is thus doubly conceived, as both unhampered and implemented.

When liberty is claimed or conceded as a right, there arises a distinction between primitive and moral liberty. Primitive liberty is the claim of any interest to the positive and negative conditions of its realization. This liberty manifests itself

on every plane, from the most elemental or selfish appetite to the most spiritual or humane aspiration. It possesses no moral quality in itself, but creates an obligation on the part of other interests. According to democratic theory, every interest is, so far as it goes, an original source of value: to negate it is to do evil, and therefore subtracts something from the sum of goods; to negate it unconsciously, is to be reprehensibly selfish; to negate it willfully, is to be malicious. Its own self-assertion may therefore properly be attended with a consciousness of rectitude; and the disinterested observer will feel a moral sympathy with the victim.

But liberty is not only good in the material sense, as possessing a claim to moral consideration, but may itself possess the form of moral goodness intrinsically. When it does possess this form, whether personal or social, it may be termed "moral liberty."

Moral liberty in the personal sense is liberty internally regulated by reason and conscience. It appears upon that level of integration in which the individual's several appetites have been centered and unified by a reflective will. It is a part of the purpose of the democratic State that individuals should be allowed and encouraged to exercise the prerogatives of personality.

In the second or social sense, liberty is moralized when it assumes the form of a sentiment which moves the individual to approve and to seek the enjoyment of liberty by all. Love of liberty in this sense is tested by the attitude towards another's liberty. The love of one's own liberty creates a needful corrective of oppression, but it is morally defective, because it lacks the intent to provide for the interests of others. Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me death" is thus ambiguous. If he meant that he preferred death to the loss of his own liberty, he did not rise above the level of personal self-interest. But if he meant that he preferred death to the destruction of a social system under which all persons enjoyed their just rights, then his sentiment was "noble," but it would have found a fitter expression in the words, "Give *us* liberty, or give *me* death."

Moral liberty, in the social sense, is also possessed by what may be called "cultural liberty," meaning the "disinterested" activities of science and of art. Truth serves all interests, since all interests embrace judgments concerning their instruments or objects and are effective in proportion as these judgments are true. The use of truth by one interest is compatible with its use by others. In so far as science is successful it results in a fund of truth freely available to all, and its value is therefore social or human, rather than private and selfish. Beauty is a sharable good. The enjoyment of painting, sculpture, poetry, and music does not bring individuals into a relation of rivalry and does not create or exacerbate enmities, but induces a sense of participation and is enhanced thereby.

The liberties on which attention is focused at the present time are those whose meaning is related to government. The first is liberty under government, to which I propose to give the name of legal liberty.

The widely diffused idea that liberty is created by the State is both false and confusing. It is entirely conceivable that an isolated individual possessing suitable faculties and facilities, or an individual living in an unorganized society of individuals whose interests were happily compatible with his own, should possess and enjoy full liberty, negative and positive, primitive and moral. This reservation being made, it is now in order to affirm that no high degree of liberty is normally possible without the protection of the State.

The most serious hindrance to a man's interest is the rival interest of his neighbor, and the remedy lies in the systematic delimitation of interests. There is a greater liberty to be enjoyed through the acceptance of such delimitation than through the claim of limitlessness, because the limited liberties are guaranteed and regularized. In short, while the State neither creates nor justifies liberty, it does create security; and it is upon security that the fuller and more constructive liberties of civilization depend.

The restrictions which government imposes are justified only by the primitive and moral liberties for which they make

room—as much room as possible. Any given system of legal liberty may fail to provide the maximum of room, and this failure furnishes the ground for criticism and reform. This priority of primitive and moral liberties is not eagerly accepted by those who under the existing system enjoy the most spacious room, and would therefore prefer to invest their present legal liberties with an ultimate validity.

If it be the duty of government to promote the liberty of every man, this function must be extended to embrace positive and not merely negative liberty. The most ancient, persistent, and oppressive enemies of liberty are not external hindrances, whether physical or human, but poverty and ignorance. It is the chief fault of prosperous and of enlightened men that they forget this fact. What government does in the way of education, public information, health, housing, increased wages, reduced hours of labor, or the redistribution of wealth may be as much a service of liberty as is its protection of men against interference, from one another or from itself. The distinction between “welfare” and liberty breaks down altogether, since a man’s effective liberty is proportional to his resources.

The topic of civil liberty is the most confused, and, next after that of war, the most prominent of contemporary issues. The phrase has at least five distinct meanings which are, unhappily, not distinguished. It is sometimes used to mean legal liberty, in the sense already discussed above. It is sometimes used to mean political liberty, in the sense to be discussed below. It is sometimes used, without definition, to refer to an indeterminate list of specific liberties: the liberties of speech, press, assembly, and religion, as interpreted in judicial decisions; the so-called “inalienable” rights of life, liberty, and property or happiness; the rights of petition, habeas corpus, “due process” of law, trial by jury, and the inviolability of the home or person; together with other rights embraced under the broad formulas of “common law rights,” or “the rights of Englishmen.” It is sometimes used, again without definition, to refer to a narrower group of the liberties listed above, namely, those liberties which have to do most directly

with the effective public utterance of opinion. Finally, civil liberty is sometimes taken to mean such liberties as the above, when conceived as limiting the powers of the executive and legislative branches of the government, or of the government "in power," and as entrusted to some more considered procedure, such as the framing or amendment of the constitution, or decisions by courts having a constitutional jurisdiction.

The expression "civil liberty" will here be employed in the fifth of these senses, in the sense, namely, of constitutional liberty. Civil liberty defines the line between the use and the abuse of the powers of government. It has meaning only in a political philosophy, such as democracy, in which it is affirmed that government, instead of being an end in itself, possesses obligations beyond itself. It signifies what, to use Jefferson's expression, "the people are entitled to against every government on earth."

The principle of civil liberty implies a tendency of government to defeat its legitimate end and become an abuse rather than a utility. There are three ways in which government may become the enemy of liberty: by disloyalty, by excess, and by inefficiency.

By disloyalty of government is here meant any deviation from its public function due to the private self-interest of the ruler. It signifies the chronic evil, and the chronic suspicion, associated with the name of tyranny. The popularity of government does not suffice to save it from tyranny, but may create new forms of tyranny. Thus popular government lends itself to the tyranny of the majority or of the masses; and to the tyranny of the demagogue, who conceals his self-interest by flattering the people, and appeals to their baser instincts against their reflective judgment. The corrective of tyranny in these popular forms does not lie in relating government more closely to the existing will of those who live under it, but in a scrupulous regard for the liberty of minorities or dissenting individuals, and in a system of popular education that shall emancipate the critical faculties and develop a resistance to irrational appeal.

Liberty may be conceived as a just claim not only against

disloyal government, or tyranny, but also against excessive government, or paternalism. A popular government is peculiarly liable to this abuse. It tends to be trusted by those who live under it, since it speaks in their name; and it tends to be invoked by them as a utility, since they feel it is their creature.

The issue of liberty versus excessive government derives its present meaning to most Americans from the application to "business." The beginning of sound thinking on this matter is to see that the economic system known as laissez-faire capitalism is not an effect of "the silence of the law," but is founded on legal rights. Men who are merely let alone to do as they please do not compete with one another, they plunder one another. "Free competition" depends no more on letting men do as they please, than on preventing them from doing as they please, and forcing them to do as they do not please. The only question regarding government's interference with business is whether it shall interfere more or less, and in old ways or new ways. The only democratic principle applicable to this question is the principle that the restraints imposed by government shall be justified by their positive fruitfulness to the individuals living under government. Judged by this standard, government is always excessive when it is exercised for its own sake.

Civil rights protect men, in the third place, from the inefficiency of government, that is, from the malfunctioning of its mechanisms and agencies. Considering the instruments at its command, government will sometimes most effectively serve liberty by leaving the regulation of private interests to private institutions, such as church, school, or charitable organization, or to the unofficial power of the social conscience. Thus the agencies which will effectively regulate opinion, sentiment, science, and art are coarse instruments, unsuited to so delicate an operation. If a hammer and saw were the only tools of surgery, it would be difficult to remove the diseased portions of the body without injuring the adjoining parts. Similarly, the mechanisms of public enforcement are ill suited to distinguish between art and pornography, or between science and dogma, or between persuasion and propaganda, or between education and indoctrination.

Every instrument may be dulled or broken by overuse. A State which is asked to do too much may do nothing well. Its functions may increase more rapidly than its competence. It is prudent, therefore, to limit the functions of the State out of regard for the human limitations of its rulers.

The inefficiency of government may consist not in the imperfection of its own instruments, but in its failure to profit by other instruments. It is self-evident that the State should derive the utmost public benefit from the motive of private self-interest. There is an area within which public and private interest coincide, and here the motive of private interest may be stronger and more reliable than the disinterestedness of government, and its use more economical.

Civil liberty sets limits to the government in power, and its rationale lies in the fact that the government in power tends, unless restrained, to tyranny, paternalism, and inefficiency. There are certain liberties which are justified not as a protection of the individual against government, but as indispensable to the functioning of government. Any civil liberty when so justified becomes a "political" liberty. It is not easy to circumscribe the liberties which should be here included. There is no doubt, however, regarding those liberties which enable the individual to form judgments for himself, and communicate them to his fellow-men. Among these liberties are the liberties of speech, of press, of assembly, and of religion, when these are conceived as essential to the processes of political democracy. So-called "academic freedom," embracing the liberties of research and of teaching, may be considered as an application of the same principle, as may liberties of radio or cinema, or any other form of communication which advancing technology may devise.

The meaning of these political liberties depends on the assumption that a distinction can be made between judgment and practice. The liberty to judge that property should be held in common does not imply a liberty to practice communism; the liberty to hold the theory of free trade does not imply the liberty to bring goods across the frontier without paying the

duty. Given any act whatsoever there is a distinction between a favorable opinion or sentiment towards acts of that type, and the performance of that act. A similar distinction holds also between persuasion and incitement. The line is difficult to draw, but in principle it is clear that the liberty to convert others to a judgment which if acted upon would be lawless does not imply the liberty to perform or induce a lawless act.

A democratic polity is pledged to the principles of *enlightenment* and *consent*, and the political liberties are corollaries of these principles. In a State otherwise conceived, as founded on dogma or power, the political liberties have no place.

First, democracy puts its trust in the achievement and dissemination of knowledge. But knowledge can be achieved only by minds which are freed from coercion in order that they may be faithful to evidence. Knowledge is a potential achievement of every inquiring mind. The maximum advance of true knowledge depends on giving to every mind a commission to explore the facts and exercise its reasoning capacities. The essential political liberty is thus liberty of thought, but the liberties of speech, press, assembly, and teaching are also conducive to the achievement of knowledge, through begetting criticism, confirmation, and discussion.

Every liberty is limited by its justifying principle. Those who claim liberty of judgment and communication for the sake of enlightenment submit themselves to that standard. The liberty of dogmatic affirmation, or of impassioned utterance, or of artfully propagating error, or of silencing opponents, or of personal polemics, cannot be justified as conducive to the achievement and spread of knowledge. Such liberties may be claimed, and perhaps rightly granted, on other grounds; but every thinker, speaker, writer, or teacher who claims liberty in order that he may contribute to knowledge is thereby pledged to intellectual sobriety, disinterestedness, and good faith.

Second, the liberties of judgment and communication are essential to the constitution of the democratic State as conditions of that consent from which government derives its just authority. The fundamental principle of political democracy is not the agreement of the people with the government, but the

agreement of the government with the people. If this is to occur there must be an antecedent and independent agreement among the people themselves.

Here again the justifying principle imposes limits on liberty. If liberty is to be claimed on the ground of consent, then its exercise must conduce to consent, in the sense of agreement of government with a popular choice freely and independently formed. This argues that the government must refrain from dictating the decision from which it derives its mandate. It must not only avoid interference, but must positively assist the people to choose for themselves. But consent also implies a thoughtful decision, that is, an act of deliberate choice from among the relevant alternatives. He who defends the liberty of judgment and communication on the ground of consent cannot claim a right to use this liberty merely for purposes of intimidation, emotional excitation, or hypnotic suggestion.

Political liberty may be exercised in relation to the government in power; or in relation to the political constitution, taken as embracing the principle of political liberty itself. The first of these uses of political liberty is its partisan use, and the second its revolutionary use.

It is evident that if the existing government is to rest on consent, its policies must have been, and must continue to be, debatable pro and con. The recognized device by which government by consent is obtained is through the party system, by which a single party or block of parties assumes the powers of government for a limited time. It is an essential feature of this procedure that the election should be preceded by a free discussion of issues and candidates, and the government elected is supposed to conform its policies to the judgment which has prevailed. Consent is periodically renewed or withdrawn by the same processes as those by which it is originally given. Thus the party in power, at the same time that it frames statutes and performs administrative acts in accordance with the popular mandate from which it derived its authority, must also respect the political liberties of its opponents, which may be used for its own defeat. Every party will have two loyalties, to itself and to the broad purpose of the system at large.

But what if a faction arises within a democracy, claiming the partisan liberties guaranteed by democracy, but pledged, in the event of securing power, to destroy democracy? While this issue has been forced to the front by the rise of communism and fascism, it has always been latent, and constitutes the central paradox of political democracies. They seem obliged to harbor and nourish their own enemies, and thus to foster the seeds of their own destruction.

The revolutionary form of political liberties is defensible by the principles of enlightenment and consent. It is essential to a democratic polity that not only its specific policies, but its fundamental creed, its premises spoken and unspoken, should be affirmed by those who live under it. The sort of agreement which democracy contemplates is that agreement, founded on objective evidence, which emerges only after the critical faculties have been matured and emancipated, and which can endure the test of criticism. It is impossible to appeal to evidence for democracy, without admitting evidence against democracy. The possibility of truth is conditioned by the hazard of error.

So far the partisan and revolutionary forms of political liberty are similar. We now reach the point at which they diverge. Partisan liberty is argued from the requirements of a certain type of polity, and whether the opposition to government succeeds or fails, the effect is to reaffirm that form of polity. As regards revolutionary liberty, on the other hand, the logic of the situation is entirely different. If such an opposition succeeds, liberty will have been used to destroy and render impossible for an indefinite period to come the very form of polity which was the premise of its justification.

It is impossible to discuss the question whether government should or should not grant a liberty, unless one formulates and adheres to some end. If the proponents of democracy conceive this end as government based on the reflective consent of the governed, then to argue that the government should in any given situation so conduct itself, by commission or omission, as to defeat this end is self-contradictory. In the dilemma with which the State is here confronted this contradiction seems

unavoidable: whether the State denies political liberty in order to preserve political liberty, or concedes political liberty knowing that it will be used to destroy political liberty.

The contradiction is, however, avoidable when the end is conceived as the creation and preservation of a political system, the means as a present act or policy of government. Thus if a present denial of liberty is conducive to the creation and preservation of the aforesaid system, there is no contradiction in the employment of such a means: there is, on the contrary, a positive obligation to employ such a means.

The confusion of thought which attends this subject arises from a failure to define the libertarian end. There is a scrupulous or abstinent libertarianism, which acts on the maxim, "Never restrain liberty"; and there is an experimental and constructive libertarianism, which seeks to establish a durable polity in which liberty is embodied in institutions: and as standards or norms the two are different. Up to a certain point their requirements are consistent. But the adherent of democracy who has adopted the institutional libertarian end as his supreme principle must be prepared in case of conflict to subordinate his libertarian scruples.

In deciding whether the revolutionary use of political liberty will or will not result in the destruction of libertarian institutions, many considerations must be taken into account. Recent developments in the technique of propaganda and force make it more difficult than ever before in the world's history to overthrow a dictatorship. The likelihood that democratic institutions once destroyed could be re-created is correspondingly small. A democracy which is in power should not lightly surrender this advantage. On the other hand, it is difficult to deny political liberties to a revolutionary party without weakening devotion to the ultimate end of libertarian institutions. The means tend to corrupt the purity of the end. The agencies required for the effective repression of political liberties in particular cases are likely to extend their application, and to do more evil than good. These and many other like considerations make the decision difficult. But the first step, and a long step,

toward solving the problem is a clear definition of the standard of judgment. Those who believe that the end of preserving and perfecting democratic institutions is the supremely valid standard for organized society must adopt the necessary means undeterred by any mere taboo.

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THE MEANING OF LIBERTY AND ITS PERVERSIONS

WHEN we contemplate the mass of utterances devoted to the subject of liberty we find it hard to escape the conclusion that of all the arts the most backward is the art of thinking. I am referring not to any profound or highly technical art but to an intrinsically simple one. I do not mean the art of fathoming the secrets of nature or the art of calculation or the art of philosophical speculation. I do not mean an art that depends either on erudition or on the skills of the laboratory. On the contrary it is an art that the metaphysician is as apt to sin against as the common man. It is an art that the leaders of men betray at least as often as do those they lead. It is an art that is not taught in the schools, and rarely in the colleges. Instead, there are special crafts and professions the primary purpose of which is to confound this art altogether. It is an art that established authority always suspects and often represses. In some countries today the practice of it is forbidden under the severest penalties. And yet, in this age wherein the techniques of propagandism are so highly developed, there is perhaps no art that it is more imperative for men to learn.

These are bold statements, but anyone who will take the trouble sincerely to contemplate the history of disputations concerning this word "liberty" and its meaning can be convinced, I believe, of their truth. Whatever liberty is, all men are agreed that its presence or absence is of vital importance to them.

Whatever liberty is, they have always been ready to fight for it—or about it. But for all the fighting and all the disputing the same confusions and sophistications flourish today, flourish as persistently and as triumphantly as ever in the past. Here there is no record of progress. While we have conquered great kingdoms of knowledge, while we have been penetrating to the heart of the atom and to inconceivably far-off galaxies, we have attained no consensus concerning the condition of this liberty that touches all of us so nearly. Statesmen and even scientists, men of letters and men of law, perpetuate the same misconceptions about it that we find at the very dawn of reflection. And if we have not attained any greater clarity or any greater understanding it is not because we are dealing with something in itself abstruse and baffling—it is rather because our interests, our prejudices, our warm immediate impulses will not let us approach it, examine it, and see it for what it is.

We will devote our attention to one thing only—the meaning of a word. How do we ascertain this meaning? There is no question of validity or invalidity in the mere assertion: “I attach this meaning to this symbol.” It may be a kind of anti-social act to use a word in a very different sense from that of its common acceptance, but this is in itself no offense against the integrity of thought. In a specialized context it may be appropriate, or even necessary—since there are always more meanings than available words—to use a common word in a specialized sense. Where then does the offense come in? When can we justly speak of the perversion of meaning?

The word we are concerned with is one of universal use. The philosopher and the scientist have no technical term to substitute for it. It signifies an immediate datum, something that cannot be analyzed into components or reduced to simpler elements. It signifies the state of being free, and this being free is as ultimate as being warm or pleased or angry. One indication of the ultimate character of the concept is that while in the English language we have two words for it (“liberty” and “freedom”) no perceptible nuance of difference has developed in the generic usage of them. How can we define a word of this sort? We cannot use other words that more clearly express its

meaning. We can, of course, offer cases and illustrations. We can relate its meaning to other meanings. We can consider the conditions on which the state of being free depends. We can bring out its implications. We can specify particular modes of its manifestation, particular areas in which it is present or absent, as when we speak of religious liberty, economic liberty, political liberty, and so on. We can specify within any given situation who is free and in what respect. We can turn about and define it indirectly, as the absence of its negation, the absence of restraint. But in all this we are merely identifying a meaning, not defining it. It is a meaning we must simply recognize, simply accept. The universality of usage sets it for us. It is understood by the child and by the savage as well as by the civilized man. It is a meaning we cannot do without, and thus we find that when people offer us some alternative and different meaning they nonetheless imply that it is equivalent to the universally accepted meaning. Here, as we shall see, is the root of the worst perversions. On this account much that is written on the subject of liberty is worse than futile. It confuses the issues, obscures that which it pretends to clarify, even sophisticates liberty into its own contradiction. Hence the greatest sinners against reason have been the reasoners, the philosophers, and high priests.

The history of the more pretentious writings on liberty, from the time of Plato to the present day, amply substantiates this charge, but within our present limits all we can do is to point out the nature of the more persistent and frequent misconceptions.¹

We begin with those who honestly accept the universal meaning but, being led to define it by the double negative, as the absence of restraint, are never able to see it positively again and fall in consequence into immediate error. Their argument runs as follows: liberty is the absence of restraint, therefore all restraint is a curtailment of liberty. They reason in the void of their negatives. Shall we, to bring them back to common sense, add yet another negative, and ask them, What then of the

¹ The best analysis of the subject within my knowledge is Dorothy Fosdick's book, *What Is Liberty?*, New York, 1939.

restraint of restraint? Is it not obvious that liberty—except on a desert island, where, alas, it is an unprized commodity—is subject to constant invasion and must be constantly safeguarded? Is it not obvious that the absence of restraint, whereby men in society enjoy any kind of liberty, is the presence of superior restraint on the forces that would suppress this liberty?

Here the commonest form of error is that which rests on the simple antithesis of the realm of liberty and the realm of law; one the “free” life of man in nature or in nonpolitical society and the other the coercive order of the State. Many writers on liberty have been content with this untenable antithesis. It was the view of Thomas Hobbes that liberty existed only in the interstices of law. And his contention has been upheld with undiminished vigor by many later schools, by the utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill, by the Neo-Darwinians such as Herbert Spencer, by the robust individualists and nature-worshippers after the manner of Thoreau, by the philosophical anarchists, and by the economic conservatives who at the present day echo the sentiments of Herbert Hoover’s trumpet blast, *The Challenge to Liberty*. Every law, they say, is an encroachment on liberty. Every new law reduces yet further the shrunken area of liberty.

Yet the argument is most patently fallacious. You cannot *think* about it without discovering its error. True, every law restrains *some* liberty for *some*. But in so doing it may well establish some other liberty for some others—or indeed for all. The law that forbids an employer to dismiss a worker because he joins a trade union gives the worker a liberty that, as worker, he lacked before. The law that forbids another to trespass on my property assures me the liberty to enjoy my property. Every law establishes an obligation, but the obligation is the reverse side of a right. The obligation may lie on the many and the right rest in the few, as for example under a law imposing a censorship of opinion. Or the right may be established for the many and the corresponding obligation be imposed on the few, as when a law compels factory-owners to introduce safety devices. Since liberty does not exist in the void but in the relations between men, all liberties depend on restraints

just as all rights depend on obligations. The naïve Hobbesian stand ignores this simple truth.

In a deeper sense too it misapprehends alike the nature of liberty and the nature of law. Laws may be tyrannous, but tyranny is the quality of particular enactments and has nothing to do with the essential character of law. Law is not command, though many jurists have mistakenly defined it so. A legal code is a system regulating human relationships within the frontiers of a State and applying to all who live within it. It is a necessary basis of social order, a guaranty that men will act on certain principles in their intercourse with one another, that, for example, they will fulfill their contracts and will not use violence to gain their ends. Remove this system, and every complex society would be reduced to chaos. Men could not foresee the consequences of their actions, could not undertake any enterprise that looked beyond the moment, could not possess any security of mind or body. The liberties we possess are relative to the social order in which we live and in large measure are created as well as sustained by that order. When our rights perish our liberties perish too. How vain then is the saying that liberty exists only "in the interstices of law"!

When men define liberty as the absence of restraint, the trouble frequently is that they at once think of some kinds of restraint and forget others altogether. They do not realize that in every society all kinds of restraints and liberties—legal, constitutional, economic, social, moral, religious—inevitably coexist in endless combinations for the different groups who live in the same community. There is no simple totality that may be named *the* liberty of the individual or *the* liberty of the people. When Herbert Hoover, in the book already referred to, speaks of "the American system of liberty," he finds it realized in the particular range of economic liberties that depend on equal *legal* rights, with practically no reference to the opportunities and conditions on which the exercise of these rights depends. He opposes economic controls by government, not on the ground that they are misguided but on the ground that they cause "myriad wounds to liberty." He decries "regimented agriculture" as a blow to liberty, without inquiring whether

the farmers, wisely or unwisely, want the "regimentation." He decries "regimented currency," without considering that currency is always "regimented"—by someone. The controls he disapproves, wisely or unwisely, he regards as inconsistent with liberty or even as part of "the American system of liberty." He seems scarcely conscious of the fact that if two thousand individuals are in a position to control or direct half the industry of the country, therein also lies an important aspect of the problem of liberty.

Every law restrains some liberty, but before we can condemn it on that account we must put to ourselves two vital questions. First, *whose* liberty? For every law gives some men something that they will to have or to do, while restraining them, and all other men, in the contrary direction. Second, *what* liberty? For there are many kinds of liberty, and they conflict one with another, and some can be attained only by the restriction of others, and the advancement of one man's liberty generally means the setting of a limit to the similar liberty of another man. In the simplest terms, when one man or one group dominates another, they arrogate to themselves precisely the kind of liberty over others that they deny the others over themselves. Certain liberties are incompatible with one another, certain liberties are again incompatible with the possession by others of the like liberty. Therefore the answer to the question, *What* liberty? involves always a comparison of liberties and an assessment of their relative values. Here, incidentally, is where the negative definition of liberty as the absence of restraint proves quite unhelpful. For instance, I regard the liberty of men to think as they please as more important, more valuable, than the liberty of other men to control their thinking. The absence of one kind of restraint means far more to me than the absence of another kind of restraint. So I am driven back to the ultimate, the positive, and yet not further definable meaning of liberty. Then the problem of liberty becomes a far more complex one than it seemed at first, when we were content with the negative definition. For now we have to ask: What combination of liberties and restraints is most

serviceable for the existence of what men seek when they place a high value on liberty?

Of such a nature are the more significant and searching questions that emerge when we pass beyond the elementary confusions that beset our thinking on the subject. But our immediate concern is with these confusions, and so we proceed to a second group of them. Here we meet the people who start from the universal meaning of liberty but, finding that the state of being free is realized for themselves under certain conditions, forthwith postulate that liberty itself, liberty for all men, is attained under the same conditions. They confound their personal liberty, or the liberty of some group to which they belong, with universal liberty. There are certain things they want to do, certain goals they want to achieve. If there is no restraint on this doing or achieving, that is liberty enough for all men. If all men are free to worship *their* God, that is religious liberty. If all men are free to express the opinions *they* cherish, that is intellectual liberty. Since their God is the true God and their opinions the right opinions, it must be so. They bid us, for example, distinguish liberty from license, license being the liberty to do the things they disapprove. They believe in economic liberty, meaning thereby, if they are employers, the right to run their business as they please, to hire and fire as they please. They believe in "liberty of contract," and maintain, with the Supreme Court in the case of *Adair vs. the United States*, that "the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee." They think it is no interference with the liberty of opinion to restrain the opinion of radicals, if they themselves are conservative, or the opinion of conservatives, if they themselves are radical. They universalize as liberty for all men what is liberty only for the particular group, persuasion, or class to which they adhere.

This interest-limited conception of liberty explains the defeats that the principle of liberty has suffered in many of the battles won in its name. The demand for liberty is a most powerful incentive when it is directed against a particular op-

pressor or a particular oppression. But those who win liberty for their own cause often refuse it to others. Sects that resist to the death the intolerance of established faiths may become no less intolerant when they in turn are established. Nations that have won political liberties have often used their new-found strength to dominate other nations. The principle of liberty is most apt to be defeated by its own triumphs.

From the interest-limited conception of liberty it is only one step to the final perversion. We have thus far confined ourselves to such views as profess to mean by liberty that which is its universal meaning. About this universal meaning there can be no doubt. The child knows it who is forced to work when he wants to play. The savage knows it who is prevented from following his tribal customs. The criminal knows it who is put behind prison bars. The property-owner knows it who is not allowed to use his property as he pleases. Everywhere in human society, for better or worse, there are hindrances and prohibitions set by the will of others to that which we want to do, and everywhere the condition of which we are thus deprived is called liberty. The meaning of the term may be extended to include the absence of other obstacles to action than those that depend on the will of men to prevent our acting, though then the word "opportunity" is more appropriate than the word "liberty." Or again it may be extended to include the absence of hindrances in ourselves to the fulfillment of the things our hearts desire. Thus we speak of men as being "slaves to their habits." But this is clearly an analogical variant of the universal meaning, not to be pressed too far, certainly not to be made the ground for a redefinition of a term so necessary, so widely used, so unmistakable in its primary applications. The partisans of every cause have redefined the term "liberty," as something else than that which men everywhere mean by it, as something identifying it with their particular cause, thereby creating the worst confusions. They redefine it, and still they appeal to the emotions generated by the universal meaning. They redefine it, and transfer to this new meaning the values that properly attach to the original meaning. This

is a far worse offense than those we have already indicated. This offense is "the lie in the soul."

Yet a long line of philosophers have followed this fashion. In the modern world it was set by Rousseau and it attained its philosophical culmination in Hegel. Today it is exploited most notably, though far from exclusively, by the apologists of antilibertarian forms of government. For the curious thing about these final perversions is that they enable men to justify in the name of liberty the most extreme suppressions of liberty. Our modern sophists draw a distinction between real liberty and apparent liberty. They proclaim that we are free only when we do what we *ought* to do—or rather what they think we ought to do; only when we desire what we *ought* to desire—what they think we ought to desire. They say that liberty is self-realization, the realization of the true self. They say that we find liberty in surrender to the "law" of our being, to the law of God, to the law of the State as the organic whole in which we are fulfilled. They do not say that self-realization is good and liberty is good, and seek for some relation between them. They say the one *is* the other. If they make any distinction at all, it is between a superficial and spurious liberty on the one hand and true liberty on the other. So Bernard Bosanquet, for example, contrasted our "actual" will and our "real" will. With sublime Hegelian arrogance they confer reality on what they think ought to be, and degrade to unreality that which they think ought not to be.

So it is not surprising that they often end by merging liberty in its own contradiction. It is the supreme example of having one's cake and eating it too. Rousseau again led the way when he spoke of men being "forced to be free." He was not content with saying "forced to be good," "forced to be rational." He gloried in what seemed to him only a paradox—instead of a perversion. In this he has had a multitude of followers. They transmuted liberty into self-surrender, self-abnegation, obedience, subjection. Hegel reconciled the opposites by announcing that they were one. The individual who is "forced to be free" might protest, but of course it is not his true self that protests. Hegel knows better. In the same spirit Treitschke

explained that Germany would restore the people of Alsace "against their will to their true selves." In the same spirit Gentile explains that the absolute corporate State confers more liberty than the democratic State. In the same spirit Spengler and Spann and Freyer and the whole host of Nazi apologists explain that dominance, mastery, totalitarian authority, assure to those subjected to them the blessings of "true liberty."

These apologists will not face the issue that they value other things more highly than liberty and that they reject liberty for the sake of those other things. That position would at least be honest. Instead, they pervert the universal meaning of liberty in order to deny the most obvious of facts. They would destroy the meaning of liberty because they are afraid to admit its meaning. They call it something else, hoping that thus no one will claim it for what it is.

So after the many centuries in which men have talked and written of liberty we find proclaimed from the high places doctrines more perverse and fallacious than ever were uttered at the beginning of reflective thought. I have tried to show that each of these doctrines rests on a quite elementary error, on the most simple inability—or unwillingness—to apply the art of thinking. Liberty cannot be identified with any cause—except the cause of liberty—for its whole challenge is for the right to choose between causes. The analysis of the meaning of liberty, in its application to social realities, opens up the most fruitful questions. They remain mostly unexplored. We cannot advance to the more meaningful problems because they lie beyond this ever renewed fog of intellectual confusion.

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FREEDOM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT

IN the vocabulary of political thought, the two words "freedom" and "liberty" are interchangeable. Although there has been a tendency in the English-speaking world to treat "liberty" as "something French, foolish and frivolous," and "freedom" as "English, solid, and sensible," there is no ground whatever for the distinction. Freedom is, of course, older in the Anglo-Saxon tongue, but the two words have been employed in English thought as substantially identical in meaning since the fourteenth century. In their deeper origins, in fact, they possessed strikingly similar characteristics.

Liberty stems from the Latin word *liber*, which had a double meaning: (1) free or unrestrained, and (2) especially in plural form "the free members of a household." In Old English "free" meant in the ordinary sense "dear" as applied to the free members of a household. It stemmed from *fréon*, to love, whence the current word "friend"; and freedom has carried the double meaning of *liber* from time immemorial. Neither origin nor historical usage warrants any material distinction between freedom and liberty.

In persistent usage, it is significant to note, freedom and liberty have had negative and positive features. Both have meant exemption or release from bondage, servitude, and arbitrary power—as among the ancient Romans and the early English. At the same time both have meant a given condition for human beings—the positive enjoyment of rights and privileges

in the household or family of human beings. All through written history to the latest hour negative and positive connotations have been associated with freedom and liberty. On the one side is protection against the arbitrary power of government and persons, and on the other side is the enjoyment of rights belonging to human beings conceived as something more than the beasts of the field. To lose sight of either connotation is to miss both the substance and power of freedom.

On the negative side exists a vast body of laws, customs, and practices safeguarding freedom, that is, the emancipation of persons from bondage and from the arbitrary power of government. Under this head come the agelong efforts to establish the rule of law, as distinguished from willful, irregular, and uncontrolled acts of sheer force exerted by rulers, bandits, wandering soldiers, and mobs. The results of such efforts are incorporated in various declarations of rights, in the limitations on government incorporated in the Constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of the several States, and extended by legislation and by judicial interpretation. The bare summary of the elements of freedom from arbitrary action would fill a volume. These features are well known and, despite variations of detail in interpretation, are generally agreed upon.

Such rules of law and practice are negations on power. They forbid legislatures to trespass upon freedom of press and speech, to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, to pass any *ex post facto* law, to impose penalties on any person by bill of attainder, to enact any laws respecting the establishment of a state religion. To be sure, such limitations protect persons in the positive enjoyment of certain rights, privileges, and immunities, but in essence they are negative as expressions of law. And as recent experiences with dictatorships show, they may be brushed aside by governments based upon the exercise of sheer and arbitrary power.

There is profound truth in Alexander Hamilton's statement in Number 84 of *The Federalist* to the effect that such principles as freedom of the press cannot be forever guaranteed by mere constitutional provisions. "Security of the press," he said, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitu-

tion respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion and on the general spirit of the people and the government." No doubt the very existence of declarations of rights in solemn documents of public law does act as a salutary force in restraining public officials; yet the well-framed proclamations of the Weimar Constitution were easily swept into the discard by Adolf Hitler and his Storm Troopers. Something more is needed to preserve freedom than verbal proclamations. Underlying all practice in this respect are the thought, scheme of values, and resolve of a sufficient body of people in every country to sustain assertions of freedom made in the form of law.

If we are to get at the sustaining convictions which give force to paper formulations of freedom, we must examine the thought that has accompanied the rise, growth, assertion, and defense of freedom. How have asserters and defenders of freedom looked upon the world of human beings? What assumptions have they made respecting humanity? What values have they accepted as primordial? What promises of freedom have they found in the very nature or constitution of mankind?

Witnesses for freedom start with a conviction respecting human nature, for it is with human beings, not material things, that they are primarily concerned. They assume and believe that the human being is in fact not a mere beast of the field, despite all the animal characteristics which unite humanity with the animal kingdom. Whatever men and women are, they are not apes, lions, tigers, or elephants. The products of invention, accumulated cultural goods, and "the funded wisdom of the race" support the conclusion.

Though obvious, the distinction is fundamental. It forms a starting point for considering all the features of freedom, such as capacity for self-restraint, consciously directed effort, or conformity with the requirements of common interest. It recognizes the fact that human beings are to some extent educable, despite all physical and biological determinism. It makes all mere animal analogies, such as the habits of bees and ants, merely illustrative at best, and inapplicable to human affairs in any case. Even if the whole Darwinian hypothesis respecting human origins be accepted, it yet remains a fact that there is a

break between the highest of the anthropoids and human beings. Whether this break should be ascribed to "sports" or accidents in nature, to a struggle for existence in peculiar circumstances, to physical developments, such as the apposition of the thumb and forefinger, matters little for practical purposes. Whatever their origins, human beings are differentiated from the rest of the animal kingdom by physical and psychic characteristics of their own. This is not academic. It means, in thought about human freedom, a certain degree of emancipation from the mechanism of biology, if contemporary biology may be called mechanical.

Starting with the human being so conceived, advocates of freedom assert that human life has a value in itself, and that the human being should not be used for purposes alien to humanity, as other animals are brought into servitude. To some extent this assumption is an ethical imperative, but to a large extent it represents the realism of experience. The story of "man's inhumanity to man" is certainly long and makes painful reading. Cold-blooded murders, endless slaughters in war, the cruelties often associated with chattel slavery, and endless violations of liberty, do present glaring contradictions to the assumption that human life has a value in itself. This is undeniable, and human conduct to the latest moment provides brutal illustrations.

Yet on the other side is the record of manifestations supporting the assertion—all the arts and practices of peace, industries, institutions of beneficence, the pronouncements of ethical teachers, the essences of the great religions, the endless striving for human good. Even under chattel slavery, save in its most barbaric form, the slave was accorded some rights of humanity. They were meager enough; but such as they were they indicated a break with mere bestiality. And chattel slavery has been almost completely outlawed by civilization. Nor is it without significance that this outlawry has accompanied the development of the spirit of freedom in Western civilization. So the assumption that human life has a value in itself and must be accorded some rights not granted to other animals is not a

mere theory, a mere ethical imperative; it is rooted in vast experience.

Associated with the assumption and belief that human life has a value in itself and that human beings are and must be accorded rights appropriate to humanity is another conception—a conception of human nature itself. In extreme form this conception represents the human being as innately good, and therefore worthy and capable of enjoying and preserving freedom. In this form it is placed in contrast with the conception of the human being as an animal or as innately evil and unworthy of liberty. Those who uphold the one side point to the manifestations of good, of sacrifice, and of mutual aid in history. Those who uphold the other side point to the evil, the selfishness, and “tooth and claw struggle” in history. But neither side can really strike a balance and demonstrate what the proportions are. And since history is not and cannot be an exact science, the problem must forever remain unsolved.

Does the evil in human nature outweigh the good in substance and in practice? The question is unanswerable, no matter what assertions are made under that head. Yet good there is, and advocates of freedom who hold their ground without taking on the airs of omniscience lay emphasis on the good; and by so doing doubtless aid in bringing forth the good in creating the reality asserted by their belief. Nothing is more clearly established in historical experience than the fact that even a myth may help to create the very substance of things hoped for and dreamed of. That which is affirmed by experience, such as the former universality of chattel slavery, may be hastened to destruction by the constant reiteration that it is contrary to human rights asserted and assumed; and the rights asserted against experience may be realized. Whatever the future may hold, advocates of freedom do lay emphasis on the good that is in human nature.

Implicit in the conception of human rights and innate goodness is the idea of moral equality. The term “equality” is unfortunate, but no other word can be found as a substitute. Equality means “exactly the same or equivalent in measure, amount, number, degree, value, or quality.” It is a term exact

enough in physics and mathematics, but obviously inexact when applied to human beings. What is meant by writers who have gone deepest into the subject is that human beings possess, in degree and kind, fundamental characteristics that are common to humanity. These writers hold that when humanity is stripped of extrinsic goods and conventions incidental to time and place, it reveals essential characteristics so widely distributed as to partake of universality. Whether these characteristics be called primordial qualities, biological necessities, residues, or any other name matters little. No one can truthfully deny that they do exist. It is easy to point out inequalities in physical strength, in artistic skill, in material wealth, or in mental capacity, but this too is a matter of emphasis. At the end it remains a fact that fundamental characteristics appear in all human beings. Their nature and manifestations are summed up in the phrase "moral equality."

Emphasis must be placed on the term "moral." From time immemorial it has been the fashion of critics to point out the obvious facts that in physical strength, talents, and wealth, human beings are not equal. The criticism is both gratuitous and irrelevant. No rational exponent of moral equality has ever disputed the existence of obvious inequalities among human beings, even when he has pointed out inequalities which may be ascribed to tyranny or institutional prescriptions. The Declaration of Independence does not assert that all men are equal; it proclaims that they are "created" equal.

In essence the phrase "moral equality" asserts an ethical value, a belief to be sustained, and recognition of rights to be respected. Its validity cannot be demonstrated as a problem in mathematics can be demonstrated. It is asserted against inequalities in physical strength, talents, industry, and wealth. It denies that superior physical strength has a moral right to kill, eat, or oppress human beings merely because it is superior. To talents and wealth, the ideal of moral equality makes a similar denial of right. And indeed few who imagine themselves to have superior physical strength, talents, and wealth will withhold from inferiors all moral rights. In such circumstances government and wealth would go to superior physical

strength; while virtue and talents would serve the brute man, as accomplished Greek slaves served the whims, passions, and desires of Roman conquerors. When the last bitter word of criticism has been uttered against the ideal of moral equality, there remains something in it which all, except thugs, must accept and in practice do accept, despite their sneers and protests. A society without any respect for human personalities is a band of robbers, and there is reputed to be honor even among thieves.

This doctrine of moral equality implicit in the ideal of freedom is no newfangled creation of modern times, designed as cynics have it to authorize the weak to prey upon the strong. It is as old as civilization itself. Indeed we may regard it as older, even if we dismiss the cosmogony expressed in the medieval lines:

"When Adam delved and Eve span
Who was then the gentleman?"

In ancient Greece the conception of moral equality, if with qualifications, appeared in the Hellenistic age. As Crane Brinton¹ admirably sums up the state of thought on the subject: "Herodotus is emphatic on the contrast between irresponsible Persian rule and Greek *isonomia*, equality before the law. Athenian *isotimia*, equal respect for all, and *isegoria*, equal freedom of speech and hence of political action, together with that regard for equal opportunity so evident in Pericles' funeral speech make up a conception of equality not unlike that of the early, hopeful days of the French Revolution." In short, civilized Greeks proclaimed and adhered to an ideal of moral equality and, amid glaring contradictions, applied it to some extent in practice. And at no time were the leading philosophers unaware of the glaring contradictions.

Even from Rome, with all its ruthless force and stratification of classes, the idea of equality was not absent. The idea crept into Roman law, especially in the later days when jurists had to deal with all sorts and conditions of people who were

¹ Article in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. V, p. 574, to which I am heavily indebted.

not Roman citizens. In the application of *jus gentium*—the law of peoples—they came to see that all peoples had qualities in common, and they reached the conclusion that nature had originally decreed equality, though institutions and disobedience had marred it. As Roman thought broadened beyond immediate things, it betrayed a belief in the essential oneness of humanity, despite glaring contradictions. Epictetus taught that we are all children of God and are in duty bound to cherish love for, and practice forbearance toward, one another. Weakness has its inherent rights and strength its moral limitations. Although nowhere in Roman history appeared a solemn declaration of the rights of man, all the elements of it could be gathered from the scattered works of Roman thinkers and leaders. And great as was the superstructure of force, it could not perpetuate itself, but crumbled to earth leaving naked humanity to begin over again the work of social and State rebuilding. To the multitudes bereft of their imperial rulers, the teachings of Roman moralists were more significant than the memories of the glittering eagles once carried before conquering armies.

As the empire of force crumbled, as the doctrines of Roman moralists were forgotten, as their written works were buried in dust, a new faith in moral worth and equality furnished both inspiration and a guiding principle for the reordering of human affairs. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the doctrines of Roman moralists had prepared the way for the triumph of the new faith.² Seneca had said that "we are all akin by nature, which has formed us of the same elements and placed us here together for the same end." To a similar conclusion the tragic Marcus Aurelius had come: "If our reason is common, there is a common law. . . . And if there is a common law we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are mem-

² Harold Laski, speaking of Stoicism, rightly says: "Christianity added little to this notion by way of substantial content; but it added to its force the impetus of a religious sanction, not improbably the more powerful because Christianity was in its original phase essentially a society of the disinherited, to whom the idea of the eminent dignity of human personality as such would make an urgent appeal." *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IX, pp. 442 ff.

bers of some political community—the world is in a manner a State.” In such writings had been foreshadowed the elaboration of the teachings of Jesus Christ. And in this new faith the moral worth of the human personality and the principle of equality were clearly and categorically asserted. “Of one blood are all nations of men.” “There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” If some later theologians tended to shift this equality from earth to heaven, early Christians did not take their faith in this supermundane sense alone. They brought it down to practice in the communities of the early churches, some going so far as to share the fruits of their property. So potent was the Christian faith, so powerful were the energies inspired by it, that it contributed to sapping and undermining the empire of force into which it was introduced. Although later entangled in the vested interests of accumulating property and confronted by a feudal hierarchy of class orders, Christian teachers never entirely abandoned the early doctrine of human equality. In monastic movements and in popular tumults, such as those led by Savonarola in Florence and John Ball in England, appeared the primitive passion for the unprivileged and for the mere humane.

In Protestantism of the leveling variety moral equality flamed up in a sacrificial ardor. It produced forms of religious organization which, on account of equalitarian principles, have rightly been placed by students of the subject among the forerunners of modern democracies. In them was an assertion of the right of individual conscience demanding respect. In them was a comradeship and a deep attachment to common good. As communities, religious congregations stood together against the oppressions and persecutions of State and Established Church. As communities many of them migrated to America in search of freedom for their way of life. Of the Pilgrims at Plymouth it was written: “We are knit together as a body in the most sacred covenant of the Lord . . . by virtue of which we hold ourselves tied to all care of each other’s good and of the whole.” Thus was expressed on the barren coasts of New England the ancient cry: “And the multitude of them that

believed were of one heart and one soul." Despite all formalisms, all conformity to power, and all giant masquerades, the flame of this faith and conviction has never been extinguished.

Closely associated with the levelers in religious organization, if not stemming from that source, were the levelers in politics and economics who threatened Cromwell's iron despotism in England, no less than the power of kings. This obscure and despised party, thrown up in the Puritan Revolution, united divinity and nature in the formulation of its doctrines. "All men," they taught, "are by nature the sons of Adam, and from him have legitimately derived a natural propriety (property), right, and freedom. . . . By natural birth all men are equally and alike born to like propriety, liberty, and freedom, and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature unto this world, every one with a natural innate freedom and propriety, even so we are to live, every one equally and alike, to enjoy his birthright and privilege."

Here, indeed, is evidence of the link of faith in common humanity that united Christian teachings with the reliance on nature, and later became the support of equalitarian democracy and equal rights. Thus all the elements of the Declaration of Independence in America and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France were formulated more than a century before those documents appeared, by the English levelers working in the traditions of Puritan Christianity. Thus, although to some there seems to be a break in the movement of historic idealism—a sharp antithesis between divinity and nature, there was no such break or antithesis in fact. As the great humane teachings of Greece and Rome, which combined divinity and nature, merged easily with the humane teachings of Christianity, so the great teachings of the Christian tradition were merged with the eighteenth-century philosophy of nature. If clerical monopoly on *divine* right encouraged an emphasis on *natural* right, the two sources of knowledge and inspiration were in truth never separated. Rather were they interwoven in the stream of mental and moral energies which drove institutions and mankind in the direction of a larger freedom; so forcibly indeed and so swiftly that the creed of the despised sect pro-

claimed in the seventeenth century became within two hundred years the creed of a great Respectability.

So it came about that when the philosophers of the eighteenth century resorted to Nature and applied what they deemed the cold analysis of reason to royal, feudal, and clerical institutions of prescriptive and vested rights, they actually had behind them more than twenty centuries of Greek, Roman, and Christian idealism. If God had not created all human beings free and equal, as Stoics and Christians had long maintained, at least Nature and Nature's God had done just that very thing. In any case a humane idealism historically rooted in divinity and nature, equipped with the weapon of reason and the sharp edge of scientific analysis, sapped and undermined institutions founded on prescriptive force, overthrew them in thought, and presided over the revolutions that ushered in modern liberty. Nothing could be more superficial, therefore, than the idea and belief that liberty came into being as the result of a temporary fit of uninformed reason, soon to be submerged forever in a wave of eternal unreason, emotion, and sheer force. It was, in truth, governments founded on violence—Alexandrian, Roman, and royal, that had proved temporary; while the movement of human idealism had been continuous, now underground, now sweeping to victories, now retreating, now advancing.

Hence, unless knowledge is a delusion, the inescapable conclusion: The dogma of human worth, with its implicit equalitarianism and liberalism, is as old as civilization and is irrevocably rooted in the very substance of things, whether that very substance be regarded as a realization of the divine idea or as a mere result of the material conditions of economic production. And the force of the ideal forever undermines the force of brute strength, challenges it, and overthrows it. This seems to be the very essence of Western history, of which our own times are a fleeting expression.

Holding to the assumption of human worth and the conception of moral equality, advocates of freedom contend that human effort can create material and moral conditions in which human worth, human equality, and human liberty may become

more perfectly revealed and made more evident in the arrangements of life. It would be possible to amass a mountain of evidence on this contention from writings strewn through the centuries, from Greek antiquity to our own times. But no writer associated with the rise and growth of liberty in the United States expressed it with more precision than Thomas Jefferson. In a remarkable paper he contrasted his conceptions with the theories of government generally prevailing in Europe.

"The doctrines of Europe were," Jefferson said, "that men in numerous associations cannot be restrained within the limits of order and justice, but by forces physical and moral, wielded over them by authorities independent of their will. Hence their organization of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests. Still further to restrain the brute force of the people, they deem it necessary to keep them down by hard labor, poverty, and ignorance, and to take from them, as from bees, so much of their earnings, as that unremitting labor shall be necessary to obtain a sufficient surplus thereby to sustain a scanty and miserable life. And these earnings they apply to maintain their privileged orders in splendor and idleness, to fascinate the eyes of the people, and excite in them an humble adoration and submission, as to an order of superior beings.

"Although few among us had gone to all these lengths of opinion, yet many had advanced, some more, some less, on the way. . . . Ours, on the contrary, was to maintain . . . the will of the people themselves. We believed . . . that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided in persons of his own choice and held to their duties by dependence on his own will. We believed that the complicated organization of kings, nobles, and priests was not the wisest or best to effect the happiness of associated man; that wisdom and virtue were not hereditary; that the trappings of such a machinery consumed by their expense those earnings of industry they were meant to protect, and by the inequalities they produced exposed liberty to sufferance. We believed that men, enjoying in ease and security the full fruits of their own

industry, enlisted by all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think for themselves and to follow reason as their guide, would be more easily and safely governed, than with minds nourished in error, and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence, and oppression."

Holding fast to conceptions of human nature, human rights, moral equality, and of conditions favorable to the flowering of these virtues, advocates of liberty have demanded that such virtues be permitted to unfold against all the handicaps of legal and economic privileges. This has been regarded all along as an aspect of the equalitarian trend, and in practice the rise of political liberty has been accompanied by an upswing of talents from among the once obscure, unprivileged, and subjugated. In the Middle Ages the flowering of talents was marked in handicrafts among the guilds which were, within their limits, petty democracies, endowed with large rights of self-government. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church drew its monks, nuns, priests, and bishops from various walks of life. If the higher posts often went to persons of the privileged classes, they were by no means closed to the sons and daughters of the unprivileged. No small part of the Church's strength has been and is derived from the fact that its authorities look for talents and draw talents from every section of its membership, and it is surely no accident that, despite its defeats on many fronts, the Church has survived the revolutions that unhorsed kings and nobles.

In modern times the upswing of talents, favored by the doctrine of freedom, appears in every field of human activity—in invention, business enterprise, industrial management, labor organizations, the arts, sciences, and letters. When all due respect is paid to the perfections of medieval art, architecture, and handicrafts, and the demerits of the modern "cheap and nasty" are recognized, the achievements in all the enterprises and arts that sustain humanity and adorn human nature in the centuries that witnessed the rise of political freedom stand unimpeachable. Comparisons of particular merits may yield no general conclusions. Indications of particular shortcomings prove no moral. The flowering of individual talents has been

and remains an aspect of freedom—one of its asserted and cherished values.

Such are broad tendencies of thought and conviction respecting the nature of humanity which underly the modern conception of freedom and its corollary—self-government as distinguished from government superimposed by force. In these tendencies mankind has been deemed fundamentally worthy of freedom and rightfully destined to enjoy freedom within the circle of law expressing the sentiments and ideas of self-government. Freedom has been deemed a value in itself, attached to the status and dignity of the human being. It has been deemed also an eternal force, a sacred fire in the human breast, working forever, even in prisons and dungeons, against despotism in every form.

Will this thought and this conviction perish from the earth and give place to the thought and conviction that a self-chosen and self-constituted few are now to extinguish the idea of freedom and make some kind of Asiatic tyranny the final shape of government and social living throughout the world? There is no exact science of society which enables us to answer that question. We have only the lamp of experience to guide us—our own experience and the records of history.

Since the beginning of civilization there has been a struggle between sheer force and humanity, between the few who have sought dominance by physical might and the many who have sought to protect and govern themselves under customs and rules of their own making. The contest has been waged under many names, with varying phrases of justification and defense, but in fact it has continued through the centuries. Sheer force has clothed itself in different forms at different ages. In early times it put forward no ethical pretensions. The war lord and his companions, for love of plunder and excitement, fell upon their neighbors, seized their lands and goods, conquered them, and settled down upon them, without making any explanations or claiming to bestow any benefits. In the beginning was the deed, and the deed was sufficient for the victor. No high-flown phrases represented the act as good. No system of world philosophy made it appear both necessary and beneficial to

conqueror and victim. No religious sanctions covered it with the will or mercy of God. The records of such acts of power appear in the early passages of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which describes deeds of conquest and plunder without any embellishments of morality or learning.

After sheer force took on the habiliments of civilization it was decorated by various titles. The war lord became the absolute monarch and claimed to rule by the grace of God. Huge volumes were written in justification of the power so exercised. At other times and in various places, sheer force appeared under the name of dictatorship. "Every man the least conversant in Roman story," wrote Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist*, "knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome."

At other times sheer force appeared as the *imperator*, the military commander raised to supreme power in civil government through the support of his soldiers. Caesar and Napoleon were examples. Once installed, the *imperium* was clothed with insignia and called divine, and efforts were made to give it the appearance and substance of eternity. Whether it was the war lord of the naked deed, the absolute monarch by divine right, the dictator prolonging his temporary assignment, the tyrant, or the emperor, sheer force meant the subjection of the multitudes, high and low, to the will, the passions, and the distempers of the master. Fear might check him. The peril of assassination might moderate his despotism. In his greed he might overreach himself and pull down his own system. But the people whom he ruled were subjects obeying his orders, yielding their labor and goods to his agents, fighting his wars, building monuments to his glory, and accepting his laws. Submission and servitude were their lot.

Yet accompanying the manifestations of sheer force have

been, in many times and places since the beginning of civilization, institutions of check and control set up in the name of freedom. The stark war lord did not fight his battles alone. He had companions with whom he took some counsel. The king in early England had his council, which developed into the Witenagemot, or assembly of wise men. The emperor Napoleon I had his four-chambered legislature in which even "clodhoppers," as he called them, had a weak and ineffectual voice. Napoleon III, raised to power by a plebiscite and seeking to emulate his uncle, was compelled to make concessions to parliamentary government on the eve of his downfall in war. Where absolutism did not yield, bend, and make concessions, it was in many times and places overthrown by revolution from below: the British Revolution of 1649, the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917. Indeed it is impossible to find in history anywhere back of the twentieth century a despotism which did not disappear in violence or was not, like the British monarchy, tempered down into weakness by revolution and institutions of popular control, with varying degrees of popular freedom. If the fullness of truth be our goal, it is necessary therefore to parallel the history of sheer force with the history of endless efforts more or less popular to subdue it to institutions of control directed by a portion of the people in the interest of freedom.

At the opening of the twentieth century it appeared that popular government accompanied by checks and balances conceived in the interest of freedom was destined to spread to all quarters of the globe. Then came a reaction, such as had punctuated the whole movement for freedom since the beginning of the Renaissance. Now we are in the midst of that reaction, and there are prophets engaged in foretelling the complete and final triumph of that reaction.

We cannot discover in the nature of history anything that enables us to make out of knowledge unequivocal predictions such as the chemist can make when an event is precipitated in a chemical compound. But in the very nature of history we do observe the long and tenacious struggle between humanity and brute force, between freedom and arbitrary power; and we

can scarcely escape the conclusion that this struggle will not be closed either immediately or in the distant future by any acts of any despots. If we know anything about history we know that its continuous flowing into the future will not be halted by new Alexanders, Caesars, Napoleons. Death is as merciless to them as it is to common clay. Their mortal coil is shuffled off. Their governments collapse. Their empires dissolve. Their despotisms sink into the dust. That much seems to be, indeed is, established by the record of long human experience.

We know also that humanity alone survives amid the decay and collapse of royal families and dictatorial dynasties. If history goes on, it will continue to survive. If humanity goes on, the thought and conviction respecting the worth, values, and freedom of humanity that have accompanied the rise of civilization will unfold, here weakly, there strongly. Those, then, who believe in freedom as restraints on arbitrary power and as a good in itself may take courage. The very stars may not be marshaled on their side, but undying forces of humanity march with them. Despair and defeat may threaten them, but the conviction that the noblest thought of thirty centuries belongs to them, and not to tyrants, sustains them in a conflict that is never won triumphantly and yet never lost beyond hope of recovery. If this is an illusion, they may at least draw inspiration from the knowledge that tyrants also are passing shadows.

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FORMS OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND WHAT MAKES THEM IMPORTANT

I. INTRODUCTION

FOR several centuries, culminating in the nineteenth, the course of European civilization could fairly be plotted in terms of the progressive achievement of increased liberty: intellectual, social, political, and economic. With a great European war freshly launched on its path of destruction, there is no need to remind the reader that this trend has now been definitely reversed, and that all forms of liberty are now fighting for their lives. The year 1914 stands as the most fatal landmark of this reversal. It is true that in the economic field the growth of public controls had reversed the trend much earlier, apparently following an independent course. The essential unity of the crisis of liberty in all fields may not be self-evident. Yet I believe it to represent the essential truth.

If political freedom means democracy, as may fairly be assumed, there is much reason in the proposition that it is inherently hostile to economic freedom in a developed society in which economic freedom can lead to great inequality and insecurity for the masses; and that the two are consistent only in such a simple society as is economically democratic, as well as free, and in spite of being free. It has been suggested with some force that a political system in which power goes by sheer numbers will not naturally tolerate a free and autonomous economic system in which power is distributed according to the command of wealth. Rather, having the ultimate power, the

political system will take over the economic system and remake it more nearly in its own image. If this be the natural tendency, the effect of it upon the political and intellectual system deserves more than a passing thought. In fact, it may turn out to be the vital and decisive factor in the case. We should seriously consider the possibility that, if political and intellectual freedom are used to put an end to economic freedom, they may thereby themselves commit suicide.

It should not be necessary to argue the fact that, in the realms of action, freedom in itself implies limitations; and that not all restrictions are surrenders of the essential substance of liberty. And it should not be necessary to argue that freedom is not one thing, but many, and that some forms may need to be restricted in the interest of other forms. We have grown hardened to the opposition that has greeted every new economic restriction, on the ground that it was an interference with "personal liberty." This was, of course, both true and untrue. Business liberty is perhaps one form of personal liberty, though the modern large-scale business institutions have more the aspect of impersonal organisms. But business liberty is not, in itself, the thing which is conveyed to the mind by the general term, "personal liberty." They are distinct.

But, while distinct, they are connected in ways which we are beginning to realize, with the help of what has been happening in the countries ruled by dictatorships and organized on a totalitarian basis. While business liberty can and must be restricted, it seems overwhelmingly probable that it cannot be wiped out, or restricted beyond its power to maintain a healthy existence, without wiping out also true personal liberty in all the more important senses. This is the most important conclusion to which the following examination of the forms of economic liberty will lead. It appears to be the paramount factor in the answer to the question: "Is economic freedom worth keeping?"

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

In a modern highly specialized society, it seems hopeless to attempt to define by simple formulas the scope of economic

liberty and the limits on restraints. The most characteristic formula of the age of individualism states that everyone is (or should be) free to use his own possessions in any way that does not interfere with the like liberty of others. But upon analysis, this formula turns out to define nothing. One might be free to rob one's neighbors, the neighbors being equally free to do the same. Or all might be equally free to use a blackjack on any street corner. Of course, under these conditions no one would be free to leave his property unprotected by his private armed force, and have any expectation of finding it when he returned, nor would anyone be free to walk to his place of occupation with any assurance of arriving, or returning at night. The system which this formula was framed to fit protects these liberties rather than those of the burglar or the wielder of the blackjack, and with good reason; but the formula does not specify them. What the formula seems to mean is that there are certain basic liberties (which the formula itself does not define) in which all alike have an interest and which are consistent with a constructive scheme of living together, in which all alike can be protected.

But these universal liberties, while basic, do not carry us far in explaining the structure of a complex industrial society. In practical terms, the liberties and restrictions of the hired worker are different from those of his employer, and necessarily so. If there is something universal underlying this differentiation—and there is—it consists of the liberty of each, if he will and can, to change his role. And in this case each acquires the liberties, and becomes subject to the restrictions, which formerly pertained to another. Any universal liberty in our system hinges on the liberty to change one's role.

Since there must be restrictions, and since their forms must change with changing conditions, there is a natural tendency to look on changes from the standpoint of the new restrictions they impose, as limitations on liberty, by which is meant limitations on its former scope. This, of course, represents a fact; but it is not the most important fact in the case. The most important fact, if we wish to know whether restrictions have gone too far, is the scope of liberty that remains. It may be, with

powers and restrictions both increasing, that the sum of what we are in effect free to do is increasing also, rather than diminishing.

If we are to look at the different forms of freedom, we must ask ourselves: Freedom of whom? Freedom for what? Freedom from what? As to the first, we find that there are some liberties—like the liberty to choose what one will eat for dinner—which everyone may and should normally exercise constantly. And there are some—like the liberty to lead a political movement or to direct a major industry—for which opportunity should be open to everyone who can qualify, so far as practicable, but for which few, in the nature of the case, can manage to qualify, and which fewer still can hope to exercise effectively or successfully. It is around this latter group of liberties that some of the most crucial issues hinge today. And there is a danger, which we must avoid, of thinking that, because few exercise them at any one time, therefore they are not important in a democratic society. The conclusion is unwarranted: the reason is insufficient.

The liberties in question are those of leadership and direction; obviously of crucial importance. And while the major positions of this sort may be relatively few, nevertheless in a society with as many groups and group activities as ours, a surprisingly large number of people have the opportunity to exercise leadership in some activity or other. Under authoritarian leadership individuals may still have limited liberties *within a prescribed system*. But leadership and direction must be free, *if the system itself is to have the quality of liberty*. To this end it is necessary, not that every individual should be a leader in every field, but that any idea or project should have free opportunity to prove its usefulness and make its way.

Freedom for what? Here we may broadly distinguish three major divisions of liberty. One may be classed as liberty to choose one's consumption goods from among those that are available (or to try to secure others which may not be available). This means not merely such things as ordering one's dinner and choosing the color and fabric of one's clothes; it means choosing one's place of residence, one's recreations, and

to some extent the educational environment of one's children. In a free system it includes the choosing of one's intellectual environment, at least as an adult: the pictures one looks at daily, the newspapers and books one reads, the plays one sees, the organizations one belongs to, the church one attends. And it must never be forgotten that this kind of freedom can be assured only if another kind is also assured. Someone must be free to supply what the consumer demands, or else the consumer's freedom is an illusion. And here as elsewhere the question is not whether any restrictions are imposed, but how much scope for freedom is left?

A second major division centers on the choice of an occupation. This commonly means choosing from among the occupations which the existing system holds open. But full liberty includes the liberty of the rare individual to blaze a new trail and to do something that has not been done before. And the importance of this form of liberty is out of all proportion to the number of those who have the genius to take advantage of it. Many, of course, are cranks. But the world could not afford to do without the group which has included Johnny Appleseed, Luther Burbank, and Frederick Winslow Taylor.

Full liberty calls for something more. One may be free to choose whether to be an electrician or a garment-maker, without having any part in the decision whether electricians shall produce radios or something else, or what kind of garments shall be made and how many, or under what kind of shop conditions. Beyond the choice of an occupation there lies the choice as to what the array of occupations in the system shall be, and what shall be produced by them. We may have freedom for one kind of choice, but not the other. In fact, socialistic systems are likely to afford a good deal of liberty of the first sort, but little or none of the second.

Under a system built on exchange, liberty includes liberty to alienate things, and partially to alienate one's liberty for the future, by binding oneself to contracts or by accepting the discipline that goes with industrial employment. But some minimum of liberty must remain inalienable, and the liberty to alienate must be correspondingly restricted. This inalienable

minimum is gradually being extended and includes education, some rights to health, and, in effect, a minimum of material goods and services. Traditional individualism, and the legal system that went with it, overstressed the liberty to alienate at the expense of the need that the essential conditions of liberty be made and kept inalienable. But this represented merely one concept of liberty and is not the one now prevailing.

Freedom from what? Certainly not from all outside forces conditioning one's actions; that is unthinkable. Primarily, we mean freedom from coercive authority, wielding irresistible power and prescribing positively what the individual shall do. The liberal theory is that government tells people what they must not do and leaves them free within the limits thus drawn. Naturally, the area of the *verboten* must not grow until it leaves insufficient range of choice open. Also, some positive requirements are necessary. Even an individualistic state properly requires parents to care for their children and send them to school, while anyone who chooses to operate a factory must meet the requirements of the safety-appliance laws.

There must also be freedom from undue and organized private persecution, and to this end the State must set some limit on the liberty to persecute. Not that anyone ever is, or should be, free from the pressure of the opinion of his fellows. Such pressures are omnipresent, whether in Tennessee or Greenwich Village, making for conformity of some sort. And if an individual does not care enough for an independent course of action to withstand these pressures in their more ordinary forms, he has simply not earned his liberty. When someone does withstand or disregard them, they have a surprising way of vanishing. If someone argues to you that because of these pressures all freedom is an illusion, he is probably either speaking the language of metaphysics or trying to seduce you to surrender what liberty you have to some form of authoritarian control.

Our present economic system is geared to favor innovation of certain sorts, largely as to technical methods of production and the introduction of new products. Innovation as to industrial relations is perhaps less easy, but by no means impossible. Liberty as to styles of living in general seems to be greater

than it was. It is chiefly radical proposals as to the social system itself that have to meet the stronger pressures toward conformity. But on the whole, we have established a popular attitude which is sufficiently tolerant of nonconformity to permit it to exist, and even to flourish; and that appears to be the main thing. This state of things could be easily overthrown. The preservation of it requires the proverbial "eternal vigilance." We may not be too well satisfied with what we have in this respect, but it is a precious achievement, imperfect as it may be, and one not lightly to be abandoned.

There is also freedom from the limitations imposed by poverty, disease, ignorance, weakness, and lack of opportunity. Full protection of these forms of liberty is impossible, mankind being what it is. And such protection as is possible requires some restrictions on some at least of the other forms of liberty. Protection of freedom from disease requires a public health service with powers of quarantine and various compulsory preventive measures. Disease carriers should not be free to be handlers of food. Rigorous application of the principle of individualistic liberty would sacrifice many of these other forms of freedom. And those who reach a socialistic position via humanitarian and democratic ideals do so because they believe that our traditional forms of economic liberty are at war with these other forms, and that the other forms are the more important. This is a serious issue, not to be dismissed lightly.

Such persons are likely to hold that the traditional individualistic liberties are formal merely; and that the substance of liberty as distinct from the form depends on what one can do (with the help of one's formal liberties) to promote and protect one's essential interests. Where so many of us are able to do so little, there is much reason in the claim that they possess the form of liberty without the substance. Any real answer to our present problems should face this issue squarely. It seems clearly impossible for everyone to possess both complete formal liberty and complete protection against disease, poverty, ignorance, and folly. The real issue is whether a sane balance can be struck between formal liberty and protection of its "material content," or whether we must go to one extreme or the other.

To what extent, if at all, does real liberty to do something require that one should also have the ability and the means to do it? We are not here concerned with attempting to solve metaphysical problems, but rather to give such clarity as may be given to the ideas prevalent among common men: the ideas they work by. And on this basis it seems clear that real liberty implies opportunity and ability to do something meaningful directed toward a given end; but that in the nature of the case, it does not carry a guaranty of success. In that sense, liberty and ability are not synonymous. The content of liberty can be enriched by increased opportunity and ability to command the material means of success, and it can be impoverished by the opposite; but the fact that there are severe limitations on opportunity and ability does not mean that liberty does not exist.

My liberty to buy the United States Steel Corporation may mean nothing; but it is part of my liberty to acquire a business enterprise or an interest in one. This may mean more, though perhaps not enough to make very much impression on a large-scale economic system. It is in turn part of the general liberty of any who will and can, to acquire and direct business enterprises, large or small. And this means a great deal, whether or not we are wholly satisfied with the results. It affects the character of the United States Steel Corporation, whether or not I personally play any part in this. It affects me if I buy a loaf of bread baked in an oven made of steel produced by the Corporation. From the standpoint of liberty, my inability to buy the Corporation is a serious matter only if liberty to do this is one of those liberties which do not have their proper effect unless everyone actually exercises them. Apparently it does not belong in that class.

A more serious matter is what happens to the liberty to choose an occupation, when the system is unable to afford jobs to some millions of the population who need them. This is one of the liberties which the system requires most of us to exercise; and such widespread inability as now exists is a grave impairment of the substance of this liberty. A socialistic system could, if it would, increase tremendously the effective content

of this particular liberty. And it is this one fact, more than any other, that gives ground for the contention that there would be more real personal liberty under socialism than under the system of private enterprise. There would, of course, be a price to pay. In the first place, the assortment of occupations itself would be prescribed, not freely worked out (at least, under socialism of the centrally administered type); and in the second place, the selection of candidates for jobs and for advancement would be made by a different kind of agency, under different motives and pressures. How important this would be, we may inquire into later.

Liberty is always a matter of choice between available alternatives; and the available alternatives represent the range of opportunity. The requirements here are that the range of alternatives shall be as rich as possible, as responsive as possible to the preferences of the people, and as accessible and well known as possible. This requires the equivalent of a well-organized market, under any economic system, socialistic or individualistic. The socialistic market might be better organized than the individualistic, though also probably less rich and less responsive. And the individualistic market is capable of being much better organized than it is, without ceasing to be individualistic. The range of market opportunity can be much improved.

One pair of concepts, the relationships of which are perhaps most difficult to trace, is liberty and security. Liberty implies some insecurity, because at bottom it implies testing the effectiveness of available powers and resources, with no absolute guaranty of a successful outcome. It also implies, in an interdependent society, that the experiments which some of us try may have unexpected effects on the rest of us and may make us to that extent insecure. Yet liberty also requires some degree of underlying security if it is to have much effective meaning and content. We must be able to count on something, or our experiments can only end in disaster.

This issue is harder to formulate in a satisfactory universal generalization than to settle in particular cases. We can afford purchasers security against physically harmful foods and let

them govern their own diet within the very wide range of choice that would be left; while the range of liberty that would be left to the food-producing industries would not be restricted in such a way as to cripple any of its defensible activities. On much the same terms we can control individual behavior sufficiently to afford a degree of security against epidemic diseases which would come much closer than we now do to the standard which our medical knowledge permits. This means increased restriction of personal liberty; and a perfect result (within the limits of existing medical knowledge) might not be humanly possible. We can guarantee everyone security against absolute economic disaster and still leave individuals free to achieve what status they can, above the assured minimum; but there can be no general guaranty against failure to achieve the sort of economic position people choose to strive for, or the sort they set as a satisfactory standard.

The security to which people generally feel they have a just claim is the opportunity to do some work of a worth-while character and to receive a reward bearing a proper relation to the worth of what they do. Recognizing the difficulty of defining worth, it seems clear that this claim is difficult to satisfy, consistently with leaving private enterprise a fair opportunity to reabsorb the unemployed. If the standard of worth is set by political processes, it seems certain to be set too high to meet the requirements of private reabsorption. One theoretical standard might be the assurance of such a level of income that the worker would feel that, in accepting any offer that might be made by private enterprise, he was not being coerced by the force of hard necessity, but was free. In practice, this standard would be hopelessly indefinite; and any practical attempt to construe it would almost certainly set it too high for private industry to outbid successfully.

It appears that we are not in a position to guarantee universal security, in the shape of freedom from fear of losing one's job and of being forced to accept something poorer, or even enduring some real hardship and privation, if one does not meet fair standards of performance. Even a socialistic society would have to have some jobs of a disciplinary sort, involving hardship; as

well as many of a distinctly unsatisfactory sort for those who do not succeed in qualifying for the better positions. And here there would be the likelihood that the assignment of these jobs would be governed to a large extent by considerations other than industrial capacity and performance. And this would introduce another kind of insecurity, some aspects of which might be even more serious.

Liberty is a burden as well as a privilege; and the actual exercise of undictated and unguided free choice in every act of life would overburden all of us. Therefore the most basic form of liberty is the liberty to choose how much liberty one will exercise and what guidance one will accept. The really unfree system is not the system without guidance and direction, but the system which deprives the individual of this basic liberty of choice.

Such a system, imposed on a population in which the urge to decide things for themselves is not too deeply ingrained, and managed with the greatest skill, might produce the illusion of liberty (in the sense of action in accordance with one's nature) not by leaving action free but by regimenting human nature to conformity, from childhood up. Where the leaders of such a system would ultimately come from remains a problem; unless all real leadership were relegated to an infallible tradition or "ideology," set up by the original founder or founders. And how long this could endure is another problem—to which, let us hope, this country will never have occasion to discover for itself the answer.

To escape this suicide of liberty requires a people with a sane balance in their natures. They must have enough of the urge to independent decision to reject complete regimentation. But they must have enough underlying like-mindedness to make most of them accept, without formal coercion, fundamental ideas and moral codes calling for action in harmony with the interests of the community. This is the indispensable moral basis of liberty, no less in the economic than in other realms.

A recalcitrant minority will always have to be coerced; and the majority will necessarily be subject to direction in many things which require more definite conformity than mere moral

codes will bring about, and in which they will accept direction, not because they would voluntarily choose to act in the particular way the authorities decide on, but because they are intelligently law-abiding and recognize the need for this kind of conformity. If the controls go beyond what this law-abiding spirit will voluntarily support, then there is trouble ahead. To repeat, the question is not whether there is specific direction, but whether the sphere of liberty that remains is adequate.

III. WARTIME AND PEACETIME ECONOMIES

Normally, a fairly sharp distinction can be drawn between the peacetime economy and the wartime economy, the latter being, in democratic countries, ordinarily a temporary interlude. In wartime, the advantages of the free economy are to a large extent in abeyance, for several reasons. In the first place, in wartime the dominant purpose of the economy is no longer to give individuals as much as possible of the means to liberal individual living, but to concentrate as much as possible of the country's resources on a single national end: the winning of the war. Any unnecessary surplus for individual citizens becomes, temporarily, an undesirable thing. In the second place, the wastes and fumbings of the market's trial-and-error methods become inappropriate as compared to the method of centralized statistical canvassing of resources and needs. And in the third place, the shortages of essential materials and of labor and resources for essential purposes are such that the unchecked forces of supply and demand would raise prices and rewards far beyond the level that is necessary for the most effective stimulus to the needed mobilizations. If increases in prices are limited short of the level that would equate supply and demand, rationing of scarce supplies and resources becomes necessary and is tolerated as a temporary emergency measure.

The peacetime "war against depression" is sometimes spoken of as if the same general kinds of measures would be appropriate to it. But it seems on the whole more nearly true that the essential conditions are here reversed. In wartime, the effective demand for goods and services is excessive; in depressions, it is

deficient. In wartime, more than adequate purchasing power is forthcoming via deficit-financing and credit expansion, with no serious effects on business confidence. In depressions the reverse is the case; business confidence is weakened to start with, and deficit-financing beyond moderate limits serves to make the situation worse. In wartime, the economic energizing forces are superabundant, and it is a question of directing them into the most essential channels and restricting their action in other directions. In depressions, the basic problem is a partial paralysis of the energizing forces. For all these reasons (which could be much elaborated) it appears that the same measures will not work in the same way in the two situations. The peacetime economy requires a fuller measure of liberty, unless the whole system is to be revolutionized.

IV. LIBERTY IN THE INDIVIDUALISTIC SCHEME

It is perhaps not necessary to sum up systematically the place and forms of liberty in the individualistic scheme of theory and practice. Among economists, at least, the emphasis shifted early in the nineteenth century from liberty as an inherent "natural right" to liberty as an instrument of economic plenty. There is much to be said for the contention that liberty of some sort *is* a natural right in the sense that it is such a vital need of humanity that it cannot be denied without serious or even disastrous social consequences. But while this means that everyone should have liberty of some sort, it does not necessarily mean that they must have economic liberty (though it creates a strong presumption, the economic realm being so important). And it certainly does not in itself mean that there should be the precise variety of economic liberties that has constituted the historic system of individualism.

In this system, freedom was an instrument for the production of plenty, and the plenty was to be distributed on the basis of freedom for each to get as much as his services, or those of his property, were worth in the market in some economic employment. A wide distribution of the plenty was desired, but economists were not always too hopeful as to the possibility of

freeing the masses of humanity from the burden of poverty, under either individualistic or socialistic systems.

The individualistic system was based on freedom of consumers to choose among products and among competing producers of any one product. Everyone was free to attempt what only a limited number could succeed in: namely, the working out of improved methods of producing goods or the development of new products; or was free to imitate the pioneers and compete with them (except as limited by patent rights). And all were free to secure the co-operation of labor and capital by individual bargaining in a free market, whereby each would get as much as the market could afford. Access to all occupations was to be similarly free. Parties were bound by contracts they had made, but the contracts were free, and contracts unduly limiting liberty for the future were not enforced.

The system was one of voluntary co-operation, which the co-operators were free to withhold at any time (except for the performance of existing contracts). This freedom to withhold was the basis of their power to bargain for the price of their co-operation. The fact that if they held their resources idle they lost all income from them was the only compulsion laid upon them to co-operate with someone or other and not to let their resources lie idle. Aside from this compulsion, they were free to produce what they chose, or not to produce; to work for whom they chose or not to work; to buy from whom they chose or not to buy, at a particular time or ever.¹

This freedom not to co-operate seems to be an inseparable part of the freedom to choose with whom one will co-operate, and the manner of one's co-operation, and to bargain for remuneration. The State can hardly order people to co-operate without assuming considerable responsibility for the manner and matter of the co-operation, and thus, in effect, introducing the essentials of a socialistic system. Yet this freedom is clearly dangerous; and any widespread failure to co-operate, or withholding of co-operation, can produce serious industrial paralysis. Therefore this form of freedom is no longer a purely private

¹ This is, of course, qualified in the case of public service industries by a positive obligation to render service.

affair, but has become a matter of vital and recognized public interest.

Employers can be trusted not to suspend operations as soon as profits become unsatisfactory; they are under economic pressure to continue operating so long as they can cover actual current operating expenses. And the more stably established among them are under pressure to go further and to operate at a loss, so long as financially practicable and so long as recovery is in prospect, rather than disband their working organization. These pressures are strengthened by a growing sense of public obligation to maintain employment. But the employers are also under pressure to avoid bankruptcy or unduly heavy losses. And as the price system operates, a moderate decline in demand often takes effect more largely in a decline of output than in a radical reduction of prices such as might result from a resolute attempt to maintain full production and employment at all costs. Thus, despite strong pressures to maintain operation, the liberty not to co-operate remains an important factor.

Central features in this problem are the timing of purchases of durable consumers' goods, such as houses and automobiles, and of the installation of durable productive equipment. We are learning the explosive possibilities of irregular timing in these matters; yet the State can hardly step in and prescribe regular timing by public fiat without destroying the basis of the voluntary economic system. If it is to work toward this end, it must do so by indirection, acting on the causes of the irregular timing; and the manner of doing this represents no easy problem, especially as the economists have not yet reached certainty as to some of the fundamental causes at work.

Yet the cumulative result of this freedom to withhold economic co-operation is at times to deprive millions of the opportunity, and in effect of the liberty, to earn a living, and to reduce them to dependence—which also undermines the basis of the free economic system. And this appears to constitute the central dilemma of economic liberty at the present time.

Or perhaps it shares this position with the problem of the effects of war which, if it becomes chronic, also threatens to destroy the system of liberty in all its forms. Indeed, the pe-

cular weight of the great depression of the early thirties is undoubtedly in large measure due to the aftermath of the World War, with its redrawing of frontiers regardless of areas of economic interdependence, coupled with an exaggerated nationalism and aggravated trade barriers which enable all national frontiers to do as much economic harm as possible.

But it will not do to dismiss the question by blaming all our present economic troubles on the World War. Before the War came, Americans deplored the chronic underemployment which some of the older countries suffered and felt that their own economy was of a more healthy sort, free from this ailment of the effete systems of Europe (though admittedly suffering from periodic crises). Now it seems more probable that the difference lay mainly in our comparative youth and the greater maturity of large-scale industrialism in the older economies of Europe; and that we have now become mature enough to share the difficulties of the older countries. Certain it is that since 1929 we have had no reason to feel superior in the matter of depressions and unemployment.

Neither will it do to blame all our troubles on the principle of individualism. One answer to this is like the proverbial answer to the claim that Christianity has failed—namely, that it has not been tried. The individualistic principle has not been consistently followed. The aggravation of our troubles is at least in some considerable part due to just the sort of restrictions on free competition, and obstacles to free movement, against which Adam Smith directed his heaviest artillery. This includes not only barriers to free international intercourse, but a host of internal restrictions on free competitive bargaining. Trade unions set a standard wage and maintain it in the face of the fact that industry will not and cannot employ all their members at that wage level. Industrial producers do something similar with prices. Both are, quite understandably, protecting themselves against what would otherwise be competition of a ruthless and cutthroat sort.

Moreover, it is more than doubtful whether, for example, an indiscriminate slash in wages would be a useful measure of recovery in any and all situations of depression. The problem

is not as simple as that. For wages constitute not only a major part of the cost of producing goods, but also a major part of the purchasing power on which the demand for goods depends. Hence the effect of an indiscriminate reduction in wages and prices might largely cancel out. When we learn more about these interrelationships, we may find that wage reductions are of relatively little use as recovery measures in industries and trades that serve consumers directly, while in those that serve producers, such measures may be fully effective only in connection with other measures of a more positive sort.

Without the present protections against unlimited cuts in wages and prices we should still have depressions; of that there can be little doubt. But they would be different in character. They might be sharper, shorter, and sooner mended—more like the depression of 1920-21 than like the prolonged prostration of the thirties. It is quite likely that our attempted defenses have made things worse. We have kept the principle of ultimate freedom not to produce, while the antidotes—the counter-acting competitive compulsions—have been seriously weakened. But any attempt to reverse this tendency faces enormous difficulties and is beset by doubts. We do not seem to have either the necessary certainty or the necessary ruthlessness. We shall probably have to shape our course on the assumption that this condition will not be radically transformed in the near future.

Under such conditions, what can we hope to do, within the framework of the free economic system? We can attempt to fill the gap in private spending for consumption and investment by public deficit-spending. This can have some effect in mitigating industrial fluctuations of moderate extent and duration, if well planned and timed, and placed on a basis which does not create distrust and fear of endlessly accumulating public deficits. But now, in 1939, we appear to have passed the limits of usefulness of this policy. It cannot successfully combat a state of chronic partial stagnation. Or we can hope to manage a social security program in such a way that it will not only help the victims of depression with a maximum of preservation of self-respect and a minimum of "pauperization" and demoralization, but will

also have some stabilizing effect via the steadying of the flow of purchasing power.

For the longer future, we can work toward voluntary mutual arrangements between different industrial groups for the partial stabilization of investment spending, in which all have a common interest. This is probably a matter for generations of education, experimentation, and difficult adjustment, and at best it can hardly hope to achieve perfect success. In short, under the free system we may hope to mitigate the severity of economic stagnations, especially if we can establish a sound basis for international peace, and to cushion their incidence on the chief victims, but hardly to cure them completely. Ultimately, a liberal cannot help believing that the organized common sense of humanity, and the common interest in uninterrupted production, will succeed in reducing the evil of depressions to proportions which will not be seriously harmful. But some burden of this sort appears to be a part of the price we pay for the system of economic freedom. And many are asking seriously whether it is worth the price; while many have already decided that it is not.

V. ECONOMIC FREEDOM UNDER SOCIALISM

A socialistic system might develop less productive power than the individualistic system, but it would be likely to utilize far more completely such productive power as it did develop and to afford practically complete opportunity for everyone to get a job. On this basis alone, many would rate it above the individualistic system on a scale of human liberty. This naturally involves the assumption that socialistic systems need not necessarily follow the Russian model, but may be democratic, and as hospitable to personal freedom as their essential nature permits. In such a matter we can, of course, deal only with probabilities, not certainties.

As already remarked, under socialism, consumers would presumably continue to exercise free choice among products offered for sale, though within narrower limits as to amounts and assortments of goods available and presumably as to the time of

delivery, especially in the case of durable goods. And workers would presumably have considerable freedom of selection among occupations, within a range somewhat more limited and standardized than at present. The question what goods should be produced would be affected by the consumers' choices as expressed in the market, but with a difference, since the determination what wants should be satisfied, and what not, would in the last analysis rest with a governing bureaucracy, modified by whatever democratic machinery might be set up for determining general policies. It is here that the great difference would lie—always provided the State did not prescribe the personal, cultural, and intellectual activities of the people as the Russian State does at present. Into the probabilities bearing on this question we may inquire in a moment. The chief liberty that is sure to be given up is what we know as business liberty; and the question is whether this particular form of liberty is important enough to be kept, at the price we have to pay for it.

VI. THE CHOICE: HOW IMPORTANT IS BUSINESS LIBERTY?

Considering how heavy this price is, it is not too easy for an impartial observer, accustomed to the principle that the welfare of the greatest number weighs most heavily in the social scales, to justify a decision to keep the continuity of development, building on the core of the existing system, and to work for betterment within these limitations. There are many reasons for such a decision, which actuate many persons, that will not stand the test of critical scrutiny.

One such reason is the fact that many persons who now are prosperous, and able to live lives of much freedom and generous proportions, would be less prosperous and more limited under a socialistic system. When weighed against the present lot of the unemployed, this reason appears to rest on a badly warped scale of values. If it is to be defended, it must be not on the ground of the enjoyments or welfare of the fortunate groups taken by themselves, but on the ground that it is in-

dispensable to society that there should be as many as possible who are able to live really generous lives and to be free to cultivate the interests and capacities that go with them, even if there is not enough to give everyone this privilege, and even if many of those who enjoy it put their advantages to futile or unworthy uses, in the exercise of the same liberty that leads the best among them to make invaluable contributions to society, of a sort that no bureaucracy would accomplish. On the other hand, it is not safe to take for granted that the creative leaders of a socialistic system would be penuriously paid, though they would not be in a position, out of their private funds, to endow expensive enterprises of social pioneering. This last is a really important matter, from the standpoint of free social experimentation. But on the whole, while the argument has important force, it does not seem sufficient: this reason for retaining business liberty is not as bad as many radicals think, but it is not good enough.

Another argument is that the selection of industrial leaders and directors would be on a basis which would afford a less rigorous test of efficiency in doing the job, and especially a less rigorous weeding-out of the less obvious grades of inefficiency, which could not be proved by bureaucratic records of performance. The force of this argument is necessarily conjectural. The existing system is far from perfect on the score of efficiency. Tendencies to nepotism and bureaucracy exist, but they are under a pretty severe check; more so than bureaucratic tendencies in government. It is possible that a socialist dictatorship *might* be ruthlessly efficient, though the element of ruthlessness would itself involve a very considerable sacrifice of the possibility of the higher and more creative forms of efficiency. But there seems no point in discussing such a system in a study the main concern of which is liberty. And democratic socialism would presumably involve a considerable sacrifice of efficiency, possibly more than would be involved in periodic moderate depressions. This argument has force; nevertheless it does not seem quite good enough.

More serious, perhaps, than a loss of efficiency in the current work of production is the cumulative effect over generations of

a slowing-down of the rate of technical progress; and this also might be expected under a socialist system. Yet it is not likely that progress would stop; and there is much evidence that our present speed of technical advance is greater than we can successfully assimilate, and that we might be better off if the rate slowed down somewhat. This argument for preserving business liberty is a good one; but there is still room to doubt whether it is good enough.

Another argument is that one of the primary objectives of socialism, namely, the abolition of class inequalities, would turn out to be an illusion, and that the result would simply be to set up new class divisions, with a fresh starting point and an altered basis of selection. To speak in unduly simple terms, a bureaucracy would replace a "plutocracy." A socialist might grant this point fully and still hold that the most decisive element in the case for socialism is not affected. This argument also seems hardly good enough.

What would be the effect of a socialist system on those forms of freedom which are properly designated as "personal liberty"? Is there any reason why personal liberty, as distinct from business liberty, should not be as unrestricted under socialism as under the present system, or more so? I believe that there is; and the reason centers upon the coercive potentialities of a central administrative authority which has ultimate power over the livelihood of every citizen. This is a power of which we in this country have no direct knowledge, though elsewhere people have learned its meaning by bitter experience.

Advocates of the looser federative forms of socialism might deny the necessity for such a central authority; but without it there is no clear way of settling the terms of interchange between the industrial units that would be set up. Each can hardly be sovereign; there must be an ultimate sovereign power over them. And this power must be predominantly of an administrative character; and the policy-forming decisions which might be made by a democratic (or nominally democratic) legislative authority would, even more than in our present system, have to be applied to such complicated situations that continuous and detailed democratic scrutiny would be even more

impossible than with us at present. Hence these policies would be extremely dependent on the administrative organization for their concrete interpretation and embodiment in action. And the administrative organization would include—how much? In a real sense, it would have no limit, short of every citizen. What would be the tendencies of an organization with such possibilities of power?

The probability is that the system would start with a requirement of universal espousal of some officially formulated "ideology"—perhaps the Gospel according to Karl Marx, as expounded and interpreted by an infallible priesthood. But for the sake of argument, let us pass this by. Aside from this, what would be the natural tendencies of such an organization? A naturally defensible principle would be to permit criticism of the performance of the administration in the carrying out of the fundamental purposes of the system, but to suppress attacks on these fundamental purposes. If a more liberal principle were formally adopted, one can hardly imagine it being carried into effect, by an administration of the character this one would necessarily have. But who is to decide where criticism of performance ends and attacks on fundamental principles begin? The real power would rest with the administration itself.

Some offenses and penalties might be in the hands of a judiciary, and the judiciary might be theoretically independent, though it is hard to see how this independence could be a working reality under such a system. But the administration would not be dependent on judicial penalties. It has the most irresistibly powerful system of rewards and penalties in its hands already, in its power over occupational opportunity. If American political administrations held such power, how long would it be before an administration would come into office which could not resist the temptation to exercise it, and to construe faithfulness to the administration as an indispensable test of fitness to hold the positions it had in its gift? (Note that under socialism this means all the real jobs in the country.) And after that happened, how long would it be before the formal guaranties of liberty would cease to be of any effect?

A radical nonconformist often has difficulty under our pres-

ent system in keeping his job or in getting another of similar quality; and this is a serious matter. How much more serious would it be if there were, in the last analysis, only one employer? The sad imperfections of personal liberty as we have it are often used as arguments by socialists. Yet they seem to be the poorest of reasons for adopting a system under which such avenues of escape as now exist would be cut off, and such liberty as we now have extinguished. "Disciplinary jobs" have already been mentioned, but the term conveys no faint impression of what such discipline could amount to. It has the power to rob martyrdom of its dignity and to reduce it to bald sordidness and the breaking-down of personality itself.

In short, it seems that the existence of genuinely independent employers, with some one of whom the nonconformist can find employment, is not merely a matter of business liberty, but is one of the indispensable safeguards of true personal liberty. And this may be the one really adequate reason for refusing to make the irrevocable shift to socialism, despite the admitted and ominous defects of the system we have.

One word in closing, by way of safeguard against a possible misapprehension. This argument should not be taken as a brief for "preserving the existing system." That is a straw man. Existing systems are not preserved unchanged, no matter what we decide about them. They change of themselves, if they are not altered by outside forces; and our present system is not exempt from this law. No single form of existing business liberty is sacred. But this argument is a brief for continuing to struggle onward with a system embodying the principle of liberty, economic as well as personal, in spite of the difficulties. This does not offer a quick cure of basic evils. It offers rather a prospect of generations of effort, with patience, persistence, and tolerance, to strike a sane balance between liberty and control, and to reduce our worst evil to tolerable proportions by a process of adjustment subject to free discussion, not by arbitrary fiat and suppression of dissent.

Since such a course cannot quickly cure the evil of unemployment, we shall have to pay a deal of attention to ways of mitigating the more disastrous burdens it throws on individuals

and groups. This is a palliative, perhaps, but a necessary one, while we are working toward the larger goal. In this latter process, public functions will inevitably increase, and business will inevitably have to surrender to collective planning and direction (though not necessarily to that of "political" government) some of the liberties that now remain to it. This would be true, even if political government were to abandon the details of this task to business itself, retaining only general leadership and power of stimulation and ultimate veto.

It is conceivable that at some point in such a process we might achieve enough co-ordination to reduce unemployment to tolerable proportions without making everyone an employee of the State. At that point, it would make little difference whether we called the system "socialistic" or not. "Socialism" of such a sort, reached by such a process, could still leave room for true personal liberty; it could still be democratic. But this can only be attained by a process that does not go too fast for business to adjust itself without catastrophic breakdown or violent revolution. If such a process is to continue, we must avoid committing ourselves to the experiment that would mean the end of free experimentation.

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DEMOCRACY RECONSIDERED

I. "DEMOCRACY" AND "LIBERTY"

THE word "democracy" is used to indicate several interrelated but different concepts:

1. The lower strata of society, the common people, the "masses" as distinct from the "classes." We say that the middle classes occupy the space between aristocracy and democracy; that it is idle to harbor illusions on the wisdom of democracy; that democracy can be more warlike than an aristocracy.

2. That doctrine which the English call "liberalism" and which upholds the rights of the lower classes against the political and economic privileges of the upper classes. We say that democracy implies equal political rights for all citizens; that democracy teaches that there must be no hereditary privileges; that it is impossible to conciliate democracy with imperialistic practices.

3. Those political parties that hoist the democratic doctrine as their banner and claim to uphold the rights of the lower classes. We say that British democracy was defeated in the national election of 1931; that a resolution was adopted in its national convention by the democracy of a given country; that a given democracy should join hands with other democracies.

4. The institutions which conform to the democratic doctrine. We say that French democracy does not grant the franchise to women; that democracy cannot work in time of war;

that in the North American democracy there is a Supreme Court.

5. A country endowed with democratic institutions or its government, irrespective of whether democratic or antidemocratic parties are in power. We say that the Western democracies tried to appease Hitler by the Munich Pact; that in 1939 war broke out between dictatorial Germany and the Western democracies; that democracies cannot survive unless they show greater efficiency than the dictatorial countries.

6. The whole of the personal and political rights which a democratic constitution grants the citizens. We say that democracy vanishes if freedom of speech is abolished; that there is no use talking democracy if freedom of the press is curtailed; that without democracy there is no respect for human dignity.

7. Not all, but one of those rights that are granted by a democratic constitution. We say that freedom of speech is democracy; that universal suffrage is democracy; that a parliamentary form of government is democracy.

8. Those institutions or conditions which would prevail if the democratic doctrine were consistently carried out. We say that democracy is a most hopeful way of life; that democracy grants the same rights to men and women, to colored and white; that democracy, according to Mazzini, is progress of all through all under the leadership of the best.

Not seldom it proves difficult to define with precision what idea one has in mind when the word democracy—or some other equivalent expression—is used. We hear it said that democracy is in a state of decadence. But it is not clear whether we should understand that the masses have fallen into less satisfactory economic and political conditions, or that the exponents of the democratic doctrine have become fewer in number, or that the democratic parties are losing ground either as a result of their own errors or because the democratic doctrines have been discredited, or that democratic institutions have been wholly or only partly superseded by institutions not in conformity with the democratic doctrine. We read in the book of an English writer, who, however, was a man of great intelligence: "It has sometimes been held that democracy (a) would be no less

hostile to personal liberty than other forms of government. It is true that the masses (b) may be as antagonistic to personal independence as the classes. But if it is argued that the democratic principle (c) can be hostile to liberty this is a fallacy, for it is full publicity and free discussion that are the organs of democratic government (d) and if it suppresses them democracy (e) deprives itself of the means of forming a judgment of its own affairs." In this text the word democracy is used in case (a) as equivalent to the democratic form of government or democratic institutions; in (b) the masses supplant democratic institutions; in case (c) the democratic doctrine takes the place of democratic institutions and the masses; in case (d) democratic government is what it ought to be if it corresponded faithfully to democratic doctrine; and in case (e) the masses again take the upper hand.

All these ambiguities are increased by the fact that the word democracy, like all other abstract collective words (Nation, State, Church, Fatherland, Army, Parliament, Party, Capitalism, Proletariat), is easily subjected to poetic sublimation and is endowed with a soul, a genius, a heart, and many other organs which serve us poor mortals. "Democracy" stirs up the masses, directs its parties in the political struggle; it is born, it grows, it weakens, falls ill, runs the risk of dying, or actually dies as would a person of flesh and blood. Many controversies on democracy are nothing but senseless squabbles over a mythological and nonexistent being.

Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that the word democracy is used also to indicate doctrines and activities diametrically opposed to one of the essential institutions of a democratic regime, that is to say, the right of self-government. Thus do we hear of a so-called Christian Democracy which, according to *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, has for its aim "to comfort and uplift the lower classes excluding expressly every appearance and implication of political meaning"; this democracy already existed in the time of Constantine when the clergy "began the practical work of Christian democracy" by establishing hospices for orphans, the aged, the infirm, and wayfarers. The Fascists, the Nazis, and the Communists also often and readily dub as

democracy, nay more, as the "real," "true," "full," "substantial," "more honest" democracy the political regimes of present-day Italy, Germany, and Russia, because these regimes also profess to comfort and uplift the lower classes after having deprived them of the very political rights without which it is not possible to conceive of "government by the people."

The word "liberty" also labors under the disease of manifold meanings. Philosophers have spun a tremendous web of confusion around it. But we have no need of venturing on that tempestuous sea. We shall deal with the word as it has been used in the political idiom. Already in the eighteenth century Montesquieu observed that "there is no word that admits of more varied meanings, and has made more different impressions on the human mind, than that of Liberty."

Some have taken it for the faculty of deposing a person on whom they had conferred tyrannical authority; others for the power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey; others for the right of bearing arms and of being enabled therefore to use violence; others, in fine, for the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country or by their own laws. A certain nation thought for a long time that liberty consisted in the privilege of wearing long beards. Some have annexed this name to one form of government exclusive of others; those who had republican tastes applied it to this species of policy; those who had enjoyed a monarchical government gave it to monarchy. Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government best suited to their own customs and inclinations.

Montesquieu mentioned some of these meanings merely to introduce into his treatise, according to his custom, relief spots for the benefit of the reader. For our purpose, it will suffice to notice that the word is taken to mean:

1. The whole of the personal and political rights which a citizen enjoys under a free constitution. This meaning is analogous to that of democracy under number 6.

2. Any one of those rights, as if the whole of those rights were lost if a single one of them were discarded or curtailed. We term liberty the right of self-government, which Montesquieu termed "power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey"; this "power of a civil society or state to gov-

ern itself by its own discretion or by laws of its own making" Richard Price called "civil liberty"; and the American Declaration of 1774 stated that "the foundation of English liberty, and of all free governments, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council."

3. National independence or self-determination, i.e., what Montesquieu defined as "the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country or by their own laws." We say that Italy and Germany gained their liberty during the nineteenth century.

Moreover, liberty no less than democracy is subject to a poetical-mythological transfiguration and in the hands of politicians not seldom is made to mean the opposite of what any honest man thinks when he uses the word. Thus Hitler and Mussolini maintain that they are endeavoring to gain liberty for their nations in international competition and that whoever hampers their nations in the conquest of their "living space" commits a crime against their liberty; in this case liberty becomes what Montesquieu described as "the right of bearing arms and of being enabled therefore to use violence."

In the title of the present paper "democracy" means "democratic doctrine" and in the pages which follow the reader will never find the words "democracy" or "liberty" transfigured or adulterated, and all confusion will be avoided between the various concepts which the words evoke.

II. DEMOCRATIC AND OLIGARCHIC INSTITUTIONS

A democratic constitution grants equal rights to all citizens without discrimination of social class, creed, race, sex, or political affiliation.

Such rights fall into two categories:

1. Personal rights, that is to say, those rights which pertain to the members of the commonwealth as private individuals and which the French Constituent Assembly of 1789 termed "the rights of man": the right to physical integrity and liberty and to be secure in one's house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to choose and follow

one's calling and to own and inherit property; the right to swift trial by impartial courts in accordance with known laws; freedom of thought and religion; and the right to be educated according to one's own abilities.

2. Political rights, that is to say, the rights which pertain to the individual as a member of the commonwealth and which the French Constituent Assembly of 1789 termed "the rights of the citizen": freedom of speech, of the press, and of association; the right to participate in peaceable assemblies; the right of petition; the right to be admitted to public office according to one's talents; the right of representation or self-government, i.e., the right to change the men in power in central and local governments by the direct means of elections or through one's own representatives; and the right of resistance to unconstitutional governmental activities.

A democratic constitution must include "all" personal rights, "all" political rights, plus equality of rights among "all" citizens, plus the institutions of self-government.

Before the Reform Act of 1832, England possessed a self-governing Parliament, or a "parliamentary regime" as it is commonly called, because the House of Commons was vested with the right to turn out the Cabinet by a vote of no confidence. But the middle classes, the lower middle classes, and the lower classes were more or less thoroughly excluded from political rights, and the lower classes did not even enjoy full personal rights. British "liberties" were the privilege of an upper-class oligarchy. The characteristic feature of the British Constitution was a restricted franchise. Even after the Reform Act of 1832, the franchise remained for many years the privilege of a middle-class oligarchy. The British Constitution was democratized during the last century by the gradual extension of the franchise to all classes and by the abolition of traditional privileges, although it still retains vestiges of the old oligarchic system, such as hereditary royalty and the privileges of the Lords and of the Established Church.

The constitution of the German Empire before the War of 1914-18 granted all German citizens all personal rights, a fair measure of political rights, and even universal suffrage in the

election of the Imperial Reichstag. None the less, the Empire did not have a democratic constitution. It was a federation of local States in which all classes did not share equally in the right of representation and whose executives did not depend upon the votes of the parliaments (*Landtagen*). The electorate had only the right to make their opinions known through their representatives while the Cabinets could to a large extent disregard those opinions. Thus the States forming the Imperial Federation had an oligarchic and not a democratic franchise and had representative but not self-governing parliaments. The Imperial Reichstag itself, though elected by universal suffrage, did not have the power to unseat the Chancellor by a vote of no confidence. It was a representative but not a self-governing institution. Moreover, legislation passed by the Reichstag needed the approval of an Upper House (*Bundesrath*) composed of delegates appointed by the executives of the various oligarchic and not self-governing local States. As a consequence, the constitution of the German Empire was oligarchic although it embodied universal suffrage, which is one of the indispensable features of a democratic constitution. Universal suffrage alone does not make a constitution democratic.

A parliamentary or self-governing regime may be either oligarchic or democratic. A democratic regime, besides granting equality of personal and political rights, must be parliamentary or self-governing.

In a self-governing regime the majority rules. The consent of the majority, however, does not suffice to bring a political constitution within the framework of democratic doctrine.

When the democratic movements originated, they aimed at establishing the rights of the lower-class majority against the privileges of the clergy and the nobility. After the abolition of the political privileges of these minorities a new peril arose: majorities might suppress the liberties of minorities. The democratic doctrine consequently became more complex. It came to imply not only the principle that the right to rule is vested in the majority but also the principle that the right to disagree with the majority is vested in the minority. Political liberty is fundamentally "the right to differ." From this right to disagree

spring all other political rights of the citizen in a democratic regime. These rights are meant not so much to establish the power of the majority as to protect the minorities in their right of opposition. The best test of the standards of a democratic constitution is the provisions it makes for the protection of minorities.

Thus, a democratic constitution must include not only personal rights, political rights, and juridical equality, but respect for the personal and political rights of the minorities.

We have spoken of the rights vested in the "majority" and "minorities" by democratic institutions. This terminology does not correspond to realities and should be discarded.

In all societies, political control—that is to say, administrative, military, legislative, economic, religious, moral, and intellectual leadership—is in the hands of an "organized minority," while the disorganized majority conforms more or less willingly to the commands of the minority. Mosca termed "political class" the minority controlling a given society at a given time. This "political class" has nothing to do with a "social class" in the Marxian sense of the term. It means the network of managers, high officials, and influential persons who, in a given society, control public bodies and private organizations. Such leaders are not necessarily drawn from one single class even though the upper strata of society do furnish the majority. Elements from the lower social classes are admitted into the ruling class in varying proportions.

When the political class splits up into conflicting sections, each of which brandishes a formula of its own, one then has "parties." Under a democratic form of government there are parties which maintain that the existing social order cannot be altered without impairing the welfare of those very lower classes which bear the weight of the entire structure. Other parties claim the monopoly of upholding the rights of the underprivileged majority against the privileges of the upper-class oligarchy. As a matter of fact, the latter, no less than the former, are "organized minorities" striving for predominance. Nor does their victory always bring about an increase in the

welfare of that majority, although victory always does bring about an increase in the welfare of any victorious minority.

Even in the most radically democratic regime the government is not run by the majority of the citizens. It is run by that party which, for the time being, is upheld by the votes of the majority. And this is the majority not of the citizens but of that single section of citizens sufficiently interested in politics to vote on election day. All parties are organized minorities that try to gain the support of the majority of the electorate, and this majority of the electorate, in its turn, is as a rule only a minority of the entire population.

We may carry even further our analysis of the minorities which compete for the right to rule. The victorious minority is composed of two parts: (1) a permanently organized machine, bossed by ward heelers, that votes solidly for the party regardless of circumstances; and (2) a flying squadron of unattached voters who are not members of any party, whose actions are unpredictable and who determine victory by voting now for this party and now for another. When the difference in voting strength between the permanent forces of the conflicting parties is not great, the victory is due to that fluctuating minority which is not regimented in any party and which may even be extremely small in numbers.

De jure, a dictatorial regime is the rule of an autocrat, an oligarchic regime is the rule of a privileged minority, and a democratic regime is the rule of the majority of the citizens. *De facto*, all political regimes are ruled by organized minorities. The autocrat could not govern millions of men if he were not surrounded by intimate advisers, party leaders, and high civil and military servants, under whom a hierarchy of minor servants assists the upper stratum of the governing class in controlling the subjects. Intimate advisers, party leaders, high civil and military servants, and minor servants have *de jure* no authority whatsoever. Sovereignty—that is, the right to make decisions and give orders—is lodged in the autocrat alone. *De facto*, the autocrat makes such decisions and issues such orders in accordance with the suggestions of the men with whom he is in touch, and the lower strata of the governing class also share

to a certain extent in the authority of the higher-ups. All governments are governments by minorities. A democratic regime, no less than any other regime, is ruled by minority. And within the organized minorities or parties contending for power, there are more or less clandestine coteries that pull the strings behind the scenes. Government by majority has never existed nor is it likely ever to exist. Hence it would be correct never to speak of "majority" or "minority," but rather of "party in power" and "opposition parties."

What, then, is the difference between an autocratic regime, an oligarchic regime, and a democratic regime if all three are government by minorities?

In a dictatorial regime the minority that surrounds the dictator, and in an oligarchic regime the ruling minority, possess the monopoly of power by their own rights and have no legal responsibility towards the common herd. A democratic regime is an open field for free competition among all organized minorities or "parties" aspiring to run the government. In order to gain power or to remain in power, each minority seeks the support of the greatest possible number of citizens. All citizens, and not one class of the population alone, are entitled by universal suffrage to take part in competition if they choose to do so. Thus any section of the disorganized majority can, from time to time, give vent to its grievances and, under the leadership of one of the organized minorities of the opposition, overthrow the organized minority in power.

The existence of competing parties is essential to the working of democratic institutions. As Sir Herbert Samuel, one of the British Liberal leaders, has explained it, men and women of the same mind must have some method of acting together for their common purposes.

Otherwise an electorate is merely a mob. Some one must frame policies, choose candidates, carry on propaganda; some one must watch the actions of the elected members; some one must mould and develop the political activities of the future. In the legislature, members supporting the same principles must work steadily together; otherwise a parliament becomes nothing more than a collection of shifting groups of individuals, and the system of representation breaks

down through its own ineffectiveness. All this can be done only by political parties. Where parties are insufficiently developed, as in India, the successful working of democratic institutions is doubtful. Where they are suppressed as in Germany, Italy and Russia, democracy is destroyed.¹

III. DICTATORIAL INSTITUTIONS

Better to understand the nature of democratic institutions one has only to observe those institutions which stand in direct opposition to them, that is, dictatorial institutions.

Under dictatorial institutions one party alone is entitled to exist. As one Fascist leader in Italy writes: "The old free State was based on two assumptions: political freedom and the party system. All parties were lawful and were permitted to exist under free rule. Today, Fascism has entirely superseded such doctrines and practices." It is a familiar joke in Moscow that there may be any number of political parties in the Soviet Union, but under one single indispensable condition: that one party be in power and the others in jail.

All associations whose activities may be regarded as hostile to the party in power are outlawed. One man—the dictator—controls the entire machinery of government. The confidence men of the supreme master control every subordinate department of national life. Not only political associations but trade unions, charitable institutions, athletic clubs, and the like must be directed by men enjoying the confidence of the men in power. Daily papers, reviews, and all other agencies of information must be run by men subservient to the party in power. Books distasteful to the party in power are either suppressed, confiscated, or burned. Judges, public officials, and teachers are dismissed from their posts, and professional men are not allowed to carry on their professions if their political or technical activities run counter to the dictates of the party in power. Ministers of all churches must either keep silent on all matters tabooed by the party in power or join in singing the official anthems if they do not wish to be silenced or have their congregations dis-

¹ *Contemporary Review*, Vol. CXLVIII (1935), pp. 263-64.

persed. Elective local government is abolished, and local bodies are run by appointees of the central government. The executive in the central government no longer depends on the legislative power. Parliament is stripped of all real authority. National elections are either abolished or reduced to a sham so as always to give a show of unanimous approval to the party in power. The personal liberty or integrity of the subjects, their property, the privacy of their homes, the right to choose their professions or their religion, are placed at the discretion of the men in power and their police. Actual or potential opponents are not tried by independent judges but by administrative or military courts and have no guaranties of a fair trial. In short, not only political but also personal rights are discarded.

Before the rise of modern dictators a political regime which not only excluded political rights but also violated the personal rights of the subject was termed a "tyranny." An "absolute," or "despotic," or "autocratic" regime was a regime having a hereditary monarch, in which no political rights were granted the subject but under which his personal rights were protected at least to a certain extent by fixed laws that not even the sovereign—at least in theory—was entitled to violate. Dictatorship was that form of government in which the man endowed with autocratic power was an upstart who had abolished free institutions. The Czar of Russia was an absolute monarch, whereas Napoleon I and Napoleon III were dictators.

The political institutions of present-day Germany, Italy, and Russia should be termed "tyrannies," since not only political but also personal rights have been discarded. But as a result of the moral degradation which has spread all over the world during the last twenty years, the notions of both personal and political rights have become so obscured in our minds that we no longer make any distinction between tyranny and dictatorship, and as far as Germany, Italy, and Russia are concerned, we term their political constitutions dictatorships while we should term them tyrannies.

Dictatorial or tyrannical regimes today are called "fascist." The term was invented in Italy soon after the War of 1914-18 to connote a political party which claimed to be both anti-

democratic and anticommunist. It spread from Italy to other countries with the same meaning. Dictatorial or tyrannical regimes which do not abolish private ownership of the means of production and distribution today are called "fascist" in order to distinguish them from the dictatorial regime of Soviet Russia.

There is no doubt that the historical origin and the economic structure underlying the Communist dictatorship differ from those upon which are based the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships. The Communist dictatorship in Russia was set up with the aim of creating economic equality by abolishing private ownership of the means of production and of distribution, and it purports to prevent Russia from reverting to the institutions of capitalistic society. On the other hand, both the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships claim to have saved Europe from communism and maintain that their object is to uphold private ownership, though under increasing governmental supervision. Yet many of the legislative measures by which Hitler has suppressed democratic institutions in Germany are the exact counterpart of Italian Fascist laws. And the latter are but imitations of the laws enacted in Russia by the Communist Party. Hitler ought to pay huge royalties to Mussolini, and Mussolini, in his turn, to Stalin. Thus if the historical origins and the economic aims differ, the political institutions are analogous.

Mussolini has christened his dictatorial regime a "totalitarian" regime. This word has also enjoyed great favor. A totalitarian regime demands the subject's total allegiance to one single authority: that of the dictator and the other subordinate leaders of the party in power. A democratic regime allows the citizen to harbor in his heart different loyalties: toward his family, his parish, his college, his city, his profession, his political party, his fatherland, and even international institutions, such as the Catholic Church or the proletarian Internationale. A democratic regime is not a totalitarian but a pluralistic regime.

Authority, discipline, obedience, are the passwords of dictatorial regimes. Self-reliance, discussion, co-operation, are the passwords of democratic regimes.

IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY

Whoever deduces the democratic doctrine from the assumption that "all men are born equal," and understands that doctrine in the sense that men are born with equal abilities, takes as a point of departure something which does not exist. The opponents of the democratic doctrine, institutions, and parties need to exert very little effort to show that that assumption is nonsensical, and that since the basis of the construction is absurd, the entire construction disintegrates.

However, one may interpret that formula not in the sense that men are born with equal abilities but in the sense that all men, in a self-defining civilized community, are entitled to the same personal and political rights and liberties. Thus no longer does one assert a fact but a moral and juridical principle.

On what basis can this principle rest?

It rests on a fact which is demonstrated by the whole of man's experience. Men are born not with equal abilities, but with an equal ability to blunder. No person or group of persons possesses a monopoly on infallibility. There exists no social science as exact as the physical sciences. Forecasts on social life are always uncertain. There are lucky politicians and unlucky politicians. One man just happens to be reaching the door at the very moment it opens, and he enters without the slightest difficulty. Another man may knock for years, and it will never open to him. Sometimes the way out opens up by itself when the people least expect it and without their having contributed in any way to the event. Often, a political leader is deemed wise or foolish merely because he had the good or bad fortune to be in power at a time when favorable or unfavorable coincidences brought about upgrade or downgrade trends in national life. The art of government is, to a large extent, a gamble, because the prediction of social facts is, to a large extent, a gamble.

From this truth that no one is infallible and that no social class possesses a monopoly on intelligence or virtue must be drawn a conclusion to the effect that no social class ought to

be vested with a monopoly on political power. Selfishness is only too natural to the human heart. If the enjoyment of political rights and consequent political power is monopolized by one section of the population and withheld from the rest, the privileged section will promote only those measures tending to increase or preserve its own wealth, influence, or prestige. Any initiative which might endanger that position will be combated or allowed to fall. The interests of the sections excluded from political power will be ignored or trampled under foot. Justice will be nothing but the interests of the stronger man as long as it is the stronger man alone who defines Justice. This is why the democratic doctrine revindicates for all citizens the right to organize into parties. The party whose leaders inspire the majority of the electorate with the greatest confidence goes to power. If this party fails to justify the confidence placed in it, the electorate puts another party in its place. The various possible solutions of impending problems are thus tried out one after the other. By trial and error—"muddling through," as the English say—a way out is found.

The "masses" are neither more nor less infallible than the "classes." With all the respect due the memory of Jefferson, we can no longer allow ourselves to be deluded today by the idea that if the citizens are permitted free elections they will generally elect "the really good and wise" and that "a natural aristocracy" of "virtue and talents" will arise which does not labor under the drawbacks of "an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth." The wise man of Monticello lived during a period when human hopes were in the heyday of their youth. In A.D. 1940, we can no longer repeat that the composite judgment of the masses is superior to the composite judgment of the few. The composite judgment of a few or many blunderers is nothing more nor less than the composite blundering of a few or many blunderers. Democratic doctrine does not need to bind itself to outlived slogans. It needs only to assume that a working man may have more horse sense than a millionaire and that both may blunder to the same degree.

In choosing their representatives the majority of the electorate may be wrong. They may discover soon after turning out

one party that they have brought into power a party which is worse than the one that was turned out. In that case the majority of the electorate turns out the incumbent party at the next election and either returns the first party to power or elects a third. That is why elections are held from time to time. Recurrent elections have been devised for the very purpose of enabling the citizens to correct the blunders they may have committed in former elections. Recurrent elections spring from the negation of the contention that a people is faultless.

The citizen is not a "sovereign" in the sense that he rules the country. In a representative democracy, the sovereignty of the people only means that the citizens have the right to turn out their rulers when the latter, in the opinion of the majority of the electorate, have made too many blunders. When he designates his representatives the citizen merely declares whether he is satisfied or not with prevailing conditions. If he is satisfied, he votes for the party in power.

This is much less majestic than "sovereignty." But it is still a right of great importance. The men in power are thus obliged to be ever on the alert and keep their fingers on the pulse of popular feeling in order not to be uprooted by some tornado of discontent. And when vast streams of dissatisfaction have been created either by the mistakes or the bad luck of the party in power, an electoral landslide changes the men at the helm and a revolution is avoided. Ballots, not bullets. No other form of government guarantees broader opportunities to all social forces wanting to have a say in the business of the community. No other form of government thwarts more effectively the establishment and enforcement of political monopolies by any organized minority. No other form of government forces a quicker adaptation to new conditions upon political classes or makes easier the wiping out of those political classes no longer fit to survive. No other form of government gives greater opportunities to assert themselves to individuals having something to say and the urge to assert themselves.

As far as the party in power is concerned, not even its members are "sovereign" in the sense that they rule the country. In that monument of common sense which is John Stuart Mill's

Considerations on Representative Government (Chapter V), it is clearly stated that "instead of the function of governing, *for which it is radically unfit*, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government": to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to censure them if found condemnable; to expel from office the men who compose the government if they fulfill their trust in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the country, and to be "the nation's Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions."

The philosophy of dictatorship is based on the assumption that humanity is divided into two parts: the "common herd" and the "chosen few." "Some are, and must be, greater than the rest." "The best must rule the rest." But the "chosen few," the "best" must be chosen by someone. This is the business of the dictator. "Authority comes from above." The dictator is infallible. He is the predestined Man, the Savior, the Healer, something like a Man-God who rules and exacts obedience by the force of his personal superiority over all other men and women. The dictator and his chosen few are allegedly endowed with the mysterious gift of ignoring their private interests and of being acquainted with the higher demands not only of the present generation but also of the future ones of centuries and millennia to come. This is why the classes must rule and the masses must obey.

The Catholic Church is the most perfectly organized religious dictatorship. The Pope chooses the bishops, who, in turn, ordain the priests. Bishops and priests together form the class of the "chosen few" to whom the faithful owe unquestioning obedience. One God, one truth, one shepherd, and one flock to be guarded from sin and error. This is the logical outcome of the doctrine according to which the Pope is divinely inspired. Gregory XVI, who, upon his death in 1846, left the finances of the Church in indescribable confusion, was convinced that he was infallible even in financial matters. According to the Vatican Council, however, the Pope is infallible only when he speaks *ex cathedra*. But there are zealots who hold that whoever questions his teachings, even when not speaking *ex cathedra*, commits a sin of pride. Pius XII, in his address of August 24, 1939,

announced that the rulers of all peoples "through his voice heard the voice of Christ," that he spoke "in the name of God, of Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost," and that he "brought to men the word of Jesus Christ."

Under the old absolutist monarchies, the King was not as infallible as the Pope, but he was king by divine right and enjoyed the privilege of particular assistance from Heaven. For the sincere monarchist there is something divine even in a constitutional king: "Those of us who were brought up in the Victorian period," writes an English Tory, "were taught to look on the Queen as a being perfect in wisdom and goodness. To a Victorian child it was perhaps only her sex that distinguished her from the Deity; and she was much nearer than God to her people. . . . To her subjects, if not *dea*, she was at least *diva*."² The consistent monarchist tolerates parliamentary institutions only as long as parliamentary majorities do not come into conflict with the plans of the sovereign, or rather of the "Crown" or the "Throne" (abstract terms are better fitted to arouse mystical feelings). When a conflict does occur, the consistent monarchist cannot fail to side with the infallible Throne.

Modern dictators are no less infallible than kings by divine right. "Mussolini is always right"—teaches the catechism of the perfect Fascist in Italy. "For the young Fascists," wrote a correspondent of the *London Times* (October 25, 1935), "Mussolini is a God." A high official of the Department of Public Education told a French newspaperman: "Mussolini is the center of everything. For our children Mussolini is Divine Providence. Mussolini is a hero. Mussolini is a God."³ The Catholic Church cannot adopt this doctrine. Yet Pius XI, in December, 1926, went as far as to certify that Mussolini had been "sent by Divine Providence."

In Germany, Goering proclaims: "We Nazis believe that in political affairs Adolf Hitler is infallible, just as the Roman Catholic believes that in religious matters the Pope is infallible. His will is my law." At the National Convention of the Hitler Youth Movement in February, 1937, the leader of the German

² O. Christie, *The Transition from Aristocracy*, pp. 202-03.

³ *Echo de Paris*, September 30, 1935.

Labor Front, Dr. Ley, made the following "confession of faith": "We believe that God has sent us Adolf Hitler, so that Germany may receive a foundation for its existence through all eternity." Dr. Hans Fraulck, Governor-General of German-occupied Poland, said on February 1, 1940: "Today the world knows that this one man [Hitler] in all history, this great shaper of German destiny, is a man truly sent to us by Almighty God." Hitler in person has made the following pronouncement: "Providence has ordained that I should be the greatest liberator of humanity. I am freeing men from the demands of a freedom and personal independence which only a few can sustain." No Pope, however, has yet given him a certificate similar to that which has been given Mussolini. But if Hitler decides to respect his concordat with the Vatican, some fine day he will get the same anointment.

One who can never aspire to such privilege is godless Stalin. But even he has his source of infallible inspiration in the Communist Manifesto. Karl Marx begot Nicolai Lenin, and Nicolai Lenin begot Joseph Stalin. In truth, the Communist doctrine does not exalt one single man above all others, but places above all other classes a collective idol, "the proletariat." The leader of the Communist Party is supposed to have received his power from "the proletariat," and not to have conquered it by his own personal strength. All that the Communists say and do is meant to heighten the prestige of that collective entity, "the proletariat," and not to swell the prestige of one individual. But sporadic tendencies toward a personal deification of Stalin appear now and then. On December 5, 1939, the Soviet radio described Stalin as "the blazing sun of the whole earth." It is impossible to underestimate human intelligence. So Stalin may also become an infallible God.

Whether provided with divine inspiration or not, dictators are infallible. The leader of a democratic regime says to his adversaries: "I believe I am right and that you are wrong. Let me try and see what are the results of my policies. If they prove unsatisfactory, you will then have your chance to do otherwise." The dictator says: "I am right and the results of my policies cannot but be satisfactory. Every man must be either for me or

against me. Whoever declares himself against me will find himself in jail."

The basic assumption of democratic doctrine is humility. Justice Holmes used to say that a democrat is merely a person who does not imagine himself to be a god. Humility is the highway to tolerance and freedom. Intolerance in all dictatorships, be they fascist or communist, be they political or religious, springs from one source which is common to all, pride. If an infallible God were to take over the care of our happiness and salvation, the dictatorship of that God would be the most suitable political regime for ensuring the welfare of the people. Anyone opposing that infallible God would be either a fool or a wicked enemy of the community. His opposition to the infallible God would be an absurdity or a crime. In the event that he could not be convinced by propaganda, he should be put out of the way by fire or the sword. He who is convinced that he possesses the infallible secret of making men wise and happy is ever ready to kill. Robespierre was an incorruptible man who harbored an unmistakable faith in his own righteousness. There was no difference, from this standpoint, between him and the Inquisitor of whom El Greco has left us such a telling portrait. Robespierre therefore sent a great number of people to the guillotine.

The Catholic Church today is disarmed and therefore no longer burns heretics. It has to be satisfied with sentencing them to the eternal fires of the hereafter. Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler are armed. They control this world, not the next. What for religious authorities is a sin is for them a crime. They therefore sentence to death.

Basically, a conflict between two moral outlooks underlies the conflict between the democratic and the dictatorial philosophies. If one likes to bully weaker people and is prepared to bow before any bully stronger than oneself, one longs for a dictator. If one does not like either to bully or be bullied, one cleaves to democratic institutions. The choice depends on the amount of respect one feels for others and for oneself.

Louis D. Brandeis

*Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States*

TRUE AMERICANISM

E PLURIBUS UNUM was the motto adopted by the founders of the Republic when they formed a union of the thirteen States. To these we have added, from time to time, thirty-five more. The founders were convinced, as we are, that a strong nation could be built through federation. They were also convinced, as we are, that in America, under a free government, many peoples would make one nation. Throughout all these years we have admitted to our country and to citizenship immigrants from the diverse lands of Europe. We had faith that thereby we would best serve ourselves and mankind. This faith has been justified. The United States has grown great. The immigrants and their immediate descendants have proved themselves as loyal as any citizens of the country. Liberty has knit us closely together as Americans.

AMERICANIZATION

But what is Americanization? It manifests itself, in a superficial way, when the immigrant adopts the manners and the customs generally prevailing here. Far more important is the manifestation presented when he substitutes for his mother tongue the English language as the common medium of speech. But the adoption of our language, manners, and customs is only a small part of the process. To become Americanized the change wrought must be fundamental. However great his outward

conformity, the immigrant is not Americanized unless his interests and affections have become deeply rooted here. And we properly demand of the immigrant even more than this. He must be brought into complete harmony with our ideals and aspirations and co-operate with us for their attainment. Only when this has been done will he possess the national consciousness of an American. I say, "He must be brought into complete harmony." But let us not forget that many a poor immigrant comes to us from distant lands, ignorant of our language and with jarring manners, who is already truly American in this most important sense; who has long shared our ideals and who, oppressed and persecuted abroad, has yearned for our land of liberty and for the opportunity of aiding in the realization of its aims.

AMERICAN IDEALS

What are the American ideals? They are the development of the individual for his own and the common good; the development of the individual through liberty and the attainment of the common good through democracy and social justice.

Our form of government, as well as humanity, compels us to strive for the development of the individual man. Under universal suffrage every voter is a part ruler of the State. Unless the rulers have, in the main, education and character and are free men, our great experiment in democracy must fail. It devolves upon the State, therefore, to fit its rulers for their task. It must provide not only facilities for development but the opportunity of using them. It must not only provide opportunity; it must stimulate the desire to avail of it. Thus we are compelled to insist upon the observance of what we somewhat vaguely term the American standard of living; we become necessarily our brothers' keepers.

THE AMERICAN STANDARD OF LIVING

What does this standard imply? In substance, the exercise of those rights which our Constitution guarantees—the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Life, in this connec-

tion, means living, not existing; liberty, freedom in things industrial as well as political; happiness includes, among other things, that satisfaction which can come only through the full development and utilization of one's faculties. In order that men may live and not merely exist, in order that men may develop their faculties, they must have a reasonable income; they must have health and leisure. High wages will not meet the worker's need unless employment be regular. The best of wages will not compensate for excessively long working hours which undermine health. And working conditions may be so bad as to nullify the good effects of high wages and short hours. The essentials of American citizenship are not satisfied by supplying merely the material needs or even the wants of the worker.

Every citizen must have education—broad and continuous. This essential of citizenship is not met by an education which ends at the age of fourteen, or even at eighteen or twenty-two. Education must continue throughout life. A country cannot be governed well by rulers whose education and mental development are gained only from their attendance at the common school. Whether the education of the citizen in later years is to be given in classes or from the public platform, or is to be supplied through discussion in the lodges and the trade unions, or is to be gained from the reading of papers, periodicals, and books, in any case, freshness of mind is indispensable to its attainment. And to the preservation of freshness of mind a short workday is as essential as adequate food and proper conditions of working and of living. The worker must, in other words, have leisure. But leisure does not imply idleness. It means ability to work not less but more, ability to work at something besides breadwinning, ability to work harder while working at breadwinning, and ability to work more years at breadwinning. Leisure, so defined, is an essential of successful democracy.

Furthermore, the citizen in a successful democracy must not only have education; he must be free. Men are not free if dependent industrially upon the arbitrary will of another. Industrial liberty on the part of the worker cannot, therefore,

exist if there be overweening industrial power. Some curb must be placed upon capitalistic combination. Nor will even this curb be effective unless the workers co-operate, as in trade unions. Control and co-operation are both essential to industrial liberty.

And if the American is to be fitted for his task as ruler, he must have besides education and industrial liberty also some degree of financial independence. Our existing industrial system is converting an ever increasing percentage of the population into wage-earners; and experience teaches us that a large part of these become at some time financial dependents, by reason of sickness, accident, invalidity, superannuation, unemployment, or premature death of the breadwinner of the family. Contingencies like these, which are generally referred to in the individual case as misfortunes, are now recognized as ordinary incidents in the life of the wage-earner. The need of providing indemnity against financial losses from such ordinary contingencies in the workingman's life has become apparent and is already being supplied in some countries. The standard worthy to be called American implies some system of social insurance.

And since the child is the father of the man, we must bear constantly in mind that the American standard of living cannot be attained or preserved unless the child is not only well fed but well born; unless he lives under conditions wholesome morally as well as physically; unless he is given education adequate both in quantity and in character to fit him for life's work.

THE DISTINCTLY AMERICAN

Such are our ideals and the standard of living we have erected for ourselves. But what is there in these ideals which is peculiarly American? Many nations seek to develop the individual man for himself and for the common good. Some are as liberty-loving as we. Some pride themselves upon institutions more democratic than our own. Still others, less conspicuous for liberty or democracy, claim to be more successful in attaining social justice. And we are not the only nation which combines love of liberty with the practice of democracy and a longing

for social justice. But there is one feature in our ideals and practices which is peculiarly American. It is inclusive brotherhood.

Other countries, while developing the individual man, have assumed that their common good would be attained only if the privileges of their citizenship should be limited practically to natives or to persons of a particular nationality. America, on the other hand, has always declared herself for equality of nationalities as well as for equality of individuals. It recognizes racial equality as an essential of full human liberty and true brotherhood, and that racial equality is the complement of democracy. America has, therefore, given like welcome to all the peoples of Europe.

Democracy rests upon two pillars: one, the principle that all men are equally entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and the other, the conviction that such equal opportunity will most advance civilization. Aristocracy, on the other hand, denies both these postulates. It rests upon the principle of the superman. It willingly subordinates the many to the few and seeks to justify sacrificing the individual by insisting that civilization will be advanced by such sacrifices.

The struggles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries both in peace and in war were devoted largely to overcoming the aristocratic position as applied to individuals. In establishing the equal right of every person to development it became clear that equal opportunity for all involves this necessary limitation: each man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so will not interfere with the exercise of a like right by all others. Thus liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise of the right in each is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every other of our fellow citizens. Liberty thus defined underlies twentieth-century democracy. Liberty thus defined exists in a part of the Western world. And even where this equal right of each individual has not yet been accepted as a political right, its ethical claim is indisputable.

America, dedicated to liberty and the brotherhood of man,

rejected the aristocratic principle of the superman as applied to peoples as it rejected the principle when applied to individuals. America has believed that each race has something of peculiar value which it can contribute to the attainment of those high ideals for which it is striving. America has believed that we must not only give to the immigrant the best that we have, but must preserve for America the good that is in the immigrant and develop in him the best of which he is capable. America has believed that in differentiation, not in uniformity, lies the path of progress. It acted on this belief; it has advanced human happiness, and it has prospered.

WAR AND PEACE

On the other hand, the aristocratic theory as applied to peoples survived generally throughout Europe. It was there assumed by the stronger countries that the full development of one people necessarily involved its domination over another, and that only by such domination would civilization advance. Strong nationalities, assuming their own superiority, came to believe that they possessed the divine right to subject other peoples to their sway; and the belief in the existence of such a right ripened into a conviction that there was also a duty to exercise it.

The movements of the last century have proved that whole peoples have individuality no less marked than that of the single person; that the individuality of a people is irrepressible; and that the misnamed internationalism which seeks the obliteration of nationalities or peoples is reprehensible. The new nationalism adopted by America proclaims that each race or people, like each individual, has the right and duty to develop, and that only through such differentiated development will high civilization be attained. Not until these principles of nationalism, like those of democracy, are generally accepted will liberty be fully attained and minorities be secure in their rights. Not until then can the foundation be laid for a lasting peace among the nations.

The world turns anxiously to the United States, the one

great democratic, liberal country, and bids us point the way. And may we not answer: Go the way of liberty and justice—led by democracy. Without these, international congresses and supreme courts will prove vain and peace “the Great Illusion.”

And let us remember the poor parson of whom Chaucer says:

“But Criste’s loore, and his Apostles twelve,
He taughte, but first he folwed it hymselfe.”

4. CULTURAL PATTERNS FOR FREEDOM

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THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

WHAT is freedom and why is it prized? Is desire for freedom inherent in human nature or is it a product of special circumstances? Is it wanted as an end or as a means of getting other things? Does its possession entail responsibilities, and are these responsibilities so onerous that the mass of men will readily surrender liberty for the sake of greater ease? Is the struggle for liberty so arduous that most men are easily distracted from the endeavor to achieve and maintain it? Does freedom in itself and in the things it brings with it seem as important as security of livelihood; as food, shelter, clothing, or even as having a good time? Did man ever care as much for it as we in this country have been taught to believe? Is there any truth in the old notion that the driving force in political history has been the effort of the common man to achieve freedom? Was our own struggle for political independence in any genuine sense animated by desire for freedom, or were there a number of discomforts that our ancestors wanted to get rid of, things having nothing in common save that they were felt to be troublesome?

Is love of liberty ever anything more than a desire to be liberated from some special restriction? And when it is got rid of does the desire for liberty die down until something else feels intolerable? Again, how does the desire for freedom compare in intensity with the desire to feel equal with others, especially with those who have previously been called superiors?

How do the fruits of liberty compare with the enjoyments that spring from a feeling of union, of solidarity, with others? Will men surrender their liberties if they believe that by so doing they will obtain the satisfaction that comes from a sense of fusion with others and that respect by others which is the product of the strength furnished by solidarity?

The present state of the world is putting questions like these to citizens of all democratic countries. It is putting them with special force to us in a country where democratic institutions have been bound up with a certain tradition, the "ideology" of which the Declaration of Independence is the classic expression. This tradition has taught us that attainment of freedom is the goal of political history; that self-government is the inherent right of free men and is that which, when it is achieved, men prize above all else. Yet as we look at the world we see supposedly free institutions in many countries not so much overthrown as abandoned willingly, apparently with enthusiasm. We may infer that what has happened is proof they never existed in reality but only in name. Or we may console ourselves with a belief that unusual conditions, such as national frustration and humiliation, have led men to welcome any kind of government that promised to restore national self-respect. But conditions in our country as well as the eclipse of democracy in other countries compel us to ask questions about the career and fate of free societies, even our own.

There perhaps was a time when the questions asked would have seemed to be mainly or exclusively political. Now we know better. For we know that a large part of the causes which have produced the conditions that are expressed in the questions is the dependence of politics upon other forces, notably the economic. The problem of the constitution of human nature is involved, since it is part of our tradition that love of freedom is inherent in its make-up. Is the popular psychology of democracy a myth? The old doctrine about human nature was also tied up with the ethical belief that political democracy is a moral right and that the laws upon which it is based are fundamental moral laws which every form of social organization should obey. If belief in natural rights and natural laws as

the foundation of free government is surrendered, does the latter have any other moral basis? For while it would be foolish to believe that the American Colonies fought the battles that secured their independence and that they built their government consciously and deliberately upon a foundation of psychological and moral theories, yet the democratic tradition, call it dream or call it penetrating vision, was so closely allied with beliefs about human nature and about the moral ends which political institutions should serve, that a rude shock occurs when these affiliations break down. Is there anything to take their place, anything that will give the kind of support they once gave?

The problems behind the questions asked, the forces which give the questions their urgency, go beyond the particular beliefs which formed the early psychological and moral foundation of democracy. After retiring from public office, Thomas Jefferson in his old age carried on a friendly philosophical correspondence with John Adams. In one of his letters he made a statement about existing American conditions and expressed a hope about their future estate: "The advance of liberalism encourages a hope that the human mind will some day get back to the freedom it enjoyed two thousand years ago. This country, which has given to the world the example of physical liberty, owes to it that of moral emancipation also, for as yet it is but nominal with us. The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in practice the freedom asserted by the laws in theory." The situation that has developed since his time may well lead us to reverse the ideas he expressed, and inquire whether political freedom can be maintained without that freedom of culture which he expected to be the final result of political freedom. It is no longer easy to entertain the hope that given political freedom as the one thing necessary all other things will in time be added to it—and so to us. For we now know that the relations which exist between persons, outside of political institutions, relations of industry, of communication, of science, art, and religion, affect daily associations, and thereby deeply affect the attitudes and habits expressed in government and rules of law. If it is true that the political and legal react to shape the

other things, it is even more true that political institutions are an effect, not a cause.

It is this knowledge that sets the theme to be discussed. For this complex of conditions which taxes the terms upon which human beings associate and live together is summed up in the word "culture." The problem is to know what kind of culture is so free in itself that it conceives and begets political freedom as its accompaniment and consequence. What about the state of science and knowledge; of the arts, fine and technological; of friendships and family life; of business and finance; of the attitudes and dispositions created in the give and take of ordinary day-by-day associations? No matter what is the native make-up of human nature, its working activities, those which respond to institutions and rules and which finally shape the pattern of the latter, are created by the whole body of occupations, interests, skills, beliefs, that constitute a given culture. As the latter changes, especially as it grows complex and intricate in the way in which American life has changed since our political organization took shape, new problems take the place of those governing the earlier formation and distribution of political powers. The view that love of freedom is so inherent in man that, if it only has a chance given it by abolition of oppressions exercised by Church and State, it will produce and maintain free institutions is no longer adequate. The idea naturally arose when settlers in a new country felt that the distance they had put between themselves and the forces that oppressed them effectively symbolized everything that stood between them and permanent achievement of freedom. We are now forced to see that positive conditions, forming the prevailing state of culture, are required. Release from oppressions and repressions which previously existed marked a necessary transition, but transitions are but bridges to something different.

Early republicans were obliged even in their own time to note that general conditions, such as are summed up under the name of culture, had a good deal to do with political institutions. For they held that oppressions of State and Church had exercised a corrupting influence upon human nature, so that the original impulse to liberty had either been lost or warped

out of shape. This was a virtual admission that surrounding conditions may be stronger than native tendencies. It proved a degree of plasticity in human nature that required exercise of continual solicitude. The Founding Fathers were aware that love of power is a trait of human nature, so strong a one that definite barriers had to be erected to keep persons who get into positions of official authority from encroachments that undermine free institutions. Admission that men may be brought by long habit to hug their chains implies a belief that second or acquired nature is stronger than original nature.

Jefferson at least went further than this. For his fear of the growth of manufacturing and trade and his preference for agrarian pursuits amounted to acceptance of the idea that interests bred by certain pursuits may fundamentally alter original human nature and the institutions that are congenial to it. That the development Jefferson dreaded has come about and to a much greater degree than he could have anticipated is an obvious fact. We face today the consequences of the fact that an agricultural and rural people has become an urban industrial population.

Proof is decisive that economic factors are an intrinsic part of the culture that determines the actual turn taken by political measures and rules, no matter what verbal beliefs are held. Although it later became the fashion to blur the connection which exists between economics and politics, and even to reprove those who called attention to it, Madison as well as Jefferson was quite aware of the connection and of its bearing upon democracy. Knowledge that the connection demanded a general distribution of property and the prevention of rise of the extremely poor and the extremely rich was however different from explicit recognition of a relation between culture and nature so intimate that the former may shape the patterns of thought and action.

Economic relations and habits cannot be set apart in isolation any more than political institutions can be. The state of knowledge of nature, that is, of physical science, is a phase of culture upon which industry and commerce, the production and distribution of goods and the regulation of services, directly depend.

Unless we take into account the rise of the new science of nature in the seventeenth century and its growth to its present state, our economic agencies of production and distribution and ultimately of consumption cannot be understood. The connection of the events of the industrial revolution with those of the advancing scientific revolution is an incontrovertible witness.

It has not been customary to include the arts, the fine arts, as an important part of the social conditions that bear upon democratic institutions and personal freedom. Even after the influence of the state of industry and of natural science has been admitted, we still tend to draw the line at the idea that literature, music, painting, the drama, architecture, have any intimate connection with the cultural bases of democracy. Even those who call themselves good democrats are often content to look upon the fruits of these arts as adornments of culture rather than as things in whose enjoyment all should partake, if democracy is to be a reality. The state of things in totalitarian countries may induce us to revise this opinion. For it proves that no matter what may be the case with the impulses and powers that lead the creative artist to do his work, works of art once brought into existence are the most compelling of the means of communication by which emotions are stirred and opinions formed. The theater, the movie and music hall, even the picture gallery, eloquence, popular parades, common sports, and recreative agencies, have all been brought under regulation as part of the propaganda agencies by which dictatorship is kept in power without being regarded by the masses as oppressive. We are beginning to realize that emotions and imagination are more potent in shaping public sentiment and opinion than information and reason.

Indeed, long before the present crisis came into being there was a saying that if one could control the songs of a nation, one need not care who made its laws. And historical study shows that primitive religions owe their power in determining belief and action to their ability to reach emotions and imagination by rites and ceremonies, by legend and folklore, all clothed with the traits that mark works of art. The Church that has had by far the greatest influence in the modern world took over their

agencies of esthetic appeal and incorporated them into its own structure, after adapting them to its own purpose, in winning and holding the allegiance of the masses.

A totalitarian regime is committed to control of the whole life of all its subjects by its hold over feelings, desires, emotions, as well as opinions. This indeed is a mere truism, since a totalitarian state has to be total. But save as we take it into account we shall not appreciate the intensity of the revival of the warfare between State and Church that exists in Germany and Russia. The conflict is not the expression of the whim of a leader. It is inherent in any regime that demands the *total* allegiance of all its subjects. It must first of all, and most enduringly of all, if it is to be permanent, command the imagination, with all the impulses and motives we have been accustomed to call "inner." Religious organizations are those which rule by use of these means, and for that reason are an inherent competitor with any political state that sets out on the totalitarian road. Thus it is that the very things that seem to us in democratic countries the most obnoxious features of the totalitarian state are the very things for which its advocates recommend it. They are the things for whose absence they denounce democratic countries. For they say that failure to enlist the whole make-up of citizens, emotional as well as ideological, condemns democratic states to employ merely external and mechanical devices to hold the loyal support of its citizens. We may regard all this as a symptom of a collective hallucination, such as at times seems to have captured whole populations. But even so, we must recognize the influence of this factor if we are ourselves to escape collective delusion—that totalitarianism rests upon external coercion alone.

Finally, the moral factor is an intrinsic part of the complex of social forces called culture. For no matter whether or not one shares the view, now held on different grounds by different groups, that there is no scientific ground or warrant for moral conviction and judgments, it is certain that human beings hold some things dearer than they do others, and that they struggle for the things they prize, spending time and energy in their behalf: doing so indeed to such an extent that the best measure

we have of what is valued is the effort spent in its behalf. Not only so, but for a number of persons to form anything that can be called a community in its pregnant sense there must be values prized in common. Without them, any so-called social group, class, people, nation, tends to fall apart into molecules having but mechanically enforced connections with one another. For the present at least we do not have to ask whether values are moral, having a kind of life and potency of their own, or are but by-products of the working of other conditions, biological, economic, or whatever.

The qualification will indeed seem quite superfluous to most, so habituated have most persons become to believing, at least nominally, that moral forces are the ultimate determinants of the rise and fall of all human societies—while religion has taught many to believe that cosmic as well as social forces are regulated in behalf of moral ends. The qualification is introduced, nevertheless, because of the existence of a school of philosophy holding that opinions about the values which move conduct are lacking in any scientific standing, since (according to them) the only things that can be *known* are physical events. The denial that values have any influence in the long run on the course of events is also characteristic of the Marxist belief that forces of production ultimately control every human relationship. The idea of the impossibility of intellectual regulation of ideas and judgments about values is shared by a number of intellectuals who have been dazzled by the success of mathematical and physical science. These last remarks suggest that there is at least one other factor in culture which needs some attention: namely, the existence of schools of social philosophy, of competing ideologies.

The intent of the previous discussion should be obvious. The problem of freedom and of democratic institutions is tied up with the question of what kind of culture exists; with the necessity of free culture for free political institutions. The import of this conclusion extends far beyond its contrast with the simpler faith of those who formulated the democratic tradition. The question of human psychology, of the make-up of human nature in its original state, is involved. It is involved not just

in a general way but with respect to its special constituents and their significance in their relations to one another. For every social and political philosophy currently professed will be found upon examination to involve a certain view about the constitution of human nature: in itself and in its relation to physical nature. What is true of this factor is true of every factor in culture, so that they need not here be listed again, although it is necessary to bear them all in mind if we are to appreciate the variety of factors involved in the problem of human freedom.

Running through the problem of the relation of this and that constituent of culture to social institutions in general and political democracy in particular is a question rarely asked. Yet it so underlies any critical consideration of the principles of each of them that some conclusion on the matter ultimately decides the position taken on each special issue. The question is whether any one of the factors is so predominant that it is *the* causal force, so that other factors are secondary and derived effects. Some kind of answer in what philosophers call a *monistic* direction has been usually given. The most obvious present example is the belief that economic conditions are ultimately the controlling forces in human relationships. It is perhaps significant that this view is comparatively recent. At the height of the eighteenth century, Enlightenment, the prevailing view, gave final supremacy to reason, to the advance of science and to education. Even during the last century, a view was held which is expressed in the motto of a certain school of historians: "History is past politics and politics is present history."

Because of the present fashion of economic explanation, this political view may now seem to have been the crotchet of a particular set of historical scholars. But, after all, it only formulated an idea consistently acted upon during the period of the formation of national states. It is possible to regard the present emphasis upon economic factors as a sort of intellectual revenge taken upon its earlier all but total neglect. The very word "political economy" suggests how completely economic considerations were once subordinated to political. The book that was influential in putting an end to this subjection, Adam Smith's

Wealth of Nations, continued in its title, though not its contents, the older tradition. In the Greek period, we find that Aristotle makes the political factor so controlling that all normal economic activities are relegated to the household, so that all morally justifiable economic practice is literally domestic economy. And in spite of the recent vogue of the Marxist theory, Oppenheim has produced a considerable body of evidence in support of the thesis that political states are the result of military conquests in which defeated people have become subjects of their conquerors, who, by assuming rule over the conquered, begot the first political states.

The rise of totalitarian states cannot, because of the bare fact of their totalitarianism, be regarded as mere reversions to the earlier theory of supremacy of the political institutional factor. Yet as compared with theories that had subordinated the political to the economic, whether in the Marxist form or in that of the British classical school, it marks reversion to ideas and still more to practices which it was supposed had disappeared forever from the conduct of any modern state. And the practices have been revived and extended with the benefit of scientific technique of control of industry, finance, and commerce in ways which show the earlier governmental officials who adopted "mercantile" economics in the interest of government were the veriest bunglers at their professed job.

The idea that morals ought to be, even if they are not, the supreme regulator of social affairs is not so widely entertained as it once was, and there are circumstances which support the conclusion that when moral forces were as influential as they were supposed to be it was because morals were identical with customs which happened in fact to regulate the relations of human beings with one another. However, the idea is still advanced by sermons from the pulpit and editorials from the press that adoption of, say, the Golden Rule would speedily do away with all social discord and trouble; and as I write the newspapers report the progress of a campaign for something called "moral rearmament." Upon a deeper level, the point made about the alleged identity of ethics with established customs raises the question whether the effect of the disintegra-

tion of customs that for a long time held men together in social groups can be overcome save by development of new generally accepted traditions and customs. This development, upon this view, would be equivalent to the creation of a new ethics.

However, such questions are here brought up for the sake of the emphasis they place upon the question already raised: Is there any one factor or phase of culture which is dominant, or which tends to produce and regulate others, or are economics, morals, art, science, and so on only so many aspects of the interaction of a number of factors, each of which acts upon and is acted upon by the others? In the professional language of philosophy: Shall our point of view be monistic or pluralistic? The same question recurs moreover about each one of the factors listed—about economics, about politics, about science, about art. I shall here illustrate the point by reference not to any of these things but to theories that have at various times been influential about the make-up of human nature. For these psychological theories have been marked by serious attempts to make some one constituent of human nature *the* source of motivation of action; or at least to reduce all conduct to the action of a small number of alleged native "forces." A comparatively recent example was the adoption by the classic school of economic theory of self-interest as the main motivating force of human behavior; an idea linked up on its technical side with the notion that pleasure and pain are the causes and the ends in view of all conscious human conduct, in desire to obtain one and avoid the other. Then there was a view that self-interest and sympathy are the two components of human nature, as opposed and balanced centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are the moving forces of celestial nature.

Just now the favorite ideological psychological candidate for control of human activity is love of power. Reasons for its selection are not far to seek. Success of search for economic profit turned out to be largely conditioned in fact upon possession of superior power while success reacted to increase power. Then the rise of national states has been attended by such vast and flagrant organization of military and naval force that politics have become more and more markedly power politics,

leading to the conclusion that there is not any other kind, although in the past the power element has been more decently and decorously covered up. One interpretation of the Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the fittest was used as ideological support; and some writers, notably Nietzsche (though not in the crude form often alleged), proposed an ethics of power in opposition to the supposed Christian ethics of sacrifice.

Because human nature is the factor which in one way or another is always interacting with environing conditions in production of culture, the theme receives special attention elsewhere. But the shift that has occurred from time to time in theories that have gained currency about the "ruling motive" in human nature suggests a question which is seldom asked. It is the question whether these psychologies have not in fact taken the cart to be the horse. Have they not gathered their notion as to the ruling element in human nature from observation of tendencies that are marked in contemporary collective life, and then bunched these tendencies together in some alleged psychological "force" as their cause? It is significant that human nature was taken to be strongly moved by an inherent love of freedom at the time when there was a struggle for representative government; that the motive of self-interest appeared when conditions in England enlarged the role of money, because of new methods of industrial production; that the growth of organized philanthropic activities brought sympathy into the psychological picture; and that events today are readily converted into love of power as the mainspring of human action.

In any case, the idea of culture that has been made familiar by the work of anthropological students points to the conclusion that whatever are the native constituents of human nature, the culture of a period and group is the determining influence in their arrangement; it is that which determines the patterns of behavior that mark out the activities of any group, family, clan, people, sect, faction, class. It is at least as true that the state of culture determines the order and arrangement of native tendencies as that human nature produces any particular

set or system of social phenomena so as to obtain satisfaction for itself. The problem is to find out the way in which the elements of a culture interact with each other and the way in which the elements of human nature are caused to interact with one another under conditions set by their interaction with the existing environment. For example, if our American culture is largely a pecuniary culture, it is not because the original or innate structure of human nature tends of itself to obtaining pecuniary profit. It is rather that a certain complex culture stimulates, promotes, and consolidates native tendencies so as to produce a certain pattern of desires and purposes. If we take all the communities, peoples, classes, tribes, and nations that ever existed, we may be sure that since human nature in its native constitution is the relative constant, it cannot be appealed to, in isolation, to account for the multitude of diversities presented by different forms of association.

Primitive peoples for reasons that are now pretty evident attribute magical qualities to blood. Popular beliefs about race and inherent race differences have virtually perpetuated the older superstitions. Anthropologists are practically all agreed that the differences we find in different "races" are not due to anything in inherent physiological structure but to the effects exercised upon members of various groups by the cultural conditions under which they are reared; conditions that act upon raw or original human nature unremittingly from the very moment of birth. It has always been known that infants, born without ability in any language, come to speak the language, whatever it may be, of the community in which they were born. Like most uniform phenomena the fact aroused no curiosity and led to no generalization about the influence of cultural conditions. It was taken for granted; as a matter of course it was so "natural" as to appear inevitable. Only since the rise of systematic inquiries carried on by anthropological students has it been noted that the conditions of culture which bring about the common language of a given group produce other traits they have in common—traits which like the mother tongue differentiate one group or society from others.

Culture as a complex body of customs tends to maintain

itself. It can reproduce itself only through effecting certain differential changes in the original or native constitutions of its members. Each culture has its own pattern, its own characteristic arrangement of its constituent energies. By the mere force of its existence as well as by deliberately adopted methods systematically pursued, it perpetuates itself through transformation of the raw or original human nature of those born immature.

These statements do not signify that biological heredity and native individual differences are of no importance. They signify that as they operate within a given social form, they are shaped and take effect *within* that particular form. They are not indigenous traits that mark off one people, one group, one class, from another, but mark differences in every group. Whatever the "white man's burden," it was not imposed by heredity.

We have traveled a seemingly long way from the questions with which we set out, so that it may appear that they had been forgotten on the journey. But the journey was undertaken for the sake of finding out something about the nature of the problem that is expressed in the questions asked. The maintenance of democratic institutions is not such a simple matter as was supposed by some of the Founding Fathers, although the wiser among them realized how immensely the new political experiment was favored by external circumstances—like the ocean that separated settlers from the governments that had an interest in using the colonists for their own purposes; the fact that feudal institutions had been left behind; the fact that so many of the settlers had come here to escape restrictions upon religious beliefs and form of worship; and especially the existence of a vast territory with free land and immense unappropriated natural resources.

The function of culture in determining what elements of human nature are dominant and their pattern or arrangement in connection with one another goes beyond any special point to which attention is called. It affects the very idea of individuality. The idea that human nature is inherently and exclusively individual is itself a product of a cultural individualistic movement. The idea that mind and consciousness are intrin-

sically individual did not even occur to anyone for much the greater part of human history. It would have been rejected as the inevitable source of disorder and chaos if it had occurred to anyone to suggest it—not that their ideas of human nature on that account were any better than later ones but that they also were functions of culture. All that we can safely say is that human nature, like other forms of life, tends to differentiation, and this moves in the direction of the distinctively individual, and that it also tends toward combination, association. In the lower animals, physical-biological factors determine which tendency is dominant in a given animal or plant species and the ratio existing between the two factors—whether, for example, insects are what students call “solitary” or “social.” With human beings, cultural conditions replace strictly physical ones. In the earlier periods of human history they acted almost like physiological conditions as far as deliberate intention was concerned. They were taken to be “natural” and change in them to be unnatural. At a later period the cultural conditions were seen to be subject in some degree to deliberate formation. For a time radicals then identified their policies with the belief that if only artificial social conditions could be got rid of human nature would produce almost automatically a certain kind of social arrangements, those which would give it free scope in its supposed exclusively individual character.

Tendencies toward sociality, such as sympathy, were admitted. But they were taken to be traits of an individual isolated by nature, quite as much as, say, a tendency to combine with others in order to get protection against something threatening one's own private self. Whether complete identification of human nature with individuality would be desirable or undesirable if it existed is an idle academic question. For it does not exist. Some cultural conditions develop the psychological constituents that lead toward differentiation; others stimulate those which lead in the direction of the solidarity of the beehive or anthill. The human problem is that of securing the development of each constituent so that it serves to release and mature the other. Co-operation—called fraternity in the classic French formula—is as much a part of the democratic ideal as is per-

sonal initiative. That cultural conditions were allowed to develop (markedly so in the economic phase) which subordinated co-operativeness to liberty and equality serves to explain the decline in the two latter. Indirectly, this decline is responsible for the present tendency to give a bad name to the very word individualism and to make sociality a term of moral honor beyond criticism. But that association of nullities on even the largest scale would constitute a realization of human nature is as absurd as to suppose that the latter can take place in beings whose only relations to one another are those entered into in behalf of exclusive private advantage.

The problem of freedom of co-operative individualities is then a problem to be viewed in the context of culture. The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the chief of which are law and politics, industry and commerce, science and technology, the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, or the values men prize and the ways in which they evaluate them; and finally, though indirectly, the system of general ideas used by men to justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live, their social philosophy. We are concerned with the problem of freedom rather than with solutions, in the conviction that solutions are idle until the problem has been placed in the context of the elements that constitute culture as they interact with elements of native human nature. The fundamental postulate of the discussion is that isolation of any one factor, no matter how strong its workings at a given time, is fatal to understanding and to intelligent action. Isolations have abounded, both on the side of taking some one thing in human nature to be a supreme "motive" and in taking some one form of social activity to be supreme. Since the problem is here thought of as that of the ways in which a great number of factors within and without human nature interact, our task is to ask concerning the reciprocal connections raw human nature and culture bear to one another.

Franz Boas

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LIBERTY AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLE

MANY years ago, I lived alone with a tribe of Eskimos. I traveled about, generally accompanied by a family with whom I had made friends, a man and his wife. Sometimes I traveled alone for days on a dog sledge. Those were days of the most joyful feeling of freedom, of self-reliance: ready to meet the dangers of the ice, sea, and wild animals; on the alert to meet and overcome difficulties; no human being there to hinder or help. Still, there were restraints that in the exuberance of youth I did not feel. Nature interposed insurmountable obstacles to my plans. Food had to be provided for myself and for the dogs. A dread disease had reduced the number of available dogs, which hindered me from going where I wished. More than this, the very task which took me to the Arctic, although freely chosen, was imposed upon me by the cultural pattern in which I had grown up. My Eskimo friends wondered why I should choose to climb mountains where there was no game, why I should gather up useless plants and stones, and do other things that have no sensible use in their lives. Maybe they thought that somebody, or some strange compelling habit, made me do things that could be understood only as due to compulsion, not to free choice.

My Eskimo friends felt absolutely free. There was no one to command them, no one to tell them what to do and what not to do. They settled and hunted wherever they chose. The

only restraints felt by them were those imposed by the forces of nature; but my observation of their habits showed me how subject they were to the rigorous demands of custom. They were not allowed free choice of their food; the hunter had to observe the strictest regulations to secure success; sickness and death in a family disturbed the regular life of the whole community in which it occurred; the breach of customary observances by a single individual was believed to affect the life of everyone who came into contact with the transgressor; in short, I found their freedom restricted at every step. Still, their customs were to them so natural, so self-evident, and the only possible way of living known to them, that they were not felt as a restraint of freedom.

The life of the Eskimo as seen from my point of view as well as my life seen from the Eskimo point of view was not free, for objective observation from the point of view of one culture shows the restraints imposed by life in another type of culture. At the same time, the individual who is thoroughly in harmony with the culture in which he lives does not feel these restraints and will feel free.

Freedom is a concept that has meaning only in a subjective sense. A person who is in complete harmony with his culture feels free. He accepts voluntarily the demands made upon him. He does not feel them as imposed upon him. They are his natural reactions to the events of daily life. Obedience to a ruler, law, or custom is not exacted but rendered freely.

For this reason, the concept of freedom can develop only in those cases where there are conflicts between the individual and the culture in which he lives. The more uniform the culture, that is, the more intensely all the individuals of a community are subject to the same customs, the stronger will be the feeling of lack of restraint.

Nevertheless, one form of subjection may be felt in a culturally uniform society: the impotence of man against fate, against fate as determined by the forces of nature, by supernatural powers, or by predestination.

We may call those cultures primitive in which little differentiation between classes has developed. Even in those groups

in which the mode of life of everyone is practically the same, where everyone has to obtain sustenance in the same manner by his own efforts, where no economic classes exist, except those developed by different degrees of ability to provide for one's needs, there are differences according to sex and age, but these are so deeply embodied in the cultural pattern that in the course of everyday life they are seldom felt as restrictions of freedom. Although in most cultures of this type children are generally treated with great indulgence, there will always be cases in which they are disciplined and compelled to obey until in the course of their individual development they become completely assimilated to the culture of the tribe.

Still, in a loosely organized society like the one just described, individual tyrants may occur, individuals of unusual strength, skill, and will power who interfere with the lives of their fellow-tribesmen. Such are the "strong men" of the Chukchee and Eskimo who tyrannize a village until the people rise against them, do away with them, and free themselves of the fear of their torturers.

More complex societies embrace classes with different privileges and functions, and different standards of behavior. The relations between the classes may be so institutionalized that the restraints imposed upon each of them are accepted as a "natural" arrangement. When the privileged group is felt as a valuable asset for the whole community the lower class may be eager to protect and to maintain its privileges, in a way quite similar to conditions in feudal times, or in modern monarchies. An example of this kind occurs among certain Indians of British Columbia. Although the people have to pay tribute to the chief, the possession of a respected chief's family is valued so highly that the people rise against a chief who weakens his own family by causing the death of his successor.

The consciousness of restraint, and hence the concept of freedom, cannot arise where there is no conflict between the wishes of the individual and his freedom of action. He must be conscious of a freedom of choice. As long as he feels that there is no possible mode of behavior except that prescribed

by social custom which keeps his activities in standard bounds, there can be no concept of freedom.

Interference with the freedom of action or the personal comfort of an individual by fellow-tribesmen may occur even in the simplest societies. Such interference is generally based on personal conflicts. Two individuals may strive for possession of the same object. If the customs of the community permit, the conflict may be decided by combat between the antagonists and may also involve their friends. Unfriendly gossip may create a condition against which the individual cannot successfully contend and which limits his freedom of action within the social group. In some forms of culture opportunity is given to him to free himself at least partly by a show of valor or power which silences the gossip for a while, in others he is entirely at the mercy of his personal enemies without any means of redress. Such conflicts between individuals, or between individuals and society as a whole, or between groups unfriendly to each other, may encroach seriously upon the freedom of the individual.

Unless personal conflicts are regulated in some way by custom, they are liable to disrupt society. In many primitive societies customary law which restrains excesses of hostility between individuals holds these disruptive forces in check. In more complex societies law regulates the rights of individuals and checks license.

The problem of freedom is different when the wishes of an individual go counter to the customary behavior of the community, for instance when a couple desire to marry against the strict rules of choice of mates. In such a case it is not only the disapproval of the community or the forcible method by which such a marriage is prevented that affects those concerned, but even more the restraint of their freedom of choice, enforced by a custom rejected by them.

Only when this revolt against custom occurs can a feeling for the meaning of intellectual freedom develop. In primitive society, this conflict is rare. Passionate love between man and woman who belong to groups forbidden to intermarry is about as rare as in our society passionate love between brother and

sister, father and daughter, or mother and son. Obviously the traditional mores exert a strong restraining influence upon the wishes of the individual.

It is, however, certain that intellectual freedom is not entirely absent even in societies in which rigid dogmatic belief pervades the whole life. Among tribes in which the life-histories of individuals are known in some detail, we find disbelievers who disregard sacred teachings and who come into conflict with their fellow-tribesmen. More frequently we find those given to speculation who develop or reform the tribal dogma. It would be difficult to understand the complex ceremonial life and the systematic mythology of many peoples if we did not assume that priests or other thinkers have shaped a heterogeneous mass of ceremonial actions, myths, and religious teachings into a more or less consistent whole. A communal growth of such phenomena without individual initiative is unthinkable. More than this, primitive cultures the history of which we do not know appear to us as stable, frozen; but this impression is erroneous. All cultures are in a state of flux, slow among primitive groups, rapid when differentiation reaches a higher degree. Whatever the stimulus may be that brings about changes, it can become manifest only through the thoughts and actions of individuals whose concepts deviate from the cultural norm of their time. In this sense they are free, so far as they modify the existing forms. When no outer forces break the continuity of tribal life, the changes are generally slight. Not so when the life of the people undergoes violent changes. This may be observed most readily in the contact between primitive cultures and European civilization, when intertribal warfare is suppressed, new products of our industry are imported, and new standards of life and thought are observed. Under these conditions we see new ideas develop that are neither the old nor the new, but a result of the interaction of both.

Similar observations may be made in the study of art. In a stable society the artist is bound to a traditional style, not absolutely, as is proved by the development of local styles in each art area and wherever we can trace historical changes in style. With the introduction of new art forms and new tech-

niques, radical changes may develop which are due to the free inventive genius of gifted individuals.

With all this, the *concept* of freedom is not found in primitive society. The individual, on account of the lack of knowledge of diverse forms of thought and action, cannot form by himself the concept of something new, not intimately connected with the range of his experience, and, therefore, the possibility of a free choice does not exist. We believe that we have such freedom and are not aware of our own limitations founded on our participation in our culture, which does not permit us to feel its limitations. In this sense we may say that absolute freedom does not exist. We are free in so far as the limitations of our culture do not oppress us; we are unfree when we become conscious of these limitations and are no longer willing to submit to them. This is true, no matter whether the constraint put upon us is due to our subjection to individuals or to the manifold restraints that law and custom impress upon us.

Albert Einstein

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FREEDOM AND SCIENCE¹

I

AT first glance it seems that freedom and science do not have much relation to one another. In any case freedom may well exist without science, that is, to the extent that man can live without science, man in whom the impulse of inquiry is innate. But what of science without freedom?

Above all a man of science requires inward freedom, for he must needs endeavor to free himself from prejudices and must constantly convince himself anew, when new facts emerge, that what has been established, however authoritatively, is still valid. Intellectual independence is thus a primary necessity for the scientific inquirer. But political liberty is also extraordinarily important for his work. He must be able to utter what seems true to him without concern about or danger to his life and livelihood. This is apparent in historical investigations, but it is a vital precondition for all scientific activity however remote from politics. If certain books are condemned and made inaccessible in so far as their author is not acceptable to the government on account of his political orientation or race, as is largely the case today, the inquirer cannot attain an adequate basis on which to build. And how can the building stand if it lacks a secure foundation?

¹ Translated from the German by James Gutmann, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University.

It is self-evident that absolute freedom is an ideal which cannot be realized in our social and political life. But all men of good will should seek to guard mankind's effort to realize this ideal in ever increasing measure.

II

I know that it is a hopeless undertaking to debate about fundamental value judgments. For instance if someone approves, as a goal, the extirpation of the human race from the earth, one cannot refute such a viewpoint on rational grounds. But if there is agreement on certain goals and values, one can argue rationally about the means by which these objectives may be attained. Let us, then, indicate two goals which may well be agreed upon by nearly all who read these lines.

1. Those instrumental goods which should serve to maintain the life and health of all human beings should be produced by the least possible labor of all.

2. The satisfaction of physical needs is indeed the indispensable precondition of a satisfactory existence, but in itself it is not enough. In order to be content men must also have the possibility of developing their intellectual and artistic powers to whatever extent accords with their personal characteristics and abilities.

The first of these two goals requires the promotion of all knowledge relating to the laws of nature and the laws of social processes, that is, the promotion of all scientific endeavor. For scientific endeavor is a natural whole the parts of which mutually support one another in a way which, to be sure, no one can anticipate. However, the progress of science presupposes the possibility of unrestricted communication of all results and judgments—freedom of expression and instruction in all realms of intellectual endeavor. By freedom I understand social conditions of such a kind that the expression of opinions and assertions about general and particular matters of knowledge will not involve dangers or serious disadvantages for him who expresses them. This freedom of communication is indispensable for the development and extension of scientific knowl-

edge, a consideration of much practical import. In the first instance it must be guaranteed by law. But laws alone cannot secure freedom of expression; in order that every man may present his views without penalty there must be a spirit of tolerance in the entire population. Such an ideal of external liberty can never be fully attained but must be sought unremittingly if scientific thought, and philosophical and creative thinking in general, are to be advanced as far as possible.

If the second goal, that is, the possibility of the spiritual development of all individuals, is to be secured, a second kind of outward freedom is necessary. Man should not have to work for the achievement of the necessities of life to such an extent that he has neither time nor strength for personal activities. Without this second kind of outward liberty, freedom of expression is useless for him. Advances in technology would provide the possibility of this kind of freedom if the problem of a reasonable division of labor were solved.

The development of science and of the creative activities of the spirit in general requires still another kind of freedom, which may be characterized as inward freedom. It is this freedom of the spirit which consists in the independence of thought from the restrictions of authoritarian and social prejudices as well as from unphilosophical routinizing and habit in general. This inward freedom is an infrequent gift of nature and a worthy objective for the individual. Yet the community can do much to further this achievement, too, at least by not interfering with its development. Thus schools may interfere with the development of inward freedom through authoritarian influences and through imposing on young people excessive spiritual burdens; on the other hand schools may favor such freedom by encouraging independent thought. Only if outward and inner freedom are constantly and consciously pursued is there a possibility of spiritual development and perfection and thus of improving man's outward and inner life.

Vilhjalmur Stefansson

Ethnologist; Geographer; Past President of the Explorers' Club

WAS LIBERTY INVENTED?

IT is common to praise the ancient Greeks. They were the first this and the greatest that. Pelion upon Ossa and coals to Newcastle may well take a back seat to lauding the Hellenes. They have been so long touted, and with so much ingenuity, that it is a triumph if we can add a leaf to their garland. In this the currently popular historians who deal with the genesis and development of human institutions may have succeeded, to judge from a 1939 article by Professor Hyde.¹ The Greeks, he says, invented liberty. He does not give a year to the invention but dates it earlier than the siege of Troy, which may have been around 1200 B.C.

Dr. Hyde's view, taken seriously, is depressing if we apply it to the chronology of Bishop Ussher; for then we have had liberty among us for half our career since Eden, and have not been getting far with it.

But naturally Professor Hyde ignores the Bishop and uses instead, or at least implies, the time scale of the paleontologists and the anthropologists; whereupon liberty, if discovered in the second millennium B.C., will have been a human institution for only a tiny fraction of our human course; so that we may well pat ourselves on the back for the progress we have made in so short a time.

Professor Hyde does not define the term liberty except by

¹ Walter Woodburn Hyde, "The Origin of Liberty," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XLVIII (1939), pp. 519 ff.

saying he uses it "in our sense of the word." The authorities he cites to prove that liberty was absent from the empires of the Nile Valley, the Fertile Crescent, and that general neighborhood are conventional. The article, though brief, does make a sufficient case that liberty "in our sense of the word" was absent from those countries during the two or three millenniums that immediately preceded the Trojan war.

It runs through Professor Hyde's discussion not merely that he himself thinks liberty was invented but that he takes for granted his readers will agree with him. He is a distinguished historian and is, therefore, surely familiar with a large body of the most respected historical writing. So it would appear that the historians as a class, or at a minimum the school to which Professor Hyde belongs, assume that liberty, when first upon the earth, had just been discovered by some human individual or by some group of humans. To an anthropologist, or at least my variety, this permits a startling inside view of a sister discipline which we had supposed to be congenial with our own.

But perhaps we should not be startled; conflicts between disciplines are numerous in the history of science. For instance, those with college four decades behind them can remember classrooms in the same building, or at least on the same campus, where astronomers would not give the sun more than ten million years while the geologists were explaining that the earth required at least a hundred million.

A current sample of like conflict between sciences is the one between anthropology and dietetics as to whether a wholly nonvegetal diet permits good health; more specifically as to whether it contains enough Vitamin C to prevent scurvy. Here the contradictions are flung back and forth just about as they were in the 1900's between the geologists and the astronomers. Teaching in the same universities, issuing books through the same publishers, the protagonists have been challenging each other on several points, three of which we mention.

First, the dietitians make the broad claim that exclusively carnivorous food does not contain enough Vitamin C for optimum health, while the anthropologists support the equally broad contrary thesis that multitudes of people belonging to

several races are known to have lived indefinitely in good average health on a diet wholly carnivorous.

More narrowly (and hedging somewhat) the dietitians have also been saying that if it is at all possible to avoid scurvy upon a nonvegetal diet, then it must be through the eating of the whole animal, particularly the "organs rich in Vitamin C" (liver, etc.). Squarely against this has been the teaching of the anthropologists that the typical hunter (at least in the northern third of North America) will have a dog team, and that instead of feeding one whole animal to his family and another whole one to his dogs he will divide each, giving those parts to the dogs which the family least covets. The records of innumerable travelers and other reporters show these less coveted portions, among most if not all hunting tribes, to include most of those organs which the dietitians have called rich in Vitamin C. So the dietitians are telling us that on such a food division as practiced by, for instance, the northern Canadian Eskimos and the Athapascans, the people will develop scurvy, but that the dogs will remain in good health; while the anthropologists are declaring that both men and dogs are known to have under Eskimo and Athapasca food division good prospects of average health, and in particular that neither family nor teams will develop scurvy.

The last of our sample contradictions is: The dietitians contend that those who want to remain healthy for long periods exclusively on flesh foods must not merely eat the whole animal but must also see to it that a large part of their food is consumed raw or underdone. Here the countervailing statement of the anthropologist is that although some exclusively carnivorous people, such as the Eskimos, do cook their meat on the average less than we do, there are other wholly carnivorous people, such as the northerly Athapascans, who are meticulous about cooking—so much so that early travelers found them horrified by the sight of Europeans devouring underdone roasts and steaks.

We anthropologists know of many such conflicts with other sciences as we have with dietetics; but, speaking I know for

more than just myself, I had no suspicion until reading the article by Professor Hyde that my discipline would look upon as obviously false what historians look upon as obviously true, and in such deep concerns of man as those which relate to social restraints and to freedom from them.

For apparently the historians take as axiomatic that freedom must have been invented by some man or group of men, while we feel that it cannot have been invented by humans since we must have had it already while in the process of growing human. They seem to take the absence of liberty as a natural early human condition; the invention, discovery, or first development of it as necessarily related to a "high" civilization, to one where abstract thought and broad generalization, as well as notable ingenuity and originality, had been developed. We on the other hand take as basic that early man, at least for some time after he began to fit the present definitions of *homo*, was living under a freedom broader than has ever been described by non-Utopian writers that deal with Greece.

We anthropologists feel, then, that the abridgment of liberty, and not liberty, is a human invention. We concede that the Greeks may have reinvented or rediscovered liberty, and that they probably did; but we deny the possibility that they could have been its inventors or discoverers.

Since there appear to be such fundamental differences between historical and anthropological thought upon liberty and the abridgments of liberty, it may be well to present an anthropological view in a book for which these themes are the general topics. For contrast, or at least for an introduction, we give the historian's view, as presented through the *Scientific Monthly* by Dr. Hyde.

The fact that we Americans enjoy liberty while we imagine certain other nations do not, and the ever present fear that we may conceivably lose it ourselves, shows that we regard its acquisition as a human achievement somewhere in the past. Few of us, however, realize when the idea first appeared on earth and imagine that in some form or other it has always been here, at least since mankind began to be civilized. But we shall see that this is a fallacy and that

long periods of civilized man passed without it, and that liberty was evolved late in historical times by one and only one great people—the ancient Greeks.

With this and more for an introduction, Dr. Hyde proceeds to a description of the cultures south and east of the Mediterranean and in the Mediterranean for the millenniums just before the Trojan war, continuing down to the period of the highest development of such freedom as the Greeks had. There is a parallel synopsis of histories. As we have said, a good case is made out for the absence of liberty “as we understand it” from those great empires of the Mediterranean world which are chiefly familiar to us, the Egyptians and the successive powers of the Fertile Crescent down to the Persians, with references to various other countries and powers—among them Crete, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Macedonia.

Coming back to the Greeks of his introductory paragraphs Dr. Hyde presents his claims for them as the first people who ever had liberty. The statement is forceful, and no doubt logical upon such premises as historians of that school keep at the back of their minds. We give a not unfair, although perhaps inadequate, summary through quotations. Some of these are divided by only a few lines of text while others have paragraphs between them.

. . . To have “invented” liberty, as I like to term it, is, to my mind, the greatest thing the Greeks did or could have done, beside which all their other achievements in thought, art and literature, however remarkable, were secondary. . . .

. . . We first see the idea [of liberty] dimly adumbrated in the council of chiefs before Troy as described by Homer, but the germ was older, doubtless brought into the peninsula of Greece from the grasslands of the Danube by the ancestors of the historical Greeks who perfected it. . . .

Those who write today about Greek liberty depend for their material chiefly upon what the Greeks wrote, and then upon what others have written about them. From this type of study there come, no doubt usually, results as given by Professor Hyde, among them that:

. . . Freedom also kept the Greeks from tabus and asceticism, for their religion allowed them a sane use of nature's gifts. Their morality, like other features of their lives, was governed by "moderation." Greek ethics was a social and not a religious phenomenon, . . . There was no divine sanction to their rules of conduct, . . . Their simple ethics freed them from any deep sense of sin or fanaticism for unattainable perfection. The Greek accepted life, lived here and now, and was little concerned with doctrines of immortality. He hated death as much as we Christians do—but for a different reason. He hated it, but did not fear it.

These deductions confirm us in that when the historians use liberty "in our sense of the word," they are really using it as the anthropologists do. Take my own case, for instance. In several of my books, among them *Hunters of the Great North*, *My Life with the Eskimo*, and a chapter which I contributed to the volume *I Believe*, I have said about the Eskimos that they had liberty and also that they had most if not all of the things which Professor Hyde tells us about the Greeks—the only hedging that might be required here would be on taboo. But, perhaps through not being familiar with the historical point of view, it did not occur to me to attribute all such things among the Eskimos to Eskimo liberty, as Professor Hyde attributes them among the Greeks to Greek liberty.

The Greeks had the things Professor Hyde names, and they also had liberty; the Eskimos had the same things, and they had liberty. There is, then, nothing in the compared or contrasted results of the students of the Greeks and of the Eskimos that is incompatible with the idea that the traits above described, among others, may coexist with liberty.

From such works as the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* it will appear, I now realize, that Professor Hyde's conception of the origin and nature of liberty is well known and has been printed frequently. We may, then, consider that the case for the Greeks has been sufficiently stated. On that assumption we proceed to a discussion of liberty as it is found among the most primitive peoples of today—those farthest back on that scale which runs from Iron Age through Bronze and Neolithic to Middle, Old Stone, and Pre-Stone. We take our descrip-

tions naturally from those men of today who combine the qualities of being in their own culture farthest back from the Iron Age and of being, through reasons of geography, history, and the like, most nearly uninfluenced by contemporary "high" cultures. For me it is convenient to depend chiefly upon the Eskimos, for they fit our specifications and I happen to know them through having lived with them many years as one of themselves.

Like Professor Hyde for the Greeks, we find it difficult for the Eskimo case to discuss liberty, as it were, in a vacuum. So we give a background sketch of their lives. We have to make it perhaps a little more detailed than Professor Hyde does, for he presents his argument to readers whom he knows to be familiar with Greek history and culture; we must present ours to an audience most of whom we know to be unfamiliar with the corresponding aspects of life and nature among the Eskimos.

We need in fact also a brief general introduction to our statement.

Liberty of course has a meaning chiefly in relation to its opposite, the abridgment of liberty. Biologists say that liberty has been abridged by certain animals, among them ants; but it has not been similarly contended that abridgments of freedom have been discovered among the animals biologically nearest man, his cousins (if not his ancestors) the apes.

By average scientific opinion, we have been human at least a million years. For ultraconservatism, bring that estimate down to a hundred thousand; still man had run more than nine-tenths of his human course long before the siege of Troy. So far as the mere chances are concerned, this is plenty of time for the development of that curtailment of liberty which most of us agree was found in Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, and the rest of those countries during the millenniums immediately before Christ.

The Andaman Islanders, the Tasmanians, the Tierra del Fuegians, and the Eskimos had, all of them, spent the same 90,000 years with the same opportunity for devising institutions that fetter liberty.

American anthropologists, at a congress in 1939, passed a resolution by what the newspapers said was a unanimous vote to the effect that if there are pronounced intellectual differences between races then we have not as yet discovered what they are. A priori, then, the ancestors of the four groups we have named might, any or all of them, have developed such techniques for abridging liberty as chattel or wage slavery. It is equally true that, having developed the curtailment of freedom to any conceivable degree, they might have gone into a reverse cycle—they might have rediscovered liberty, as the ancestors of the Greeks also might have and may have 10,000, 30,000 or 70,000 years before Troy.

On a basis of mere logic you would think that, with many different cultures in the world at the time of Columbus, a factual survey of the globe might have discovered a highest degree of servitude among one people, a highest development of liberty with another, and various grades between in various other countries or cultures. Those of high average freedom in 1492 might have been the descendants of a group who, one or two thousand years earlier, had a low freedom ratio; and the reverse with other groups.

What we have just stated may be called the anthropological view. In essence it is that abridgments of liberty tend to increase, both in variety and degree, as you move from simple to complex social conditions, from cultures that are "low" to those that are "high." There is an opposed popular view, that liberty goes with "advanced" culture. Then there ought to be most liberty in some such place as a university center, like Cambridge, Massachusetts, or Ann Arbor, Michigan, and least in whatever part of the world is most remote culturally from these standards. If we could discover contemporaneous with our university communities others that conform to our usual descriptions of the "Stone Age," we should (by this view) find a community where freedom was abridged a great deal more than in Cambridge.

Now it did happen to me that, after being a teaching fellow and a sort of instructor in anthropology at Harvard, I went

from Cambridge to live with a Stone Age community and had a chance for a firsthand comparison of their liberties.

We of the United States were not as freedom-conscious when I left Cambridge in 1906 as most people there and elsewhere in the United States were in 1936. However, we had all recited in school Burns on chains and slavery and Patrick Henry on the choice between liberty and death. Back in the sixth grade I was as convinced of the wrongness of British Colonial taxation as any of my Wall Street friends are today of the inequity of New Deal taxes. So I was, even in 1900, freedom-conscious to a degree. On my second Arctic expedition in 1910, about the first mental comparisons I made between the university town at the mouth of the Charles and the Eskimo villages at the mouth of the Coppermine were some bearing upon freedom.

It is not necessary here to prove that my associates in Cambridge, Massachusetts, were of an "advanced" culture. It is necessary to explain, at least briefly, the life in Coronation Gulf to bring out the distance in social institutions between an American college town and a Stone Age community.

A description of the culture of those Eskimos with whom I lived first during the year 1910-11 gives practically our definition of the "lowest savagery." They had no food except the tissues of animals. They used fire for cooking, as man is thought to have done in every land of the earth through many decades of centuries. They dressed exclusively in skins, as the ancestors of the North Europeans are believed to have done when England and France were in their ice ages. They used copper extensively, but merely hammered and ground into shape. For their stone implements and weapons they did not use the elaborate chipping by which we know the Late and Middle Stone Ages, and were thus in the Old Stone Age. Indeed, it has been suggested by T. A. Rickard, a student of the implements and weapons of ancient man, author of *Man and Metals* and numerous similar works, that the Coronation Gulf Eskimos were in a cultural period earlier than any of the proper Stone Ages.

The Gulf people made fire by striking together lumps of

pyrite and, if they had to, by friction of wood on wood. They lived during summer in tents of undressed skins; during winter in houses of snow. Their only domestic animal was the dog, their only vehicles the sled and skin boat. For caribou and bears they used spears; for these and other animals they used the bow and arrow; for the seal they used harpoons. Their fuel was the fat of animals and so was their light.

Under their Stone Age way of life, these Eskimos were neither pathetic in our eyes, when we had become used to living with them, nor were they wretched in their own. They liked winter better than summer and were glad the summers, with stifling heat and swarms of biting insects, were brief. They liked the seacoast better than the treeless prairie inland; but they liked that prairie better than the woods farther south, to which they resorted only when they needed material for sledges or implements. They believed themselves to have a better country than the forest Indians, and were correct in that so far as I could judge, for I have lived with those Indians and they were, both in their own eyes and mine, a wretched people, starving more often than the Eskimos. They shivered a hundred times more, for they were as badly protected from the cold as the Eskimos were well protected—they had never developed a culture really suited to their environment, while the Eskimo culture seemed to me nearly perfect in its time and place, yielding a sense of stable security and ministering to comfort.

The Gulf Eskimos were not merely satisfied with their country and climate but also with nearly everything else. They considered meat, the tissues of animals, the finest diet in the world; they had plenty of it and were in good health on it, the best I have seen anywhere. That animals should eat vegetation and that people should eat the animals seemed to them not merely normal but desirable. They were so dressed and housed that, to judge from my experience when clothed and living similarly, they were more comfortable in winter than people usually are in New York or London. They were more free from skin troubles than we, although (or because) they knew not soap or towels and never bathed. They never washed,

but their faces looked as clean as ours. Their body odors were less conspicuous than ours, no doubt in part through a Mongolian nature that is less smelly than the European, but also I think because their clothes did not capture and store up body secretions as do our fibrous undergarments. There were strong smells in their dwellings but they were smells of foods which are liked—no one finds very reprehensible the smell of a cheese if he likes its taste, and certainly we do not ordinarily find distasteful the odors of steaming coffee or grilled bacon.

The foregoing is a personal statement. In the literature concerning primitive Eskimos there are two diametrically opposed views, that they are the happiest people in the world and that they are the most wretched. A fair analysis will usually show that those who call them wretched mean that the writers think they would themselves be wretched if they were living Eskimo style; while those who call the Eskimos happy are judging objectively, by laughter and smiles and signs of contentment.

Of course there are unhappy people in Eskimo Land as there is wretchedness in Merrie England. What those mean who say the Eskimos are happy is that the average of happiness seems to be greater than what the travelers are used to when at home.

But we are supposed to discuss here not happiness but freedom, and these are not inevitably synonymous.

There are, of course, many sorts of liberty. The first, chronologically, is in a child's relation to parents and to other grown-ups. On this the travelers vary from saying that Eskimo children are never punished to saying that they are seldom punished, or less often than in other countries. A part of this freedom from punishment is freedom from restraint. Among the forest Indians, just to the south of Coronation Gulf, infants are strapped to a board much of the time during their first year. Our children are in cribs and cradles. The Eskimo child crawls around on the floor with a lack of restraint which, at the least, is not common among us. Our children do not get what they cry for unless we think it good for them. When the Eskimo child wants something he usually gets it, whether

from our point of view it is good for him or not. To be concrete, when a two-year old child wants the scissors he is almost certain not to get them with us and almost certain to get them with the Eskimos.²

There is a like relative difference between most of a child's other freedoms when we compare Eskimo ways to ours. During the period of youth our children are told what to do, and so are the young Eskimos; but with the important difference that the punishment of recalcitrants may be and frequently is both mental and physical with us but can be only mental with the Eskimos—bad children suffer both disapproval and spanking with us; with the Eskimos there are no spankings or slaps but only the disapproval of family and associates.

In theory, marriages are equally free with us and with the Eskimos; they are upon the advice of parents and friends or on personal inclination in both cases. In practice the freedom of marrying whom you like is somewhat greater with the Eskimos. Subsequent to marriage, their freedom is definitely greater. With us the parents of a young couple are, on both sides, expected to advise them that the union should be permanent or at least should be continued for a time. With the Coronation Gulf Eskimos it did occur that parents advised either the young husband or the young wife; but this was bad form, meeting the disapproval of the community. And certainly there were many cases where a couple separated without anyone advising them against doing so—it was not considered the affair of either parents or friends.

With us the desired mate is free to say no to a proposal; that is so, too, among the Eskimos. With us freedom of saying no disappears with marriage, and we are expected to sympathize with the one who prefers to continue the union. With the Eskimos, after marriage as before, the sympathy of the community is with the one who is unwilling. A woman, or man either, has just as much right to refuse the continuance of a marriage as to refuse entering upon it.

² On why Eskimo children are allowed to play with scissors, and why their general freedom is more than that of our children, see, for instance, the author's *My Life with the Eskimo*, pp. 395-403.

Among the Eskimos, as with us, differences of personality are such that in one family the man has his way usually, in another the woman. We have a theory, however, that the man should control, usually or always; that the woman should have her way seldom or never. The Eskimos make no such distinction between husband and wife; neither is supposed to have any authority over the other. It is no more improper for the woman to be the stronger character than for the man to be.

From what we have just said follows the absurdity of stories that "primitive" Eskimo husbands lend their wives to other men. This can be true, and is true, only among those Eskimos who are no longer "primitive" but who have adopted the white man's religion and customs to that extent which makes wife-lending possible. The wife-lenders, then, are Eskimos who have surrendered their own belief that man and woman are equal, each without authority over the other, and have taken in its place a view based upon the Christian nuptial promise of a woman that she will obey her husband and upon the European attitude that a man should be master in his own house. This means, of course, that stories which you have read about Greenland Eskimos lending their wives to white men may very well be true; for, after all, those Eskimos have been in close association with Danes, and with other Europeans, for two hundred years. They began to adopt Christian marriage vows, through the rule of the church, so many generations ago that no doubt it seems to Greenlanders of today as if the obedience of wives and the lending of them had always been Greenland customs.

Sex jealousy, as we understand it, seemed unknown among the Eskimos of Coronation Gulf as recently as 1910; it is said to have become fairly common before 1930. During those twenty years perhaps half or three-fourths of the five hundred or so Coronation Eskimos had died off, through diseases introduced by the whites, while their culture had been affected materially by traders, missionaries, and particularly by Christian Eskimos who had moved in from the Mackenzie River district of northwestern Canada and from Alaska. With these whites and Christian Eskimos had come the wedding pledge

of obedience to the husband and the European idea that a man is the head of a household, that a woman is a kind of property, and that either husband or wife is disgraced by the "social misconduct" of the other—especially that a man can be disgraced by what his wife does.

The Coronation Eskimos, like those who have been described from other regions not strongly influenced by whites or Athapascan, Algonquin, and other Indians, were communistic anarchists. The kind and degree of their freedom will appear through a discussion of their communism and of their anarchy.

That communism means nobody owning anything is, of course, merely a device of polemics; or, if you like, any communism is a modified communism. Stone Age Eskimos owned certain things and did not own others.

In Coronation Gulf, land could not be owned. Neither could it be in the Mackenzie region to the west. The question of house ownership could not arise in the Gulf district, for there cold-weather dwellings were of snow and thereby transient. But in the Mackenzie, where houses were of earth and wood, it could arise. We digress, therefore, to explain that in the Mackenzie delta the builders owned a house as long as they dwelt in it, but lost all title when they moved out. However, there would necessarily grow up, and did grow up, a practical definition of what was meant by moving out. A family known to be on a journey, and to plan coming back, was looked upon as still in the house. There was, however, a tacit requirement that owners leave behind things to indicate they were coming back. If it was winter, and if they expected to return before spring, they would leave their belongings in the house and would close the door. But if the absence was to include the breakup, as between March, which is winter, and June, which is summer, then they would leave goods in a depot outside; for it is the nature of the Mackenzie houses that they leak and are damp in spring, which has an unfortunate effect upon most things that are Eskimo property.

If a family were planning to be away a whole year, and were to try to keep the house vacant during that time by a combination of leaving things in it and of asking that it be

kept vacant, the conduct would be recognized as antisocial. Persistence in antisocial conduct is practically inconceivable on the Eskimo Stone Age cultural level. I have never heard from them, or read of them in books, that an attempt was actually made to keep a house vacant for more than a few weeks or at most a few months. The normal thing, if you were moving away, would be to think of somebody whom you liked, whose house was not as good as yours, and to suggest that he and his family be ready to move in when you move out. For it is recognized that an occupant, whether the original builder of a house or not, has at least such right over it that he could turn it over upon leaving to anyone whom he liked who happened to need it.

But the community would be the ultimate judge of whether the friend needed the house. If it were obvious that he did not need it, then (for the reasons we have mentioned, that in primitive Eskimo society you do not go against public opinion) the man who is starting on the journey would, to begin with, make no suggestion to his friend about moving in; but were he so callous to local feeling as to make the suggestion, then his friend, unless equally callous, would decline. This is another point on which we have no direct evidence—I have neither heard of nor read about a case where anyone moved into a vacated house unless his doing so met the approval of the community.

The approval of an Eskimo group may, of course, depend on friendships, or on personal liking, as with us; but in theory always, and in practice at least usually, the community approval of a family moving into a vacated house is based upon their being known to need the house.

A Mackenzie River saying has it that "There is no more sense in wanting a house that is too big for you than in wanting a coat that is too big for you." Therefore, a small family who build a large house will invite a family they like to share it with them. In practice, the wife has more of a say here than the husband, for it will be the two women, with their children, who constantly are at home while the men are out hunting. But although congeniality between the women is of more im-

portance than between the men there may be a situation where the decision rests with, or at least is based upon, the children. If they are old enough they have strong preferences in play-mates and will clamor that a family shall be invited which has the right number and kind of children.

As this paper is being written come stories from England which show that the Eskimo view of housing, never wholly alien with us, is just now much to the fore.

A friend writes from southwestern England that in a way he is lucky his country home is so small that obviously there is room in it for no more than his own family. It seems there is in his village a local committee which receives children that have been evacuated from London, studies the housing facilities of various homes in the district, studies also personal congenialities, and then by just such common-sense methods as were used by the Eskimos of Mackenzie River decides upon which householder the children shall be quartered. The chief difference seems to be one of procedure. In England the matter is formally determined by a committee formally chosen; among the Eskimos the thing happens more informally, and as it were naturally, for it is the entire community and not a selected group which makes the decision. Nor do Eskimos have set conclaves, like a New England town meeting or a Russian soviet. They just talk things over informally when they happen to meet—outdoors, within doors, in somebody's home or in the clubhouse. No vote is taken, but there develops a consensus of opinion. This is based upon all the factors applicable, such as whether given families are friends or strangers, whether the children involved on both sides are of ages such that they will play well together, whether a local family has no child and will, for that reason, provide a specially desirable home.

Clearly things are not wholly formal in the British arrangement. There is no doubt that, especially in small villages, public sentiment gradually makes itself felt informally in Devonshire or Cornwall much as it does at Mackenzie River or Point Barrow.

Land and houses considered, we turn next to food with the Eskimos and take a special case to bring out a general view.

There are two seals in Coronation Gulf, the "common" and the bearded; the common weighs usually less than a hundred pounds, the bearded several hundred. A sealer who gets a small one takes it to his wife, who skins it and cuts it up. She keeps the skin for family use and so with the fat and the lean. She may give some of the food uncooked to a neighbor, but usually she cooks as much as the size of her pot allows, and either invites the neighbors to join in a meal at her house or sends portions of cooked food to families that are known to be without fresh meat.

When a hunter secures a bearded seal he does not take it home but stands on a small ice hummock with hands outstretched long enough to turn around three times slowly. All hunters who see him doing this gather, and the most influential of them cuts the seal into as many pieces as there are hunters present. This master of ceremonies gets the second last piece; so that he has been, to an extent, punished for being eminent, just as the hunter, who gets the last piece, is punished for being successful. However, in a community where no one lacks for anything as long as anyone has something, this issue is really academic.

The reward which the hunter gets for his success is that he is the hero of the hour. He is like a football player who has made a touchdown. If he consistently has better success in getting large seals than do the other hunters, he is like a player who can be relied on to make gains for his team whenever at all possible.

It is a matter of detail and not of fundamentals that there are different rules for the handling of common and bearded seals. The end result is the same; the community shares with approximate equality the benefit of any success.

We turn once more to Mackenzie River, and for an example rather than a principle, when we tell of their fishing.

A large Mackenzie family with whom I lived the winter of 1906-07, at one stage twenty-three of us, had tons and tons of fish accumulated by midwinter. Then the less successful hunters and fishers began to come in from various districts. At first we took them into our house; they ate our fish with us; their

women shared in the cooking and sewing; their men and some of their women helped us in fishing. When there was no more room in our house the gathering hunters began to erect snow-houses or other dwellings in a cluster around our house. The fishing season was over, and we were getting only a few each day. The inroads of people and dog teams upon the fish pile were daily more noticeable; in a few weeks nearly all the fish were gone. At that stage the custom is to load sledges to capacity with the last of the fish and to scatter in various directions for hunting grounds that are supposed to be better. In the Mackenzie district this usually worked, for I was not able to learn that there had been a famine in the region within the memory of anyone living, or within the survival of reliable tradition.

As long as there was room, the visitors had as much right as we to bunk in our house. When the houseroom was gone the newcomers were, of course, free to build their own camps. Everybody within our house or without it was as free to use fish for men or dogs as we who had caught them. There was no chance for the most prominent man in our family or for anyone else to play Lord Bountiful. The people who gathered around us did admire us for the activity and success with which we had carried on the fishing; they acknowledged freely that we had done much better than they. They admired us and they liked us; but it was not in their way of thinking to be grateful to us, except as a town is grateful to a civic leader or a school to a winning ball team.

But we did have a slight degree of food ownership in the fish catch. As said, no one had to ask permission to use our fish locally nor did any have to ask permission for loading up their sleds with "our" fish when the camp finally broke up; but if a traveler came along who spent a day or two with us and then passed on, he would have to ask for fish if he wanted to take some away with him, and he would expect to pay—would pay unless we who had caught the fish said to him specially that we did not want pay.

This about freedom with dwellings and with fish in Mackenzie River is said with diffidence, in that Eskimos there had

been in touch with whites—off and on, remotely, for half a century; then constantly and more intimately for the seventeen years just before I spent with them the winter of 1906-07. So their customs might have changed to some extent. I did, however, question them searchingly on how things used to be, finding evidence of change sometimes and no doubt occasionally failing to discover proof of a change that really had taken place. Therefore, we discuss here Mackenzie River only when no sample of what we are trying to bring out is available from Coronation Gulf. Otherwise this paper is based mainly upon the Gulf Eskimos, some five hundred of whom had never seen a white man before 1910, so they cannot have suffered much change through European influence.

When a Coronation meal was being eaten you would not join unless you were invited; but you were sure to be invited. If your house was short of food you would not send a petition to another house; but the people next door knew about as much as you did about the food situation of your own family and would not think of eating without either sending you a part of their meal or else asking specially that you join them. The only modification of this procedure was that instead of sending a message to every house a woman might get one of the children to run out and shout at the top of his voice that they were about to eat. If people didn't hear the shout it was their misfortune, unless a neighbor took it upon himself to let them know.

Freedom of visiting back and forth was controlled in these Eskimo villages exactly as it is among us when we live in friendly groups. In nothing is a child better trained than in watching for signs of being not quite welcome. They learn not to shout when anybody wants to sleep. They learn to go outdoors when they notice that the house is getting too crowded. It is not merely that public opinion is so strong that no one resists it but also that everyone is taught to watch for the slightest signs of individual or collective irritation.

There were in Coronation Gulf no men or women of authority, but everyone had influence gauged by a lifetime of association. In a period of scarcity an outsider might get the impres-

sion of authority when a man said he was going inland hunting and everybody followed him; but if you knew the language and understood the people you would realize that they followed Brown rather than Jones because they thought his judgment better—Brown led them only in the sense of being first to announce that he would go; people followed because they thought his to be a good lead. It was like getting a Wall Street tip that a Napoleon of finance was buying a certain stock.

Not merely did the Eskimos have no chiefs but they had no prisons or other forms of confinement, no floggings or things of that sort. There were only two forms of punishment, the disapproval of the community and death. Theoretically, the death punishment was inflicted only for that crime which is worst in the Eskimo calendar, troublemaking, and it should not be inflicted until the community was unanimous, which, in practice, meant years of discussion. The execution should be by the nearest of kin, for then a blood feud would not arise.

We discuss the vendetta only as it bears on the degree of freedom. The feud ought not to start, because a man who knew he was being discussed for execution would move away to another community. Having to do that is not as serious with them as with us, for they own no houses or other property which by its nature must be left behind; they could take with them their personal property. They would be welcome in another community even if it were known why they had come; a man would have to develop a local unpopularity before falling in line for execution.

In operation an Eskimo blood feud was similar to those of Kentucky or Sicily, except that there was no concerted effort to exterminate one of the two families involved—it was sufficient for your family to be one ahead in the score of killings. A feud usually closed by that family moving away which, at a given time, was one ahead. If they moved far enough away, the feud would die out.

The blood feud was no doubt the worst single element in the Eskimo social organization, but it was not a problem related to freedom or liberty, as these are usually understood. We have

in fact described the feud chiefly to show that the question of freedom is not involved.

We have said that small animals rather than big were handled as if they were private property, but that in reality neither was private property in our sense. We have said that land could not be owned at all and that a house was not owned after our manner of ownership. Portable articles, however, were owned with the Coronation Eskimos in just our way. Their bows and arrows were as much their private property as rifles and cartridges are with our sportsmen. They owned their knives, spears, harpoons, fire implements, cooking pots—in fact, anything and everything that could be carried with you on a sledge or in a boat. And of course they owned sledges and boats as we own our cars and our power launches. And whatever you own you may sell, with the Stone Age Eskimos as with us.

Property obviously common to the whole family was never sold by husband or wife unless both were in agreement. Mature children in the family were consulted; young ones were not consulted, but they were listened to tolerantly if they expressed strong views, as through fondness of a dog or pride in a sleigh. With dog trading especially, even a young child might have considerable influence.

When the thing to be sold was clearly individual property, as a man's crooked knife or a woman's case of needles, there was also consultation at least of husband and wife; but this was looked upon more as a courtesy than a necessity. It was rare that either discouraged the sale of a thing which naturally was in the province of the other.

There was in our Stone Age community a recognized scale of prices, but it was also recognized that a special case may bring out a new value. A dog may have a standard price of two six-inch copper knives; but everybody will appreciate your being willing to exchange a dog for one knife, or even two dogs for one knife, if you have many dogs and are in special need of a knife. If you have nothing with which to buy a knife or a dog, your chances among Eskimo friends of receiving them as presents are about the same as with us among our friends. And, just as among us, you might take the knife or dog as a present

but would say to yourself, or even say aloud, that you expected to pay when you were able.

We have not given a complete view of freedom among the Stone Age Eskimos of Coronation Gulf, and cannot do so, for this is a chapter and not a whole book. But the examples we have taken are fair. We might add a few things, as a mere recital. Children are free to do, if they can, the work of grown people; the grown may play children's games, by themselves or with the children, and not lose caste. Men may do women's work and women men's work. One or a few women may travel with many men, one or a few men with many women. When people are eating in two groups there may be all men in one and all women in the other; but usually there is the same number of persons in each group, so that if there are fewer women in the party there may be two or three men eating with the women.

Coronation Gulf had no exceptions to sex equality, but exceptions are known from the far west and far east. In Greenland, for instance, the rowing of the big boats was done by women, the steering by a man. Apparently there was something in the nature of disgrace to a man in having to row with the women.

This does not mean that there was no division of work. For obvious and mainly biological reasons the women looked after the children, kept house, and did the chief work of the camp, while the men hunted. There was no more disgrace, however, or impropriety, in a woman's hunting than there is with us in a woman's driving a car or piloting an airplane. If a man stayed home and looked after the children while the wife went hunting, it was always for a natural reason—that he was lame, that he was recovering from an illness, that he was snowblind, or something of that sort. You never say to a man that it is too bad he has to look after the children; what you say, and feel, is that his being lame is unfortunate.

It is not possible to find among Homer's, Plato's, or any other Greeks an approach to such complete liberty as there was among the Stone Age Eskimos of Coronation Gulf. The liberty was similar among all those Eskimos whom I have visited who

were near enough to "savagery" so that I felt I could rely on what they were telling me about former days.

There seem, indeed, to be no writings for any part of the world, except perhaps a few of those on Utopias, which have ever described a human society that had more kinds of liberty or higher degrees of them than we found in 1910 among the Eskimos of Coronation Gulf.

With the Indians next south, the northerly Athapascans, liberty was on nearly as high a level when I was with them at various times between 1906 and 1912.

Roughly speaking, and of course with numerous exceptions, there was in North America a decrease of pre-Columbian liberty as you went south from its north coast, an increase of the infringements on some or most of the different liberties, until you came to a maximum of infringement, a minimum of liberty, in what we now call Mexico and Central America.

Again with numerous exceptions, the march southward, away from the Eskimos and from liberty, coincided with an advance upon districts of higher and higher culture, or at least of cultures which we speak of as higher.

Not alone in the New World but throughout the whole world it appears to be a rule, if not a law, that infractions upon liberty grow as communities grow, whether the community growth be in numbers, in culture, or in both. Such at least is the anthropological position; which does not mean that we disagree with the historians when they say that among the Greeks, and among a number of other peoples, restraints upon liberty are known to have decreased parallel with an increase in population and a growing complexity of social organization. In that connection we return to matters upon which we have touched before.

The agreement between the disciplines of anthropology and history upon liberty among the Greeks (seemingly in every respect except upon whether the Greeks invented it) leads us to ask whether we are perhaps guilty of a purely verbal dispute. Is there no issue here but the definition of a term? Have the historians so redefined liberty (even while saying with Professor Hyde that they are using it "in our sense of the word") that

they can consistently speak of as having liberty people like the Greeks, for whom even the historians claim only a limited amount of freedom, and then speak of as not having liberty people like the Eskimos who, in comparison with the Greeks, had a larger number of freedoms and had many if not most of them in a higher degree?

Evidently the historians must have redefined liberty, at least in the back of their minds; for they do speak of liberty having been invented by the Greeks.

Seemingly, then, the historian does not think it an exercise of liberty when an Eskimo group makes a decision through informal conversations during a few months and an informal arrival at a majority opinion which governs their conduct for some time thereafter; but he does think it an exercise of liberty when Republicans and Democrats campaign the United States for several months, cast a ballot on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and thereby arrive at a decision which governs the United States for some time.

Or do the historians perhaps think we have liberty because we have both democratic institutions and great power as a nation, but that the Eskimos have not liberty (although their institutions are freer than any democracy) because they are not powerful enough to withstand, say, the Government of the Northwest Territories of Canada or that of the Territory of Alaska? If so, the historians speak merely as of today. For if they will consider the evidence they will find that the Eskimos of northernmost North America were more powerful than the Indians just south of them when white men first arrived in those districts, and that there is indication they had been more powerful than any other people of whom they had even hearsay knowledge for more centuries than the United States has yet been a free nation. We in America are more affected today by the actions of a country like Argentina or Hungary than the Eskimos of northern Canada were through at least a number of centuries by the conduct of the Athapascan Indians—the only people with whom there was any known chance they could come in contact.

We mentioned, when saying that the Eskimos of northern

Canada had most of those things which Professor Hyde specifies as being the results of Greek liberty, that the chief, if not the only, exception would be taboo. The Greeks may not have been quite so free from taboo as the Professor intimates, or at least one sees the chance for a debate with him on it; but certainly they were freer than the Eskimos. The Greeks were not, however, freer than the Eskimos from sex taboos. There are a number of classes of taboos which we have today that neither the Greeks nor the Eskimos had; there is also a large and rigid class of taboos which the Eskimos do have that were less developed or absent among the Greeks.

That Eskimo taboos are a serious restriction upon freedom is not quite as true for them as it has been for the Jews at certain stages of their culture.

Eskimo food taboos, their largest single group, are not of the kind the Jews had. There is, for instance, no Eskimo concept which is nearly related to the Jewish idea that you must not use the flesh of an animal unless it splits the hoof and chews the cud, nor do the Eskimos have anything resembling kosher meat. But while the Eskimo food taboo does not resemble a Deuteronomy taboo, it does resemble the prohibitions that are imposed upon us by physicians. A doctor tells me to go easy on meat; he prescribes for you the avoidance of cocktails; to Jones he forbids a group of foods which he claims are fattening; to Brown he forbids certain breakfast cereals because (he says) they might aggravate a digestive trouble. "Doctor's orders," when of that kind, resemble superficially at least the food taboos of the Eskimos.

Our historians do not seem to feel it a notable abridgment of the liberties of the American people that tens of thousands of us are following taboos for which we have paid a doctor or which we have taken from the pages of a magazine.

The case for the closer resemblance of Eskimo food taboos to modern ones than to those of biblical Jews is strongest when we make it for sections of the Eskimo territory like Coronation Gulf that are most removed from known outside influences. The Coronation group had, so far as I discovered, only one taboo that resembled the Jewish—none of them ever ate bear

livers. The rest of their taboos were individual. An old lady had said about her newborn grandson that until he killed his first caribou he must not eat marrow from the left front leg of any caribou. A father had said to his young son that until he was able to build his first good snowhouse he was never to break a marrow bone by hitting it against a stone, but must always lay it down first and hit it with the stone. A shaman had been to the moon and had learned up there that caribou would soon appear if everyone in the community (or perhaps all the women in the community, or all the childless women in the community, or the left-handed men in the community, or something of that sort) would refrain from eating grouse livers. As the result of a trance a shaman had informed an expectant mother that she would have easy delivery if she walked around the house from right to left, and not from left to right, the first time she went outdoors each morning, and if at the same time she chewed on a piece of sinew, without swallowing it.

Such were the typical Coronation taboos—surely not much greater infringements on liberty than our seeing the moon over the right (or is it the left?) shoulder, not walking under a ladder, or being careful to knock on wood.

The Eskimos of the Colville section in Alaska did have a number of taboos that resembled the old Jewish ones. No child of a given sex might eat certain parts of an animal until attaining a certain age or achieving a certain goal. Specific parts of certain animals might not be eaten by a woman before marriage; there were other parts that she might not eat even after marriage until her first child was born; and there were food taboos where a woman did not attain complete freedom until after her fifth child. Even so, there might be abridgments of the same freedom if one of her children were ill, a different abridgment if two of them were ill, and still another if her brother's child was ill.

These mountain Eskimos of Alaska, and some others, had indeed developed (or borrowed) a taboo system that outsmarted Deuteronomy. But would the historians think of Jews as unfree though they had the taboos of Deuteronomy if they had also

the freedoms of the Greeks? The Colville Eskimos had more freedom than the Greeks.

The anthropological part of our discussion has been upon the assumption that liberty "in our sense of the word" is that liberty of which we are thinking when we say that Hitler, Stalin, or Roosevelt are wanting to deprive us of it. We have not tried, except for mentioning the possibility of a verbal dispute, to discuss a liberty such that a Greek is free if he has it and an Eskimo is not free though he has it.

CONCLUSIONS

We state some conclusions regarding liberty, not from their having been established by this inadequate discussion but rather from the general nature of the body of anthropological facts and resulting doctrine.

If we know that man is descended from apes, or from an apelike animal, then we surely know that he cannot have invented liberty during the time he was becoming or since he became man; for you do not invent the thing you have. We believe that what man did invent was the infringement of liberty. More, we think we know he must have done so; for we seem agreed both that earlier he did not have it and that later he had it.

We think, from a comparative study of the scale running from what we call primitive to what we call high, that there is most freedom in the lowest cultures, though with exceptions; and that there is usually least in the middle group. In the highest cultures you are watching a group of prestidigitators; for now you see liberty and now you don't.

If the Greeks are known to have rediscovered liberty, whether once or twice, it does not seem improbable that the Mexicans of 1500, if not molested by the Spaniards, might have rediscovered a liberty which their forefathers began to lose when they were at some such stage of culture as that of the Coronation Eskimos of 1910. For the probability seems to be

that the ideas and devices both of liberty and of servitude have been rediscovered in various cultures in many lands.

Even with their slavery, and many repressive institutions, the Greeks did have considerable liberty during what we call their Great Age. A high civilization is, then, not necessarily low in liberty.

It may be, as Professor Hyde implies, that the Greeks had more abridgments of liberty in earlier times, before the Trojan war, than they had when they defeated the Persians. If so, they were on a rising curve of a liberty cycle at least from Homer to Alexander. Thereafter, again as Professor Hyde says, they were on a downward swing of the curve. Perhaps there has been a recent slight upward swing, say from the time when Byron went south to help them re-establish their ancient liberty (or was it their ancient glory?).

Since the average high cultures are not quite so bad, from the abridgment of liberty angle, as the majority just below them, those partial to liberty may perhaps reasonably take heart. For it is at least not incompatible with the trend of the evidence to hope that the cultures now most advanced may advance still further, and so to where it can be rightly said that there is as much freedom in the highest as in the lowest human societies.

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ORGANIC FREEDOM

ORGANIC freedom broadly is concerned with the behavior or action of organisms; and only as these essential concepts are given substance will a consideration of organic freedom be significant. "Organism" has two distinct meanings. It denotes, on the one hand, a living individual, plant or animal, single or many celled; and, on the other, that sort of unit system of which animate beings are the outstanding example. Any system sufficiently distinguishable from its surroundings to be identified as a unit and composed itself of lesser units which are interrelated in the whole is an organism in the wide sense—a molecule, a galaxy, a house, a university.

I have tried to minimize confusion by introducing the term "org" for the inclusive category and reserving "organism" for its most common usage. Orgs, then, include animorgs and inanimorgs, and the former rubric includes organisms. A cell in a multicellular organism is likewise an animorg; and a society or ecological community of organisms is as clearly one. The term "epiorganism" has proved useful for the latter. A single cell, then, while itself an animorg may be a unit in an animorg of higher order, a multicellular organism; and a single organism may be a unit of an epiorganism, an animorg of still higher order.

We shall especially be concerned in this essay in examining freedom of units in animorgs and of animorgs in their environment; yet, although this class of orgs possesses characteristics

unique to itself and superimposed upon those common to all orgs, few if any of our conclusions will prove less valid for inanimorgs than for animorgs.

"Freedom" has to do with the restriction or lack of restriction of action. It is a common word, with many and powerful connotations which have been built mainly upon our own subjective and, often, emotional experience. When circumstances permit me to behave as I "wish," when "no" restrictions are imposed, then I am "completely free." The alternate situation frustrates my volition; I much prefer the freedom to do exactly as I please—an omnipotent animalcule in, yet independent of, the universe.

Stated so, it is obvious enough that freedom derives from a private egotism, a primitive drive to power and resistance to thwarting, and nearly always is used to express a state of license or capriciousness. The free actor suffers no restraint and may be as aimless or purposeful, as erratic or consistent, as bad or good, in his actions as he pleases. Yet freedom does *not* stem from chaos, as this would demand, but from order. Such matters as determinism, free will, contingency, and time, as well as purpose, are bound up with freedom; and we must examine orgs more closely with such problems in mind.

I have elsewhere (*Scientific Monthly*, 1940) developed in some detail the parallelism between a community of cells and one of organisms, and have shown the very real justification for regarding an epiorganism society and an organism as like cases. Each is an individual animorg built of units with certain relations among themselves and to the whole; and these relations—the mechanisms of integration included—are alike in both. I shall, therefore, not hesitate to pass from one order of animorg to another in pursuing the present essay. Indeed, the great part of the following discussion of freedom and determination applies to all orgs, animate or not.

Consider the behavior of a cell in a multicellular organism—a nerve cell in your brain, a protective cell in your skin, or a white cell in your blood. You, the organism, have no subjective awareness of any equivalent awareness on the part of your units; nor is there any evidence that such awareness as they

possess includes a recognition of being part of a greater collective unitary awareness. Nor can you do more than infer the subjective elements in other organisms like yourself. We shall do well, then, to eliminate for the moment any argument from volition and consciousness and depend on the objective evidence from action or behavior.

A single unit can act, deterministically, only in response to an internal influence or stimulus or to an external one or to a combination of them. For a unit in an org, however, it is useful to further divide—though the demarcation is not sharp—those external influences which originate in the org from those which originate beyond it. A particular muscle cell might contract in response to some change within itself, to some change in the blood bathing it or the nerve connected to it, or to some change in the environment of the whole organism—say a strong electromagnetic field.

Of course, org changes themselves are commonly initiated from the environment, but sometimes a long regression intervenes. The nerve impulse which makes the muscle contract may depend upon an immediately preceding prick to the skin, the simple reflex; but it may depend upon the position of the balancing organ in the ear, and so on the attitude of the head, and so on many other muscular contractions, before being referred to the external force of gravity and the external stimulus which led to a bending of the head. Still more, the nerve impulse may seem to arise spontaneously in the brain in the course of "willing." In this last instance we would have a unit, the nerve cell, responding to its own internal state; which is the same case, named above, of the muscle cell initiating its own contraction.

If org control of its units can commonly be traced back to environmental action on the org, perhaps intrinsic control of the unit similarly traces back to action on the unit by its org. The answer to this must define the degree of indeterminacy of the unit. To the extent that the unit originates its action fully within itself its behavior is indeterminate. But "fully" covers a great deal, for the past as well as the present is involved. A particular atom of radium may disintegrate in a second or a million years from any moment in time; and no known external agent has any

influence on this behavior. Yet a population of such atoms exhibits a regular and predictable rate of decay, just as a population of human beings exhibits a set death rate. In the case of the atom, we may refer events to the probability of a certain energy configuration occurring between its nuclear units and so exclude the past history of the atom or the control from outside it; and, of course, a certain indeterminacy at the subatomic levels seems to be established by modern physical theory. The time of death of a particular man, however, is clearly not independent of his individual past or of his environment, whatever balance of indeterminateness may enter at any moment. Perhaps the same is true, on a different scale, for the atom.

Many have argued from indeterminacy of the electron, through trigger action, to freedom, or free will, of the organism. One universal characteristic of animorgs is adaptive amplification, the ability to respond to a small amount of energy applied as a stimulus by releasing a much greater amount of energy and by directing this energy to maintenance of its own equilibrium state. A feeble stimulus to a sense organ initiates nerve impulses which spread in the nervous system, reach motor nerves, and elicit powerful muscle contractions which tend to eliminate the stimulus. Such a typical reflex—the pulling away of the finger from a flame, or the emptying of the filled urinary bladder—is the familiar case of trigger action or adaptive amplification.

But not all behavior can be traced so directly to an environmental or even to an intraorg stimulus; “voluntary” acts constitute the clearest apparent exception. The next word I write—tatterdemalion—seems to be subject to my choice. No question arises here about the needed muscle movements, they are fully controlled by nerve impulses reaching them; nor is there any uncertainty about these nerve impulses, which travel in a mechanical manner along the nerve fibers into which they are discharged from certain nerve cells. The problem centers about these nerve cells in the top of the brain: are they set in action, in this particular pattern, by stimuli reaching them from other parts of the organism—other sensory nerve impulses, for example, or some alteration in the chemical state of the blood

which flows past them; or are these cerebral neurones able to initiate appropriate discharges intrinsically? If the latter, then the analysis must be pressed further to the electron or ion, for nerve discharges originate from electric currents in the cell. The cell membrane may be in a state of unstable equilibrium so that the indeterminate movement of an electron suffices to unbalance it, a nerve impulse is discharged, other cells are fired off by it, muscles contract, and the electron has pulled the trigger and exploded an act of the organism.

Now it is true that nerve cells can continue to beat electrically in a constant environment within the body or even outside of it. And it is further true that this beat can be modified by all sorts of external circumstances—as temperature and chemicals—which alter its internal metabolism or electrical charge. But it must be obvious that a strictly indeterminate electron jump within a nerve cell could not lead to regular co-ordinated behavior by the organism, despite any amount of trigger action. The amplification can exist but it would not be adaptive. The man's acts would not be controlled by his free will but by some electron's caprice. No organic freedom can be derived from an indeterminism of the org's units or of its subunits; this leads only to a helpless impotency at the hands of the unpredictable, to chaos, not to freedom.

The discharges of brain nerve cells, then, which led to my writing the word I "willed" to write must have been somehow determined by other events in my organism. To be sure, such mechanisms as already mentioned—other nerve impulses or chemicals—may act upon these nerve cells; but the question still persists: How were *these* set in motion? If immediately from outside of the organism, we are back to the obvious reflex type of behavior. If immediately from within it, then the regression is extended—through internal sense organs, which are stimulated by blood pressure, which is increased by hormones, which are released by other nerves, which are activated from the brain stem and cerebrum by a sound, which had become a meaningful word as a result of the conditioning of past experiences, or what you will—until sometime in the past the chain again is traced to an origin from the environment of the

org. On such analysis, volition is completely reduced again to controlled action; and spontaneous or free behavior becomes merely that which is under controls so intricate and distant that they are not readily traced.

There can be no question that the overwhelming bulk of our "free" actions are determined. What response is made to a given situation can be predicted with ever higher accuracy as the individual is better known: all normal humans throw out their arms when they stumble; nearly all will exclaim when suddenly hurt, and in a particular language; the American, but not the Englishman, answers the telephone with "Hello"; and Mr. Micawber could be depended on to meet adversity with the ineffectual optimism of "Something will turn up." A person given the appropriate suggestion while under hypnosis will perform some bizarre act hours or days later, yet think he did it of his "free will" and supply some rational reason. The psychoanalyst can often predict days or weeks in advance what emotions, dreams, and acts a patient will experience or perform. And in compulsive neurotic or psychotic states, even the subjective experience of freedom is gone—the sufferer "must" perform a certain act despite his maximum power of willing not to.

Is the determination complete, however, or is there a small residue of contingency at each org level; not an indeterminacy of the unit amplified in the org, but the converse—an org control of the unit? Can some sui-generic act of willing, arising *de novo* in me, set off my nerve cells without the mediation of the familiar physiological mechanisms? Can the organism directly control its electrons?

An oblique approach to this question may be profitable, even if it remain unanswered. There are but few possible relations between an org and its units. The org might control its units completely, or partially, or not at all; and similarly for control by the units of the org. Certain possibilities can at once be excluded. A complete control of units by org and of org by units would present an entirely self-contained system subject to absolutely no influence from outside itself. Only the whole universe is such a system, and that by definition. Complete lack of control in both directions between org and units is likewise ex-

cluded by the very essence of an org. Interrelations between units and whole must exist, else the assemblage is a chaotic swarm, not a cohesive entity.

If either the units or the org completely controlled the other, but the reverse control were not complete, then no environmental influence on the system could be exerted except at and through the controlling level. It would make no difference, in this respect, whether the reverse control were partial or absent. But if the control in one direction, say from org to unit, were partial and the reverse one were absent, then the environment could influence the unit directly or via the org but could influence the org only directly; whereas if both were partial, environment could act symmetrically in either direction. Complete or absent control in either direction would lead to contradictions with the nature of orgs; but a simple consideration of organisms will make the point more directly.

It is patent that reciprocal control exists between the cells and the multicellular organism they constitute, and that the environment can affect org or units through either level. A rise of environmental temperature acts upon the whole organism and sets in motion known mechanisms which decrease the activity of many cells and organs. The direct action of heat on these cells would augment their activity. Conversely, the play of light and shadow upon certain cells, receptors in the retina, may suddenly stop or abruptly initiate generalized activity of the organism—an animal “freezes” or flees on sighting a dangerous predator.

The school of behaviorists has emphasized the determinate reflex aspect of organism responses, acting through units; the gestaltists have stressed the total “set” of the whole organism and of its environment as important modifiers of responses to seemingly identical stimuli. Similar unitary and organismic views have battled in other branches of biology; and, indeed, philosophers fall into the same schools of “nothing but” and “something more.” The whole is nothing but, or is something more than, the sum of its parts.

I do not presume to have the answer. Surely at present no mechanism is remotely discernible which would enable the org directly to influence its units, other than through the known

chains of successive chemical, physical, and neural events which all trace back ultimately to an environmental stimulus. But these units collectively respond so appropriately, even at the highest levels of integration, and with so little regard to their existence as units, and the subjective experiences of organic unity and of spontaneity are seemingly so universal, that it is wise to avoid an extreme conclusion.

Fortunately, as earlier indicated, this point is not crucial for the present argument; for, whether or not a residuum of free will remains for the organism, the overwhelming majority—for immediate practical purposes all—of its acts are determined. Org and units interact with each other, and the environment acts upon both via either. What is important and demonstrable is that the relative intensities of the org-unit reciprocal controls are not uniform in all cases but show certain consistent trends in the animorg spectrum.

When animorgs are placed in an "ascending" scale of evolution the control of units by org increases relative to that of org by units. "Higher" organisms appeared, on the whole, later in earth history than did "lower" ones; they manifest a greater sensitivity to a wider range of environmental influences; they perform more intricate acts at higher speed and with improved co-ordination; they are more integrated orgs with new kinds of increasingly specialized units functioning in greater interrelation. And, at each animorg level—cellular, organismic, and societal alike—evolutionary change makes the unit less an independent individual and more a subservient bit of the greater org.

Primitive cells, which are also unicellular organisms, have protoplasmic bodies with negligible regional differentiation. All portions are actually or potentially interchangeable, and any small fragment can regenerate the whole. Advanced cells show great differentiation into fixed body parts, and certain of these, for example, the nucleus, are essential to continued life, yet are irreplaceable.

In multicellular organisms, the rich assortment of forms illustrates every shade of transition from a loose colony of cells to a unified individual. The boundary between a colony, of

unicellular attached protozoa, and a multicellular individual, a sponge composed of cells resembling these protozoa, is uncertain almost to the point of arbitrary definition. A sponge can be fragmented into single cells, yet these are able to migrate to reconstitute the individual. Further along, a small bit of any body region of a hydra or a flatworm can remold itself and grow into a complete individual. Cuttings of many plants can develop similarly. Insects and crayfish, more advanced, can repair the loss of an appendage but the lost leg is doomed. Finally, in vertebrates, any extensive mutilation of the body is fatal and regeneration is limited to bits of skin, bone, and blood which have been injured. In fact, the shift from homogeneity and independence to an interdependent heterogeneity can be followed in the development of an egg. Before fertilization, five per cent of the egg (which is a simple org) may regenerate the whole; when development, differentiation, and integration have changed it into an adult vertebrate, the whole may not be able to regenerate a missing five per cent.

Epiorganisms exhibit entirely comparable variations. A colony of sponges is simply some individuals in propinquity. One of corals shows more interdependence and, for example, possesses a characteristic form. A beehive, an anthill, a termite nest is each a well-knit epiorganism with specialized mutually dependent units and a characteristic form and function. The shape of the group nest is as distinctive for a termite species as is the shape of the single body; the epiorganism disintegrates when a vital unit, the queen, is lost. Loose and ephemeral epiorganisms are seen in flocks of birds or hunting wolf packs; more developed ones, in herds of grazers; still more advanced examples in Indian tribes, in single families or clans; perhaps most strikingly, in a whaler and its crew—remaining for years as an isolated, highly integrated org.

As an org advances in integration, its units lose in independence. A drop of mercury confined in the capillary of a thermometer is less "free" than one on an open surface. A cell, specialized for motion in a metazoan body, has renounced its heritage of immortality, of reproduction, even of nourishing itself. Its action or inactivity is normally under the complete

control of the organism via nerve fibers which run to it. It can perform only one of the many duties which living things must execute—for the others it depends on fellow-members of the cell community—but for this one it is especially differentiated and its performance is superb. The unit narrows but intensifies its competence; the separate functions are parceled out in the org to many unit specialists; and these units are co-ordinated into a harmonious whole by org mechanisms which, like the units, are ever more diversified, specific, numerous, and, most important, powerful: this is the path to greater org integration.

Animorgs at the epiorganism level are no different. As a society evolves, say the United States nation, its units also become differentiated for special functions and act under intensified org controls which reintegrate the lot. The parallel with a metazoan body is surprisingly close—units perform the same set of functions, and the same org mechanisms regulate their performance. Mechanical forces, transported substances, transmitted stimuli, and spatial intensity gradients which are timeless, alike in the body and the society, control the activity and even the differentiation of the units. And the control tends ever towards greater completeness; towards some sort of totalitarianism if you will.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the familiar epiorganism case. As a community changes from a frontier outpost to an urban center, the men and women who compose it become co-operating specialists. The man who could farm, butcher, build, trade, fight, hunt, doctor, judge—all in primitive fashion—is succeeded by one who is a far more expert architect, banker, soldier, physician, or lawyer but who is unable to function in the other roles. The integrating mechanisms of transportation and communication increase in distance, speed, and power of control; from mule pack to air express and from smoke signal to radio broadcast, these forces of unification and regulation have steadily grown in effectiveness, and the person has been submerged in the group. A baby, like an egg, is a relatively undifferentiated unit which becomes specialized and limited under the org forces which preside over its maturation. The man's language, dress, interests, habits, skills, depend (as to kind)

overwhelmingly on the nation, community, class, family in which he grew.

You and I, today, require the skilled efforts of others, many on another hemisphere, to feed, clothe, warm, convey, protect, amuse us; an epidemic in Japan, a political upheaval in Argentina, a financial collapse in Europe, a blizzard in the prairie States, can dislocate the life of a New Yorker even to the extent of physical suffering. The art, science, literature, technology, politics, and ideas of all the world are ours in a day and profoundly influence our thoughts and actions. Does not Hollywood set the mode for much of the world? All mankind is a loose epiorganism and is rapidly, amazingly rapidly, moving towards integration.

Physically and intellectually, the unit is immersed in an increasingly complex and regulated environment supplied by the epiorganism, and is increasingly dependent on this org milieu for its development and healthy survival. In the same way, the blood and fluids of the vertebrate body constitute an internal environment for the tissue cells; and elaborate organismic devices preserve the constancy of salts, foods, oxygen, acidity, temperature, pressure, and many other attributes of these "nursing" liquids. An isolated protozoan survives the wide chemical and physical vicissitudes of pond water; a mammalian brain or heart or kidney cell is killed or disabled by far smaller fluctuations in the state of the blood. The highly "civilized" man can survive and function only within a tremendously circumscribed range of corporeal and intellectual conditions, created and kept constant by the epiorganism in which he is embedded.

What, then, of the freedom of an individual man, as a unit in the social org and in the whole universe? This is the case of most intense interest to us. Complete freedom is an illusion of the emotions. Man is not free to leave this planet, to stop eating or breathing, to stay continuously awake for a week or to run two hundred yards at the rate for one hundred. These physical and physiological strictures we are rarely aware of and do not rebel against, they are part of "the way things are."

But the org restrictions of freedom—the "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" of religious faith, of social code, of judicial

law, of group and neighborhood standard, of family tradition, of individual conscience—these epiorganism controls seem more arbitrary and less inevitable. Yet, aside from detail, they are natural and necessary elements in the evolving integration of the epiorganism from a chaos of independent units, complete "anarchy," towards a unified nation or internation, complete "totalitarianism."

The renunciation of the individual privilege to kill, to plunder, to run where one will, even to be as noisy as one's mood may urge, is the price with which is purchased other more cherished privileges. Comfortable homes and tasty meals, theater and music and books, the very possession of language and abstract symbolic thinking are the proceeds of such barter. Would any prefer the freedom of wandering over the virgin continent, naked, often cold and hungry, stalking or being stalked by other animals, alone or in a family group, able to communicate only by signs and animal sounds and concerned with communicating only about imminent danger or opportunity?

Man is overwhelmingly a unit in his org, not a single independent unit; and the society creates tremendous opportunities for him to develop, specialize, and express himself. It offers new avenues for "free" action—man was not free to speak without language or to read without writing or to reason without symbols. For freedom is almost the reverse of unrestraint. A free object is one subjected to a single or a harmonious group of influences rather than to seriously opposing ones. It acts without conflict and in the particular direction in which it is impelled. A free-falling body, a free-wheeling automobile, a free-floating balloon, are precisely such cases and are accurately called "free."

Further, even in the case of epiorganism checks and impulses on man, himself, there is relatively little subjective awareness of restraint. We feel, overwhelmingly, that we act under internal compulsion, not external, and "run free" before our "consciences," which the society has developed in us. Inborn in human nature are certain emotional drives or responses (the pseudo-affective animal, controlled by its lower brain center, the hypothalamus, of the physiologist; or the id of the psycho-

analyst) and certain potentialities for learning or conditioning (in the cerebral cortex). What is learned; how the inevitable conflicts between primitive individual emotions and socialized rational thought, between id and ego or superego, are resolved or inflamed; which patterns of behavior become the habitual and automatic ones; such major decisions rest with the org in which the unit develops. Once made, in harmony with the social pressures, the individual "freely" does what "his" desire or determination designates. As with a cow, accustomed to being milked from the left side, alternate possibilities are unconceived or rejected.

It is mainly when progressive org changes produce conflicting situations within the epiorganism, or when these changes are so rapid that differentiated units and epiorgans (great institutions) can no longer follow with the needed new adjustments, that questions of individual freedom arise. New geographical discoveries and racial migrations were the most important sources of change and strain in the past; new technological inventions and political forms seem to be the present storm centers.

"Free" speech is the most treasured human freedom; and rightly so, since the new fact or fancy is for the evolution of the epiorganism what the new gene mutation or recombination is for that of the organism. This freedom is in danger only as it threatens the older order with the newer; when epiorganism strains begin to mold new human units to have different thoughts. Society troubled no one who said that the earth is round, or that man arose from simian ancestors, until he began to offer disturbing evidence that he might be correct. Similarly, it became dangerous to question the divine right of kings or the blessings of laissez faire only when they had already come under question.

The issue I am raising is this: as org influences become more pervading and powerful (as they must and do; consider the huge growth of physical power by exploiting natural resources of coal and oil and water and by building machines of destruction), what of the danger that power may be concentrated in a few units which selfishly oppose normal change? In the organ-

ism, dominance of certain cells and organs, for example the brain cortex, is essential to integration of the org and is healthy; but pathological breakdown or exaggeration or "usurpation" of these gradients of control and of activity does occur. In the epiorganism, likewise, gradients of control are normal enough—universities, armies, businesses, governments are so organized—but they may become distorted and pathological and, if not corrected, be fatal to the afflicted epiorganism. Which, if any, of the conflicting types of epiorganisms will have adequate survival value, on strictly biological criteria, I dare not predict. Some relative considerations as to existing democratic and totalitarian states have been presented in the essay earlier mentioned.

Two more problems must be hurriedly touched, those of purpose and of value. Purpose seems to be present in action whenever the antecedent event is more easily interpreted in terms of the consequent one than the reverse. When we see bone cells maneuvered into proper positions to support the organism's weight, or blood vessels dilate to supply more oxygen to active tissues, or white blood cells force their way into an infected region to destroy bacteria, it is hard to avoid the connotation of purpose. Yet any purpose is not in the immediate act, which is determined by well-established mechanisms, but rather in the selection or creation of these particular mechanisms.

A drop of water winding its way steadfastly to the sea shows no less purpose than an amoeba "seeking" food; nor is the mechanism, gravity, which directs the water better understood than those which direct the body cells, perhaps even less so. Similarly, men are used by their epiorganism to serve its "purpose" of survival and evolution. They are directed into one or another function by org forces to which the individual is subject even when he is cognizant of them; indeed we probably know more of these than of the ones, simpler but more remote from our immediate experience, which direct the cells of an organism.

Whether, or how, by the combined "purposes" of its unit men can direct or expedite the evolution of a society is a ques-

tion obscured in the uncertainties of two others: the existence or degree of indeterminism of the org, already touched upon; and the manner in which an org consciousness or will is built from that of its units. I know no answer to this latter—I have no insight whatever into how my unitary organismic awareness arises from the multiple awarenesses of my constituent cells, whatever these may be; nor can I extrapolate from my subjective experience as a unit in an epiorganism to the nature of the epiorganismic awareness.

But, whatever freedom there be for purposeful striving towards certain ends, these ends can be partially evaluated from the evolutionary viewpoint. The ethic or value most insistently seen in natural selection is that of ruthless competition, of might makes right. This is a very small part of the truth. The main biological virtue, seen at the cell, organism, and epiorganism levels alike, is co-operation among units and self-sacrifice of the unit for the org. This is a virtue in the objective sense that it has a high survival value, that animorgs possessing it in greater degree succeed in exploiting more of the environmental resources than do others possessing less. Indeed, a certain amount of "co-operation" is implicit in the very character of orgs.

All sorts of body mechanisms lead to the sacrifice of the unit for the whole—we need look no further than the plant cells which form woody tubes and then disintegrate to leave open sap channels, or the animal blood cells which advance, often to sure death, towards invading bacteria. It is simple to say at this level that the unit is exhibiting no altruism in its sacrifice, for the whole process is mechanistically determined. But the same is true for men, as cells of the epiorganism; and the same degree of freedom, none or slight, exists at both levels.

Man acts overwhelmingly from internal compulsion, but this we have seen is determined by the society in which he matured. And the more integrated the epiorganism, the more clearly is the balance in favor of unselfish co-operative behavior. The dictates of one's conscience are far more tyrannical than those of one's fellows. The sacrifices of friend for friend, of mother for child, of member for clan, of citizen for country and, perhaps

most of all, those of believer for abstract belief, are incomparably greater than those deliberately made for selfish ends and may transcend death in the suffering accepted. Animals also renounce individual welfare for that of others in the family or pack; but only when incorporated into a human epiorganism do they give evidence of an abstract loyalty. If even a few of the stories of dogs starving on a master's grave or dashing into a flaming building after a baby are true, they are striking testimony of the power and pervasiveness of org influences making for co-operation.

And so we reach the position that organic freedom is a very different thing from what it is often taken to be. Man in his society has at most a trace of internal indeterminacy. As the society evolves, he is subject to ever more immediate control by it, less to control by his extraorg environment. But these controls mostly leave him "free," for they mold him so that he "wills" to do the things he must. And as certain liberties are lost, others more precious (by our standards) are created. Epi-organisms, as organisms, evolve towards greater control of their units, towards totalitarianism, but some forms seem biologically less sound than others, and many of the existing societies will surely not survive.¹ As history unfolds I am confident that man will find himself more subject but less slave.

¹ It should be obvious that this paper is not directly concerned with any particular totalitarian or other existing State. Yet, with world events shaking our lives and emotions, it may be wise to state explicitly that each of the existing dictatorships embodies several attributes which are spurious and unfortunate additions to its totalitarian form. Thus, the terrorism, falsifications, irrationalism, and martial orientation of Nazi dominated Germany are *not* essential elements in its basically advanced integration as a nation. In their absence Germany might have helped to lead the world forward rather than to threaten its achievements of centuries.

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FREEDOM AND LITERATURE

IF I were to write an article on the well-worn theme, "books which have influenced me," I should name among them *Essay on Liberty* by John Stuart Mill. This was published in 1859 and was never more needed than in 1940. I read it when I was seventeen, and it immediately became part of my mental furniture. It is no exaggeration to say that I use it every day. Mill's love of liberty was equaled by his courage, the rarest of all qualities in what are called public men. For when a committee called upon him, asking him to stand for Parliament (it is significant that the American *runs* for Congress and the Englishman *stands* for Parliament) he agreed, but only on certain conditions. He said that although he had enough money, he would not contribute a penny; the office should be open to all, irrespective of worldly possessions; that if he were elected he would endeavor worthily to represent his constituents; but that if any measure came up which he thought best for the country as a whole, he would support it, even if it were against the interests and expressed wishes of his constituents. One of the committee exclaimed, "God Almighty could not be elected on that platform!" Possibly not; but Mill was. During the campaign, he addressed an assembly of workingmen and as he rose to speak, an enormous transparency was elevated which bore the sentence "Workingmen are usually liars" and in response to the public question, "Did you say that, Mr. Mill?" he replied, "Yes," and the audience broke out in tremendous applause.

In a discussion of freedom and literature, one should not only set a high value on freedom but a high value on literature. I regard literature as more important than politics, economics, and science. For while man cannot live without bread, he cannot live on bread alone. And although historians give an immense amount of space and emphasis to wars, wars are not nearly so important as literature. The best of all recorded wars was the Trojan war, because it produced more excellent literature than all the rest of the wars of the world put together. The fact that it was fought for a woman and that every soldier on both sides knew what he was fighting for gave it an oddity all its own; but its chief distinction was in its literary legacies.

One might say that war is not history but rather an interruption of history; after any particular war is finished, the nations involved must try to clean up after its appalling waste, and resume their daily and normal activities. Literature is the immortal part of history:

“Leave the fire ashes, what survives is gold.”

Carlyle said no nation is great unless it has a voice. The true greatness of nations consists in their contributions to civilization; and the greatest contributions to civilization are found not in material comforts or in timesaving or laborsaving devices, but in literature, the theater, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and all the fine arts. Even the commercial value of these is an interesting by-product, when we remember that Phidias has brought and is bringing more money to Greece (to take only one illustration) than all the merchants and businessmen past or present. For hundreds of thousands of tourists go thither only because of the ancient works of art.

No nation is great unless it has a voice. Italy is not great because every boy sleeps on his knapsack; Italy is great because of Dante and Petrarch and Raphael, Michelangelo, Leonardo, Andrea, and all the rest. Germany is not great because she has extended her territory over Austria, Poland, and other areas; Germany is great because of Goethe, Lessing, Schiller, Bach, Beethoven, Wagner, and all the rest. Russia is great not because of Czarism or Communism or Lenin; Russia is great because of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Chekhov, and other writers;

England is great not because she has the most powerful navy in the world, but because she has produced more great poets than any other nation.

No nation can ever be defeated if she has made imperishable contributions to literature. The Romans conquered Greece in 146 B.C. and immediately the conquered country began the conquest of her conquerer. The Romans surrendered to the Greek gods, the Greek literature, and the Greek language. Hitler may or may not be defeated, but no country can defeat Goethe and Beethoven. I was reading the other day in the London *Spectator* an article by Nevinson, who said that when he was English war correspondent in the Boer War, and stood by while in the presence of Earl Roberts the Boer flag was hauled down and the British flag was hauled up, signal of complete and final victory, he then walked through the town and heard in a Boer house a woman playing Beethoven's Waldstein Sonata. "And this is a conquered country?" he meditated. "But no force can defeat a country where the conquered inhabitants play Beethoven." That glorious music was a paean of eternal victory, an indestructible and everlasting triumph.

To show how far Europe has relapsed into barbarism since the first decade of the twentieth century we have only to recall a questionnaire sent about 1905 to many thousands of Germans by the weekly magazine *Arena*, asking them to name "the twelve most important Germans living." Here is the result:

1. Emperor William
2. Gerhart Hauptmann
3. Dr. Robert Koch
4. Ernst Haeckel
5. Professor Roentgen
6. Prince von Bülow
7. Max Klinger
8. Richard Strauss
9. August Bebel
10. General Haeseler
11. Professor Behring
12. Reinhold Begas

The immensely significant fact is that next to the German Emperor (and the vote for him was complimentary) the private

citizen regarded as the most important in the whole nation was a man who had never done anything useful; who had never, in the accepted sense of the word, done a day's "work"; it was the poet, novelist, dramatist, Gerhart Hauptmann. He was regarded as more important than Dr. Koch whose discoveries in tuberculosis had saved thousands of children; than Professor Behring, discoverer of the diphtheria antitoxin; than Professor Roentgen, whose discovery of the X-ray is superlatively useful; more important than a statesman, Prince von Bülow; more important than a great general who fought in the War of 1870; more important than the great socialist leader, Bebel.

Furthermore, of the eleven eligible men on this list, one was a man of letters, one was a composer of music, one was a painter (Klinger), one was a sculptor (Begas)—and Haeckel could be regarded as primarily belonging to literature.

The Paris edition of the *New York Herald*, commenting on this list, said: "It is doubtful whether the Emperor and Prince Bülow would feel complimented in being included in the same list as Herr August Bebel, the greatest exponent of Social Democracy in Germany, and, as a matter of fact, in Europe."

A Yale undergraduate, John H. Garber (B.A. 1923), directed my attention to the following article in *Life* for November 3, 1921:

ORDER OF MERIT

The refusal of the poet *Hauptmann* to consider the possibility of becoming the President of the German Republic should not be taken as a precedent. Mr. Hauptmann explains that he is very busy writing a drama that deals with the great events of the last three years. Political parties, and even governments, may rise and fall, but there is always a chance that a drama by one of the world's most distinguished poets may become a permanent affair. . . .

It requires ability of a high second-rate order to be a statesman.

It requires ability of a high first-rate order to be a poet.

These citations are put in here to emphasize the importance of literature and the fine arts. During the early months of depression, Christopher Morley called on President Hoover in the White House and asked him, "What at the present moment is America's greatest need?" And the President unhesitatingly replied, "America's greatest need is a great poet."

The fact that on the list of twelve Germans appeared both Hauptmann and Bebel cannot be regarded as propaganda either for poetry or for socialism; but it surely does indicate that those who believe in the supreme importance of literature and the fine arts also believe that freedom from autocracy is important to their expression and development.

A good many recent books have dealt with the subject of freedom. A good many philosophers have endeavored to define the word. This is an interesting exercise of the intellectual muscles, and is therefore valuable. But some of the analyses and definitions of the words "liberty" and "freedom" are so metaphysical that the ordinary reader becomes confused; what seemed simple has become complex. Still, I think the common man knows what he wants and perhaps it will help him to consider concrete examples in the past and in the present. Bacon said, "Histories make men wise." Santayana said, "Those who are ignorant of the past are bound to repeat it."

The common man may not be able to give a dictionary definition of freedom; but if he reads an American newspaper containing attacks on the President and observes that in England in the midst of a terrible war, men are allowed to speak and write publicly against the policy of the government, he knows that both England and the United States are free countries.

Although in general the history of the world may show a continual struggle for individual freedom, the cold fact is that there has been very much less freedom since 1915 than there was from 1815 to 1915. Before 1914 one traveled from one country to another in Europe without the vexation of official interference; one never exhibited a passport except in Russia. Such freedom today seems fantastic. The ideal of human existence mentioned in the book of the prophet Micah does not seem roseate or glorious except by the contrast of conditions in 1940: "they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree; and none shall make them afraid." Here no one is promised riches or prosperity or immunity from disease; all that is promised is individual freedom. To be let alone. It does not seem like a Utopia. Yet how very much farther away from this simplicity are we than we were in 1910!

In another portion of the same book of Micah, the then present conditions of life are precisely what they are today in many places in the world:

The good man is perished out of the earth: and there is none up-right among men: they all lie in wait for blood: they hunt every man his brother with a net. . . .

Trust ye not in a friend, put ye not confidence in a guide: keep the doors of thy mouth from her that lieth in thy bosom. . . .

. . . a man's enemies are the men of his own house.

In Mr. Duffus's review in the *New York Times* of a book *On Human Freedom* by Jacques Barzun, the following passage from the book is cited:

Democracy is only the special atmosphere of a constant oligarchy. It is not better than fascism or communism in an absolute sense. It is better only for those who prefer pluralism and the fruits of culture to unanimity and the lazy security of regimentation. . . . As a culture, and when that culture is actively kneaded by critics and creators, it affords more air to breathe freely, more room to move in, more variety to encourage further variety.

In an article in the American magazine *Esquire* for February, 1940, by Dana Doten fascism and communism are called the religion of "little men," those who are content not only to have the machinery of government run by rulers, but to have their own thinking done by the same rulers. Slavery is often more physically comfortable for the slaves than liberty; but human beings, with all their faults and weaknesses, prefer freedom to security. As Mr. Bryan expressed it, "The people have a right to make their own mistakes." Regimentation is fatal to individual liberty.

Even in the happy year 1911, the English critic, George Calderon, in the introduction to his admirable translation of two plays by Chekhov, made the following diagnosis:

Each generation believes that it stands on the boundary line between an old bad epoch and a good new one. And still the world grows no better; rather worse; hungrier, less various, less beautiful. That is true; but there is consolation in the assurance that whatever

becomes of this husk of a planet, the inner meaning of it, hope itself, God, man's ideal, continually progresses and develops.

That is what Mr. Calderon thought of the world in 1911; what he thinks of it now I do not know; he was killed in the war.

One thing is regarded as evil by both authors of the citations just given—*regimentation* instead of *variety*. Mr. Calderon says the world is growing worse and uglier because it is "less various." Mr. Barzun says that democracy is "better only for those who prefer pluralism and the fruits of culture to unanimity and the lazy security of regimentation."

Enlightened minds who love culture recognize the necessity of individual freedom. Nothing is worse for creative literature and art than their subservience to propaganda. Even the degradation of "literature" into pornography is not so evil as its degradation into propaganda. For pornography is generally recognized as evil and repulsive; but the use of creative writing for nationalistic propaganda is widely regarded as moral; it is believed that the artist uses his gifts to aid a noble cause; but he really sacrifices and degrades them. In one of Vachel Lindsay's most original and beautiful poems, "The Broncho Who Would Not Be Broken," he describes the fate of the thoroughbred pony who was hitched by cruel men with giant mules for plowing and who died rather than conform.

Although the author may not have so intended it, his poem could be taken as a symbol of Pegasus degraded into a draft horse for propaganda.

Some of the greatest poets have steadfastly refused. In the Napoleonic wars, Goethe was repeatedly besought by his countrymen to write poems against the French, and he invariably refused to do this. He said, "The French are a civilized people, and I shall not attack them." But I think his real reason was that he regarded poetry as more important than politics. One day many years ago when a general election was in progress John Morley was walking in London and, meeting the poet Rossetti, he asked him which way he had voted. Rossetti's reply showed that he did not even know there was an election; and on being informed, he remarked, "Well, I suppose one side or

the other will get it, and it does not make much difference which." At the time Morley was shocked; but, recalling the incident, he said, "I can't remember now which side did get in."

Whether one is shocked or not by Rossetti's indifference to politics, in his own case it was certainly true that it was more important for humanity for him to write poetry and to paint pictures than it was to take any side in political debates.

It is essential for the welfare of mankind that the importance of creative literature be continually emphasized. The highest level of culture ever known in any one city was in Athens in the fifth century before Christ. And indeed from 500 B.C. to 300 B.C., beauty and form in literature, architecture, sculpture, received conscious emphasis. That golden age took art more seriously than anything else. Sparta, emphasizing only "preparedness," succeeded in "conquering" Athens; but when the Spartans destroyed the long walls, they released immortal beauty into the whole world. What armed force could conquer Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Socrates? And in a certain sense these dramatists were more lasting even than the great man of science who immediately followed them, Aristotle. For today many things in the works of Aristotle could be corrected—but not in Sophocles or in Euripides. They remain as flawless as the Parthenon.

It is significant that this overwhelming emphasis on the esthetic came in an age of intellectual freedom, when the makers of creative literature were free in expression and when people spoke their minds in the market place.

There have been times in the past when literature flourished in a government that was not democratic, but only when the supreme power was definitely favorable to creative writers or when it allowed them to depart and to live in countries that were more free. The history of creative literature includes many great works written in exile and, indeed, works written in prison. The best thing that ever happened to John Bunyan was his imprisonment, because it gave him the only leisure he could find; and the government, instead of torturing him, allowed him access to pen, ink, and paper.

Liberty is the heart of literature. Even in countries where

the ruling powers happened to be favorable to literature and especially to literature that had "no offence in it" the best men preferred liberty, as they preferred freedom to splendor.

In *Les Misérables* one evening at the Club, Marius, the Napoleon-worshiper, wound up a long speech:

"Be just, my friends! to be the empire of such an emperor, what a splendid destiny for a people, when that people is France, and when it adds its genius to the genius of such a man! To appear and to reign, to march and to triumph, to have every capital for a magazine, to take his grenadiers and make kings of them, to decree the downfall of dynasties, to transfigure Europe at a double quick-step, so that men feel, when you threaten, that you lay your hand on the hilt of the sword of God, to follow, in a single man, Hannibal, Caesar, and Charlemagne, to be the people of one who mingles with your every dawn the glorious announcement of a battle gained, to be wakened in the morning by the cannon of the Invalides, to hurl into the vault of day mighty words which blaze for ever, Marengo, Arcola, Austerlitz, Jena, Wagram! to call forth at every moment constellations of victories in the zenith of the centuries, to make the French Empire the successor of the Roman Empire, to be the Grand Nation and to bring forth the Grand Army, to send your legions flying over the whole earth as a mountain sends its eagles upon all sides, to vanquish, to rule, to thunderstrike, to be in Europe a kind of gilded people through much glory, to sound through history a Titan trumpet call, to conquer the world twice, by conquest and by resplendence, this is sublime, and what can be more grand?"

"To be free," said Combeferre.

Henry A. Wallace

Secretary of Agriculture in the Government of the United States

THE GENETIC BASIS FOR DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

IN this essay I shall deal especially with the subject of "racism"—that is, the attempts of individuals in certain groups to dominate others through the building up of false racial theories in support of their claims. My discussion also will include the role that scientists can play in combating such false theories and preventing the use of these theories for the destruction of human liberty.

Naturally, having spent some years in the field of genetics, I would be the last person in the world to deny that heredity is an important factor in the plant and animal and human world around us. In recent years I have dealt more directly with social problems, and I have been just as greatly impressed with the part played by environment. But my experience in both these fields has given me some insight also into the misconceptions and limitations as to both heredity and environment as factors controlling the destinies of human beings.

It may be worth while to review here briefly the old question of heredity and environment, and see what is the consensus of present scientific judgment on this subject.

Marvelous progress has been made in the field of genetics in the years since Mendel's law began to be put to work by myriads of scientists unraveling problems of heredity. Our knowledge of chromosomes and genes and the way they affect the development of animals and particularly plants has been helpful in increasing the efficiency of agricultural production.

Much that has been done, not only in the development of strains of livestock for the farm, but in the breeding of race horses, dogs, and other animals, is due to the concentration of desirable genes through selective breeding.

People naturally have said, "If such wonderful results can be attained with plants and animals, why not breed a superior race of humans?"

Efforts in this direction may some day be worth while, but we should recognize today the meagerness of our knowledge and the impossibility at present, so far as human heredity is concerned, of translating even that meager knowledge into practice.

We know that human heredity is transmitted through the forty-eight chromosomes with which each baby starts its life. On these chromosomes, which are found in every cell of the body, are the beadlike structures called genes which in some fashion determine the various characteristics of the individual. From our genetic studies we know that in humans there are perhaps 10,000 of these genes—governing not only physical characteristics such as color of eyes and skin, but also mental and emotional attributes. Obviously, in view of the life span of human beings and the number of genes with which we must deal, it is absurd from a scientific, to say nothing of a sociological, point of view to expect to be able to breed a new race which is superior in mental and moral as well as physical qualities, even if we had many hundreds of years in which to work.

It might be possible to concentrate on some one characteristic, such as tallness, and produce striking results in a few generations, in the way that livestock breeders have done through selective breeding with colors of coat and other physical characteristics that mark the breeds. Or we might be able to do spectacular things in the way of musical ability, which we know definitely is transmitted as a hereditary trait.

But as to the transmission of intelligence, our knowledge is still very limited. During the last three years the Department of Agriculture, in its experiment station at Beltsville, Maryland, has been studying intelligence and its associated characters in dogs, in an effort to learn to what extent these characters

are inherited and how they respond to different environmental stimuli.

As measures of intelligence, six different tests have been used, these being designed to measure such characters as learning, obedience, and courage and the extent to which variations in these traits affect sheepherding ability.

Tremendous variations in intelligence, as measured by these tests, have been found to exist. Some dogs respond well to all tests and others are distinctly morons. Others respond well to one test, such as a test of courage or obedience, but fail on others. One dog passes all the tests with flying colors but for some reason is a failure when it comes to actual sheepherding. Like some humans, he is good as long as he is passing examinations, but a failure in the business world. Timidity may so affect the behavior of an otherwise intelligent dog that it will fail completely in its other tests, yet the evidence would seem to indicate that such dogs if properly handled may do exceptionally well as sheepherders.

Experimental matings of the dogs are now in progress to determine in what way such characteristics are inherited. It is too early to know the outcome of these matings, but our results so far show that great variation exists in these traits in all breeds. It is evident from the results that breed differences do exist with respect to certain traits. In the main, however, with environment constant, we know that so far as intelligence is concerned, there is much more difference between the animals within the breed than between the breeds themselves.

Heredity is a fact, and we cannot escape its effects. But I think any geneticist worthy of the name would agree that environment is also a fact, and that we cannot truly evaluate the place of heredity unless we provide a favorable environment for the chromosomes and genes to do their work. The inherited character is the end result of the interaction of specific genetic factors, or genes, under the conditions of the environment. Years ago, when I was in college, the boys used to ask the animal husbandry professor what cross produces the best meat animal. He usually answered, "the corncrib cross"—in other words, plenty of food. That applies not only to meat animals,

but also to children, and explains why good diet is so important in children's growth and development. It also explains the efforts of the Department of Agriculture to improve the diet of our underprivileged children through the Food Stamp Plan and other measures which are making the surpluses of the farms available to consumers who need them most. We feel that good feeding is more important than racial selection in improving our national stock.

Numerous experiments have been carried on by geneticists and psychologists to determine if possible the relative importance of environment and heredity, or nurture and nature. In these experiments, various tests, including that known as the I.Q. test, have been applied. One experiment, carried on in Iowa, measured the I.Q. of children born of moronic mothers so as to determine whether their I.Q. had been raised after being placed in a favorable environment. Other studies have been made with identical and fraternal twins, some pairs having been reared together and others apart.

Walter S. Neff, of the College of the City of New York, in his study of *Socio-Economic Status and Intelligence*, points out that nearly all the differences in intelligence between groups of children of the highest and lowest status is due to environment. This is his conclusion after a critical survey of the comparatively large amount of work done by various scientists. He says that "it has definitely *not* been proved that social status of the parent has anything to do with native endowment of the infant. That a positive relationship later in the life of the individual may develop is hardly denied. But all the summarized studies tend to show that low cultural environment tends to *depress* I.Q. approximately to the degree agreed to as characteristic of laborers' children, and that a high environment *raises* I.Q. correspondingly. All, then, of the twenty-point mean difference in I.Q. found to exist between children of the lowest and highest status may be accounted for entirely in environmental terms."

The truth is that, from a practical standpoint, we can do very little to improve the heredity of human beings. Most of the differences which are attributed to race are really due to social

or economic background, and we know positively that social and economic background in the vast majority of cases has nothing whatever to do with heredity. In other words, there is no reason to believe that a thousand children from wealthy homes on Park Avenue in New York City will on the average have any more intelligence than a thousand children from poverty-stricken sharecropper families from the South if both are given the same food, care, and educational opportunity. There are some environments in the United States which I suspect might in certain cases cause a child sixteen years old to have an I.Q. of 60 and other environments which might cause the same child at the age of sixteen to have an I.Q. of 120. That would be an extreme example, of course, but it illustrates my point, which is that although we can do very little to improve the heredity of human beings, we can do a great deal to improve their environment.

The effect of environment on body size was brought out by studies completed recently by the Bureau of Home Economics in co-operation with the Works Progress Administration. Measurements were obtained on 147,000 boys and girls distributed in fifteen states and the District of Columbia. Thirty-six body measurements including weight were taken for every child.

It was found that these children differed in body structure from State to State. The children measured on the west coast, for instance, are on an average larger than the children measured in any other section of the country. Children of different social and economic groups were compared, and the results showed that children of a higher income level were on the average larger with respect to most measurements than children of a lower economic level. In some instances, the social and economic comparisons were made between and within regions. The results were quite illuminating. Children of the higher economic level measured on the west coast were found to be larger than the children of the lower economic level of that region. One might jump to the conclusion that the children in the wealthier families had a better heredity. But the children of the lower economic level measured on the west coast were larger than the children of the higher economic level measured

in the other region to which I refer. Unless we are ready to concede that there are distinct hereditary differences among the people of our several States, or that the differences can be accounted for by selective migration, we must assume that the variations in size are due to variations in environment.

Further evidence of the effect of environment is found in observations of the Farm Security Administration concerning underprivileged farm families. Economic handicaps resulting from the tilling of submarginal land or too small acreage, from one-crop farming, and from insecurity of tenure go along with lack of education and poor health. Doubtless in some cases there are also hereditary weaknesses, but we have reason to believe that deficiencies due to remediable environmental drawbacks are far more frequent than those due to hereditary tendencies.

I have discussed the question of environment in relation to heredity at some length because it has a direct bearing on the claims concerning superior racial stock—claims that have to do not only with definite physical characteristics but also with the less tangible mental and spiritual traits.

Such claims have been put forth in Europe within the last few years as a justification for conquest and the suppression of human liberty.

The fallacies of such claims as they pertain to any one group of Europeans are readily apparent from a study of the purity of European nationalities and stocks. To show just how far from pure these stocks actually are would require a comprehensive analysis of the entire history of Europe. But even in the absence of such a detailed study, their mixed or heterozygous nature is apparent from the historical fact that conquering tribes of Huns, Turks, Mongols, and other peoples moved across the face of Europe and blended with such diverse groups as the Armenians, Finns, Slavs, Greeks, and Germans. The introduction of the African Negro slaves and the intermingling of the various local peoples of Europe also contributed to the mixture. All of this intermingling brought about not only a diversity of common physical characteristics but also the more important psychological ones. Europe has been a vast "melting pot" for the same peoples for the past two hundred years.

The racial situation in Europe is so confused that even the Nazi theorists have been appalled and have found it necessary to retreat from the concept of a Nordic body to that of a Nordic soul. Apparently it is necessary to infer that among the leaders of the Nazis there are some typical Nordic souls animating some exceedingly non-Nordic bodies.

I do not wish to give the impression that the mixing, or blending, of European stocks was undesirable. I do wish to emphasize the historical fact that it occurred, and in the light of this fact, to point out that it is sheer nonsense for anyone to talk about the purity of any European stocks. Europe gives us one of the best examples that we could have of a heterozygous population. In its population are gathered together most of the human genes of the world—genes that determine size; color of skin, hair, and eyes; intelligence, craftiness, feeble-mindedness, and thousands of other characteristics.

Judging by our corn studies, which involve the actual creation of pure strains, as the Nazis apparently would like to do with human beings, it would require at least seventeen generations, or five hundred years, of the closest possible kind of breeding to get out of this conglomerate population anything approaching purity. Corn-breeding work has taught us that pure lines derived in this way are usually weak and require crossing in order to attain vigor. The vigor of the human race has continuously been sustained by crossings of diverse types.

It is, of course, undeniable that the idea of a racially pure stock has great emotional appeal, and that for economic and political purposes only it has been used very effectively to deceive many people. But scientists should be the last to be deceived by false racial theories based on emotional appeal and fostered for political purposes.

There is really no such thing as a pure race, in the sense in which the term is commonly used by fanatics. I like the statement contained in a resolution unanimously passed by the American Anthropological Association in December, 1938, which read: "Race involves the inheritance of similar physical variations by large groups of mankind, but its psychological and cul-

tural connotations, if they exist, have not been ascertained by science."

It is not only in Europe that fallacious claims concerning mentally superior racial stocks are made. In this country, much of our thinking is based on assumptions that certain races or racial strains are mentally superior or inferior. These assumptions crop out in discussions of voting rights, of immigration policies, and of the sterilization of supposedly "inadequate" members of society. I repeat, heredity plays its part in human affairs. There are great differences between the heredity of different individuals, but as in the case of breeds of livestock developed for the same purpose, the differences between the individuals within a given nationality or group are much greater than the differences between the nationalities or groups. Most of the assumptions commonly held about superior or inferior human stock are not in accord with the findings of science.

It is encouraging therefore to discover the balanced scientific view of this question so well stated by a group of leading thinkers in the "Geneticists' Manifesto" made public in Edinburgh at the time of the Genetics Congress held there in August, 1939. This manifesto, accepting the existence of hereditary differences between human beings as a basic premise, declares that "the effective genetic improvement of mankind is dependent upon major changes in social conditions, and correlative changes in human attitudes," and that "there can be no valid basis for estimating and comparing the intrinsic worth of different individuals without economic and social conditions which provide approximately equal opportunities for all members of society instead of stratifying them from birth into classes with widely different privileges." The manifesto calls for the "removal of race prejudices and the unscientific doctrine that good or bad genes are the monopoly of particular peoples or of persons with features of a given kind." It declares that genetic improvement of the race cannot be achieved "unless there is an organization of production primarily for the benefit of consumer and worker, unless the conditions of employment are adapted to the needs of parents and especially of mothers,

and unless dwellings, towns and community services generally are reshaped with the good of children as one of their main objectives." And the manifesto concludes: "The day when economic reconstruction will reach the stage where such human forces will be released is not yet, but it is the task of this generation to prepare for it, and all steps along the way will represent a gain, not only for the possibilities of the ultimate genetic improvement of man, to a degree seldom dreamed of hitherto, but at the same time, more directly, for human mastery over those more immediate evils which are so threatening our modern civilization."

Those "immediate evils" of which the manifesto speaks are all too terrifyingly real to be ignored. All of us have seen how the fallacious doctrines of racial superiority have been translated into attempts to perpetuate or seize political and economic advantage. In some countries of Europe, these attempts have been completely successful, and personal freedom—including freedom of the scientist to follow his calling unhampered—is gone. In the United States also, "racism" has reared its ugly head.

For the combating of "racism" before it sinks its poisonous fangs deep into our body politic, the scientist has both a special motive and a special responsibility. His motive comes from the fact that when personal liberty disappears scientific liberty also disappears. His responsibility comes from the fact that only he can give the people the truth. Only he can clean out the falsities which have been masquerading under the name of science in our colleges, our high schools, and our public prints. Only he can show how groundless are the claims that one race, one nation, or one class has any God-given right to rule.

To disseminate the truth about this all-important question is the first duty of the scientist. But his responsibility goes further. He should without ceasing to be a scientist do his best to bring about better social and economic arrangements. He should throw his weight definitely on the side of making our democracy a true democracy, so that every child and every adult may have an equal opportunity to earn and enjoy the

good things of life. In doing this he will truly serve science, and he will truly serve humanity.

In this hour of world-wide crisis, it is time for men of science to act. It is time for them to band together to spread far and wide the truth about the genetic basis of democracy, and to work together for a better environment so that our political democracy and scientific freedom may survive.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FREEDOM

THE first essential in any scientific study is a possibility of comparison. The measuring rod, the stop watch, and the balance are at the very roots of science. If our study of freedom is to have any practical results, we must try to tackle the question, Is A freer than B? A may be a bus-driver in New York, and B a bus-driver in Belgrade. Or B may be a corporation vice-president, a poet, or A's wife, in New York. In almost every case we find the question unanswerable. A has more freedom than B in some directions, but less in others. And the different kinds of freedom are incommensurable. A can, if he wants to, read the works of Marx, and can afford to go to the movies every night, which B cannot. But B can have a drink after 10 P.M. and can afford a garden where his children can play, which A cannot. Who is to decide which is freer? Our best plan will be to specify different possible fields of freedom, so that we may be able to carry out comparisons within these fields. The overall summary will inevitably be subjective, but we can at least say that in some particular respect A is more free or less free than B.

Besides asking whether A is freer than B, we can ask the very important question whether A is becoming more free or less free in a given respect as the years go by. I would personally prefer to live in a country where freedom was increasing from a rather low level to one where it was declining from a

high level. This again is perhaps a matter of one's own philosophy. But certainly such trends cannot be neglected.

Our classification of the fields of freedom will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary, and different classifications will overlap. Thus let us see what is meant by religious freedom, which most people in the United States honestly believe that they enjoy. It means legal freedom to believe any of a fair variety of doctrines and to persuade others of their truth. There is also legal freedom to attack the religious doctrines of others up to a point. But you will find yourself in jail if you walk into a Catholic church and denounce the worshipers as idolaters, or into a Protestant church and brand them as heretics. You may practice religious rites if they are not indecent or dangerous to life. But if you think you enjoy full religious freedom, try practicing the Hindu Laya Yoga in New York and see how long the vice squad will leave you alone. Or bring over a crate of rattlesnakes and try the Hopi snake dance, and see how many laws you are breaking. As for the religion of the Latter-Day Saints, which turned the salt deserts of Utah into a garden, one of its main practices, polygamy, has been prohibited by the Congress of the United States. The plain fact is that in any society there has at most been freedom for a group of religions which enjoin fairly similar standards of moral conduct. So it will be logical to divide up religious freedom under freedom to communicate ideas, freedom in sexual relations, various kinds of economic freedom, freedom of children, and so on.

Besides this horizontal classification, so to speak, there is a vertical classification of freedoms at different levels. The most fundamental level is the technical level. This may be Marxism, but it is also common sense. There could be no freedom of the press before printing was invented, because there was no press to be free or unfree. Thus a technical advance makes possible a new kind of freedom and a new kind of bondage. Given the technical possibility, there must in general be some legal restrictions. In no country is the press so free that incitements to murder the rulers of a state may be printed within it. Most people will support this restriction. Besides legal restrictions

there are customary restrictions. Law permits me, but custom refuses me, the right to walk about the streets of London in

“A scarlet tunic with sunflowers decked,
And a peacock hat with the tail erect,
Which might have had a more marked effect.”

In primitive societies there is no division between legal and customary restrictions, and in England too gross a breach of custom may turn out to be the crime of “insulting behavior.”

Economic restrictions on freedom are of primary importance. A vast number of technical possibilities are only open to a small minority. Very few people can own a steam yacht. Somewhat more can own a grand piano or an automobile. The all-important liberty of communicating ideas is enormously restricted by the fact that very few people are rich enough to own a daily newspaper. Further, the development of technique tends to increase economic restrictions on liberty, simply because modern technical inventions embody a great deal more labor time than most of those of the past. Augustus Caesar could have more clothes and a larger house than an ordinary well-to-do Roman. But, unless he had wanted to have a pyramid built for him, he had few or no kinds of qualitative freedom, beyond his special political freedom as Emperor, which many other Roman citizens did not enjoy. Communists, who are often regarded as enemies of freedom, lay great stress on the fact that in practice many kinds of freedom, though not legally or customarily restricted, are economically restricted so that they are the privileges of a small minority. “Liberty,” they claim, “is such a precious thing that it must be rationed.” Under socialism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, certain liberties, for example the liberty to print or to voyage in a yacht, can only be practiced by groups.

Finally we must consider internal restrictions on freedom. These may be at a variety of levels which in practice we rather arbitrarily divide into physiological and psychological, though every doctor realizes that the distinction is seldom quite sharp. Clearly a paralytic has less freedom than a man with full power over his muscles. But most people would regard a man

with a wooden leg as freer than a cocaine addict or a victim of an obsessional psychosis which compels him to wash his hands twenty times a day. Beyond this it is harder to go. We all know people whose idea of "true freedom" is the following of some very narrow path. We can hardly define psychological freedom without venturing into philosophy. Freedom is something more than being able to do what one desires so far as the laws of nature permit. The drug addict with unlimited supplies of his drug is at least relatively unfree. His actions are controlled by a single motive, and lead to madness and death. A rich man who oscillates in a narrow orbit of office, bed, golf course, and annual holiday in the same resort is controlled by a narrow set of motives. He is relatively unfree because he has been so effectively conditioned by society that he has no will of his own. We need not however go to the other extreme and hold up as an example of complete freedom the man who never keeps an appointment or is faithful to one woman for a month on end. The so-called Bohemian can be described as the slave of his own caprices, and psychoanalysis would probably show that he is dominated by irrational motives of which he is unconscious.

As a geneticist, I see the problem in this way. Every human being, apart from monozygotic twins, has a unique genotype. For example, my own genotype determines in me a subnormal capacity for music and a supernormal capacity for mathematics. Every genotype can be placed in many different environments. In some the individual will develop its powers and act freely; in others this will not be so. If I had been born into a musical family and had had no opportunity of learning mathematics, I should have been less free than I am. Some genotypes, such as those which determine idiocy, can never attain to much freedom. A few, perhaps, can only find their realization in anti-social activity, though this is doubtful. But in any modern society a vast number of different activities are open. In so far as the choice between these activities is based on genotypes we can say that the society is free. Or to put it in another way, that society is freest in which each individual is pursuing those activities which give most scope to his or her innate abilities. I

am perfectly aware that Aristotle defined happiness as "unimpeded activity." It may be said that I am speaking of happiness rather than freedom. The framers of the American Constitution realized that they were closely connected, though I suspect that happiness arises rather as a by-product from other activities than from its own deliberate pursuit.

But we cannot leave the matter on this merely biological level. I agree with Spinoza, Hegel, Engels, and Caudwell, to whose analysis of freedom in *Illusion and Reality* I am profoundly indebted, in defining freedom as the recognition of necessity. This is obviously true in the technical field. As long as men thought in terms of magic carpets, seven-league boots, and angels who carried a house from Palestine to Italy, they could not begin to investigate the necessities embodied in the laws of physics. And until they did this, they could not build railways or automobiles. It is also true in the social and political fields. A free man willingly obeys laws which he recognizes as just, that is to say, necessary in the existing social context. And it is true in the psychological field. Here one is free so far as one understands one's own motives. In order to do this one must not merely examine one's own consciousness and so far as possible one's unconscious, but also the social system by which one has been conditioned. A man who accepts his mother's moral teaching as the voice of conscience is no more free than one who believes his sex hormones when they tell him that the last pretty girl he has met is the most wonderful woman in the world. The difference between a man and an animal is largely a matter of consciousness, and the difference between a psychologically free and unfree man is also largely a matter of consciousness.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Imprisonment is the very negation of freedom. And freedom to go where one wants to is a very important kind of freedom, if only because one can escape from many kinds of bondage provided emigration to a freer country is possible. In the nineteenth century freedom of movement meant political freedom

for many millions of Europeans who crossed the Atlantic to the United States. Today this is no longer so.

Freedom of movement depends in the most obvious way on technical inventions, such as roads, the riding of animals, wheels, harness, ships, railroads, automobiles, and aeroplanes. But this technical progress has had two effects. It has made legal restrictions on freedom of movement necessary, and it has led to economic inequalities. Bullock cart drivers on country roads in India do not seem to worry much about the rule of the road. A collision between two vehicles moving at three miles per hour does not greatly matter. But somewhere about ten miles an hour a rule of the road becomes necessary. At twenty miles an hour the energy liberated in a head-on crash is increased fourfold, and the rule becomes a matter of life and death. With higher speeds an elaborate road code, and special police to enforce it, are needed. That is to say, some legal restrictions on freedom are the inevitable result of technological gains in freedom. In actual fact many of these legal restrictions result in real gains of freedom. I can drive much faster because drivers are restricted to one side of the road than I could if both were legal. And being a rational man I recognize the necessity for this restriction and gain in freedom by doing so.

I gain from other restrictions. The anarchist's ideal would, I suppose, be that anyone should be free to go anywhere. But I am actually freer because this is not so, and no one has a legal right to enter my house except with my permission or with a warrant from the State. I should be still freer if I possessed a small private garden. But privacy can be carried too far, and it is carried too far when one man can enclose a hundred square miles of mountains for the purpose of shooting, and keep the public off them. In this case, as in many others, a considerable measure of equality is a requisite for freedom.

In practice, however, restrictions due to private property in land are less serious than other economic restrictions. Most people in Britain cannot move about as they would like to for one of two reasons. Either they have a job, get only very brief holidays, and, though they may have saved a good deal of money, dare not leave their job for fear of losing it. Or they

are out of work and cannot afford to travel. It is extremely difficult to arrive at any data, but I am inclined to think that the average man has a greater freedom of movement in the United States than anywhere else, and that this freedom is increasing most rapidly in the Soviet Union, where it is already fairly high. This, if correct, is due to the great development of transport and the high real wage in the U.S.A., and the system of holidays with pay and workers' holiday resorts in the U.S.S.R., together with the fact that as there is no unemployment there, workers tend to move very freely from one job to another.

It is also due to the large size of these two states. It is extremely difficult to leave one's country in search of work. And in an increasing number of states one cannot take any large sum of money out of it, so that in practice one can only travel abroad on State business or business approved of by the State. The difficulties of foreign travel have been increasing for the average man since 1900. A rich man or a man with political influence can fly half round the world in a week. But I can remember when I could travel to most European states without a passport, whereas now I must often waste days in getting the necessary visas. Freedom in this respect is declining rapidly. The restrictions are certainly mainly due to economic causes. If, as seems likely, capitalism works progressively worse as the years pass, they will increase. And it will become increasingly desirable to be a citizen of a State covering a large area. For this purpose, by the way, the British Empire is not a State. One needs a passport or permit to travel to Ireland or Canada from Britain.

As for the internal or psychological aspects of freedom of movement, we are slaves of custom to a most surprising degree. I spent three days this winter going up the principal mountains of Wales in January, when they are covered with snow. I met exactly two other parties, though the Alps were crawling with Englishmen a year ago. And in certain types of society there is a strong ideological objection to travel. It is instructive to read the words which Dante puts into the mouth of Ulysses in hell. In one of the greatest passages in literature he describes

a voyage of exploration to South Africa. And he repents it. Dante thought it was wicked to sail outside the straits of Gibraltar.

Very few people are explorers. A ban on exploration is no infringement of the liberty of the vast majority of people. Yet it may have a decisive effect on the history of a nation. The present expansionist drive in Japan is largely a belated attempt to overcome the handicap produced by the prohibition of foreign travel from 1636 to 1860. A blow to the liberty of a very small minority may be a blow to a whole people.

FREEDOM AS A CONSUMER

Every human being is a consumer, even if not a producer. Every improvement in the technique of manufacture means a potential increase in freedom of consumption. So does every increase in real wages. Hence a comparison of the real wages in different countries tells us a good deal about the amount of this kind of freedom. Given the possibility of buying something beyond essential food, clothing, and shelter, freedom depends on the choice of commodities or services which is available and the way in which the choice is actually made.

Legal restrictions may be few, as in the United States. (Some people think that lethal weapons are too easily bought there.) They may be very serious, as in Britain during war, when many foreign-made goods are unobtainable owing to import restrictions. Over large sections of the world freedom of consumption has been drastically curtailed in recent years in order to promote national economic self-sufficiency, or autarchy. Apart from the question of books, which will be considered later, the most interesting problem is that of alcohol and drugs. Heroin is an unrivaled cough cure. I have several times taken large amounts of it for a considerable period without developing the faintest craving. Probably many others—perhaps a majority—would be none the worse if they could buy it freely whenever they had a cough. But there are enough potential addicts to justify its prohibition. Many people would prohibit alcoholic beverages because when they are sold freely some people abuse them.

The attempt was a failure in the United States, but may succeed in India. No prohibition of this kind should be regarded as desirable in itself. In fact, even if we agree that narcotics should not now be sold freely, we may hope that our descendants will one day achieve sufficient psychological freedom to make free sale possible.

Custom, as well as law, plays a very big part in limiting freedom of consumption. There may be a standardized type of expenditure for a given class or profession. Thus until recently in England the ritual killing of foxes, grouse, salmon, and so on, at appropriate times of the year, was the hallmark of respectability. At an earlier period a gentleman was expected to form a library. In the present age of transition England is probably unusually free in this respect, freer than the United States or France. On the other hand, as we shall see later, England is one of the least free countries in the world as regards discussion of the merits of consumable goods.

I think it probable that, owing to the high average real wage, the United States heads the list as regards freedom of consumption. This was almost certainly so during the epoch immediately preceding the Eighteenth Amendment and the economic collapse of 1929. Today there are so many families with no margin for buying beyond the barest necessities that it is not so certain. The most rapid increase, though from a low level, is occurring in the Soviet Union.

FREEDOM AS A PRODUCER

I personally enjoy nearly maximal freedom as to how I earn my living. I am paid to devote myself to a certain branch of science. I give a few lectures and conduct research on problems which interest me. I have no fixed hours of work, and I could take three months' holiday a year if I wished. Besides this I earn some money by writing. But I do not have to support opinions of which I disapprove in order to earn my living. In fact I combine a decent remuneration with free choice. A few other intellectual workers are equally fortunate, but this number is rapidly diminishing, at least in western Europe. How

few paid manual or administrative workers enjoy this kind of freedom is shown by the universal demand for recreation, i.e., an alternative to work and purely cultural activities, such as listening to good music, and by the fact that many people actually look forward to retiring from their work.

On the technological level freedom of production is being rapidly strangled by the abuse of patent laws by monopolists. In many industries the small firm is hopelessly handicapped for this reason, quite apart from underselling and other activities of trusts.

Freedom as a producer means in particular freedom to choose your occupation, freedom to regulate its details, and unless the occupation is pleasurable, short hours of work and long holidays. Where there is widespread unemployment there can be no freedom of choice. A man with a job holds it like a bulldog, and does not try a number until he gets one to his liking. Under capitalism the workers have little opportunity of controlling their conditions of labor, though trade unions can accomplish something, and as a voter the worker may be able to help himself in a very indirect way. Where, as in Germany, neither method is available, illegal strike action may still have some effect. But direct control, as on a Soviet collective farm, or to a less extent in a Soviet factory, is only possible under socialism. Since hours and holidays are satisfactory in the Soviet Union, and unemployment does not exist, it appears that man is freer as a producer there than elsewhere. Since in all capitalist countries the independent producer is being more and more completely eliminated, the prospects of freedom for producers under capitalism do not seem to be bright.

FREEDOM AS A CAPITALIST

In Dante's hell the sins of Sodom and Cahors were punished by a shower of slowly falling flames. But while the former class of sinners could escape them to some extent by running, the latter, who were usurers, or as we should say, financiers, were not allowed this privilege. However, usury is now permitted throughout Christendom, and this freedom has been an

essential condition of the immense technical advances made under capitalism. These advances are slowing down because finance, which formerly served industry, is now strangling it.

In the Soviet Union the sin of Cahors is punished in this world, and so are other activities by which one man appropriates what, according to Marxist economics, is the value created by the labor of others. These activities include not only usury, but private trade and the employment of others for profit. The extreme form of the latter kind of exploitation, namely, slavery, is of course almost universally illegal. The antisocialist claims that a very vital kind of freedom has been suppressed. The socialist retorts that this kind of freedom, like freedom to drive on the wrong side of the road, is incompatible with the fullest technical progress, and that those natural powers which are developed in the capitalist can be used under socialism in administrative posts. Outside the Soviet Union freedom of trade and investment is at present being effectively strangled in most belligerent and some neutral countries, except for those very large corporations which to a considerable extent control the States. It is hard to say where the capitalist is freest. I should hazard a guess that Argentina stood somewhere near the opposite pole from the Soviet Union.

SEXUAL FREEDOM

The minimum amount of freedom compatible with the reproduction of the race was enjoyed in Paraguay, where the Jesuits married off their Indian subjects without allowing a choice of spouses. Marriage between different groups of the population may be illegal, as in Germany and South Africa; it may lead to loss of employment, as when officers in the British Guards "marry beneath them"; or it may merely meet with social disapproval. Divorce and remarriage are permitted in most countries, though not, for example, in Italy.

Extramarital intercourse is rarely a crime, provided the parties are of a certain age. However, adultery is liable to severe punishment in India. And prostitution is criminal in many countries, though only in the Soviet Union is the man con-

cerned punished more severely than the woman. Intercourse between two males is generally criminal (though not in Denmark), while that of women is rarely so. There is an equally bewildering variety in the customary limitations to sexual activity. In some circles within the same country monogamy is rigid, in others people normally "live in sin."

Almost everyone will agree that complete sexual freedom (which I suppose would include freedom of rape) is undesirable. Dante and I (to mention no others) would say the same of economic freedom. As regards legal sexual freedom Denmark probably heads the list of civilized states, while Ireland ranks very low both as regards legal and customary freedom. The high cultural level and the rarity of prostitution in Denmark seem to show that such freedom may be harmless.

The main economic bars to sexual freedom are unemployment and gross disparity of income. Both of these may lead a woman to cohabit (whether in or out of wedlock) with a man whom she does not love, but whose income is more secure or larger than her own would be were she independent. It may similarly, but more rarely, induce a man to marry a woman for her money, or to live with her. This kind of check on freedom is probably most pronounced in the "Latin" nations and least so in the Soviet Union.

A discussion of psychological checks awaits the development of a comparative analytical psychology.

FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE IDEAS AND STATEMENTS

This field of freedom includes freedom of speech, of the post, and of the press. Technologically it depends on the inventions of writing, printing, telegraphy, radio, and so on, and on the development of arts such as poetry, drama, and cinematography. Incitements to certain crimes and grossly indecent speech, writing, and art are everywhere illegal. Further, one or more of the technical means of communication may be a monopoly of the State or of big business. Thus radio is directly controlled by the State almost everywhere in Europe, but not in the United States. On the other hand the United States

film industry is probably more trustified than those of some European nations.

The legal restraints may be by civil or criminal law. State prosecutions of men for speeches and writings are rather rare in England, though a Mr. Gott has several times been imprisoned for rude remarks about God, and ten years ago communist speakers and writers were constantly being imprisoned. If Britain follows the example of France, this condition is likely to recur. But as compared with many countries Englishmen have a wide liberty of propaganda on general matters. For example, in France the State forbids public statements in favor of the Third International; in the Soviet Union, against it. In England both are permitted, but favorable statements must be cautiously framed.

In law there is extremely little freedom of political discussion in England. Sedition is defined as a word, deed, or writing calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State, and lead ignorant persons to subvert the government and laws. In actual practice you can say a great deal in ordinary times, and print a great deal if you can get a printer. But in times of political tension the law may be enforced against the opponents of the government. Not of course against the opponents of the king. In 1936 the *Daily Worker*, the communist party organ, was alone among daily papers in suggesting that Edward VIII might consult his own wishes regarding his marriage. The undoubtedly seditious and possibly treasonable activities of the leaders of the Conservative party and the Church of England which led to that monarch's abdication were not, of course, interfered with.

In the Soviet Union the position is the opposite. Legally there is fairly complete freedom of speech. And actually there is a good deal. I have heard a man say that he could not see much difference between Stalin and Nicholas. A member of an important Soviet merely replied that there was quite a big difference. But on the whole custom is more stringent than law; so that there is somewhat less verbal political criticism than in England, though much more than in Germany or Italy, and perhaps more than in France. On the other hand the press

has in practice little freedom in political matters. In fact in Europe a press consistently opposing the government is only found in Britain, Switzerland (and before Hitler's invasion), in Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. In Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium, this liberty was largely restricted. Thus among European nations, Britain enjoys considerable press freedom in political matters.

On the other hand English civil law makes any statement which could affect the financial interests of a well-to-do man very dangerous. For example, a firm recently circulated a leaflet to the effect that I habitually used a medicine which they sell. I have never even seen it. I was told that the statement was not a libel on me. I attempted to deny it in the press and even to suggest that the firm had in some measure departed from the strictest canons of morality in using my name. This suggestion was held to be probably libelous, and no journal would publish it for fear of an action. Finally one journal has consented to publish a bare denial, without any comment.

Similarly it is extremely dangerous to make any attack on the character of a rich man in public life. In consequence there is an entirely erroneous impression in many quarters that British politics are less corrupt than those of France or the United States. Attempts have been made to start consumers' research in Britain, as in the United States. But the law of libel prevents this. Hence there has been a considerable deterioration in the quality of some British manufactured goods in recent years from the high standards of the nineteenth century.

To my mind the correct law would be fairly simple. Either statements of a general character about commodities made without any evidence being adduced in their support, such as "Guinness¹ is good for you," should be illegal; or, better, it should be legal to make such statements and also equally unsupported statements, such as "Bass¹ is bad for you, and Worthington¹ is worse." At present, in commercial matters one can only praise, and not blame. Given the further fact that advertisers exercise a very strong influence over the policy of newspapers, so that in practice numbers of advertisements appear in the

¹ These are names of beers widely sold in England.

news columns, it will be seen that there is very little freedom of criticism in commercial matters.

This kind of criticism appears to be highly developed in the Soviet Union, particularly in such journals as *Krokodil* and *Vechernaya Moskva*. And indeed it is a necessity if socialism is to be successful, since such criticism is a possible alternative to competition for sales between different firms, as a means for keeping up the quality of goods.

The freedom of the press is both legally and economically limited. In most countries libel, whether seditious or not, is more severely punished than slander. Everywhere technological progress is tending to improve the position of the big daily newspaper with a circulation covering a radius of 250 miles or so from its press, as against the small paper. Hence large capital is needed to start a daily newspaper, and wholesale distributive organizations can be used, and are used in England, to boycott any newspaper which criticizes the government too severely. In practice this method, and the influence of advertisers, means that in capitalist countries the circulation of socialist journals is very small compared with the number of socialists, even where such journals are legal. In the Soviet Union any attempt to start an opposition journal would probably be prevented by practical rather than legal difficulties.

The position as regards publication of books is roughly parallel to that of the press. In Britain the law of libel is the main check. I have personally been prevented from criticizing fraudulent claims made for foods and drugs, from suggesting that certain doctors were incompetent, and from exposing pro-Nazi activities of British Conservative politicians and writers. The ban on indecency makes a scientific discussion of certain branches of human physiology rather difficult. But it is not a serious difficulty. On the other hand it is extremely severe in Ireland and used with great effect. Books published in Britain which are politically offensive to the government have long been prevented from entering certain parts of the Empire, and since the war their export to neutral countries has also been stopped. However, as regards book publication Britain is incomparably freer than most European states.

Other methods of disseminating opinion, such as the drama, are often subject to censorship. This is so in Britain. At the present moment for example, the censor, though he allows a measure of antiwar propaganda on the stage, forbids all reference to the help rendered to Hitler by members of the British government in the years before the present war. On the other hand the censorship of indecent passages has been greatly relaxed of recent years, and almost all portions of the female body are now legally visible on the London stage. This is doubtless a gain of liberty for spectators, but hardly for girls who lose their jobs if they try to exercise the liberty to keep their clothes on. There is also a censorship of films in most countries. These forms of censorship are strongly supported by the Catholic Church, although of late years this body has probably disseminated more indecent (and untrue) stories than any other organization, mainly in connection with the Spanish war. As a matter of fact the Republican government was rather puritanical. The film censorship is everywhere strongly political.

The radio is generally a State monopoly. At one time the British radio sponsored discussions on political, social, and religious topics, but these were always censored to some extent and were finally discontinued. It is now purely an organ of government propaganda. The United States radios are very much freer, though like the press their general political policy is controlled by that of the advertisers. However, British listeners are certainly freer than those of many other countries. They are permitted to listen to the German radio (a freedom of which I have not myself taken advantage for some months), while Germans who listen to the British radio are imprisoned.

We see then that the liberty of the press which was gained during the nineteenth century has now been lost in most countries, partly by direct government action, partly by the use of the civil law, and partly by technological advances which have favored centralization, and therefore control by big business. On the other hand the radio and cinema have never achieved so great a freedom as the press.

It is probable that the highest degree of freedom of com-

munication of ideas exists in Denmark and in certain parts of the United States, notably in New York State, while the lowest degree is to be found in Germany and Italy. This kind of freedom is a very important one, but intellectuals are apt to speak and write as if it were the only kind. Actually an intelligent but reactionary government will allow a large measure of freedom of press and speech, being well aware of the fact that discontented people can "blow off steam" by this means without causing any serious disturbance, particularly in countries such as Britain with a long tradition of fairly free discussion. This is all the more the case if they can control the radio, the films, and the more widely circulated newspapers. For this reason freedom of speech and press, though correlated with political freedom, is not synonymous with it.

I have not mentioned the internal barriers to freedom of expression. And yet they are of profound importance. Some of us are no doubt congenitally incapable of original expression in words, music, photography, or any other art form. But most psychologists, and most ordinary people who have had sympathetic dealings with children, believe that the majority of human beings could make some real contribution to culture if they were put in the right environment. For some reason or other

"Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy."

This may be due to economic causes. In the case of many a mute inglorious Milton, the poet says that

"Chill penury repress'd their noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul."

But as the rich and the moderately well to do are almost as dumb as the poor, this is not the whole story. Probably most people could express themselves best in some communal activity such as symphonic music, drama, or dance. "Civilized" society is well organized for mass production of commodities and for mass consumption of standardized cultural commodities such as cinema films and phonograph records. But it is

far less organized than most primitive societies for collective artistic activity. Possibly the Soviet Union may be leading the way here. My own opinion is that the prospects for artistic activity are probably brightest in China, where art has never been thoroughly commercialized, and if peace and security are restored the natural artistic ability of the people will find a new scope. And the genuine respect of the Chinese for intellectual activity may make China in the future, as it has more than once been in the past, the intellectual's paradise.

POLITICAL FREEDOM

On no aspect of freedom is there more confusion than on that of political freedom. At one time it is taken to mean government by natives of one's own country, rather than by foreigners. Yet there is more political freedom (though not very much) in a province of British India such as Bengal than in a "native state" with an absolute ruler, such as Hyderabad or Nepal. It is also regarded as synonymous with democracy, and the latter with parliamentary government, though the Greeks who invented the word democracy (which meant government of the people, by the people, for the people, which did not, however, include women or slaves) had no parliaments. Finally it is taken to mean the right of stating opinions on political matters.

Nowhere in the world do these conditions exist in their entirety. The first type is only possible in practice for powerful nations. The members of smaller nations may easily find themselves in the position of citizens of Iraq, Estonia, or Cuba, and this possibility increases with the development of transport. Actually they are better off as members of a larger aggregate in which they enjoy a measure of cultural autonomy and equality of citizenship. It is useless for Welshmen or Georgians to say that they are oppressed by English or Russians, when Lloyd George, a Welshman, was chosen (and may conceivably be chosen again) to rule England in a critical hour, while Stalin, a Georgian, is the most important man in Russia. It may be that Welshmen would be freer if Wales enjoyed

as much autonomy as Georgia, but actually the Welsh nationalist movement is not very strong. Where there is not equality of this kind, nationalist movements certainly make for increased freedom. This was, I think, the case in Ireland, and is in India. On the other hand the nationalist movement of the Sudeten Germans, which brought them under Hitler, diminished their freedom.

The second type of political freedom is claimed for all kinds of political systems. Even the Nazis claim that they enjoy "true" freedom, because Hitler expresses the political ideals of every true German. If so there must be a lot of untrue Germans. Now in the past there have been two main types of democratic government, namely, the Greco-Roman and American types. In the former all citizens met together frequently, listened to orators, and voted for or against laws. In the latter they elect representatives at rare intervals, and these latter legislate. I call this system American rather than English, because when America became a democracy, the English Parliament was still elected on a very restricted franchise.

The obvious advantage of the first system is that the citizens decide matters directly concerning them, and of which they have immediate knowledge. Its disadvantages are, firstly, that voting is public and intimidation therefore possible, and that while well adapted for the government of a small city, it is impracticable for a State, let alone an Empire. It was largely for the latter reason that it broke down when Rome acquired an empire.

The American or representative type is adapted for a large State, but has the disadvantage that representatives can and do break their election pledges, that the people can only vote at rare intervals, and that in practice they have a choice only between representatives of a few organizations (e.g., the two great American parties), whose policies are framed in secret by a small number of men. In the Soviet Union an attempt has been made to combine these two types of democratic mechanism. The village Soviet has the advantages and disadvantages of a Greek Assembly, whilst the supreme Soviet corresponds to the American Congress.

In theory this is an ideal system, but it is claimed that in practice all power is in the hands of the Communist party and its sympathizers. In practice, however, parliaments are also controlled from outside. In 1921 when Mr. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of Britain, was displaying a certain radicalism in his financial policy, the *Financial Times* asked, "Does he and do his colleagues realise that half a dozen men at the top of the big five banks could upset the whole fabric of government finance by refraining from renewing Treasury Bills?" Certainly the Labour party realized this ten years later. "Upsetting the whole fabric of government finance" is, of course, not sedition!

In practice then the political liberty in a parliamentary democracy is largely at the mercy of big business. But not wholly so. Enough parliaments have annoyed big business to render it necessary to suppress parliamentary government over much of Europe. And not only in Europe. Newfoundland was unable to pay its debts to Britain. In consequence "the mother of parliaments" began to eat her children, and Newfoundland is now governed by British officials. It will be remembered that when Britain refused to pay its debts to America the British Parliament was replaced by an American Governor-General!

The plain fact is that over most of the world such parliaments as survive are as subservient to big business as is the supreme Soviet in Moscow to the Communist party. And even the most violent opponents of Communism will hardly claim that big business is democratic. Nowhere in the world is there political liberty as Jefferson conceived it, and as it actually existed in the days before monopoly capitalism developed. There is still a fair amount in parts of northwestern Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States, the British Dominions, and some Latin American republics. On the whole it seems to be on the upgrade in the Soviet Union, China, and (with intermissions) in India, but stationary or on the downgrade elsewhere.

So long as the present class struggle goes on we cannot look for any great measure of political freedom even in the inter-

vals between wars. Only a classless society which does not feel itself menaced either from within or without is likely to develop a true political freedom in which discussion is both legally and economically free and constitutionally elected governments are not overthrown by the violence or economic pressure of minorities. We may look forward to such a day, but we must not deceive ourselves into believing that comparative freedom of discussion, pleasant as it may be for intellectuals like myself, is synonymous with full political freedom. If the newspapers, radio, and other means of large-scale propaganda are mainly controlled directly or indirectly by big business, there is only rarely need for the forcible suppression of opposition. But the possibility of such suppression is always in the background. Under the Emergency Powers Act of 1939 any British citizen can be imprisoned without trial for an indefinite period. It will be very surprising indeed if this act is not used to strangle constitutional opposition. In England today political freedom has *de jure* no existence at all, even if *de facto* a good deal remains.

But if speech is still theoretically free, as indeed it is in the Soviet Union, this is because speech is an obsolete method of propaganda compared with radio and the press, and if our oligarchs control the latter they can afford to allow a rather moderate liberty of the former.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

We saw at an earlier stage that religious liberty embraces a very wide field. In the sense of freedom to propagate religious and irreligious opinions and to perform rites which are not held to be cruel or indecent, it is fairly widespread. However, it is rarely complete. For example, a conscript in Britain must register as a member of some Christian sect or as a Jew, for the purpose of burial. Being neither a Christian nor a Jew, I exploited the liberty available to me as a soldier in 1914-18 by registering as an adherent of several different branches of Christianity, and of Judaism, on different occasions. Adults are not compelled to attend religious ceremonies, though they

are hard to avoid in the army. But children can be and are compelled to do so in most countries, whilst in the Soviet Union I understand that organized religious instruction of children is forbidden. Thus in practice religious liberty is often like that of Germany after the Reformation, when each petty ruler was free to persecute his subjects if they disagreed with his theological opinions. Every British father is a princeling who can beat his children if they do not go to the church of which he approves, or go to one of which he does not.

Religious freedom is seriously compromised where religion involves ritual food or rest. It is very difficult for an orthodox Jew to rest on Saturday in England or for an orthodox Christian to rest on Sunday in Russia. In fact full religious freedom is impossible in an integrated community, simply because many religions can only be practiced in their entirety when the vast majority of a people hold them.

The minimum of religious freedom is found in some Mohammedan countries such as Afghanistan, Persia, and parts of Arabia, and in Spain. It is rather low where there has recently been a violent reaction against religious intolerance, as in Mexico. It is below the maximum where any form of religion or irreligion is associated with the State, as in Britain, Italy, Sweden, and the Soviet Union. It may also be lowered where a religion is associated with foreign influence, as is Christianity in China. Here the Chinese, who are on the whole very tolerant in religious matters, have forbidden missionaries to attempt conversions to Christianity because such activity is thought likely to break up the national unity.

The highest degree of religious freedom is probably found in the United States, where the State is formally neutral in religious matters. But complete religious liberty is impossible, simply because all religious bodies are somewhat intolerant when their supporters control the government. They may be very intolerant like the Catholic Church, or very slightly so, like the Society of Friends, but they cannot from their nature be completely tolerant.

FREEDOM OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

The freedom of women has very little to do with the freedom of sexual relations. It is minimal in Mohammedan countries such as Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan, where all women are veiled and those of the well-to-do classes are imprisoned. The impossibility of romantic love in such countries is compensated by homosexuality. It is maximal in countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union whose women not only enjoy legal equality with men but are actually appointed to responsible positions such as that of ambassador. Indeed in the United States women's rights are perhaps overdeveloped in connection with alimony for divorced wives, which enables a number of women to live an idle life at the expense of men. The same type of male subjection is found in a less developed form in England. Complete liberty and equality in this matter can only be achieved where work is available for every able-bodied adult.

Children enjoy little liberty where the family is patriarchal and their corporal punishment is commonly practiced. State education generally makes for greater liberty for children, who often obtain a valuable political education by playing off their parents against their teachers. In Britain the children of the poor are far freer than those of the rich. A rich boy can be birched on his bare back at Eton up to the age of nineteen, and is then sent to a university where he is locked up every night until he is twenty-three or so. In fact ruling classes, the world over, are cruel to their own children. They have to be molded into efficient members of the class, and must suffer in consequence. The Hitler Jugend appears to be an attempt to inflict the English public-school spirit on all the children of an unfortunate nation.

Complete freedom for children is impossible, but children can, in practice, be given freedom at a very early age if their training is directed to teaching them the recognition of necessity. This means that they must be allowed to see and feel the consequences of their own actions, which will inevitably

include some broken limbs and other injuries. If they are neither bullied nor pampered they develop human personalities at a very early age, and may be responsible citizens at the age of seventeen.

It is particularly difficult to compare different countries as regards the freedom of children. Child labor for long hours at monotonous work is no doubt a negation of freedom. But a boy doing interesting paid work for short hours is far freer than one in a school learning dull and often useless lessons.

CONCLUSION

We have ranged over a number of fields in each of which a greater or less degree of freedom is possible. Nowhere have we found the problem simple. This is partly because one man's freedom limits that of another, so that most kinds of freedom demand a measure of equality. If six bankers can control a State, it is time that the bankers had less freedom. In fact freedom in a class state means mainly freedom for one class, and that generally turns out to be a poor sort of freedom. In particular, if a ruling class is to be efficient, its members must be severely conditioned in youth. On the other hand the overthrow of the class state has meant in the Soviet Union a period of "dictatorship of the proletariat" with considerable restrictions on freedom, and would probably do so elsewhere.

Three facts must be kept in mind. Even the freest of men has been so conditioned that he does not notice the lack of some freedom which a man born in another place or time would regard as essential. This is why we are honestly apt to regard our own country as "the land of the free and the home of the brave," when we see the restrictions to which foreigners submit without a murmur. Curiously enough the foreigners often think the same when they visit our country. An intellectual who is making a fairly good living often regards himself as almost absolutely free. He is freer than many of his fellows. But he is only free because his product, whether in science, art, or literature, happens to find a market. When the market changes he finds that his freedom may be freedom to starve.

However, the market is not a natural phenomenon, like the weather. It can be controlled, and although this involves some restriction of freedom, more and more people are coming to think that it results in a considerable increase of freedom on the whole.

Secondly, freedom is positive as well as negative. Man is a social animal, and human freedom can only be freedom in society, that is to say, freedom to act as a social being. This is a hard saying, because it means that certain kinds of freedom, for example the freedom of a landlord to keep the public off a hundred square miles of mountains or the freedom of a few bankers to overthrow a government are antisocial. But it turns out that they are antisocial just because they restrict the freedom of others. The Greeks had a word for the man who used his freedom to turn his back on society. The word was "ἰδιώτης," in English "idiot."

Thirdly, freedom is not static. It is always finding new fields. For example we are beginning to recognize the right of animals to freedom. It is now thought wrong to chain up a dog for life, though the anthropomorphism of our ideas on this matter can be illustrated by the case of an eagle which recently returned to its cage in the London Zoo after two days of miserable liberty. Like everything that grows, freedom negates itself. The individual lover of freedom may join an organization which limits his own choice. Moreover, he is more likely to find himself in prison than the man who always takes his cue from the majority.

And the same is true on a larger scale. A war or revolution fought for freedom means the temporary loss of a good deal of freedom. In the long run the loss is generally more than made good. But a social change, like a technological advance, always means a loss of some former liberty. We must realize that the freedom of one man may be the bondage of another, that the charter of liberty of one generation may form the chains of its successor.

I believe that a comparative study of freedom on the lines which I have indicated would do a great deal to increase the respect between different nations, many of which, if far from

ideal, have at least something to teach others in this important matter. It would enable us to see the beam in our own eye before crusading to remove our neighbor's mote. And a historical study would show us the way in which freedom has actually developed, and help all lovers of freedom to strive for a real increase of that great good. The position of freedom in the modern world is so precarious that its preservation and extension require not only good will, but all the thought which we can devote to it. The problem of freedom is not a simple problem. Now as never before in history "*Notre salut dépend de notre intelligence.*"

5. THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM

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RELIGION AS THE BASIS OF THE POSTULATES OF FREEDOM

FOR the purposes of this paper a "postulate" may be defined as a "supposition," an "assumption," an "essential prerequisite."

The postulates of freedom, then, are those underlying principles and facts which must be accepted if the belief in and the defense of freedom are to be logical and rational. This does not mean that no person can or does cherish freedom unless he accepts the postulates to be advocated in these pages; it merely means that rejection of the postulates renders freedom logically indefensible.

The chapter titles of this volume comprehend freedom in all its elements, varieties, and relations. Although they do not specifically mention the topic, more than one of the constituent papers will probably give some attention to freedom of the will. Freedom of the will is logically essential to all other freedoms. That is to say, a person who rejects it, a person who does not believe that he has power to choose between alternative volitions and actions, between doing and not doing, cannot logically believe in the existence of political, civil, economic, or any other kind of external freedom. Whether he realizes it or not, such a person must regard all these freedoms as illusory. To be sure, the determinist, the disbeliever in free will, can point to the palpable difference between personal freedom and personal slavery; between political liberty and foreign domination. Before January 1, 1863, the majority of Negroes in our

Southern States were slaves; thereafter, they were free men. Before September, 1939, the people of Poland were politically free; since the beginning of last October they have been politically subject to Germany and Russia. The determinist can rightly assert that the freedom enjoyed by the emancipated Negroes and by the people of Poland for almost two score years before the Hitler invasion were palpable realities. He can insist upon the obvious fact that the Negroes and the Poles were in those respective periods free from certain external restraints which bound them in their conditions of subjection. While the common sense and consciousness of the determinist make him aware of these facts, his disbelief in freedom of the will logically compels him to maintain that freedom from external restraint left both the Negroes and the Poles unfree psychologically; for they were determined, compelled, by motives drawn from their character and circumstances to fight for and to accept the external freedom which they enjoyed. According to the determinist a similar statement must be made concerning the slaveowners and Hitler; both were psychologically unfree in their acts of suppression and repression.

What practical difference does this problem make? Immunity from the external restraint involved in personal and political slavery is a genuine good, something worth striving for and cherishing by the determinist no less than the indeterminist. As reasonably and logically as the latter, the former can fight for and cling to this freedom. Undoubtedly so. The only practical difference is that the determinist cannot attribute to the oppressors moral blame or pronounce upon them moral condemnation. If there be no such thing as free will, if the slaveholder and Hitler could not avoid acts of tyranny and oppression, then they cannot reasonably become the objects of moral blame and moral indignation. They have no more responsibility for their oppressive performances than has a lion that swallows a lamb or a sleepwalker who goes out a tenth-story window. If the will be not free, then no one is morally responsible for his acts, be they good or bad. The men and the nations that deprive individuals and peoples of freedom

are no more justly liable to moral blame or condemnation than the lion, the tiger, the earthquake, or the cyclone.

What practical difference does this make? Only so much: if the will be not free, no ethical appeal can reasonably be made to the oppressors of the poor, the political users of tyrannical force, the Hitlers, the Stalins, or the Mussolinis, to refrain from their suppression of freedom. They can all logically reply that they are not free to refrain. On the other hand those who struggle against oppression cannot logically have recourse to moral indignation. Both groups are victims of forces over which they have no control.

To be sure, the observation of William Ladd, Professor at Yale University, remains as true today as it was when he made it many years ago, namely, only a few persons deny freedom of the will in theory and even these accept it in practice. In their everyday conduct, judgments, and attitudes, they act as though they believed in free will. Nevertheless, this contradiction between theory and practice is not only illogical but productive of evil effects. When men reject freedom of the will, their belief in external freedom is inevitably weakened. If they apply to political and civil situations the same assumptions and judgments that they use in evaluating the private actions of individuals, they are logically prevented from using words of moral condemnation against men who destroy political or civil liberty. They cannot rationally denounce the rape of Poland or the "liquidation" of millions of citizens of Soviet Russia. If they are true to the principles of determinism, their judgment upon those outrages cannot go farther than this: "It is too bad that Hitler and Stalin were inevitably compelled by character and circumstances to fall under the domination of motives which irresistibly force them to conquer and to kill. We cannot really 'blame' them any more than we 'blame' a mad dog that attacks human beings, or a swollen river that destroys property and lives. In the latter cases the resulting deaths clearly do not imply moral guilt in their causes. Similarly, the destruction of Poland and the assassination and starvation of Soviet citizens do not connote moral guilt in Hitler and Stalin. Our

evaluation of their conduct must be stated in terms not of blame but of regret."

Such is the practical effect of denial of free will. To the extent that determinists are logical, they are unable to condemn violations of civil and political liberty. To the extent that they put logic aside and follow their native intuitions in their attitude toward these violations, they can be as eloquent as the believers in psychological freedom; but they do so at the expense of their intellectual integrity and they expose themselves to the danger that sooner or later they will be affected by this internal contradiction, with the consequent weakening of their moral indignation against political and civil malefactors.

What is the relation of religion to this situation? To what extent is religion at the basis of this postulate which we call free will? This is the connection: all the great religions, at least all those of the Western world, assume and assert that the human will is free. They all maintain that if the will be not free, innocence and guilt, desert and demerit, praise and blame, have no meaning. In creating and keeping alive the belief in free will, religion has exercised vastly more influence than all other social forces combined.

Based upon religion are two other important postulates of freedom: namely, the moral dignity of the human person and the essential equality of all persons. Being an elementary concept, the dignity of personality is not susceptible of strict definition. Since it is not a constituent species of a genus, it cannot be defined in terms of "proximum genus" and "specific difference." However, its meaning can be made clearer by synonymous expressions. Human dignity, the dignity of personality, means that the human being has intrinsic worth, that he is intrinsically sacred, that, in Kant's fine phrase, he is "an end in himself," and that he is never to be treated as a mere means or instrument to any other end whatsoever.

Human dignity is best understood when it is associated with the term "rights." Man possesses rights because of his moral dignity as a person. No rights inhere in animals. According to the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence "all

men are created equal" and "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. . . ." While the enjoyment of these rights may be prevented by force, the rights themselves cannot be destroyed or taken away either by one's fellow-men or by governments. In other words, men are endowed with *natural* rights: rights which are born with them and remain in them as long as life remains.

In a recent magazine article, John Dewey declares: "The intellectual basis of the legal theory of natural law and natural rights has been undermined by historical and philosophical criticism." Subjectively undermined, yes; objectively, no. A denial of natural rights does not disprove their existence, whether those who deny be journalists, college professors, or alleged statesmen. Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Russian Communism agree in holding that all individual rights, personal, political, religious, and economic, are created by the State and can be modified or taken away by the State. This denial of natural rights is an essential element in the theory and philosophy of all these political systems. Neither Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, nor Soviet Russia admits that individuals have natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

For our present purpose, natural rights may be described as moral claims to those spheres of action which are necessary for the welfare of the individual and the development of his personality. Chief among them are the rights to life, to personal integrity, to economic opportunity, to property, to a reasonable minimum of education, to the expression of thought and opinion by voice or by the written word, and to association with one's fellow-men in organizations. As social groups, men have a natural right to determine the form of government under which they shall live and the persons who shall rule over them.

In passing, I should like to cite two very great men on the right of self-government. In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson declared that governments "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Political power, wrote Cardinal Bellarmine more than three hundred years

ago, "resides immediately in the whole state, for this power is by Divine law, the Divine law gives this power to no particular man, therefore, Divine law gives this power to the collected body. Furthermore, in the absence of positive law, there is no good reason why, in a multitude of equals, one rather than another should dominate. Therefore, power belongs to the collected body." This power, continued the Cardinal, "is delegated by the multitude to one or several, . . ."

The bearing of natural rights upon freedom ought to be obvious. Since rights are claims to spheres of action, they imply freedom within these spheres. Each of the specific rights enumerated above connotes a specific kind of freedom. These freedoms comprise: immunity from physical restraint and attack; immunity from physical interference and oppressive contracts in pursuit of livelihood; immunity from physical and legal interference in the acquisition and enjoyment of physical goods; freedom to move about from place to place or from job to job; freedom of speech, writing, and assembly; freedom of association and organization and immunity from political subjection and oppression.

Concerning freedom and rights in the economic sphere, an excerpt from the decision of the Supreme Court in *Allgeyer v. Louisiana* is worth quoting here. The liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment comprises, said the Court:

. . . not only the right of a citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

The foregoing statement omits a positive element of economic rights and civil freedom. This positive element is not found in the due process clause or in any other part of the Federal Constitution. It is, however, included in the natural law and is among man's natural rights. It stresses opportunity

rather than absence of restraint. It comprises all those social and economic conditions which are necessary for a reasonable livelihood and a reasonable development of personality.

The man who rejects human dignity and natural rights must logically deny that any of the freedoms above enumerated have compelling validity. While conceding that they are necessary means to the welfare of the individual, he can deny that this is a rational end. He can deny that the individual, his welfare, or his development are worthy social objects. This is the position taken by the adherents of totalitarianism. According to this political and civil philosophy, all the interests and the welfare of the individuals, political, economic, religious, and other, are absorbed by and completely subject to the State or the political government. This doctrine was not invented in Italy, Germany, or Russia. It is as old as Hegel and far older. It was explicit in the political theories of the ancient world, when, to quote Lord Acton, "the passengers existed for the sake of the ship." In the nineteenth century it was held by many political writers and came to be known as the theory of "the Omnipotent State."

There are men who reject both totalitarianism and natural rights. These can rationally hold, as some of them do hold, that the individual should be permitted to enjoy only so much freedom as is compatible with the interests of a powerful economic or racial group, of a majority or even of a dominating minority. Since there is no such thing as ethical values, the only proper determinant of freedom is physical force plus cunning.

Now the chief interpreter, advocate, and champion of ethical values is religion. It is religion that has been mainly instrumental in disseminating and keeping alive the doctrines of the sacredness of the individual, of human rights, and consequently of rational freedom. Religion has inculcated these doctrines chiefly through its teaching on the creation and spiritual nature of man. Religion proclaims that man was created in the image and likeness of God, and that he is something more than an animal since he possesses a spiritual and immortal soul. If the soul of man is directly derived, evolved, from the soul of some long-defunct animal, whether denominated an ape or an an-

thropoid, then, of course, man has no intrinsic worth or sacredness. If the Creator did not, at some stage of the evolutionary process, breathe into the first man "a living soul," then is the human being no more sacred than an ape. Then may any person reasonably be treated as a mere means either to the State or to any person or group of persons who possess the requisite physical power.

All these truths can, indeed, be discovered and maintained by the unaided operations of reason. But this has been achieved only by a select few of mankind. The great majority have obtained and retained these truths under the guidance of religion. So, we conclude that religion is the basis of that postulate of freedom which we have been discussing in the immediately preceding paragraphs; namely, the dignity, the intrinsic worth, of human personality.

The third postulate mentioned above, the equality of all persons, is complementary to the second. If all persons are of intrinsic worth, then all are equal in this respect. All have equal moral claims to be regarded as persons, equal natural rights, and equal claims to those spheres of action which are necessary for life and the development of personality. Throughout history, this postulate has been the most effective barrier to laws and social practices which would discriminate against racial minorities and other weak social groups. It has also been the most effective force in educating, stimulating, and persuading men to struggle for conditions of social equality. To be sure, the doctrine of human equality has not succeeded in establishing these conditions everywhere, nor have the professors of the doctrine always applied it in full measure to the situations which they controlled or influenced. These failures are human, caused by prejudice, selfishness, lack of charity, and intellectual inability to draw the necessary practical conclusions from accepted premises. Nevertheless, the amount of achieved human equality in the world would have been infinitely smaller if the postulate that we are now discussing had not been widely accepted and cherished.

In so far as it has been accepted and applied, the doctrine of personal equality, at least in the Western world, owes by

far the greater part of its prevalence and effectiveness to the teaching of religion. This is a commonplace of recorded history. The postulates of human dignity and human equality reinforce and in turn are strengthened by the principle of fraternity, brotherly love, or charity. Since all persons have intrinsic worth, since they are all morally equal, reason demands that they should be so regarded by their fellows. Men should love their neighbors as themselves, as persons having the same dignity, the same rights, and the same needs. One of the greatest of these needs is freedom, immunity from arbitrary interference in those activities which are essential to life and the development of personality. On the other hand, the principle of fraternal love greatly strengthens in practice the principles of human dignity and human equality. On this point, the following sentences from the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, are pertinent and persuasive:

For, justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing.

While the principle of brotherly love is a part of the natural law and is knowable by natural reason, it has been reinforced and elevated by the teaching of Christianity. According to the latter, love of the neighbor is akin to love of God. Christians are commanded to love their fellows because these are adopted sons of God. Obviously this commandment attributes to the human person a dignity and worth infinitely higher than that which he possesses as a human being. The latter dignity is natural, the former is supernatural.

Whether the postulate of brotherly love be accepted in its full supernatural sense or from merely natural motives, its beneficent importance for freedom and the struggle for freedom is incalculable. And most of its prevalence, force, and appeal is and always has been due to the teaching of religion. While other religions have contributed to this result, the influ-

ence of Christianity has been the most effective. By way of summarizing the effect of Christianity upon the postulates of freedom, I would quote the following statement from the Apostolic Letter of Pope Pius XI, to the Catholic University of America, October, 1938:

Christian teaching alone, in its majestic integrity, can give full meaning and compelling motive to the demand for human rights and liberties because it alone gives worth and dignity to human personality.

Freedom of the will, the dignity of personality, the equality of all persons, and brotherly love comprise, in my opinion, all the important postulates of freedom. They are all based upon and made logical and practically effective by the teaching of religion.

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FREEDOM, PURPOSE, AND VALUE

IF there is anything that men value, it is freedom to carry out their purposes. If there is anything about which modern science and philosophy have spoken with uncertain voice, it is freedom, purpose, and value. In this yawning chasm between theory and practice there have been born evil practices and false theories. When a psychologist like Wolfgang Koehler can say that "there is no word which sounds so bad to most psychologists as purpose,"¹ he is saying that psychology is embarrassed in the presence of the most conspicuous fact of human existence. What would a man be without his purposes? Yet there are many thinkers who regard purpose as illusion, mechanism as truth; who treat freedom as epiphenomenon, the gray matter of our brain as the true cause of all our acts; who define value quite deliberately as "nonsense," because it cannot be verified as a complex of sense data.

Facts are, it is true, inconvenient; but they have a way of revenging themselves on theories which insult them. There is, for instance, a philosophy called physicalism, whose exponents would reduce all statements to physical terms, and thus neatly do away with all troublesome facts of subjective consciousness. But this very philosophy is based on the argument that the physical language is the only one that is universally suited to intersubjective communication. St. George must keep the subjective dragon alive in order to slay it.

¹ *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, New York, 1938, p. 55.

Other philosophies to which freedom, purpose, and value are inconvenient have been devised by thinkers who adopt the method of analytic abstraction. Abstractions are necessary tools of thought; without their aid we should always be confronted by the whole of our experience as a solid chunk, indivisible and unintelligible. But though necessary, they are both insufficient and misleading if they are not in the end related to the living whole from which they had been divorced by analysis. The abstract thinker seeks to discover what the world (or some aspect of it) would be if X were not in it. Mathematics, for example, defines what it would be if there were no X —no sense data, and no freedom, purpose, or value except the freedom to think purposively about mathematical values. Very few mathematicians, if any, commit the error of forgetting that there is an X which they have omitted. There are, however, some abstract thinkers who are so deeply perplexed by the facts of freedom, purpose, and value that they try the experiment of conceiving what the universe would be if sense data alone were given, and X , everything characteristic of humanity, were simply not there at all. One may, of course, think of such a possible universe; one may believe in it; but one may not reasonably regard it as an interpretation or explanation of the X which from the start has been excluded from it. We may, and for certain personal purposes, we must, abstract from purpose and personality; but for the living whole of truth we must, as individuals and as a civilization, return to the fundamental facts which we have ignored or distorted. Only in that return do we discover the true function of our analytic abstractions and thus approach the rational unity of experience for which every mind yearns and struggles.

I

It is always debatable whether definition should come at the beginning or at the end of an investigation. How can we investigate without first knowing what our problem is? Yet, if it is a problem, how can we know the definitions which solve it until our work is done? The answer to this dilemma is that all

definitions are hypotheses, subject to correction, and that a writer is fairer to his readers if he makes no secret of such definitions as he actually starts with. Let us then suggest working definitions of freedom, value, and purpose—purpose being saved for the last because it is most difficult.

Freedom we shall treat as the experience of choosing from among possible courses of action. This is close to Hans Driesch's concept of freedom as saying "yes" or "no" to a given content. However, Driesch's "yes or no" is ambiguous. It might mean saying "I like it" or "I do not like it." Such a yes or a no is not properly a free act, for it is neither a choice nor a proposal to act, whereas freedom is always both of these. In our definition, the word possible means thinkable and consistent with the facts and laws of the field in which the choice is made. I cannot freely choose to write English rather than Chinese; but I can choose to write English rather than German, because I know both languages. The word action refers to any change of the contents or objects of experience which may result from choice. Thinking, running, being silent, hoping, or speaking would all be action, regardless of whether they are "mental" or "physical." All that is required of an act is that it effect a change of some sort.

This definition requires a little further explanation. The process of comparing and estimating the different possibilities is called deliberation. Hence, normal freedom involves a reference to value—a standard of estimation; the possibility must be regarded as worth choosing. Further, if freedom is to function in the building of personal and social life, there must be some way of making its choice effective. In other words, freedom is no mere introspective, "Yea, verily," said to some concept. It is a move toward the effective realization of that concept. Freedom means interaction between the chooser and his world; it means control of mechanisms by the act of choice. When Socrates chose to drink the hemlock rather than to violate the laws of Athens; when Moses chose to share ill treatment with the people of God rather than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season; when Madame Curie chose a life of discipline and poverty for the sake of the ideal of scientific research;

or when Admiral Byrd immured himself alone at an outpost in Antarctica—freedom was exemplified. On some level, every normal human being exerts his freedom at least occasionally every day of his life.

Value is a term used in many different senses—in mathematics, in painting, in economics, in ethics, and in psychology. For our purpose, we shall distinguish two meanings of intrinsic values or ends. First, value may mean any conscious experience of liking, preferring, or enjoying. Let us call this a value claim. In so far as I like the taste of a liquid, I find value in it. The experience of liking it is an experience of value. But the liquid may turn out to be a deadly poison, in which case the survivors would judge that I erred in my value claim. If I had known the consequences, I should no longer have enjoyed the taste, however agreeable to sense it might be. Secondly, value may mean any conscious experience of liking or preferring which survives critical inquiry into facts, relations, and reasons. Such a value may be called (at least relatively) a true value or an ideal value as distinguished from an untested value claim. Both value claims and true values reside solely in conscious experience. Intrinsic value is no property of unconscious things or processes or even of ideals. Ideals are simply concepts of a kind of experience that would be valuable if it were actual and so are purely instrumental to the intrinsic values of conscious experience.

Of our three fundamental terms, purpose is the most difficult. It is usually defined as an end or project not yet executed.² Warren³ adds that the thinker with a purpose is determined to bring about the situation. Warren gives as a second meaning, "The end, real or apparent, toward the attainment of which vital processes are co-ordinated." Thus, we may view purpose abstractly (in Hegel's sense of the word) as the mere end in view, or concretely as the organization of experience toward that end. The concrete meaning is truer. To conceive a possible end is not to have a purpose until we make every effort to realize it. Hence, purpose is best defined as the con-

² See Baldwin's *Dictionary*, s.v.

³ *Dictionary of Psychology*, s.v.

scious selection of a foreseen end, together with acts appropriate to the realization of that end. The purposing is not merely the choice of the end; it is the entire process of organizing experience under the dominance of the end. The end is not merely a future state of affairs; it is the immanent form and structure of the whole process. Mere wishing for the goal is not purpose. Kant points out in Section I of *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* that the good will is "not . . . a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power." Purpose, however, is more than Kant's good will, for it requires more than the summoning of means; it requires their actual use. An unfulfilled purpose is a bare intention, a frustrated plan, the mutilated torso of a purpose. The purpose is the *propositum*—what is actually set forth in action, not merely in imagination.

The interrelation of freedom, purpose, and value we shall call spirit. Freedom is freedom to purpose value. Purpose is the free realization of value. Value is maintained by free purpose. Spiritual freedom, purpose, and value—the core of human existence—are challenged, restricted, and imperiled by many social, political, and intellectual currents of our time.

II

Although practical man has always been alert to the importance, the uses, and the limits of his freedom to purpose values, theoretical man has been baffled by what does not lend itself to direct observation by the senses and is not readily treated in the laboratory. Theoretical man has, on the whole, manifested a consequent indifference to his own essential nature. In Greece he thought about the properties of water and air long before he thought about the properties of mind; and modern science began by banishing all purpose, since a search for final causes confused science.

A survey of language shows that many of the terms used by common men as well as by scientists and philosophers in expressing their fundamental concepts are words which point only to visual experience, away from the invisible experience of

free, purposive valuing. It is true that to know (*gnoscere*) means to perceive either by the senses or by the mind, and that perception (*per + capio*) means any kind of thorough taking; if we take experience thoroughly we must take freedom, purpose, and value. But even theoretic man has preferred to take experience easily and vividly rather than thoroughly and completely, and he has clung to the visual tradition, or, as it has been called, "The Spectator Theory of Knowledge." A spectator is one who looks; theory means looking; knowledge is the only word here that originally allows a nonvisual experience. Realism, of course, refers to the visible thing, the *res*. But even idealism is named from the root *id*, which means see. Intuition (*intueor*) is simply looking at what is seen; vision, that supposedly spiritual act, has no etymological touch of freedom, purpose, or value—it means only seeing (*video*).

No matter how intellectual we try to become, we cling to insight. We seem to walk by sight and not by purpose in our etymology. If our insight reaches its highest level, it is synopsis, in which the optical is evident (as vision is evident in the very word "evident"). The esthetic is often interpreted, as by Kant, as having some relation to purpose; yet the Greek word means only what is perceptible to sense. There is a certain irony in the fact that as soon as *Zweckmässigkeit* creeps into Kant's esthetics it has to be purged by being labeled *ohne Zweck*. Even imagination (*imago, imitor*), which originally referred only to likeness and might thus mean likeness in purpose or value, quickly came to mean the seen likeness of a visible object. A philosophy is a world view (*vue*), that is, something seen. Contemplation comes from *contemplor* (to gaze at). Consideration is from *considero* (to look at closely); an interesting hint at man's early stargazing, for *sidus* (star) is concealed in the word. A temple is a space marked out (cut, from *τέμνω*) for the purpose of observation by the augur. Even the ultraphilosophical German word *Vernunft*, which seems so remote from pollution by sense, according to Hermann Paul derives from *vernehmen*, which originally meant to see, although it is now usually applied to the sense of hearing.

When Pitirim A. Sorokin, in his great work, *Social and Cul-*

tural Dynamics (Volume II, Chapter I), wishes to divide (another derivative of *video*) philosophical systems, he provides (*pro + video*) three classes: the ideational, the idealistic, and the sensate. His first two classes are in etymology exclusively visual, although the sensate allows nonvisual perception. All of his classes etymologically exclude freedom, purpose, and value.

This does not mean that humanity has been ignorant of all experience except the visual. Yet it plainly does mean that man has given visual sensation an inordinately large place, partly, indeed, because of the great usefulness of vision to human purposes. "Seeing is believing," we say, although seeing alone gives no direct information about freedom, purpose, or value. Perhaps theoretic man has clung to vision because it is fundamentally spatial, whereas purpose is fundamentally temporal; space is tangible and solid, whereas time is so evasive that even George Berkeley became "lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties" when he wrestled with it, and Augustine knew what it is only when he was not asked. But if space gives us structure, time gives us function, and without temporal functions space is abstract and useless, both intellectually and practically. Man is struggling slowly away from bondage to the visible; yet if, in German, he tries to speak of purpose, he calls it *Absicht*, again, a sight. After all, seeing is simply staring. In itself, it is a passive immediacy, with neither action, understanding, nor purpose. The seeing eye may perceive change, but it initiates no change. It is, to quote the odd title of a lecture by Professor R. C. Givler, "The Round Glass Eye of the Absolute." It sees all, knows all, does nothing; such a seer is unmoved, but is itself no mover, no purposer, no valuer. A view of the world based on visual evidence alone misrepresents every moment of human experience, including the actual experience of seeing, which always includes some elementary purposing and valuing, and often some freedom of choice. Humanity has stared long enough. It has wrestled with what it has seen. Thinking man has not wrestled sufficiently with free, valuable purpose.

Why has man so largely concentrated his science and philosophy on visual facts, neglecting or subordinating the equally certain and far more important facts of the realm of free pur-

pose? Why has he so largely left freedom to random desires, taste, or dogma? Is it perhaps because he prefers the certain to the important, the necessary to the possible, the spatial to the temporal, or the present to the future? It seems that the history of man's mind has been largely guided by a determination to value what is visible to sense, and therefore certain, above all the free purposes and ideals, which alone justify any value judgment whatever. That is to say, the positivistic preference for the visible and rejection of values as "nonsense" rest on an uncritical and incoherent value judgment; for if I am warranted in valuing sense data, then valuing is itself warranted. Yet it is on an arbitrary neglect of value experience that much of our thinking is grounded; from it arises not only most of the conflict between science and religion, but also much of the social and political conflict which is tearing civilization apart. The choice of visual, spatial interests rather than free, purposive, temporal interests, may be, as Fichte and Bertrand Russell and others think, a matter of character or temperament. Yet a thinker who can include all of the facts of experience in his philosophy may judge which temperament is the more inclusive, and which the narrower in its empirical basis. He may even criticize himself. We need a self-critical civilization.

The seer may see without acting; the purposer may see in order to act. Paraphrasing the famous thesis of Karl Marx on Feuerbach, we may say that science and philosophy hitherto have seen the world differently, whereas the main thing is to purpose freely that it shall become more valuable.

The primary fact, from which all facts are derived, which all theories interpret, and from which all free action emanates, is the fact of the total conscious situation which is a person's present experience. In that experience, vision, insight, and synopsis are functions of the will to purpose values. Science is the work of men rigorously and freely loyal to ideal purposes, love of truth and of sound method. No analysis is fair to experience until its results are related in a concrete synthesis with the total value purposed by the free mind. Such a synthesis is implied by the very nature of mind as the ideal fulfillment of its own true purpose. The immensity of the human task is clear when

we ask: How much of this synthesis of freedom, purpose, and value with visible and sensible fact is now accessible to the laborer, the employer, the businessman, the priest, the scientist, the philosopher? Hitherto, only partial glimpses of the spatial or of the temporal aspects have been achieved by the greatest spirits. Should not this fact, instead of depressing the mind and leading to pessimism, rather fill man with new hope when he envisages the boundless development which lies ahead?

III

There is doubtless more justification for the neglect of freedom by theoretical man than has yet appeared in what has been said. Freedom and purpose have often been not only irrelevant, but even inimical to the search for truth. When new truth has seemed to threaten ancient good, men have tried to preserve the good by burning or crucifying seekers for the truth. Furthermore, the lines between the realm of the visible and the realm of freedom cannot be drawn easily and sharply; else why have men so long been perplexed about the problem of freedom? Why would a mind like Kant's assign the visible to phenomena and the free to noumena, and then later try to smuggle in purpose by a third Critique? If the coast were clear and the sailing plain, such exquisite subterfuges would not be necessary.

Kant's solution surely is not final. The visible and the free can be completely severed only by wresting the free from its home in time, and banishing it to a concentration camp out of space and out of time, which Kant once, with unconscious humor, called "*das Ende aller Dinge*" ("the end of all things"). No, we cannot save freedom and value and purpose by banishing them from nature and committing them either to Kant's noumena, to Santayana's essences, to the positivists' land of "nonsense," or to any other dungeon in an Ivory Tower.

We must seek freedom where it is—in the real world, the very same world visible to the eye. In the actual world of our consciousness at every moment we experience a pervasive and

continuous mingling of the free with the unfree, the purposeful with the purposeless, the valuable with the evil and the neutral. No actual free act is wholly free. It is a choice within limits rigorously determined by past experiences and present environment. No purpose is wholly purposive; even in dream-land, purposes must be an ordering of given brute facts which were not made by any purpose, and which resist the desire of purposers to destroy them. No value is wholly valuable; for every actual experience of value is surrounded by enemies of that experience—precarious accidents and exigencies which threaten its continuance or which sap the resources of the valuer. Each individual, himself both free and not-free, both purposeful and not-purposeful, both valuing and not-valuing, confronts a like strife in all his social comrades; and we all dwell in a realm of nature which manifests like properties.

This complex human situation has led to the most conflicting interpretations. Pessimists have seen the worm in every bud, the universal opposition to free purpose. Optimists have seen the universal presence of free purpose and value. But the only thoroughgoing realists, as well as the only really adequate idealists, are meliorists who see that everywhere there is promise of spirituality—of ideal values achieved by free purpose—but everywhere spirituality finds visible nature present with it as an inexorable limit. A limit, yes; but a limit that is as much instrument and potentiality as it is obstacle and bar.

All our experience and everything that we can infer from it is thus a mingling of the spiritual and the nonspiritual. The creative aspects of reality—its free, valuable purposing—exist within an uncreated framework that is given, a framework of rational law and of brute fact. The framework is necessary. There is no doubting either our logic or our sense data. A complete knowledge of this framework would leave life dry and clear, but aimless. Yet the lot of those who merely contemplate the framework is far less pitiable than that of those who freely pursue supposedly valuable ends without due regard to the framework in which alone these ends can be realized. Knowledge of the unfree, the purposeless, and the valueless is essen-

tial to the actual free realization of values. What is given in man's spirit can never be spiritually controlled until spirit and nature are wisely related each to the other.

I V

We have related the realm of vision to space and the realm of spirit to time, contrary to the ancient tradition that identifies spirit with contemplation of the timeless. This tradition is rejected partly because the only concrete meaning of the timeless is what is true at all times; partly because all contemplation, even of the timeless, is an event in time; and partly because freedom from time is a futile escape-mechanism as compared with real freedom in time.

That time is integral to effective freedom is clear. True freedom is the choice of a valuable purpose and the process of carrying it out. Time is the home of freedom and of purpose; Samuel Alexander said that "time is the mind of space." The future, with its inexhaustible potentialities, is the objective of all choice. Free purpose in time is therefore the symbol of man's infinite perfectibility and is a ground for the confidence that no arbitrary barriers set by tyranny can confine the spirit or prevent free planning for a better future. It was precisely when King Manasseh was shedding innocent blood in the streets of Jerusalem that the prophets, doubtless in the concentration camps of their day, were writing their constitution for the future society in the book of Deuteronomy.

One difference between a small spirit and a large spirit, between petty freedom and great freedom, may be fairly measured by the time span which the spirit includes and organizes in its purposes. Memory is essential to the integrity and unity of the spirit; a purposer who forgets the lessons of the past is sure to have unwise purposes. But the most ample historical memory affords no assurance of firm, long-range purposes unless it be supplemented by anticipation of the future. The purposer is the explorer of the future. Every purpose is a venture into the unknown. Prometheus is more daring than Epimetheus. The purposer learns hard facts with the advance of time, yet,

if he be rational, he never abates his loyalty to ideal values. Although he cannot foresee what will befall him, he can foresee what direction his free purpose will take, no matter what befalls. The great spirit chooses a life purpose that no circumstance can overthrow, yet will pursue it with a flexibility that adjusts every circumstance to the purpose.

V

It would not, however, suffice to measure the free spirit solely by the range of its purposive time span. Freedom faithful to a distant goal is indeed impressive; but blind, uncritical tenacity is mere obstinacy, becoming less and less virtuous the longer it persists. Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, have taught us that freedom is a good only in so far as it is rational. Irrational uses of freedom must, it is true, be tolerated if there is to be security for its rational use. Here is one of the many points where a democratic society must allow evil in order that good may come. If only rational freedom be allowed, freedom ceases to be free and rationality ceases to be rational. To act only as others dictate, however wisely they may dictate, is abdication of personality.

Freedom and reason, however, remain vague abstractions until they are defined. They are especially confusing if called Freedom and Reason, with capital letters. Freedom we have defined as the experience of choosing from among possible courses of action. Reason has been used in so many senses that it is a treacherous word. Abstractly, reason may be viewed as the sum of all principles of logic. Concretely, it is equivalent to reasoning—the process of applying logical principles to our actual consciousness. More exactly, concrete reason is the movement from a problematic, confused, or inconsistent conscious situation toward a better-ordered, clearer, and more consistent conscious situation. Mr. Dewey in his *Logic* denies that confused situations can be cleared up by “manipulation of our personal states of mind”;⁴ in reply to which it must be said that no clarification has ever occurred except by such manipulation.

⁴ P. 106.

Omit personal minds, and what is left of reason and reasoning?

In a word, reason is the conscious movement from less coherence (less system, order, and connection) toward more coherence (more system, order, and connection). Concrete reason is not mere theorizing; it is an organization of our experience as a whole. One of its foundation principles is: Include all the facts. "The true," says Hegel, "is the whole." Reason includes the discovery of the simplest parts of every complex (analysis), of the relations of the parts (synthesis), and of the properties of the whole which do not belong to the parts (synopsis). Analysis without synthesis and synopsis increases accuracy while diminishing adequacy. Synthesis or synopsis without analysis is romantic fog. All stages of reason are essential to its function.

It is now clear why freedom and reason are allies. Freedom requires reason for its self-protection and its guidance. The irrational "free" man is slave to the unknown. Reason, on the other hand, protects man, as far as is possible, from enslaving surprise. Furthermore, rational thought affords guidance to freedom, revealing which ends are transitory and self-defeating, which ends are permanent and self-sustaining. If reason guides freedom, it also requires freedom for its very existence. Without inner freedom to think and outer freedom to express thought, reason remains a barren and unreal ideal. The abstract norms of reason are of no human importance unless men are free to apply them concretely, so as to judge their senses, their passions, and their world by the demands of inclusive coherence—and then "remake it nearer to the heart's desire," or, rather, nearer to the mind's best insight.

Only the blindest can fail to see the peril in which the wise and necessary alliance of reason with freedom, purpose, and value stands today. The rising tide of irrationalism imperils reason and freedom alike.⁵ Reason itself, in so far as current logical positivism is a form of reason, is betraying itself by denying the possibility of a rational knowledge of values or

⁵ For excellent recent treatments of irrationalism see J. Seelye Bixler, *The Religion of a Free Mind*, New York, 1939; and also the chapter on "Valuations: Sentimental or Scientific," Melvin Rader, *No Compromise*, New York, 1939.

purposes. The attacks on free reason from totalitarianism are obvious. Less obvious, but more insidious, are the assaults on reason and freedom in the democracies—assaults in the name of patriotism, God, and the Constitution. Rational freedom may be enchained by its zealous friends as effectively as by its zealous enemies. The concrete realities of freedom and reason can be preserved only by ever renewed struggles. What man is free to gain, man is also free to lose. History must witness repeated agonies of free spirit in strife with forces of mechanical, irrational enslavement.

V I

It is not superfluous to add that freedom-purpose-value is a social as well as a logical and an individual category. Significant social expression is mostly the organization or conflict of free purposes. No society could be built on merely visual perceptions; no social structure would ensue from bare exchange of well-verified scientific descriptions of sensory facts. All such exchange becomes social because of the relation of the facts to some social purpose, if it be only the purpose to investigate. Every society is a more or less free pursuit of common purposes and values. Economic facts have profound social significance, but only because of their function in promoting or obstructing vital human purposes. A society, therefore, is never constituted by purely economic categories. Likewise, "blood and soil" have social importance only as race or land tend to help create or destroy the values which free purpose seeks.

V I I

Freedom-purpose-value is more than a social category; it is also a metaphysical category. If we find a principle to be pervasive and essential in human experience; if we find reason and social organization to depend on it; if science is an exhibition of it; then we may well infer that such a principle is inherent in the structure of the universe.

This is obviously no place for the construction of a metaphysical system. Meanwhile it is appropriate to point out that

no metaphysical system can be said to be adequately grounded in experience if that system omits from consideration man's daily experiences of freedom-purpose-value and his fight against the frustration of these experiences. Denatured facts will yield only denatured metaphysics. To select unfree, purposeless, and valueless facts exclusively is as irrational as it is to select exclusively the facts of freedom, purpose, and value. Hence a metaphysics based on actual experience can be neither wholly spiritual nor wholly unspiritual; but it may be wholly personal if our personality is our total experience of tension and struggle between the spiritual life and its given limits. Metaphysics cannot offer ghostly, lawless spirituality; but it may be an objective interpretation of what Kant called the primacy of the practical reason.⁶ The evidence of science is that law prevails among the brute facts of nature; and free purposive striving for value persists in every normal mind, however perverted that striving may become.

The central problem of philosophy first came to light when Socrates turned away from the book of Anaxagoras because he asked for the bread of mind and Anaxagoras gave him the stone of mechanism. The actual world contains both bread and stones, both purposive and visual experience, both the spiritual and the unspiritual. The problem of metaphysics and of life is to discover and apply the true relations of these two factors, which we have often wrongly contrasted as the ideal and the real. The primacy of the spiritual over the brute facts of the unspiritual is a key to human and cosmic evolution. The unspiritual may be spiritualized, not by being explained away or declared to be inherently spiritual and perfect, but by being controlled through the persuasion of the spiritual.

VIII

Both among the very sophisticated and among the very unsophisticated one often hears the question: What is the purpose of life? What is the value of living? What is this freedom for?

⁶ Emmanuel Mounier in *A Personalist Manifesto*, New York, 1938, has spoken of "the primacy of the spiritual."

The unsophisticated are inexperienced and have not tasted the heights or the depths. It is natural that they should be vague and hesitant when they hear conflicting reports from explorers. The sophisticated are overexperienced. That is, they have had too much experience of human *trivia* and *vitia*. Hence, in their ennui, they are unable to see true value in the long perspective of human and cosmic purpose. The sophisticated have become sophists. They see, but they do not comprehend, the relativity of all values. In truth, values are relative to free, rational purpose. Those who actually devote themselves to the realization of free, rational purposes find themselves in the immediate enjoyment of present values and engaged in a quest for future values. This enjoyment and quest are so intrinsically satisfying that the inquiry about the purpose of life seems naïve and almost laughable to one who is living value.

Yet after all the question is not laughable. It is serious and tragic, for two fundamental reasons: Firstly, the conflict of opinion about true value, and, secondly, the conflict of nature with all value.

The conflict of opinion is not to be brushed aside. Plato and Hegel were two of the world's greatest and most rational minds, and both were opposed to democracy. Thomas Aquinas and Dante saw eye to eye about God, the *ens realissimum* and *perfectissimum*. Bertrand Russell and George Santayana find it impossible to believe that God is *reale*, not to mention *realissimum*. To take another field, who can tell what art is so that Phidias and Dali would agree? Could Thomas Jefferson and Alfred Rosenberg come to a common definition of the good? Conflicts of opinion concerning the fundamental ends of life prevail among creeds, parties, nations, classes, races, and economic systems. They manifest no tendency toward settlement by treaties or leagues or academies. Spiritual peace in our time is a mirage.

What has philosophy to offer in the presence of these facts? Numerous considerations of pith and moment. First of all, universal agreement has never been necessary to the supreme enjoyment of value. The highest moments of life, indeed, have something private about them. They are almost incommunica-

ble; at best they can be shared with but a few. Mystic ecstasy, breath-taking beauty, or free responsible action come to the soul with credentials that require no majority vote of the neighbors for their endorsement. Some of the neighbors might only profane the highest values. Secondly, there is, on the other hand, a universal factor in all worthy purposing of value. That factor is reason. As we have already seen, without reason no human being can survive as a unity; without it his purposes nullify one another, his values cancel out, his freedom becomes inner anarchy. The law is inexorable: Seek reason or be condemned to spiritual self-destruction.

Thirdly, however, reason is compatible with magnificent variety of purpose among individuals and cultures. Spiritual value is not a fixed code of action on which all agree, nor is it a rigid scale of items eternally better or worse than each other. Spiritual value is rather the growth of the spirit in its individual and social manifestations, in such wise that every conscious being may preserve and develop what it experiences as truly worth preserving. Thomas Aquinas and George Santayana may both be spiritual men.

Fourthly, no responsible person will commit himself to any purpose unless he has surveyed as widely as he may the relations of this purpose to other purposes, especially to the underlying purpose that has hitherto prevailed in his life. Out of this survey, a new and richer unity may emerge, as it never could from any hasty or forced agreement with the standards of others.

This spiritual life, we emphasize, does not occur in a vacuum. Individuals and their societies are surrounded by the energies which we call nature. Nature kills, maims, frustrates, torments the bearers of spiritual life. In fact, if one were to consider the laws of physics, chemistry, astronomy, and biology abstractly, without regard to the facts of value experience, one would readily declare it to be a priori certain that such laws were utterly foreign to purpose and freedom. But purpose and freedom exist, and an abstract view of the laws of science is therefore a falsification of experience. It is empirically true that nature is destructive and that values are threatened daily by seem-

ingly indifferent natural forces. True as this is, it is only part of the truth, for it is also true that values, as the late Professor Walter Goodnow Everett often said, are born in the womb of nature. Nature sustains the existence of persons and their purposes; makes planning for the future possible and often successful; offers freedom a wide field of choice and of instruments for the effective attainment of chosen ends. Nature is hostile and nature is friendly. The counterpart of the conflict of nature against values is the sustenance of values by nature. To strike out both facts and declare nature neutral is a singular manifestation of fact blindness. No philosophy is true which neglects either aspect of nature, much less a philosophy which neglects both aspects. No life can be fully human which rests on illusions that arise from forgetting facts.

Conflict remains. Freedom of purpose also remains. No philosophy can be sheltered from the strife of nature and the strife of purposes. It is in conflict that man's spiritual values have been achieved. Out of the dialectical tensions of spirit with spirit, and of spirit with nature, there have grown art and religion, science and philosophy, and noble character. Perhaps Heraclitus spoke more wisely than he knew when he said that strife (πόλεμος) is the father of all things. "It is king of all and shows some to be gods, and makes some to be men—some slaves and others free." The universal conflict may be such that eventually every spirit that wills to be free shall actually be free.

I X

The *Zeitgeist* is not predisposed to spiritual personalism. Philosophers and statesmen abound who regard all spiritual synthesis as sheer fantasy. They call it impractical nonsense—perhaps Jewish ideology, perhaps wishful thinking, or if they are hard put to it for epithets, they brand it as theological. In any case, the *Zeitgeist* is against the spirit as out of step with the times, and as economically unproductive. What is more, the spirit is against the *Zeitgeist*. What free spirit, purposing rational value, can view the current act of the human drama without condemnation? Man as he is is surely something to be over-

come. One need not be a partisan of Nietzsche to hope and struggle for the coming of Beyond-Man, to whom the man of today will be "a joke or a sore shame."

Yet, if we hold that out of all conflict a new synthesis will arise, we need not regard the present situation as desperate. On the contrary, its strife may be a father of all things to coming generations, if military madness does not exceed all bounds. It is well for the spirit that it now lives in an age which challenges its very right to existence. If the spirit cannot meet that challenge, it deserves to perish. "The unexamined life is not worth living." The challenge of our times to the spirit takes the form: "Show us your papers. Tell us on what you base your lofty pretensions. If you cannot verify your fine speeches, we shall scrap you—we positivists, logical and illogical. We have proved both by theoretical refinements and by coarse brutality that your purpose and value and freedom have neither referents nor military power." It is true that nothing is more remote from the logical positivists in their Ivory Tower than the intent to support violence, yet there is a strange contemporary meeting of extremes in the assault on the spiritual life, however unpurposed the attack on purpose may be. Can the spirit meet this onset?

For its defense, spirit can rely on four items of experience, which are no matters of opinion or theory, but matters of fact. These items are: First, the presence of freedom, purpose, and value in nearly all human conscious experience; secondly, the fact that the three elements of spirit are presupposed by all proof and verification; thirdly, the fact that all social communication involves them; and fourthly, the fact that they are the ultimate source of the use and direction of physical forces in human relations.

First, then, we are directly conscious of freedom, purpose, and value in nearly every moment of experience—of freedom, it is true, less continually than of purpose and value. Spiritual facts are as directly experienced as are sense data. When I choose to pick up a red rose rather than a green leaf, I experience my free choice as directly as I experience the red of the rose or the green of the leaf. When I purpose to give the rose

to my wife, that purpose, which means an orientation of my total experience, is as certainly experienced as is the sensory pattern of the rose. When I value the beauty of the rose's form and color, my value experience is as real as is my perception of form and color. Incidentally, it should be remarked that it is as impossible to translate freedom, purpose, and value into the sensory language of physicalism, as it is to translate sense data into the forms of freedom, purpose, or value. True philosophy must synthesize, not reduce; must save experiences, not destroy any.

Secondly, the free purpose to achieve a valued end is a necessary constituent of all proof and verification of every kind. One can never verify any proposition without purposing to verify, or without freedom and value in the choice of that purpose. Every theory, and every test of every theory, is someone's free purpose to seek a value. Freedom is just as essential to the testing of statements about sun spots, radium, or determinism, as it is to the testing of democracy or tyranny.

At this point, someone is almost sure to remark that these considerations may be an interesting play of dialectic, but are lacking in cogency because they fail to take into account the need for public verification. Logical plausibility, or even logical necessity, has no bearing on the real world, the objector will say, unless evidence is offered which is open to common, social inspection. Surely I cannot inspect your freedom, your purposes, your valuations, nor you mine. Hence they are not real.

This leads us to say, thirdly, that freedom-purpose-value is a presupposition of all social structure and of all communication. They are the social *a priori*. As John E. Boodin has pointed out, purposes are really the ultimate social facts.⁷ Society is at once a co-operation and a clash of purposes. Without purpose, no experience is known to be public, no thought is communicated, no sign is interpreted. Elsewhere, Boodin remarks that a theory which excludes teleological motives may seem simpler, but "lacks truth and reality."⁸ If William James was right in de-

⁷ J. E. Boodin, *The Social Mind*, New York, 1939, p. 228, and Chap. VI on "Social Systems" entire.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

fining every self as a "fighter for ends," and in declaring that "the only meaning of essence is teleological,"⁹ then individual, social, and scientific experiences are alike impossible without purpose. To call purpose a social *a priori*, therefore, is not to appeal to an abstract theory, but to analyze experience. An act of public verification is an appeal to the free purposes of others to affirm or deny the item under discussion in the light of the evidence to which purpose directs attention. Without such appeal and free and relevant response to it, nothing could be meant socially, or verified or refuted. The language of purpose is a source of the meaning of all other languages, including the physical. Your act of pointing at an object, for example, is a futile gesture until I know your purpose in pointing. The circumstances may suggest a lucky guess, but the guess must be about your purpose. If purposes are not public, nothing is public.

Fourthly, the most important item from the social standpoint is the fact that persons who purpose values are the eventual sources and directors of the use of physical force in human affairs. Ever since the dimmest protohuman mind emerged from its animal ancestry, there has been in man the conflict between violence and persuasion as preferred means of gaining desired ends. The serpent tried persuasion (in its lowest form, to be sure) and succeeded directly with Eve, vicariously with Adam. Cain, however, slew his brother and gained nothing but a reputation as the first murderer. Since then, humane and spiritual men have tried to be as wise as the serpent and as harmless as the dove. They have engaged in unequal competition with men of violence.

One might well suppose that violence would long ago have exterminated all traces of reason, of character, of beauty, and of worship, in view of the manifest inequality of the struggle. In every generation prophets of evil arise who proclaim: "The end is at hand, goodness has perished from the earth, with the exception that I, even I only, am left." Yet the historical fact is that the end has never come. The most brutal of tyrannies, the darkest of dark ages, the most deliberate persecutions and

⁹ W. James, *Psychology*, New York, 1890, Vol. I, p. 141, Vol. II, p. 335.

inquisitions, have never broken the spiritual life of man nor crushed his determination to persevere.

Why this impractical vitality of the spirit? We have already hinted at part of the answer. It is incorrect to think of violence and persuasion as utterly unrelated and opposed phases of experience. On the contrary, each of them is a stage in the dialectic of spirit. Persuasion is plainly a level where social value is purposed by appeal to the freedom of all members of the community and to their rational insight. Violence, however, is also a means of social expression; as such, it, too, is a result of the use of freedom. It is an instrument chosen for its supposed utility in achieving ends regarded as intrinsic values. No one values violence for its own sake, unless he is mentally diseased. Some factor that disturbs the spirit—hunger or fear or ignorance or desire for revenge—may lead men to set up goals that can be attained only by violence. Yet when they use violence, they are still free spirits, "fighters for ends." The man of violence is a free purposer of value, however tragically futile his use of freedom may be, or however irrational his value judgments.

Herein lies man's chief hope for the future. Violence can be used by men only because the men are spirits in distress. A bitter nay to the everlasting yea of the spirit is embodied in violence; but that nay is itself also a yea of the spirit to the spirit. Hate is an antithesis in the same spiritual movement as the thesis of love. History shows that it is impossible for a society to survive permanently if it "sticks in the antithesis." The man of violence in the end cannot endure himself, because he, too, is a spirit. Sooner or later he becomes conscious that his weapons of force crush not only his victims, but also his own spirit. Violence can be sustained only by the spirit and in the long run the spirit cannot and will not sustain it.

Man must move on from the suicide of spirit by violence to a synthesis in which the physical becomes the body and the instrument of the spiritual. This synthesis has been achieved in many individuals. Society has yet to reach the stage where it prefers the wisdom of disciplined freedom to periods of violent self-destruction. Slowly, dimly, it is groping toward goals set for it by the cosmic spirit.

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FREEDOM IN THE PERSONAL NEXUS

THE traditional formulations of the problem of human freedom are so abstract that they have neither substance nor meaning. Or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that they have substance and meaning only as it is lent to them by the personal interests and assumptions of individuals, so that they change from generation to generation, from country to country, from circumstance to circumstance. If the issue is to be put in the way of solution we must begin by determining what we are discussing when we discuss freedom. This cannot be done by any mere definition of terms, which would carry no further than the use of the word in the present context. We must determine the locus of the problem in universal human experience. We must discover the center of disturbance. We must put our finger upon the concrete origin of the question, if it is to be real and not artificial; a problem of life and not of language.

The traditional dilemma of free will or determinism is entirely artificial, like most exclusive alternatives of a high order of abstraction. If a rigid determinism obtained in the field of human behavior there could, of course, be no choice; and equally if a rigid freedom of will prevailed there could be no choice either, since both alternatives would be equally open. But it would be a waste of energy to pursue an abstract argument when it is easy to see by inspection that the debate is artificial. We need only suppose that we have accepted either al-

ternative, and ask what difference it makes in concrete experience. If everything is determined, it still remains unquestionable that a man is freer out of prison than in it; freer in America at peace than in Germany at war; freer in health than in sickness, freer when he has money in his pocket than when he is penniless. If man possesses freedom of will equally these variations in freedom remain unaffected. The locus of the real problem lies in these variations of human freedom under varying conditions. The question is not, "Are we free?" but "How free are we?" It is not, "Have we freedom of will?" but "Under what conditions have we most freedom of will?"

Men have craved for freedom, demanded freedom, and fought for freedom. This proves that they have meant by "freedom" something that could be achieved by human effort; and not something that we either have or lack. If the free-will controversy were more than a scholastic wrangle, nothing could be done about freedom, whichever of the two alternatives were correct. This fact throws a curious light upon the metaphysical controversy itself. If we can increase freedom by taking the appropriate action, then freedom must be conditioned. It is only by altering its conditions that we can increase or diminish freedom. We can diminish a man's freedom of action by locking him in a room, and so changing the conditions of his action. To say that anything is conditioned is to say that it is determined. The conditions are its determinants. Thus what men have always meant by freedom is itself determined. In theory they have assumed that if everything is determined there can be no freedom. Yet what if freedom itself is determined? We tend to think too easily that men long for a freedom that is denied them by the forces of nature and history. Perhaps the opposite is nearer to the truth. Perhaps man is only too anxious to escape from a freedom which nature and history combine to thrust upon his timidity. Perhaps we are destined to be free whether we like it or not. To be free is to be responsible. To evade responsibility is to flee from freedom. If it is true that the inexorable laws of human development compel man to accept an ever increasing responsibility for his own destiny, then freedom is determined at the metaphysical level, as an inevita-

ble product of the laws of nature. In that event freedom and determinism are implicates, not contradictories.

There is also a subjective factor in the problem which demands preliminary attention. No one, I imagine, would consider that we are not free because there are many things that we are unable to do. A drowning determinist, clutching at straws, would hardly contend that we are not free because we cannot pay week-end visits to the moon. Freedom has clearly some relation to our desires, and our desires have their roots in the same nature of things that determines the possibilities of our action. No man can intend to do what he knows or believes to be beyond the bounds of possibility. It is doubtful whether we can even seriously desire, for any length of time, what we believe to be unobtainable. Freedom seems to lie in some *ratio* between our desires and our capacity to satisfy them; between what we can intend and what we can achieve. At least we may satisfy ourselves that men experience the lack of freedom only when their efforts are frustrated; only when they fail to achieve what they believe to be possible. The social function of the agitator, which has sometimes been of high importance in the history of freedom, is to persuade men to envisage, to desire, and to demand a freedom that they do not possess. His difficulty often lies in convincing the people that they are in bondage. His success depends upon convincing them that the new forms of life he proposes are really possible. The contented man is free, as the sages have always told us, because his powers are adequate to his desires. They have, perhaps, been too ready to assume that any man can be contented if he chooses. Even if he could, it is not at all clear that he ought to be. At any rate, it is important not to overlook this subjective factor in freedom. Men's desires vary. Their conceptions of what is possible are not fixed. Consequently, what is freedom for one man may be slavery for another, and the vision of a new possibility may turn freedom into bondage.

It would appear, then, that freedom, as we experience it, resides in the adequacy to our purposes of our powers, opportunities, and means. Its opposite is the experience of constraint, which arises when for any reason we must refrain from doing

what we ourselves desire to do, or must do something other than we would. But this general formulation is too wide for our purpose. It covers checks to the spontaneity of our behavior which appear as mere momentary vexations, no sooner felt than overcome; as well as those major and permanent frustrations that may make life not worth living. We have, as it were, drawn a circle round the field within which the problem is to be located. We must try to discover its center. We have included all cases; we have to determine which are the crucial cases. The answer which I wish to suggest is that the center of the problem of freedom lies in the nexus of personal relationships, and that all other types of constraint are derivative from the constraints of personal relationship, at least if they are real.

Before explaining this view, it will be well to consider the distinction between real and illusory freedom which I have introduced as a qualification. There is, we have seen, a subjective element in freedom, and it is, of course, on this account that freedom can be illusory. But the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" must be used in this context with extreme care. The ordinary distinction between the two is derived from the reflective field, in which we "stand over against" the world, in contemplation or in thought. In this attitude, whatever we consider is independent of the processes of consideration. It is "objective" in the sense that our activities of observing and thinking "make no difference" to it. But freedom is not objective in this sense; neither is it a property or character of anything objective. Freedom is a modality of action, and actions are not contemplated but performed. Here indeed lies the formal defect of the question, "Is the will free?" It postulates an objective entity called "the will," and inquires whether it possesses an objective property called "freedom." The phrase "my will" stands for "me acting," in contrast to "me observing and reflecting." Acting means realizing an intention, and an act cannot therefore be merely objective. Neither can it be merely subjective. It is a unit of experience which begins in the "subjective" and terminates in the "objective." It bridges the gap between "mind" and "matter," between the "self" and the

"world," between "ideas" and "things," if indeed there is any gap to be bridged. Freedom, as a modality of this transition from subjective to objective, cannot be either merely subjective or merely objective. We must guard against the tendency to identify the illusory with the subjective and the real with the objective in this context. All freedom has both a subjective and an objective element in it, and these are not separable. They are rather aspects of one and the same thing. We are not necessarily free merely because we feel free; but on the other hand a constraint which is not felt is no real constraint. A contented slave is still a slave, though his slavery is no bondage for him; and when the poet writes that

"Stone walls do not a prison make,
Nor iron bars a cage"

we understand what he means, but refuse to take his statement *au pied de la lettre*. If freedom is to be real it must not be subject to destruction by a change of mood or an increase in knowledge. It must be rooted, as a subjective experience, in the objective nature of things. Otherwise it is illusory.

We may distinguish two types of illusory freedom, which we may call subjective and objective respectively. Freedom, we may say, is subjectively illusory, if the absence of any experience of constraint depends upon the absence of a desire to do what one would be prevented from doing. It is objectively illusory if the feeling of freedom depends upon a false belief in our power to achieve what we desire. The stoic ideal of a freedom to be achieved by getting rid of desire and "willing what happens" is the apotheosis of subjectively illusory freedom. Kant's effort to equate freedom with moral obligation falls into the same category. Desires which are suppressed do not cease to exist; they are at best inactive in consciousness. The objective type of illusory freedom is even more common. It exists wherever we overestimate our capacities or our means; or are ignorant of the obstacles in circumstances to the achievement of our intentions. Corresponding to these illusory freedoms, there are illusory constraints. We are subject to illusions of weakness as well as of power; and we are afflicted with spurious desires,

which lead us to demand impossible satisfactions that we do not really want, and which, if we were to achieve them, we should repudiate. The illusory character of such freedoms and constraints does not consist in their nonexistence or their ineffectiveness. We are not dealing with ideas which have no counterpart in the real world. In action the subjective does not confront the objective as it does in reflection. Action passes *from* the subjective *to* the objective. It is a process in time, with an inherent reference to the future. The check to action which destroys our freedom in action may come at any point in the process. Illusory freedom is experienced as freedom. But it is incompatible with its own persistence, and is therefore self-defeating. We are not free to achieve the impossible. But we are often free *in* actions which must inevitably lead to frustration, because their objective, unknown to us, is in fact impossible. Such freedom is properly called illusory, since it depends upon illusions, and must lead to its own destruction.

With this distinction between real and illusory freedom in mind, we may return to the central issue. Real freedom depends upon the character of the nexus of personal relations in which we are involved. This is the thesis which I wish to expound. It can be expressed and understood best by drawing attention to the kind of experience of freedom and constraint which it makes the center of the problem. If I am in the company of strangers whose good will is important to me, and cannot be depended on, my conversation with them and my behavior towards them suffer from constraint. I cannot express myself spontaneously. I must think carefully before I speak, and seek to make a good impression. I must act a part; I cannot "be myself." If I leave this company and join a number of intimate friends whom I know and trust, this constraint disappears and is replaced by freedom. I can now allow my whole self to appear. I can say what comes into my mind. I can behave "naturally." I need not fear criticism, and so I can be spontaneous, speaking and acting without an eye upon effects. Here then is one familiar type of experience in which the contrast between "freedom" and "constraint" appears. My thesis is that this contrast is the central one; and that when we wish

to go to the root of the problem of freedom, this is precisely the sort of case which we should accept as a type instance, and have in mind as an example. My reason for saying this is not that there are no other types of cases which are important, such as those which form the stock in trade of all discussions of political liberty. It is that the type of experience I have chosen involves, in principle, all the others; that if it is understood, then all the others are, in principle, understood; if it is solved, then all the others are soluble. The understanding of other types, on the other hand, is not possible, or at least cannot be complete, unless this type of case is understood; nor can the problem be solved in the other types of instances unless it is solved in this type. I believe, in other words, that the problem of freedom appears at different levels of experience, and that its solution at the upper levels depends upon its solution on the basic level. And I believe that if we consider the problem as it appears in the nexus of direct personal relationships, we are attacking it at ground level; we are laying bare its foundations. Only if we do this is it possible to envisage a radical solution. Even if such a radical solution is impracticable, it will still enable us to understand what partial solutions are possible and practicable at other levels, such as the political or the economic; and it will prevent us from expecting too much from reforms that do not go to the root of the trouble.

In our effort to determine the general field in which the real problem of freedom arises, we noticed that it was not the mere absence of power that created the problem, but the absence of power relative to a real desire. We noticed further that a real desire—the kind of desire that can give rise to deliberate action—depends upon a belief in the possibility of its satisfaction. This involved a curious paradox. It would seem that we can only experience a real loss of freedom in the presence of an impossible possibility. I do not mean by this that we must believe something to be possible which is in fact impossible; for this is the situation in which we enjoy a freedom which is objectively illusory. We must find ourselves in a situation in which a real possibility is actually impossible to realize; in which we believe, and believe rightly, that what we

desire to achieve can be achieved and at the same time cannot be achieved. For it is only in such conditions that we can experience a real frustration of our will. It is only then that we feel, and rightly feel, that we are *prevented* from realizing our intentions, that we are *deprived* of our freedom.

How can such a situation arise? Surely any action that I propose is either possible or impossible. At most, it would seem, I may be mistaken in thinking it possible when it is impossible, or impossible when it is not. Surely it cannot both *be* possible and impossible at the same time. Logically, of course, it cannot. But logic does not have the last word.

For our logical judgments depend upon the distinction between subjective and objective, which holds in the field of reflection but not in the field of action. In reflection about the nature of the objective world we are guided by the postulate that all unreason falls into the subjective field; so that if any illogicality comes to light it must belong to the processes of thinking, and not to what is the object of our thought. But in action the unreason of the subjective field is carried over into the objective, and our mistakes are objectively revealed and have an objective embodiment. If two of us differ in our conclusions about an objective question, then the disagreement makes no difference to the fact; it merely shows that one of us at least is mistaken, and ought to change his mind. The error of another cannot here by its mere existence destroy the correctness of my own judgment. His inability to think logically does not interfere with the freedom of my own processes of thought. But when we pass from the sphere of thought to that of action this immunity is left behind. For in action the irrationality of others can frustrate the rationality of my intentions, and my irrationality can frustrate theirs. If our intentions contradict one another, they destroy each other's possibility. What is objectively possible becomes actually impossible. Wherever, indeed, the achievement of an intention depends upon co-operation, the simplest of objective possibilities may be made impossible by the unwillingness of those concerned to co-operate; and this unwillingness may, on occasion, rest upon completely irrational and totally absurd grounds. The capacity of human

beings to "cut off their noses to spite their faces" is very high, and it is not unusual to find a group of individuals who refuse to co-operate in the achievement of an objective which all of them desire, for reasons so irrational that they must conceal them even from themselves. This is the resolution of the paradox of the impossible possibility which lies at the root of the problem of freedom. It is the nexus of personal relationship that is responsible for the variation in human freedom. We can prevent one another from achieving our purposes, even when they are objectively possible, and so limit or destroy one another's freedom. Moreover, this is the only way in which real freedom can be limited; for only thus can what is objectively possible be rendered actually impossible. Only persons can limit the freedom of persons. Any limitation of freedom must have its source in us; in the character of our relationships, as personal agents, to one another.

It is the instinctive recognition of this truth that links the experience of a lack of freedom with the idea of oppression and tyranny. When men feel the loss of freedom they behave as though someone were responsible. They instinctively feel that some individual or class is wrongfully depriving them of a freedom which is theirs by natural right. The struggle for freedom is always a struggle against oppression. The oppressors have defended themselves on the plea that the freedom demanded was in the nature of things impossible; that the constraint complained of was in fact illusory. In this instinct there is a core of essential truth, however mistaken the accusation may be in any particular case. If men feel the loss of freedom they are always justified in looking for its source in the personal field. If men are not free, then they are oppressed. Their inability to do what they desire is not a mere lack of power, but a deprivation of power, for which the responsibility rests with their fellows. The fact that we often make mistakes in assigning the responsibility, that often indeed we are satisfied to wreak our vengeance on any available scapegoat, is no argument against this truth; any more than the fact that we often assign the wrong cause for an event suggests that it is causeless. We are therefore at liberty to lay down a principle of far-reaching

importance. The solution of any problem of human freedom depends on the alteration of the relationships of persons. The importance of this principle lies in what it denies. It denies that any increase in power can solve the problem of freedom. Indeed, an increase in power which is not accompanied by a change in the nexus of personal relationships must inevitably diminish freedom. For it enlarges the field of objective possibility without altering the conditions of effective action, and so widens the gap between what can be intended and what can be achieved.

Consider two examples of this. The increase of scientific knowledge during the past century has immensely increased the range of human possibility. Much is really possible today that was objectively impossible a hundred years ago. As a result there has been a noticeable diminution of human freedom and an increase of oppression. There is nothing paradoxical about this. It is, in fact, just what must happen provided the character of the personal nexus remains, as it has remained, substantially unaltered. The increase in what is objectively possible cannot be equated with an increase in freedom. It increases the range and variety of the satisfactions that men can reasonably hope to attain. But if it leaves their forms of relationship adjusted to a narrower range of actual achievement only, then the effect is to diminish freedom. The subjective constituent of freedom must not be overlooked. Freedom does not consist in the objective existence of power, but in the possibility of using it for desired ends. If a century of scientific development has made it possible to raise the general standard of living by 20 per cent and it has actually risen only by 10 per cent then in this respect there has been a restriction of freedom by 10 per cent. (The figures, of course, are not to be taken seriously.)

Consider, in the second place, the increase in oppression which reveals itself in modern dictatorship. In olden times a despotic monarch, however arbitrary and cruel, could interfere with the freedom of his subjects only to a quite limited extent. In a modern society with the same type of relationship between ruler and ruled, the enormous increase in the range of human power involves a correspondingly enormous increase in the

restriction of freedom. Not only is the tyrant's capacity to interfere with the activities of his subjects vastly increased, but the range of possible satisfactions which he can deny them is also greatly enlarged. Here again we see that an increase in objective possibility involves a decrease of freedom if the character of the personal nexus in society remains unaltered.

It might seem that this leads us to endorse the view, widely held at present, that freedom is a function of the structure of society. This is partly correct, but only partly. The more important corollary, which must be combined with this, is that the structure of society is itself a function of the personal nexus of relationship between its members. There is an ambiguity in our use of the term "society" which is apt to result in a dangerous confusion. In general, the term refers to that nexus of relationship which binds human individuals into a unity. The ultimate fact upon which all society rests is the fact that the behavior of each of us conditions the behavior of the others and is therefore a determinant of their freedom. But the resulting nexus of relationship contains two distinguishable elements in virtue of the types of motive which underlie the active relationships involved. It is of the first importance to recognize, and to bear in mind, that a subjective element necessarily enters into all human behavior, and so into the constitution of all human relationships. The elementary type forms of these contrasted motivations are hunger and love. Hunger is a motive which gives rise to actions designed to appropriate something for one's own use. Love, in contrast, is the motive of actions in which we expend what is ours upon something or someone other than ourselves. Both these types of motive are *necessary* in the sense that they belong universally to the psychological constitution of human nature and are inescapable elements in the determination of human behavior. Both give rise to a nexus of dynamic relationships which bind us together. The first type gives rise to functional co-operation in work, and its basic forms are economic. The second gives rise to the sharing of a common life. Since the term "society" has in our day come to be so closely bound up with discussions of the organized forms of political and economic rela-

tionship, we had better specialize it for this use, and distinguish the forms of relationship which spring from the impulse to share a common life by using the term "community" to refer to them. The contrast to which our attention is now directed becomes thus a contrast between society and community.

The exact difference between society and community and the proper relation between them are best recognized by reference to the intentions involved. The intention involved in society lies beyond the nexus of relation which it establishes. In community it does not. It follows that society is a means to an end, while community is an end in itself. This may be stated from another angle by pointing out that a society can always be defined in terms of a common purpose, while a community cannot. Let us look, by way of example, at the simplest possible type of case, in which only two persons are involved. Two men may be associated as partners in a publishing business. They may also be associated as friends. That these two forms of relationship are different, and at least relatively independent, is shown by the fact that they may dissolve the partnership and remain friends; or they may remain in partnership and cease to be friends. Their association as partners is constituted by a co-operation in the achievement of a common purpose. Its form is dictated by this purpose. It involves a plan of co-operation and a division of labor between them. In virtue of this plan each of the two has a function in the business, in performing which he contributes his share of work to the achievement of the common purpose. Success depends on the proper co-ordination of their functions; and if the plan achieves this and each performs his function efficiently the partnership is a satisfactory association. The whole nature of their relationship as business partners is expressible in such functional terms with reference to the common end to which the association is the means.

Now consider their relationship as friends. We are not concerned here merely with their feelings, but with the kind of active relationship which is implied in their being friends. Notice in the first place that this association cannot be defined in terms of a common purpose. We cannot ask, What is the

purpose of their friendship? without implying that they are not really friends, but only pretend to be friends from an ulterior motive. A relationship of this type has no purpose beyond itself. Consequently its form is not dictated by a purpose; it does not give rise of necessity to a functional division of labor. For the same reason it cannot be organized. Nevertheless it is not motiveless. Its motive is to be found in the need to share experience and to live a common life of mutual relationship, which is a fundamental constituent of human nature.

We can use the same simple instance to help us to understand the relationship of these two types of association. That they are at least partly independent of one another we have seen, since they may vary independently. But we must now notice that friendship, though it cannot be constituted by co-operation for a common purpose, necessarily generates such co-operation. A friendship which did not result in the formation of common purposes and in co-operation to realize them would be potential only. Indeed the underlying motive of love is precisely to do something for the satisfaction of the other, and its mutuality inevitably leads to functional co-operation. But there are important differences to be noticed. Since the association is not *constituted* by a common purpose, it permits of a change of purposes. In a partnership, if the common purpose is dropped or becomes unrealizable, then the partnership is at an end. Not so with a friendship. If the two friends drop one common purpose for which they co-operate, it is only to find another. In the second place, the common ends which are worked for and the co-operation for their achievement are together means to maintaining and deepening the friendship. From this we must conclude that in the nexus of personal relationship community is capable of generating and containing society within itself, of making the co-operation for the achievement of common ends a means to itself and an expression of itself. Therefore it is clear that if the problem of community is solved the problem of society will be well on the way to solution.

It still remains true that within limits at least society can be independent of community. Our two men can be partners and

co-operate in the work of running their business without being friends. The necessity of making a livelihood, the pressure of immediate self-interest, may be sufficient motives to maintain the association. But there are limits to this. In the first place, though their co-operation is theoretically possible in the absence of friendship between them, in practice the absence of friendship limits the possibilities of effective co-operation in many ways; while if strong personal antagonism enters in it may easily render co-operation impossible. It may simplify the issue if we remember that we are using the term friendship to draw attention to the whole range of forms of relationship which depend upon other-regarding motives; that is to say, upon motives which give rise to actions intended to affect the lives and fortunes of others. Such motives range from murderous hate, through a theoretical point of pure indifference, to the love which is ready to sacrifice life itself for the profit of the loved one. If we keep this whole range of behavior in mind it is much less clear that functional co-operation is quite independent of the more personal forms of relationship of which friendship is our example. The more positive the personal interest the easier, *ceteris paribus*, the co-operation must be. The stronger the personal animosities between co-operating individuals the more difficult and inefficient the co-operation is likely to prove. It is only at the theoretical point of complete personal indifference that the co-operation is freed from the influence of the more personal elements in the nexus of relationship. Such an indifference is psychologically impossible between people who are in direct contact with one another. But it is possible and natural in highly organized societies, where very few of the individuals co-operating can know one another personally at all.

In the second place, any social organization is liable to be hampered or even disrupted by the intrusion of personal animosities. The machinery of co-operation seems to work smoothly only if the personal relations of the individuals concerned are kept, as it were, at a level of low tension. The more each one concentrates on doing his own part in the common task the better. The more the relations between them are de-

terminated by the common objective and the functional necessities of the plan of co-operation, the more efficient their efforts are likely to be. In all forms of organized co-operation, therefore, there is a tendency to look upon the more personal forms of relationship as a source of possible danger to the unity of the group. There is a latent tension between the two aspects of relationship. Society demands from its members a devotion to a common end which transcends all "private" ends, and a loyalty which is ready to sacrifice both oneself and one's neighbor to accomplish it. But from the standpoint of community, such a demand is absurd and blasphemous. For its values lie within, not beyond, the nexus of relationship; and all co-operation is a means of expressing the common life. Persons, not purposes, are absolute.

It has been necessary to draw the contrast between those two forms of relationship in the personal nexus because it is vital to the problem of freedom.

Probably everyone to whom freedom is a practical issue would agree that it only becomes a real issue when there is oppression; when somebody is putting constraint upon someone else and so infringing his natural liberty. This is to recognize, of course, that the locus of the problem of freedom lies in the personal nexus. From this recognition it is a natural step to the view that the solution of the problem must lie in a reorganization of society which will order the relations of individuals in such a way that the tyranny of one man over another, of one group or class over another, is eliminated. All the great struggles for freedom have taken their stand upon this view. Yet when they have won their victories in the revolt against this tyranny and that and have established the new order for which they strove, the result has always proved a disappointment to the idealists. Freedom remained obstinately unachieved. Constraint and tyranny reappear in forms ever more complicated and more difficult to deal with. Today, after centuries of struggle and effort, it is at least doubtful whether all the progress made has not left the majority of men less free than they were in the days of serfdom and slavery; with a wider gap than ever between their reasonable desires and

the satisfactions they can actually attain. This is not to say that there has been no progress. Progress has been immense and in spite of the pessimists is increasing its speed every year. The measure of progress is the increase in the range and complexity of what is objectively possible for man. This has risen so high that it is not absurd to say that already we are in a position to eliminate poverty from the life of mankind. But freedom is measured by the ratio between what is objectively possible and what we can actually achieve. It looks as though that ratio is lower than it has ever been in the history of civilization. Two things seem to be true together in the strange period to which we belong: that man's power of achievement has grown vast beyond belief; and that his capacity to achieve any serious human purpose is diminishing at an alarming rate. It is an age at once of unparalleled effort and unparalleled frustration.

The reason for this paradox seems to me to lie in our failure to distinguish the two aspects of relationship in the personal nexus. Not only do we use the terms "society" and "community" more or less interchangeably, but we tend increasingly to think of the nexus of personal relationship as a nexus of organized co-operation. As a result we are bound to conceive the problem of freedom as a problem of social organization; and, since the central organ of social organization is the State, as a political problem, to be solved by political means. The effort to solve the problem politically can only have the result of producing the organization of tyranny in the totalitarian state.

For consider. If a man is primarily a function in an organized co-operation pursuing a "common" purpose, then he exists for the group, as a means to the achievement of the common purpose. This is equally true of all his fellows. He and they have no more fundamental unity which might determine or modify or in any way challenge the social purpose. It is this purpose which determines them, sets them their places and their functions. Only in virtue of this organizing purpose are they a group. One is inclined to reply at once that this is clearly nonsense; and indeed it is. But we must not locate the "nonsense" in the wrong stage of the argument. If human society were

fundamentally a nexus of politico-economic co-operation, as so much of our modern thought and practice asserts or assumes, then any limitation of the claims of the group sovereignty upon the individual would be ridiculous, and any freedom for the individual would be accidental. The theory and practice of the totalitarian state are direct corollaries of this characteristic modern assumption. If, on the other hand, the individual has any ground of claim against the State; if it can treat him unjustly and deprive him of a freedom which is his by right of nature; then he is not primarily a functional element in an organized co-operation. He embodies in himself, as it were, an authority which limits and defines the merely political authority of the organized society. Moreover, it is not as a mere individual that he can claim such an authority; as a mere individual he cannot even exist. It can only be as a member of a more primary nexus of relationships than those of any organized society, and in which the ground of all organized society is to be found. This is the nexus of communal relationship, which we here distinguish from the social nexus. We have thus reached the point at which we can say that freedom can only be maintained in this nexus of human relationship by maintaining the primacy of the personal nexus of community over the functional nexus of organized society. If this is secured, then no doubt a well-organized society will provide greater freedom for its members than an ill-ordered society. But the most perfect organizing of society, if it involves the primacy of the State, as the authority of organized society, must result not in the extension but in the obliteration of freedom.

The problem of human freedom is then the problem of that nexus of human relationships of which friendship is the type. It belongs to the field of our direct personal relationships; not primarily to the world of our indirect, functional, or legal relationships. This was the one point which I set out to maintain. I may well conclude by showing that this means that the basis of freedom is personal equality.

The essence of any friendship consists in the achievement, in it, of a real sharing of life, of an effective mutuality of experience. This involves, of course, material co-operation, as we

have seen. It is in this effort to achieve such a nexus of relationship between ourselves and others that we have our most direct experience of freedom and constraint. Freedom is the result in so far as we succeed. Constraint is the penalty, as it is the proof, of failure. Freedom is the product of right personal relations. Constraint in the personal nexus is evidence that there is something wrong with the relationships involved. This "rightness" in such relationships is in fact personal equality. If there is constraint in a personal relationship there is a failure to achieve and maintain equality. Unless people treat one another as equals they are not friends. If one treats the other as an inferior, then he is using him as a means, and the friendship ceases to be a friendship. Thus personal equality is the structural principle of relations which are communal in type, while the experience of freedom in relations is their characteristic expression. What throws the personal nexus out of gear, and so introduces constraint and limits or destroys freedom, is always a failure to achieve or maintain personal equality. In other words, what destroys freedom is the will to power. Where one man seeks power over others, where one class or nation seeks dominion over others, the denial of equality involved creates constraint and limits freedom. And there is no way in which freedom can be restored or increased except by overcoming the desire for power.

The conclusion is a negative one; and not particularly comforting. To all the plans for achieving or defending freedom by political or economic organization it comes as a serious and unwelcome warning. There can be no *technique* for achieving freedom. The field in which freedom has to be won or lost is not the field of economics or politics, of committees and rules. It is rather the field which has hitherto been the undisputed domain of religion. An age that has put religion aside without even recognizing the need to put something in its place has already lost the sense of freedom and is ripe for the organization of tyranny. On the other hand, the will to power, though it may infect an epoch like an epidemic, is still a disease. It is not natural. And it may help us back to health to recognize the disorder from which we suffer.

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FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL

THE last thing that the average human being wants to be made to see is that as a matter of fact he is already inescapably free. This obviously does not mean free economically or politically, for these forms of freedom have not yet been generally attained and are still the object of passionate endeavor. What is meant is that inner freedom in virtue of which every individual leads his own life eternally free from his fellows within the walls of his own consciousness. So obstinate is man's refusal to admit this elemental fact that his social institutions and even his language, the tool of his thought, have from time immemorial assumed such a structure as to obscure recognition of the fact and to make even utterance of the fact well-nigh impossible. All the intellectual machinery which an individual receives as his heritage and with which he strives as best he can to adapt himself to his environment is a tissue of rationalization inspired by fear lest he see that he is really free. The oldest and the grimmest jest that man has perpetrated against himself is the jest that Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden really *wanted* to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge.

Everyone soon comes to realize and accept certain special aspects of freedom. Everyone who ever gets anywhere knows that he has to make his own decisions for himself. Everyone finds that no one is so much concerned with his own problems as himself, and that if he wants to be sure of getting a thing

right he has to do it for himself. He finds that he has no *right* to the interest or even the sympathy of others. He finds that whether or not he is free from other people, other people are free from him, and that the various devices he employs to control the actions of others are not necessarily successful. He is not *certain* of getting safely to the other side if he walks blindly across when the traffic light is in his favor, and if he does not arrive safely it is really on him and not on the man who has illegally run him down.

But although adaptation to certain of the aspects of freedom has got into the unconscious practice of most people, an adequate intellectual and emotional realization of the implications is most rare. We may attempt to obtain such a realization by reflecting on some of the commonest features of experience. No one would attempt to make a blind man experience one's sensations when confronted with a sunset. In a situation like this it is easy to say that there is something incommunicable about a sensation when the corresponding organ does not exist. But when the organ does exist, is the sensation then communicable? Does the red of the sunset sky appear to my seeing neighbor the same as to me? What shall I do to find out? Examination discloses that I can only analyze his behavior in certain situations, including in his behavior his spoken words. There is never a comparison of his *sensation* with mine. My sensation is private, forever incommunicable. This is sometimes, but not often, recognized, as in a recent *Reader's Digest* one of the examples of "a more picturesque speech" was "private as pain." Because my sensation is private, "my sensation" cannot have the same meaning as "your sensation," so that it is meaningless to ask whether your sensation is the *same* as mine.

Here we encounter one of the obstinate infelicities of language. "Sensation" is usually used without qualification by a "my" or a "your," as if there were a unique meaning, making qualification unnecessary. But analysis shows that the situation is irreducibly twofold. I know what I mean by "my sensation"; for my present purpose it is not necessary to analyze it further. But what shall I mean by "your sensation"? When it comes

right down to it, how do I know that you have sensations anyway? Certainly what I do to establish that you have sensations is different from what I do to establish that I have sensations, and since what I do is different, the meaning is different. What I do to establish that you have sensations is indirect and complicated and involves argument of one sort or another with myself. I see that you have organs similar to mine, and I observe that you behave similarly in similar situations. Would I not then be merely going out of my way to assume that you do not have sensations like me? The answer is that for certain purposes I *would* be going out of my way to assume a difference between you and me, and because these purposes control so many of the situations of ordinary life the convenience of a single word is accepted. For a very important concern in most of my contacts with my fellows is to anticipate how my fellow is going to act, and the best way I have been able to invent for predicting the actions of my fellow is to say to myself, How would *I* act in a similar situation? of course modifying my action to take account of such considerations as "if I were as sick as he" or "if I were as stupid as he." My answer as to how I would act depends on what I imagine my sensations would be. Hence it comes that what I mean by my fellow's sensations is what I imagine my own sensations would be in the same situation. This act of imagining myself in the other fellow's place is done so easily that I forget what I am doing and presently find myself using a single word, "sensation," covering both my and your, and still a little later materializing my dualistic linguistic creation by attaching meaning to "sensation" as such, unqualified by "my" or "your." Hence we finally come to handle "sensation" in a largely verbal way, to gratify impulses of verbalization. This uncritical use of the word "sensation" is not something that you and I have come to by ourselves, but is something that we have inherited. But however we came by it, there is no question but that we do use the word in this way. If we did not, we would not in the first place have tried to force into our question, Is my fellow's sensation of red the same as mine? a meaning different from that which analysis disclosed.

Language, then, presents sensation as something in common between my fellow and myself, a bond of union, whereas my sensation is inexorably private and eternally separates me from my fellow.

"Sensation" has been used in a broad sense; it includes not only what is correlated with the conventional sense organs, but embraces all that I understand by "conscious activity," including all conscious thought. There is grave danger here of being misunderstood; "conscious" and "consciousness" have such a history of metaphysical abuse, particularly by professional psychologists, that implications are almost certain to be read that I do not intend, or of which I am not even aware. My use of the word is without these professional and conventional implications. "I am conscious" is only another way of saying "I think," "I feel," "I am aware." I do not say that I *have* consciousness; neither can I say without extension and alteration of meaning that you are conscious. In the primitive meaning there is as little sense in saying that you are conscious as in saying that your sensation of red is the same as mine. For what do I do to establish that you are conscious?

Most of the words with which I describe the actions of my fellows are as irreducibly dual in meaning as is "sensation" or "conscious." These words have an altered and derived meaning in addition to their primitive meaning, which is obtained by imagining what I would be doing in the same situation. For instance, what do I mean when I ask, "I wonder what you are *really* thinking about?" Here, as in so many cases, we have to distinguish between what the analysis, when we actually carry it out, discloses must be the meaning, and the nebulous anticipation that we usually have as to what the analysis will disclose. It is often the latter that we have in mind when we talk about "meaning." I think an analysis will show that all that I can mean by asking what you are really thinking about is what I imagine I myself would be thinking about if I were in the same situation as you, including in "same situation" all the enormously complicated things covered by what I can see, or hear other people say, or get you to say by questioning or other methods, including taking account of such things

as your imagined inferior or different intelligence. But when I have finished, I see that I have merely projected myself. I think this result does not agree with what most people would say their vague anticipations are as to what the meaning will turn out to be; they probably anticipate that the analysis can be made to disclose something in which there is no mention of "me." We can express the fact that the analysis does not come out as we had anticipated by saying that it is impossible to give the *desired* meaning to "your real thoughts"; we were trying to impart a meaning that is impossible.

Common usage is infested with situations in which we want to have certain meanings and in which we verbalize on the assumption that these are the meanings, but in which analysis shows that the desired meanings are impossible. This is particularly true of almost all the "me-your" situations. For instance, what is the meaning of "we"? We love to say "we" and "our"; it gives a cozy and all-together feeling that is most comforting. Evidently what I mean by "we" is "you *and* I"; this is to be said slowly so that one can appreciate that the "and" in this expression is the "and" of merely formal conjunction only. It is a symbol that one is to do two different kinds of thing, one to the "you" part and another to the "I" part. Thus, "we feel happy" is a contraction for "You feel happy and I feel happy," with a different meaning for "feel" and "happy" in the two parts of the sentence.

There is one curious situation in which the usual relations are reversed, in which I experience what is yours and never what is my own. This is with respect to death. I know what the death of animals and other people means; I have definitions that tell me what to do to determine whether another is dead or not. But this never applies to my own death, although I always talk of my own death as if it were something on the same footing as the death of another. We are careless of this distinction, and perhaps partly because of it, although doubtless for other reasons also, we think of our death as a form of our experience. This attitude toward our own death is I believe back of the many utter irrationalities of society in every-

thing that pertains to death, and is therefore of enormous social significance.

The dichotomy of meaning of all these words has been so obscured by social and linguistic usage that many people find it almost impossible to see what is behind the verbalism. And because our language makes it difficult to see the dichotomy of meaning, we find it almost impossible to realize the dichotomy of the actual situation—the essential difference between me and thee—the essential isolation of each of us from our fellows. Right here is an example of the inaccuracy into which our linguistic habits are continually leading us. Of course all that I can say is that *I* am inexorably isolated from my fellows; to say that my fellows are isolated from me or from each other involves an extension and alteration of meaning like that we have already analyzed.

There are at least two reasons why it is so difficult to realize the underlying dichotomy of meaning in all these social words. In the first place the technique of using words in this dual fashion has been drummed into us by all our social training. It was an invention of the very first magnitude when the first man learned how to anticipate the actions of his neighbor by saying to himself, How would I feel and act if I were in the same situation? We, at this epoch, find it difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this invention; the very meaning of the subjunctive mood in which we express what we do; our "if I were," involves the invention itself. The invention was at first a complex thing, demanding as part of it the simultaneous development of a suitable language. But the invention having flowered, it proved most congenial to the genius of the race; it was no trick at all for one to imitate another as he saw him use this invention. It has grown to enormous usefulness, and is the universal and practically the only method by which each of us adapts himself to the action of his fellows; it is used in every act of social adjustment. No wonder that the shorthand expression for what we do, namely, "My neighbor has feelings just like mine," should be accepted at its face value. In fact, acceptance of it has been made into a social virtue, and

the point of view becomes a primary motivation for acceptable social conduct, as for example, in the golden rule.

The second reason we find it so difficult to realize the dichotomy of our language is that it is so very pleasant to ignore it. The picture which fits in so easily with our language, namely, of our fellows and ourselves all being similar pieces in one large pattern, all having similar feelings and thinking similar thoughts and appealed to by the same motives, is one which is very pleasant for other than reasons of linguistic convenience, for it harmonizes with our nature as social animals. We like to be surrounded by our fellow-beings, and to feel that we are all harmoniously striving for the same ends and affording each other mutual support. This feeling must go far back into the history of the race, and must have been bred into the race by the survival value of co-operative effort. The fact, then, that linguistic convenience fits in so patly with the primitive social urge makes it all the more inevitable that the linguistic urge, with all its consequences, will be followed without critical analysis, for most people are incorrigible rationalizers.

It is very much the fashion at present to emphasize the potency of the social motive in molding human institutions. But I think the thesis can be and is carried too far, when it is claimed, as so often it is, that the *only* important molding factor has been the social. It is, however, natural that the thesis should be overemphasized, because in so doing we satisfy the fundamental craving for support from without. The sciences are being contaminated by this overemphasis on the social factor no less than are the other disciplines; it is very much the fashion at present to say that science is essentially "public." In fact, the name of science is often applied by definition only to that which is publicly demonstrated and accepted. But what does one find when he examines what he actually does? In making this examination it will be sufficient to typify science by logical reasoning, since logical reasoning is part of all scientific activity. The value of logical reasoning lies in the assurance of the correctness of the conclusion that one has when he has properly gone through the logical processes. Now everyone knows that the conviction of the correctness of a proof or an

argument can be obtained only by oneself, after he has made and understood the proper analysis. No one else can make me see or understand, no matter what pressure he may exert on me. I may *say* that I understand when I do not in order to silence too vociferous an instructor, but "He that complies against his will is of his own opinion still." The feeling of understanding is as private as the feeling of pain. The act of understanding is at the heart of all scientific activity; without it any ostensibly scientific activity is as mechanically sterile as that of a high-school student substituting numbers into a formula. For this reason, science, when I push the analysis back as far as I can, must be private.

In spite of our stricture, it is evident enough that there is an enormous public aspect to all scientific activity. I usually accept what my qualified neighbor assures me is a scientific fact, and I more often than not defer to my qualified neighbor's scientific judgment. Particularly do I defer to the consensus of the scientific judgment of a large number of my fellows whose scientific attainments I respect. There are at least two reasons for this. In the first place I know that I am likely to make mistakes, so that a necessary part of any scientific activity of my own in which I can feel confidence is to check what I have done to see that I have not made a mistake. I often enough do discover mistakes of my own, and I can also discover mistakes in what my fellows have done. Conversely, when my fellow tells me that I have made a mistake I frequently find, by checking again myself, that he is right. Particularly when a number of my fellows independently say that I have made a mistake I almost always find that they are right. It comes then that I use the consensus of opinion of my fellows as a method of checking against my own mistakes. In the second place, my time is limited. I have time to think through for myself only a limited number of conclusions, and particularly I have time to collect and verify for myself only a limited amount of scientific data. I therefore accept the statement of my fellow with regard to an enormous number of scientific facts and an enormous number of conclusions drawn by him by logical processes. These results of my fellows are collected

in libraries and classified, where I can get at them when I need them. But I accept this work of my fellows only because it is my potential experience; if I were not sure that if I repeated my fellow's observations and measurements and his logical processes I would check his results, the record of his activity would be of little interest to me. Hence I demand as a condition in any valid scientific publication that it be recorded in such a form that I can repeat it and verify it. The spirit in which I demand that the scientific activity of my fellows be public is therefore paradoxically that in this way I insure that what they have done may become my private possession, and it is only in so far as it has the potentiality of becoming my private possession that it is of interest to me. The essence of science is private; science as a living thing is *my* science.

If I now step back a little for a comprehensive look at what I have been doing in analyzing my activities, I see that there are two levels at which I operate, the public and the private levels. When I say "we," and think of myself and my fellow in the same terms, or use as meaningful such expressions as "My fellow has feelings just like mine," or think of objects as eternally existing in their own right independent of any observer, or when I talk about the body of scientific "truth" as a *thing* that anyone may apprehend by the proper approach, I am on the public level. But when I say, "It means nothing to ask whether the feelings of my fellow are the same as mine, for all I can know is what he says and does," or when I ask under almost certain danger of being accused of solipsism, "What do I mean when I say that things exist eternally independent of any act of observation?" or when I recognize that "truth" without a vitalizing act of understanding by *me* is dead, I am on the private level. The public level is tremendously important, and most of our individual and social living is done on this level. Our language is so constructed that we are almost forced to talk on this level. As we have seen, before the dawn of history the discovery of the public level constituted an invention, perhaps the most pregnant invention ever made; by it we achieve an economy of intellectual effort without which existence under present conditions might well be

utterly impossible. But always beyond the public level, waiting for a deeper analysis, is the private level. It is on the private level that I realize my essential isolation; here is my awful freedom that I can hardly face.

It looks to me as though most people manage to spend almost all their lives exclusively on the public level. We begin life not conscious of any level at all; we presently find ourselves on the public level because of our whole scheme of education; and society does its best to keep us there for the rest of our lives. If some method could be devised by which it could be guaranteed that everyone would always live only on the public level, a possible satisfactory existence might be insured. But of course it is impossible by fiat or education to suppress a vision that is waiting for anyone to see. Right here is, I believe, the tap root of most of our difficulties; every one of us has the potentiality, when pushed far enough, of discovering for himself the private level. This discovery is almost always the result of some bitter experience. Curiously, one usually discovers his own freedom, I think, by discovering that other people are free from him. Someone else refuses to abide by a social convention which I had always treated as binding, and I make the disconcerting discovery that there is no way of compelling the other fellow to accept the assumption back of the convention and so to act of his own free will in accord with the convention. The converse consideration then reveals itself, namely, that my fellows are powerless to compel me to accept their interests and purposes. If the conflict of interests is too great and other conditions are right, a gangster is born. There is something of the gangster in all of us, as we discovered during prohibition. The gangster is vividly aware of the existence of the private level; it seems to me that he thinks straighter than many of the proper people who deplore his existence. Or one discovers that there are things that cannot be said and questions that cannot be asked. A child who fears that he was adopted, and who is also convinced that his ostensible parents would feel justified in falsehood in order to keep the knowledge from him, sees that he is estopped from asking them

whether he is their own. The bitterness of realization of isolation in such a situation may force a premature maturity.

The discovery of the existence of the private level thus means at the same time a discovery of one's own essential isolation, and therefore of the impossibility of anyone else getting a hold on one without one's consent. But society does claim to have a hold on one through all sorts of sanctions, and language is constructed in this atmosphere. The almost inevitable first reaction when one realizes the situation is for one to think that people and society have been saying things that they don't do, that they don't intend to do, and that they can't do. Hence arises a conflict with that very deep human need for consistency between what we do and what we say. People feel abused, disillusioned, and hurt when they discover that things are different from what everyone is saying. It is the perennially pathetic will to believe that a reconciliation between what we do and what we say is now at last being accomplished that makes possible the propaganda of dictators. The attempt to adapt oneself to what one sees to be the actual situation is a further embittering experience, and society does not thrive on bitterness.

The most important and the ultimate problem of education is to get people to see that there is a private level beyond the public level, and to learn how to live with this realization, or in other words, to learn to live with their freedom. The solution of the educational problem demands fundamental revisions. Language, now adapted almost exclusively to the public level, will have to be modified to permit expression of what one sees on the private level. Deep-seated social instincts and taboos will have to be recognized for what they are, and their field of meaning and application delimited. For instance, one of the very obstinate things to overcome will be the impulse to carry over to the private level all the associations of the "selfishness" complex. So strongly are many people conditioned to the necessity for unselfishness that their intellectual exploration automatically stops when they sniff the faintest whiff of the odor of selfishness. I cannot say to my conventional neighbor, "On the private level everything must be self-centered,"

without his retorting automatically, "But isn't that terribly selfish?" and the discussion has closed before I can reply. But every sophomore in his bull sessions knows and delights to say this so obvious thing; it is only later when he begins selling bonds that he realizes that this is one of the things that he then cannot say. The education of the future will meet the situation by making us conscious of the two levels of use of language. On the public level selfishness refers to a reprehensible code of conduct; on the private level it expresses a simple fact, no more to be argued with than any other fact of observation. Probably in order to deal with this matter it will be necessary to invent two different words, but there is far more to it than anything so simple.

Future education will have to show the individual how to live in the midst of his social isolation, but perhaps it will be even more difficult to awaken a realization of all the implications of *intellectual* isolation and to devise a method of adaptation. All the supernatural paraphernalia, which for many people is all that makes life tolerable, will simply have to go. There is no possibility of continuing to feel that one is in a *sympathetic* world, which is evolving according to some purpose with which one may feel oneself congenial, after one has seen that it does not make sense to say of even his fellow human being "He has feelings like mine." It is not that the world is really neither beneficent nor malign but instead neutral; it is that it is meaningless to think of the world in terms of beneficence. We are trying to apply an intellectual category that is inapplicable; we are trying to do something with our minds that cannot be done. Much of the machinery of thought on the public level has to be ruthlessly discarded. On the level on which one is asking, What do I mean when I say that objects exist? one has neither principles nor truths, for these are inhabitants of the public level. But nearly everyone derives intellectual support from a feeling of the existence of everlasting principles in the background; it is hard to see that these are *my* devices and to give them up and accept that it is impossible to do what I was trying to do when I invented them. It is hard to admit that there are no certainties, and that even

the probabilities with which I would fain replace them cannot have the meaning I would desire. Intellectual activity is ultimately as isolated as are my feelings, and all these things must be done.

I stand alone in the universe with only the intellectual tools I have with me. I often try to do things with these tools of which they are incapable, and I have often been misinformed and have delusions as to what they are capable of, but nevertheless it is my concern and mine only that I get an answer. An individual trying to wrench himself free from the comfortable support of all the ages into an adequate realization of what his freedom means will probably feel that the only virtue applicable to the situation is fortitude. But fortitude is necessary only as long as he stands on the traditional public level. A generation properly educated from the beginning to recognize the private level will not have to gird itself with fortitude, for never having had the feeling of intellectual support, it will have to indulge in no heroics in giving it up, but will be as objective with its freedom as the most correct scientist is today in his limited field. The uncertainty and the difficulty is in the transition. Will you and I be strong enough and wise enough to get across?

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WHAT IS FREEDOM?

Dear Uncle:

I am in despair. I had to make a speech on "What is Freedom." I got away with it by talking about the rights of men not being property rights of absentee owners. That was easy, but I must confess I do not know what freedom is. I went through mountains of books and asked whomever I could. All reading and questioning merely made the muddle in my brain worse. In politics and economics everybody says something different: government interference in business, unions, collusion, rackets, monopolies, wage slavery. Manifestly each refers freedom to just that sort of limitation from which he wishes to be free. I looked into history. But history whirls around the great names through ever changing sorts of servitude. I went to science—it is worse. If causal determination rules nature and man responds but to stimuli, there is no place for freedom. If flowers are not free, why man? Can I go east or west? Do not make fun of me. Answer my question. What is freedom? It is a very serious matter.

Yours eagerly,

Joan.

Dear Joan:

It is indeed a very serious matter. The muddle in your brain mirrors the muddle of our time. You throw a basketful of questions at my unfortunate head. You expect a definition, but there is no definition you would be willing to accept. You

know what freedom is in your heart, and you even know that you know. Since you are pregnant with this knowledge you ought to ask me as but a midwife to help you push your own baby through your brain.

"*Les grandes pensées viennent du cœur*," says Vauvenargues. Since freedom is such a "grande pensée," we must look for it at its source. It often happens, as in your case, that our brains block our hearts. First, I must rid you of your preconceptions.

Freedom has nothing to do with causal determination. I doubt that you have anything precise in mind when your lips utter the word "causality." Let us assume it means that laws govern the succession of happenings in time. Causal determination is a concept of physics. Here it has an accurate meaning. I'm sorry, but I must use the language of the physicists. Physics starts from a manifold extended in space-time and co-ordinates physical properties to the points of this continuum. Both points and properties are represented by numbers. The numbers depend on one another in a specific way. If a closed system is such that the numbers describing a three-dimensional cross section at one time determine all the other numbers representing the system at any other time, physics speaks of causal determination. It is by no means the only possible sort of order. If physicists, as they do nowadays, find that the phenomena in the world of atoms and electrons do not fit into this particular scheme, they speak of indeterminacy. Physicists are sound and reliable people. Psychologists who apply the physical scheme of reality to human behavior are less reliable. Physicists themselves do not like to go beyond their knowledge. They neither say that causal determination means compulsion nor that indeterminacy means freedom. Compulsion and freedom presuppose beings in relation to which a movement or a change is free or compelled. There are no such beings in the conceptual scheme of physics. It is the lack of such beings that excludes both compulsion and freedom from the physical aspect of reality. Physicists are far from pretending that their conceptual scheme is final and covers the whole of reality. It is a preliminary aspect. A dehumanized science that dissolves man into

a compound of physical events should speak of determinism and indeterminism but neither of compulsion nor freedom. If, however, you refute such a dissolving of man and cling to the belief in such entities, you transgress the conceptual scheme of physics. Then happenings, changes, movement, "causes" are what they are in relation to this entity. Freedom and compulsion obviously depend on this relation. Such an entity may be a being that can be compelled because it can be free, that can be free because it can undergo compulsion. The physical aspect, whether it means causal determination or not, can never decide for or against such an assumption.

Another of your questions seems to have grown out of the same habit of your brain. Referring your actions to a vague idea of determining "causes" your brain connects freedom with deliberate choice. You may have the choice of going east or west and yet your heart is far from feeling "free." You may have no choice and yet feel free.

Assume that a man has what you call the "free choice" to turn to the left or to the right. This means there are no external conditions that force him to take one way or the other. That is "freedom from." I call this negative freedom. Let me assume that man cannot make up his mind where to go. He is labile. I would not say that he is free. He lacks in his negative freedom what I should call positive freedom—and that is the kind of freedom you wish to know about. Being labile this man may be a slave. Every casual mood is his master. Do not expect to find much freedom among the idle rich, who have the choice of going to Hawaii or Egypt, are capable of yielding to any desire, responding to any stimulus, pursued by fashion, boredom, and curiosity. They follow and desert every lead. If they teach you anything about freedom, they only do so by means of what they lack.

There is another man. He knows what to do; he has no choice; in his heart is necessity. And yet you may grant him the positive freedom, which the other fellow lacks. The answer he gives to conditions is his answer; it is his entire nature that responds. Let us compare the two men. If you insist upon speaking of "causes" without defining "cause" I would say:

the mere absence of a determining cause for the first man is not freedom; the mere presence of a necessity for the second man is not servitude. Liability does not mean freedom, or such necessity slavery. Not absence or presence of determining causes but the relation of such so-called "causes" to that strange entity called self decides between freedom and compulsion. The lack of determining causes without such entities no more means freedom than causality with the presence of such entities means compulsion.

You could and should say not choice but deliberate choice. Man, the only being capable of knowing what he does, can deliberate about means and ends. That is his distinction. Thus he is free. But look a little closer into our deliberate choices! Are not most of them concerned with means; if with purposes, the purposes too are means, not ends. Calculating means for means, weighing chances and risks, amounts of pleasure and utility—is this really to be called freedom? No. Freedom, again, is not in our deliberated responses but in a certain relation between our responses, whether deliberated or not, and the strange unity we call self. Let a response originate in the whole of our being as a response of this whole to the whole of the situation. This might have something to do with freedom. I do not wish, however, to follow this line further. Even if by inquiring into this specific relation between our selves and our actions we might be able to dress up a sort of "definition," it would hardly help your heart to deliver its knowledge. I dismiss causality and deliberate choice. Freedom is not "freedom from"; even if this negative freedom were absolute—containing no compulsion whatsoever—man would still not be free; perhaps even no longer capable of being free. Freedom must have a positive meaning, and it may turn out that only in an activity that overcomes compulsion is your soul capable of realizing this positive meaning. Freedom must be an end in itself, something in your soul that you long for and cannot express.

Let me begin again, and in another tune. What is nearest to your young experience? When you ride out West, and the wind strokes the waving fields and God's sky, vaulted above, edges

the blue line of the Rockies, in your joy and the joy of your horse is something your heart calls freedom.

*Lasst mich nur auf meinem Sattel gelten
Bleibt in Euren Huettten, Euren Zelten
Und ich reite froh in alle Ferne
Ueber meiner Muetze nur die Sterne.*

Lying on your back somewhere in the mountains you may envy the eagle soaring over peaks and valleys. Are you not fond of skiing? You race down a slope in Sun Valley, turning round or jumping over every obstacle, provided you are master of your skis, through the showering snow between silently glittering trees—drinking in the white world with all your senses and slaking your world thirst.

Such examples contain some limbs of the body of freedom. I shall be cautious and say merely that they link somehow the wide world to activities in which you feel the world to be yours. Widening your soul, you own the world, and one and the same horizon embraces your self and the world your soul craves.

Such moments of elation are bound to be short. We never own the world. If we enjoy elated moments we owe it to less elated days—we enjoy them as finite beings that are limited on all sides. I must bring down the silhouette of freedom from the sky to the dark earth.

The peasant owns the soil of his father. In European mountain valleys, apart from the highways of history, you can discover the signs of freedom in many a proud and weather-beaten face, molded by labor and endurance. The man has his own manner of politeness, he is even tolerant; he may let you have your own way but be quick to tell whoever intervenes to go to hell. He depends on nature. An avalanche buries his barn, a gale fells his trees, his grass dries up. Hardships precede and succeed opportunities. Guard yourself against romanticizing. Limit his negative freedom, restrict his opportunities, nevertheless you cannot help granting him a bit of positive freedom that is more than freedom from something. His world is small, but it is his. Inherited codes and habits are part of him.

He complies with nature and her laws. His freedom is a particular relation between himself and his world. It is, however, not a state but a process—something to be acquired day by day, not to be possessed and preserved. Look at his face—he owes to the resistance he daily overcomes even the freedom he seems to enjoy as a state of mind in moments of rest. Freedom is never concrete except in the making.

I do not want you, however, to tie the concept of freedom to the farmer economy. It resides in a particular relation between man, his activity, and his world. Since the tractors and large enterprises deprived the Jeffersonian farmer of his opportunities, turning the average American from farming to salesmanship or industrial labor, human freedom has been put to a severe test, not because the farmer has gone but because the greater part of mechanized labor destroys that particular relation between man, his work, and his world. Instead of looking back to the farmer ideal we should try to restore that relation under new conditions. Spare time, week ends, even a share in the property will not do. Freedom must be inside, not outside, our job. The human soul is flexible and ingenious. It can animate even machines. We must succeed in extorting from our machine economy conditions in which work can be the worker's world as it is the peasant's. That is what human freedom will continue to demand.

You may wonder that I extended the example of the European peasant to that of the American pioneer who built up his world in a wilderness. My reason is simple. You might interpret the freedom of the American pioneer as freedom from codes. The European peasant is tied to traditions and inherited norms; if he is free it is by virtue of his relation to these traditions. His norms and habits, though inherited, are his own. We must inquire into the interplay between freedom and norms. There seems to be and yet not to be a contradiction. Though norms limit our freedom, absence of norms would be but license. That is a thorny problem demanding a cautious approach.

We are born into our language; we learn it and yet it is our own, part of ourselves. Its rules are our rules. As its slaves we

are its masters. What is a language besides being means to all sorts of ends that again may be means? Let me take speech as speech and disregard purpose. Every language is the whole of a world, a space in which our souls live and move. Each word breathes the air of the whole. Each is open toward an unbounded horizon. A language is not an aggregate of words and rules. It is a potential world, an infinity of past and future worlds, merely a frame within which we speak and can create our world, actualizing ourselves and our language. I do not pretend that we always do—good poets do it for us.

Thus we can say: The rules of our language are the basis on which the kind of freedom we can enjoy in speaking becomes possible. The first human being who endeavored to speak, creating the first word, was not more but less free than we. He had not the marvel of a preformed world, the whole of an articulate spirit, pregnant with unborn worlds. It is on this basis that we succeed in tinging an infinite horizon with the color of the individualities of our egos, groups, peoples, nations, and at the same time, in enlarging these always narrow individualities to the whole of a cosmos. That is just what "freedom" means, applied to our speaking. We talk neither of freedom when the schoolboy disobeys grammar nor of servitude when he submits to its rules. The boy would be right to complain of servitude if his teacher choked the living language into a dead model of academic rules. The real rules, the inner spirit of our language, enable our speaking to be free. They are the soil in which the worlds we create grow and feed. Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, neither invented their languages nor merely used a finished tool with greater skill. They molded casual habits, contingent manners, into a unity that embraced the breadth of the human cosmos, colored things, animated the inanimate, seized the unseizable—they built a world, leaving a heritage to their peoples, in loyalty to which their peoples participate in their freedom.

Thus it is not by obeying rules that we are slaves, nor by disregarding them that we are free. Not the rules as such but our relation to them determines whether in obeying or disobeying we are free or slaves. The peasant is free because the codes

of his fathers are his; he need not even consent to abide by them. They are part of his nature. If his son revolts, the rules become fetters. By breaking the fetters, however, his son gains merely a negative freedom, freedom from these very fetters. He will be free only by giving and following norms that are both his and the norms of his world.

People who live by dead conventions look at the Bohemian as freedom's favorite son. The Bohemian is free from codes he dislikes. The Bohemian himself, bored by petty clashes and meticulous disorder, probably holds another view. Whenever a Bohemian community is free, devotion to a cause has created norms.

You are fond of music. Is not Mozart audible freedom, freedom's resounding joy in freedom? You feel it though it refuses to be put into words. I do not attempt such a feat. I only want you to consider that this perfect appearance of freedom presupposes the elaborate system of tonality as a realm of norms, analogous to the marvel of a perfect language, and like language a slow product of a long history. On this basis Mozart's freedom makes its appearance as the whole of a world. Listening to this music you are "in" this world—all other things fade away. This world, however, is your own being, is life, actualized in a world of sounds. Of course you have a distinct feeling of Mozart's individuality. You listen to a sonata; it must be one of his. No one else could have composed it. And yet this individuality is not Mozart the individual. It is not merely the particular difference of this man from other men. The individual has disappeared in the uniqueness of a world. That is a strange and elusive thing. Mozart, like all artists, actualizes much more than a limited self or even a merely individual world. The world he creates is a world of many others, of us all, not only the world of his time and his people. You might almost say he got rid of himself, transcending the narrowness a mere ego cannot help being.

Mozart seems to pour forth the song of freedom in effortless creativity and thus to elate your soul above this wrestling world. But for heaven's sake do not explain his freedom by anything that you could call transcending man's finiteness.

Beethoven is not less free, though his music is burdened with the grief of the finite creature. He goes the whole way from chaos to order; he retains the creator's pain and joy in the created world. It is in shaking the soul to its roots that he stirs to life its leaves and blossoms. He exults over our finiteness in facing its brazen necessity. That, not escape, is freedom.

I return to the relation of freedom to norms. The rules, in this case the articulate space of tonality, are only the fundament. There is a kind of music, appropriate for exercises, that seems to be content with mere allegiance to rules—similar to passages of correct usage found in grammars as models of applied rules. Obviously mere obedience to rules is never freedom. Freedom is what you do with, and cannot do without, these rules—is in an activity that lets these rules as yours be the fundament of a world as a whole. That holds not only for music, art, or language. It links freedom to culture or civilization as its foundation. But any civilization whatsoever is such a foundation only in so far as it grants such an activity.

In language, as in music, the acrobat who displays masterly skill tempts you to call his skill freedom. But his freedom is negative—freedom from insufficiencies that hamper others. Beyond that negative freedom he is the slave of his desire to startle people by his cunning and his tricks, by playing boldly on the border of what the rules allow. A small thing is lacking, but the only one that matters: he pours no soul into his artifices and shapes no world.

Let me jump to an example of another kind. We say: This man has personality, or even, he is a "real person." We say it in a tone of praise, even of reverence. We know pretty well what we mean, but seldom realize how queer a term we use. No one means merely a charming appearance, intelligence, poise, wealth, position, or even an aggregate of particularities in which a man deviates from an average. A man can have one or all of these qualities and yet not be a real person. We do not think of greatness of ends, cleverness in means, of success or failure. Success does not produce, failure does not prevent a man from being, a personality, though it warps our judgment. What then, you ask, can it be? This mystery, which I

by no means claim to unravel, is a tissue of many strands. In any case it is safe to say: the man is somehow a whole. He behaves, speaks, acts, thinks, as a whole; he displays unity. This "unity" is sometimes simple, never uniform, and always unique. A personality is full of tensions and contrasts, but there is a concord in its very discords, and tension means strength, not weakness. This strange sort of unity unites discrepancies. A field of force radiates a suggestive power which it takes some effort to resist. We may say that this field of force embraces all things with its specific kind of color, light, and air—under a common horizon that has no boundaries.

One does not usually call a youngster a real person. If one does, one means a "potential" person, anticipating a future. Life and activity, resistance and endurance, are needed to shape a personality. The face of a real person shows many a scar. Failure, hardship, passion, effort, strengthen a unity to master stimuli and command responses. This unique unity is an ego and a world, the two as one. In giving to both the same law a real person is actualized freedom.

These examples, however, fail to stress two things without which freedom is not freedom, namely, tolerance and truth. Tolerance seems to mean the political condition that everyone can have his own way and opinion. That is not what I am after. Though tolerant times may have some freedom because of their tolerance, it is better to put it the other way: free times are tolerant because they are free.

The term "world" emphasizes the totality, the infinite horizon. It is a difficult term and easily misleads us into thinking of the sky above or the unbounded space. But it means men, not stars. Our world means the human beings among whom we live. Our world is either in their souls or nowhere. Without them the sky is mute. We are something in and to ourselves in being something in and to others. This "being to others" is part of ourselves—a genuine and not an additional part. Our life is giving and taking, the one in the other. In such give and take our world grows; without it there is no world, only environment. There is no such give and take between the master and his slaves. If man "actualizes" him-

self in others, the others must be free. Only one who is free can return your freedom to you; slaves give back only their servitude. There is a dignity in freedom that you can never have without respecting it in others. Free times are sure of their horizon. The world is wide; it embraces the ways of others though they may differ from yours. The Bostonian saints in their narrow world could not afford to be tolerant, they were far from free. If you are free you can let your friend have his way; only then can he be a friend and open the window of your ego prison. I hope you feel what I mean though it evades expression. Do not play with my words. Freedom is not the only source of tolerance; there is indifference, lack of a Whole and its commitments, laziness of heart. Most tolerance may be of that sort. That is not our concern.

And now as to truth. Here we enter a colder climate of sharper winds. Do not dare to conclude from examples that man "is" free. Let us start by confessing frankly that man is not free. He is a finite being and walks a narrow path in haze and sorrow. "God's scourge drives to graze whatever creeps on earth," says Heraclitus. We live on other beings in need and danger; we near our death exchanging one compulsion for another. Face your finiteness and all it implies.

Man can lie, he can deceive himself as well as others. He can mask a reality that he cannot endure. Most people do; they move in a world of pretense. They elude themselves. Their belief in freedom is merely a part of such elusion. They shut their eyes to the most obvious reality. They are not free. Freedom must brave truth.

I look for freedom in man's relation to his world. Freedom, I say, has to do with man building his own world. I do not mean an arbitrary world, a world of lies and illusions, but this world, the "real" world. The world we build and own, however, is never "this" world, never can be. There is always another world behind and beyond our own world, a world that is never ours. The world we build is only a world in the world. Freedom therefore is concerned not only with our relation to our own world but also, let me say, with the relation between our own world and the "real" world. This relation ought to

be of a particular sort. Our world has to represent the "real" and not a sham world. But here again I must warn you. Even this will not do. The term "real" has a specific meaning which probably is not yours. It is not the kind of reality with which physics or chemistry is concerned. It means the realness in human life. It is this reality that our world must represent, not mask, if we are to be free. In this sense of "real" the world of Shakespeare, though invented, is real. The world of chemistry, exact though it may be, is unreal. It has no relation to human existence; it is no image. It is not even the world "in" which the chemist as a human being lives. The reality I have in mind, even the chemist will find in Shakespeare rather than in his chemistry. That is the kind of truth with which freedom is concerned. Who dares not face man's finiteness should never speak of freedom.

I am pretty sure that you will be disappointed. I have not given you a definition of freedom. And a definition is what you want. You will not find it. If there is freedom, it demands that every girl must bear her children herself. Other people's definitions would mean no more to you than other people's children.

I casually picked up diverse examples, intended to span the range of the problem, gathering the limbs of freedom. These limbs form a body. Apart from the body they have no life. One implies the other. An inner tie binds them into a unity. That, however, is a long tale and cannot be told in a letter, if at all. It would demand an answer to the question, What is Man? This question contains an assertion and a question. Man "is"; what is he? The assertion puts another question, a still odder one, what this "is" is assumed to mean. Never fear; I shall not write a letter that you would never read. Not only will I withhold a definition; I shall even try to spoil the very definition you are likely to hit upon. You may start by differentiating negative from positive freedom. Since the former presupposes the latter, you may say: Man is free if he can be what he ought to be. This definition of a century ago connects negative and positive freedom. It does not sound so bad. But what does "ought" mean? Obviously not any "duty" imposed by

man upon man. There is an old answer: Man ought to "actualize" his "self." My examples even seemed to point to this answer. But both these terms, "actualize" and "self," died long ago through loss of blood. They now have a hollow sound.

"Actualize" obviously means a kind of motion; motion links a wherefrom to a whereto. The wherefrom means your potential self; the whereto the actuality of this potential self. Thus we have two modes of "self"; "actualize" means the transition from the one to the other. But what is this "self"? Why should one's narrow casual self be "actualized" and not rather perish ere its pettiness be manifest?

The first self, the *terminus a quo* of that movement, seems to mean the casual aggregate of diverse potential selves that the accidents of your and your ancestors' births may have gathered in your heritage. What, then, is the second self? The actuality either of all or of any accidental one of these casual selves? Or just that one in which a man differs from other people? The specific difference? But the *differentia specifica* may be quite irrelevant. Or perhaps the opposite: the qualities by which a human being levels off to the average? Obviously neither the one nor the other. The self that has to be actualized is not what we call the self. It is more than the self—in the mode of a self. It is something for which a self stands—a potential world. The self-actualization actualizes something in which the particular self transcends itself and escapes its pettiness.

There are still other dangers in the term. A hundred years ago people sitting in armchairs cultivated their "gentle souls" in musing upon ethical culture and called that self-actualizing. The term suggests isolated individuals, each one actualizing himself for himself. Beware of such suggestion. The world in which alone we can actualize our "selves" is the world of others. We have no actuality without being something to, in, and for others. Do not think of the world as a prison, in which everyone has to actualize himself for himself in his cell by enjoying in safety the righteousness of a gentle soul.

There is a third danger. Actuality does not mean a state which you can reach and preserve. In this queer kind of motion

that is the transition of something called a potential self to something called an actual self the motion is its own *terminus ad quem*. The transition is the end—doing is the work and the work's joy. That is the distinction of such doing. Actuality means activity, but not any one of our activities means that kind of actuality with which human freedom has to do. Here the term self-actualization deserts you. Old Aristotle, its ancestor, insisted: "ἐνέργεια ἔργον." Instead of trying to decipher such enigmatic language I advise you to turn to my examples: the work keeps in store the doing, but in works alone is the doing stored. Such works are the whole of a world; such doing builds a world as a whole. If you are aware of such dangers, go on using the term, but take care that it does not grow arid in daily usage. Most such terms do.

As I near the end of this epistle, I appeal to your brain, in giving you the reasons I had for preferring the appeal to your heart.

Freedom for what? Such was the contemptuous response of Lenin, the first of contemporary dictators, to allusions to freedom's interests in Bolshevik demeanor. If you have no answer to this question there is nothing from which man would be entitled to be free. The dictator faced a world uncertain of an answer.

Men's answers differ and change. History, you say, whirls around the great names. Sociologists and historians (not all, but most of them, and especially those who emphasize their being up-to-date) are eager to demonstrate that any answer is but the answer of a social group, a country, a time. Suspect all evidence gathered by these people; a loud voice and a smiling superiority often mask incertitude.

Certainly, men's answers change. What kinds of answers? Definitions, religious or philosophical formulas in which man thinks of the ends, purposes, goals, for which he wants to be free. Man's heart, however, is aware of a knowledge that does not change though his brain may falter. But the distinction between heart and brain will meet with sneers and laughter. It will certainly not impress the smug partisans of relativity.

They demand more acute terms. I shall try to indicate for what philosophical problem this distinction holds.

William James, analyzing the concept of "self," differentiates between the I and the Me, the knower and the known. Let us follow the lead of this distinction and call the creator of an image of himself "I" and the created image "Me." The I is not the Me. Man poses the question, What is Man? Every age and culture give a different answer. Man, however, as subject of the answer is no longer Man who asks the question. The one is the Me, the other the I. While he is on the way from the I to the Me, making an image of himself, something happens.

Man, I dare say, is a world-building animal. Man builds and shapes his world. This activity is his freedom; freedom is concerned with his relation to his world. In building up his world as a whole in which he lives, he denominates and defines and determines things of both matter and mind. All his determining, or at least most of it, is done in what I call cosmological terms, in terms belonging to, and dependent on, the patterns of the worlds he builds in his religions, philosophies, sciences. He defines Man; he determines his idea of himself, the Me, by virtue of the conceptual scheme in which he orders the phenomena in space and time, the totality of which he calls world. As far as he proceeds in this way, his defining, denominating, determining things, including the Me, risk getting entangled in the historical process and becoming an easy prey to the sociologists of knowledge and the relativistic historians.

That is what happens: The world intervenes between the I and the Me. The Me depends upon our picture of the world. These pictures change, none of these pictures is the world itself. Thus the Me changes, Man's image of himself, and his definition of freedom.

But man is not merely this Me. He is both the I and the Me; he is the activity that leads from the I to the Me in framing a world and determining the Me by virtue of this frame. As freedom has to do with this activity it must keep destroying and remaking its own definition. And that is the reason I appealed to your heart: your heart knows not only about the Me

but also about this movement from the I to the Me and thus about freedom.

I am treading the borders of dangerous questions. You may conclude that, if I am right, something in our way of determining the Me must be wrong. Certainly there is. In determining the Me we ought to retain, not dismiss, the I, the creator in the *creatum*. That is what the American pragmatists try to do in referring Truth and Reality to Man's activity. The trouble is that they go on to determine Man's activity in terms of a Me on the basis of the objective reality which they refute. This is what they no longer can nor should do. But hereby hangs a tale to which you would never listen, concerning the meaning of "is," called ontology. However, that is now merely the name of a name.

The I, man as creator, goes on building, changing, rebuilding, the image of the Me, as a *creatum* among *creata*. If he did not, his life would not be life. He builds his world and stabilizes his building, in an endless tussle with a moving world that never is and never will be the world. He stabilizes the image of the Me. The image hardens, imbedded in institutions. The creator depends on his *creata*. Freedom, however, cannot be invested in any *creatum* as *creatum*. Being activity it resides in the relation between creator and *creatum*. The dependency of the creator on the *creata* ranges between two poles. It can be mere compulsion: the *creatum* restricts and opposes the creator. Freedom can forge its own fetters. Thus it is bound to break them, destroy its own work, devour its definitions—and do so in freedom's name. But the *creatum* can be the basis and stage of further creativity, as in the case of a language. Then the interplay between creator and *creatum* is but the breathing of life. History goes both ways. Neither is the first dialectical necessity, to which you have to submit, nor the second, certitude on which you can rely.

As it is the crux of any definition of human freedom that the definition of the Me must retain the I, so it is the crux of freedom as institution that the work must keep alive the process lest freedom bury itself under the ruins of its works.

As I reread your note I discover two questions not even

touched upon in my answer. The one concerns the freedom of flowers, the other freedom's interest in government interference in business. Since the hour is late, this letter long, and philosophy endless, do kindly permit me to cover both questions in one and the same argument.

Nature is one. Let us assume that flowers "live." As they wither in your hands so life eludes the biochemist who cannot help dissecting in observing. It may be that the secret of life in a flower has something to do with that interplay between creator and *creatum*—philosophers say *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*—in which your own life breathes, grows, blossoms, and fades. If you dare to make such an assumption, you may, out of reverence for such a secret, call flowers free. Flowers, however, are blind and live in darkness. Call them unfree if you want to reserve the great name for Man, because in Man alone nature is conscious of herself—or at least could or should be.

Your father and brother quarrel about freedom's interest in government interference in business or business interference in government. Let us be fair and assume that they are not blind and are not merely reacting like flowers to dumb impulses or pressures. Let them share a hidden awareness about freedom and disagree as to the way. Is not their quarreling just a tiny bit of that same interplay between creator and *creatum*? Human beings, participating in the organic life of a not yet mechanized nation, in quest of an ever uncertain way, move in a moving world, wrestle to fit the *creata* of yesterday into the *creanda* of tomorrow, cling to the one and anticipate the others.

Grant them their quarreling and rely on your heart. All hearts throughout the world and its history beat the answer to the question, Freedom for what? though most ears are either incapable of, or prevented from, hearing the heart beat.

Yours affectionately,

K

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A STORY OF THREE DAYS

I SHALL report what happened in the course of three days to a good man who, facing the world situation, longed for a clarification of the fundamentals of freedom.

He saw: ideological devaluation of freedom had spread; freedom in the humane meaning of the word was proclaimed false, outworn, useless; and the radiance of the old idea was often exploited for other ends. Some men seemed to have lost sight of it entirely, without realizing what they had lost. Confused by the complexity of actual situations many became uncertain, basically unclear with regard to the very concept of freedom, its meaning, value, actuality. Even men who loved freedom deeply often felt helpless in the face of actual arguments. So it was with our man; not that he felt uncertain in many or most of the concrete issues; but he felt impelled to reach a fundamental clarification. What at bottom is freedom? What does it require? Why is it so dear to me? He was a humble empiric, open-minded, thirsting for information.

Of course, those three days of his search were only a beginning for him. He touched only some of the issues involved, for it was by chance that he met just those men and read just those books. They represented only certain points of view and the discussions were by no means exhaustive, yet I think that what he experienced was in many respects characteristic, typical of some fundamental trends in actual thought.

Those were dramatic days for him, in which he became more

and more bewildered, but at the end of those three days he felt that he had gained some clarification, that he now saw more clearly something that only his heart had told him before.

He sought out a sociologist who was immersed in studies of this very problem and he asked his question. The sociologist was very kind. He told him about the investigations of modern sociology, about the history of societies, how ideas of freedom had developed in them and what freedom had meant to them; he told him how different were the ideas of freedom and the ways of realizing them, etc. Our man was fascinated by the richness of what he heard. He felt that here were men with an honest, sincere approach; these were serious studies, and he became more and more hopeful. "You are the right man," he said. "I am sure you feel as I do in the actual world situation," and he told him how he felt.

"I share your feelings," said the sociologist. "I too hold proudly and passionately to our traditional values."

"But why?" he was asked. "What is it that makes freedom so dear to you also, and what is freedom essentially?"

"I am at one with the traditions of our people," said the sociologist. "But if you ask me about the fundamentals, I must answer: It became more and more clear in our studies that the standards, the evaluations, the goals, that an individual has are shaped, determined, by the social group, the society of which he is a part. Different periods in history, different societies, different nations, have different views. Ethical standards are relative."

There was a long pause. After a time our man asked in a low tone: "Is that all? Should what these others assert be true? Are our ideas of freedom merely the historical standards of a certain time, now perhaps outworn? Are there no fundamental standards; are the requirements of freedom a fairy tale?"

"No fairy tale," said the sociologist, "but developed in and characteristic for certain historical, cultural, and social settings."

"And nothing more?" asked our man. "Is no decision possible among various systems? Are there no features that are

basic in men with regard to questions of freedom, no requirements for men, as men should be? No features that are desirable, required in human society?"

"Here you are touching upon very difficult things," said the sociologist. "Some of my friends would say that the fight for freedom was always a fight against certain concrete restraints or compulsions and meant, necessarily, different things in different times. Society in its rules and institutions necessarily limits freedom, imposes restraints that with time change in different directions. There are no axioms which would allow us to speak of fundamental standards. To speak of 'the man' or 'the society' is only a pale abstraction."

Our man became more and more bewildered. "Was this," he said, "what your friends wrote and taught? And was this not one of the factors in the developments we now face, one of the factors that paved the way for political leaders proclaiming new and other national or racial ethics, willfully and efficiently?"

"Do not overestimate the role of the opinions of sociologists," said the sociologist quietly. "I told you that this is the position that most of my friends take. And certainly they were sincerely driven to these conclusions by their findings, which contain great factors in their favor. We cannot lightly dismiss them. I myself would not dismiss your questions with their answer. I feel that these are genuine questions; that as sociologists we must face not only diversities in various cultures but also must seek for fundamentals, for identities in the requirements of man and in the dynamics of society—in a doctrine of man and in a doctrine of society. There have been approaches in this direction. I feel as you do that in this context the problem of freedom will play a genuine role. But these are scientific utopias, my friend; we are far from any real insight, far from even a real method of approach. There are some young sociologists who are groping in this direction and grappling with the problem.

"But if you ask for a definition of freedom, not in terms of the full reality of a specific society, which, of course, I should

prefer to give you, then my answer would have to be: absence of restraints, of compulsions, of external hindrances from doing what one desires to do, and maybe I should add absence of imposed internal inhibitions. . . . Though I might say that such a definition certainly lacks concreteness."

Our man thanked the sociologist. He felt sad, puzzled, bewildered. He came home, sat down, and reached for one of the books he had ordered for his search. It was a novel by a famous writer of 1936. He was too disturbed to read thoroughly. A certain page caught his eye. He read, more and more excitedly, these sentences:

Anthony . . . turned over the pages of his latest notebook . . . he began to read.

"Acton wanted to write the History of Man in terms of a History of the Idea of Freedom. But you cannot write a History of the Idea of Freedom without at the same time writing a History of the Fact of Slavery. . . .

"Or rather of Slaveryes. For, in his successive attempts to realize the Idea of Freedom, man is constantly changing one form of slavery for another. . . .

"Abolish slavery to nature. Another form of slavery instantly arises. Slavery to institutions. . . .

"All modern history is a History of the Idea of Freedom from Institutions. It is also the History of the Fact of Slavery to Institutions. . . .

"Institutions are changed in an attempt to realize the Idea of Freedom. To appreciate the fact of the new slavery takes a certain time. . . .

"The honeymoon may last for as much as twenty or thirty years. Then . . . it is perceived . . . that the new institutions are just as enslaving as the old. What is to be done? Change the new institutions for yet newer ones. . . . And so on—indefinitely, no doubt.

"In any given society the fact of freedom exists only for a very small number of individuals. . . . For them, institutions exist as a kind of solid framework on which they can perform whatever gymnastics they please. . . ."

Anthony shut his book, feeling that he couldn't read even one line more. Not that his words seemed any less true now than they had when he wrote them. In their own way and on their particular level they were true. Why then did it all seem utterly false and wrong?

"Utterly false and wrong," our man said passionately. How was it possible at all, he asked himself, for a man to formulate such assertions! What he had read seemed unbelievable. At the same time he felt strangely reminded of remarks he had encountered in the last years on one or another occasion, for which these unbelievable formulations seemed somehow fundamental. Now his longing for clarification changed into a passionate drive. I must, I must see through all this. Somehow it is a strange distortion—to view the facts in this way seems to press them into a blind and wrong direction. *What* is it that is wrong in the fundamentals of this picture?

He took up the next book. It was a book from the year 1928 by a famous psychoanalyst and dealt with culture. He read it through from beginning to end. Again and again he turned back to some basic formulations in it. There were some remarks of another character added here and there, but in the main those formulations seemed to him nakedly to express basic assumptions which led straight to those bewildering passages he had encountered in the novel.

. . . every culture must be built up on coercion and instinctual renunciation. . . .

abandoning coercion and [abandoning] the suppression of the instincts . . . would be the golden age, but it is questionable if such a state of affairs can ever be realized. . . . the psychical sphere of culture . . . frustration . . . prohibition . . . privation . . . the instinctual wishes that suffer under them are born anew with every child.

. . . Such instinctual wishes are those of incest, of cannibalism, and of murder.

. . . It is in accordance with the course of our development that external compulsion is gradually internalized.

. . . Every child presents to us the model of this transformation; it is only by that means that it becomes a moral and social being.

. . . Those people in whom it [the internalization of external compulsion] has taken place, from being foes of culture, become its supporters.

. . . [but] a majority of men obey the cultural prohibitions in question only under the pressure of external force, in fact only where the latter can assert itself and for as long as it is an object of fear. This also holds good for those so-called moral cultural demands.

. . . We have spoken of the hostility to culture, produced by the pressure it exercises and the instinctual renunciations that it demands. If one imagined its prohibitions removed, then one could choose any woman who took one's fancy as one's sexual object, one could kill without hesitation one's rival or whoever interfered with one in any other way, and one could seize what one wanted of another man's goods without asking his leave: how splendid, what a succession of delights life would be!

. . . [but] only one single person can be made unrestrictedly happy by abolishing thus the restrictions of culture, and that is a tyrant or dictator who has monopolized all the means of power. . . .

"Could this be true?" our man exclaimed. "Is this Man? Society? Freedom? Is freedom lack of restraint of 'instinctual impulsions,' external or internal? Is Man essentially so determined, impelled by fear of punishment or by habits, by internalized rules imposed on him by compulsion?"

"I must see a philosopher!"

He went next day to see a philosopher and asked, "Will you tell me please what freedom is, philosophically?"

The philosopher smiled. "This," he said, "is an old and famous topic of philosophy down through the centuries. If you like, I can give you the names of a great number of books which you can study—are you interested in the history of philosophy? There are a number of philosophers who still deal with these questions, but if you like, I can try to tell you briefly how the problem lies in modern philosophy as I see it, and, I may say, as it has been well established in modern philosophy.

"The concept of freedom, of free will, of free choice, played an important role in various religions and in various philosophies. It was wish-thinking. Modern developments in science and philosophy have shown that there are no free acts. Causality governs them or, as we formulate it, all actions take place under the principle of determination, are determined by their causes; there is no such thing as an action leaping into existence uncaused, and so what is going to happen, happens by necessity. It is mere blindness if men believe that they are free to act or

to make decisions without realizing that their actions are the necessary outcome of forces which determine their choice.

"You might look into the modern textbooks of psychology. In most of them you will not even find mentioned such terms as free will, free decision, etc.

"There have been discussions about this principle of determinism. Some tried to save the old, outworn ideas by trying to defend a kind of psychological indeterminism. But there are few who would still hold these views to be defensible. There are some philosophers nowadays who believe that the newest developments in physics, viz., the uncertainty principle and statistics of probability, are again giving a foothold to indeterminism. But one should not misunderstand the meaning and role of these concepts in modern physics: they may make for some uncertainty or chance happenings but they give no basis for the existence of free will."

Our man lapsed into deep thought. "I think," he said, "I realize that important consequences are involved in this philosophical discovery of determinism. In looking, for example, at a man who has committed a crime, we should not forget to look for the causes which made him commit it. And we may find that his deed was due to factors which were beyond his control. We must try to understand his deed from the factors of causal necessity."

"Yes," answered the philosopher, "but don't forget that it is not only in cases in which you may discover an external force that compelled him, but also in cases in which it would have been said in olden times that he acted of his own free will, on his own decision, with nothing external to compel him. Such a description is utterly superficial. A man is determined even in these cases by the set of causal forces within him, by his desires, instincts, acquired habits."

"Is there not this important factor," asked our man humbly, "that man, after all, in a situation which calls for decision does not know of the forces that will determine him and, therefore, practically will have to choose, to decide? That everything is in fact determined may be of value to someone looking into the past, after the decision has been made, after the deed is done,

but not before? And so the principle of determinism does not perhaps do away with the questions of free decision."

"There are some," said the philosopher, "who try to make use of this factor of past and future for our problem, again in connection with new developments in modern physics. But don't you see, this does not help—indeed this may be the very reason why man is deceived about himself, why he may appear to himself as free, which is nothing other than that he does not know how in his seemingly free decisions he is lawfully and by necessity determined by causes."

Our man felt uneasy about this answer, but, unable to clarify the issue, he proceeded with another question. "Aren't those ideas of determinism somewhat dangerous?" he asked. "I should guess that a man who really comes to believe in determinism and to act sincerely in accordance with this belief would not only change his philosophical opinions, but his very actions. He would become a fatalist, relieved of all troubles in facing a situation that calls for a decision . . . it will happen anyhow. . . ."

"True," said the philosopher with a sly twinkle. "But fortunately men believe in their will, and even if they are philosophically convinced of determinism, they will not make use of it in actual situations. On the other hand, you may see in your remark a profound confirmation of the very principle of determinism: even your belief or disbelief in the principle may be a determining factor."

Suddenly our man jumped up from his chair. "Now," he said excitedly, "permit me another question. If we state that all is determined, does this change anything in regard to the real problems of freedom (with the only possible exception of this problem of the realization of fatalism)? Suppose we attach to every deed, to every action, to every attitude, the quality, 'It is determined,' would not all real concrete problems of freedom remain just the same? The discussions between determinism and indeterminism do not touch the real problem, in fact they obscure it. Should the essence of free action be that it is in no way determined? Or if all actions are determined, that there are no free men?"

"Let us not mix up such practical problems with the philosophical issue," said the philosopher. Here from the fullness of his heart our man told the philosopher about his troubles, facing the world situation, about his meeting with the sociologist and about the formulas in the books he had read.

Said the philosopher, "Like you I am a lover of political freedom. Certainly there is the very important problem of how much the State should or should not restrain the freedom of individuals. These are questions with which the sociologists and men of political science may properly deal; but don't you see that the very foundation of all that you have told me about the sociologist and the formulations in the books is the modern discovery of determinism, of realizing it as basic in all these questions?"

Our man realized this and was more bewildered than before.

The next day he said to himself, This is what I have learned:

1. There is no freedom because all is determined, is the consequence of causes. Or,

2. Freedom is absence of external restraints, of compulsion, freedom to pursue whatever wish may come to one's mind,

Or, because such wishes may be due to whatever standards may have been internalized on the basis of compulsion.

3. Freedom means to be able to follow those instinctual impulses without inhibitions.

Suddenly all he had heard in this context seemed to him utterly strange, narrow, inadequate; superficial, oversimplified, wrongly directed, blind to all the real problems of freedom, appropriate neither to the nature of man nor society, out of focus on both. He felt the desire to get away from all these terms and definitions, he wanted to face again the real situation, to restate the problem in full view of life.

He first thought of what the sociologist had told him and soon felt lost in the manifold features of history, its complexities, its diversities.

"First let me realize," he said passionately, "what I have seen with my own eyes. Have I not seen in my experience

strong and indeed very characteristic cases of men, of children, who were free, who were unfree? What were the essentials? My experiences, of course, are no sufficient basis for statistical generalizations; nor do I wish to make any now. What I want is to grasp, to realize, what I have seen."

He recalled a number of cases. Then he said, "Sometimes one sees a man, and by the way he goes through life, by his attitudes, by his behavior in dealing with life situations one feels: this is a free man, he lives in an atmosphere of freedom. And so in observing children.

"On the other hand, one sees men or children, and feels strongly: in their behavior there is no freedom—there is no air of freedom in their world."

It is, he thought, not easy to put into words what one faces so vividly in these extreme cases. Let me think—what were these cases concretely?

The free man, he recalled, frank, open-minded, sincerely going ahead, facing the situation freely, looking for the right thing to do and so finding where to go.

The opposite—he first thought of children he had often seen—inhibited, pushed, or driven, acting by command or intimidation, one-track minded, chained to certain ways of acting and of thinking, even in viewing situations—the very curves of their actions, of their movements, often showed these features, especially in meeting new situations. They often looked like sorry products of external influences or like slaves of any desire that might have come to their minds. Often they looked like robots, somehow crippled, robbed of essential abilities, narrow-minded, stiff, rigid, mechanical, their movements and postures often had the effect of puppets on strings. And grownups still more so. (Even slave drivers—he had seen such in our times—were they free? No, they belonged here.) Of course, many thus enslaved did not overtly behave timidly at all—just the opposite, brutal and overproud. But one sensed the same unfreedom, sometimes one saw what happened when they had to face a new situation in which their coat of armor was futile. . . .

And what experiences he had had in observing *transitions*!

If a child, if a man, having lived as that kind of slave, came

to live in another social field in which there was the real air of freedom, what marvelous happenings had he not observed in such cases! Very similar indeed to regaining health after a long illness.

Suddenly the whole problem appeared to him to be no longer a problem of philosophical schools of whatever standards or evaluations, but a problem of hygiene—it seemed to require the biologist studying health conditions. This is a task of scientific investigation, he thought. But not in terms of those previous theses. What conditions, what institutions, make for the free? What for the unfree? And what price is paid in the change?

This, it was now clear to him, was not to be viewed piecemeal, in terms of a choice, of a wish, of an “instinctual impulsion,” etc. One’s whole attitude towards the world, towards the other fellow, towards one’s group, towards one’s own momentary wishes was involved. And suddenly those theses dealing only negatively with freedom appeared to him like saying that growth, that maturing, *is* absence of impediments to growth; that beauty *is* absence of ugliness; that good thinking *is* absence of mistakes; that genuine achievement is due to absence of inhibitions; that kindness, or friendship, is nothing but absence of hostility; that justice is any legal rule imposed arbitrarily. “What we face,” he said, “is not a problem to be dealt with in such a piecemeal, negative way.”

After a while he found himself thinking of his experiences in certain specific situations in which there was clearly the one or the other kind of behavior. He recalled discussions. What differences! In the way a man faces a counterargument, faces new facts! There are men who face them freely, open-mindedly, frankly, dealing honestly with them, taking them duly into account. Others are not able to do so at all: they somehow remain blind, rigid; they stick to their axioms, unable to face the arguments, the facts; or, if they do, it is to avoid or to get rid of them by some means—they are incapable of looking them squarely in the face. They cannot deal with them as free men; they are narrowed and enslaved by their position.

For a moment he himself objected, Why are you connecting

the issues of freedom with all these features? With questions of being blind or narrow-minded in contrast to facing situations with open eyes and dealing with them honestly? Yes, he decided, I must; these things are most closely and intimately correlated with the meaning and the facts of freedom.

How was it in history, in the times when people honestly fought for freedom? Those men fought against the arbitrary, willful acts of their governments, they fought for fair and honest dealing. To those men freedom was envisaged and endeared in these terms. Freedom was sought and longed for *not* in terms of being able to do whatever might come to one's mind, to act in as one-sided and as blind a way as one might wish, to be free to brutalize the other fellow willfully. Were not those praisers and lovers of freedom those very men who demanded enlightenment for everyone, who fought for just dealing in courts, and just laws?

Thinking of the three theses he had written down earlier, he felt as if the scales had fallen from his eyes. The real question was, what kind of attitude, what rules, what institutions make for the free, what for the unfree? The real problem is not as in thesis (1), which seemed to say that all determination, all causes and influences, are factors against freedom; the problem is which ones are? This is a matter of causes and consequences; some make for freedom in men, some for unfreedom!

"What nonsense!" he said. "If a man is blind, or sees things in a distorted way and you open his eyes, give him knowledge, make him see, you may thereby strongly influence him, change him, determine him, but are you thereby limiting his freedom?"

"And do not men have a healthy desire not to be blind or blinded, at least in the long run? *Are* there not, thank God, some tendencies of this kind in men? And in the dynamics of society?"

Thinking of theses (2) and (3), he said to himself, There is something in formulating freedom as absence of restraint, of compulsion; a price is paid when spontaneity, genuineness, are impaired or destroyed. Yet the very term compulsion means willful, arbitrary force. And spontaneity, genuineness, are cer-

tainly not adequately viewed in terms of "whatever wish may come to one's mind," or in those "instinctual impulsions." What he had read about happiness was not happiness; was a crude caricature of happiness.

The assertions that "cultural institutions by necessity restrain, limit, freedom" now appeared to him astoundingly superficial. Is limiting freedom the essence of institutions for true education? of the roads that society constructs? Likewise of the development of law and of courts—if understood not in terms of any arbitrarily imposed law, but of making possible some degree of confidence in fair, just dealing? Is it not sheer piecemeal thinking to say "restraint is restraint," if a kidnapper restrains, imprisons, a child in order to extort ransom, and if another restrains the gangster from doing it in order to help the child? Is there not in the very birth of cruelty, of brutality, the factor of being blind, of being narrowed down?

And *are* there not tendencies in men and in children to be kind, to deal sincerely, justly with the other fellow? Are these nothing but "internalized rules on the basis of compulsion and of fear"? He thought of children whom he had seen grow—how little did this blind sweeping generalization apply to their kindness, to their desire for real grasp, to their horror in the face of an act of brute injustice.

"What is needed," he said, "is a sincere study of the tendencies, the vectors, their development in children, in men, in the dynamics of society, but not in terms of such rash definitions, or of those 'instinctual impulsions,' assumed in blind generalization. These are tasks for empirical study in the same way that problems of philosophy have become problems of modern science. Old theses, dependent on the philosophical school to which one adhered, should now be studied, discussed in scientific investigations. To be sure, superficial statistics will not help; these are deeper questions, involving the dynamics of men, of society. And if these fine tendencies are often weak, if their awakening, their growth, are often endangered, or if they are wholly overcome by other forces, does this justify constructing substitutes on the basis of their very opposites, or overlook-

ing them, denying them entirely? There was some positive development in this direction. It needs help."

Marvelous tasks for investigations! he thought.

Then again he found himself thinking of the actual world-situation. In full view of it, of the actual happenings, he reread the three theses he had written that morning. The whole line of approach appeared to him cruelly to miss the issue by focusing on "whatever wish may come to one's mind," and on those "instinctual impulsions." Was this the issue? (Probably it is just blind restraint that breeds and feeds such impulsions.)

Here are the basic issues, he felt, instead of in those three theses:

That human beings are exposed to injustice, to willfulness, to brutality; robbed of any hope of being treated with fairness, with kindness; that institutions are destroyed which had slowly developed, guaranteeing some justice, some fair dealing.

That men are forced to keep silent in the face of acts of injustice, with no possibility of helping the victims; forced even to help in performing those acts against their will and better knowledge.

Still more, that men, even children, by willfully distorted information become narrowed down, poisoned in their very souls, robbed of the preconditions of free judgment through being blinded, robbed of what in man and society is humane.

Now he felt more clearly why freedom was so dear to his heart.

What he had reached, he felt, was only a start. He saw that there are other problems to be faced; problems of the physical, economic constraints of men by hunger, dire lack of means of subsistence; problems of real co-operation (oh, what he had gone through were not problems of piecemeal individualism); problems of mutual justice between groups; problems of the individual called as a member of his group not only to co-operate in performing, but in facing and judging the very goals; etc. But in all these as in other urgent problems what he had gained did not seem useless. The task he felt was to face these problems also with the attitude of the free man, pro-

ductively, sincerely; real help he felt would come only this way.

He was eagerly looking forward to the further steps.

Then he took his notebook and wrote down after the three theses:

"Logical remark. This is what I have gone through, logically: In these three theses freedom is viewed in a piecemeal way and defined as a thing in itself, cut off from its living role and function, basically merely negative. Freedom is (1) a condition in the social field, and a terribly important one. In viewing such a condition we should not view it as a thing in itself and so define it, but we should view it *in* its role, in its function, in its interactions, in its consequences for men and for society. Freedom is logically (2) not just a condition; what matters is how men are and how they develop, how society is and how it develops. Freedom is a Gestalt quality of attitude of behavior, of a man's thinking, of his actions. (Think of the difference between the free and the unfree, the description of which was of course only a first approach to viewing the essentials.) Now logically freedom as condition (1) and freedom as Gestalt quality (2) must be viewed not as two pieces, but in their intimate interrelation. Freedom as condition is only one factor, but a very important one with regard to freedom as character quality. To put a man (or even a dog) in chains has consequences. Some men to be sure remain free in their hearts, even in chains, waiting for the moment to throw them off. But there are men whom chains enslave to the core. And here in the interaction between freedom as condition and freedom as character quality, one understands the real meaning of brute restraint and compulsion—the consequences for the victim and for the oppressor."

What matters is not a rash and elegant definition, but really facing the issues.

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FREEDOM AND NOMINALISM

IN the main position of this paper I shall briefly explain and defend two propositions:

I. That because the abstract natures or essences of things and their relations to one another can be with complete effectiveness represented or mapped in terms of linguistic symbols, there has arisen the "illusion of nominalism," which is the belief that the symbols or names do themselves constitute a logically autonomous and self-sufficient system, and that in the syntactical structure of that system resides the logical reality that has formerly been supposed to subsist in the extralinguistic entities symbolized by the system.

II. That because of the power of the individual to select freely from the configurations of abstract forms anyone that interests or pleases him and to construct for it a symbolic map, there has again arisen the illusion of nominalism, which in this context is the belief that a freedom to select from what is *there* is a freedom to create what was not there, with the implication that what appears to be abstract and objective is merely symbolic and subjective and its supposed laws merely rules of procedure determined arbitrarily like the rules of any game, by those who invent it and play it.

I. CONCERNING THE FIRST PROPOSITION

To a logic-loving mind it is a fascinating task to take a body of abstract doctrine that has grown from the soil of creative

imagination, rank, luxurious, and untrained, and subject it to a systematic reformulation expressed in a minimum number of indefinable (or only denotatively definable) terms and of undemonstrable propositions or postulates from which can be deduced in succession an assemblage of interrelated theorems adequate to cover the whole subject matter. And when such a logical map of symbols has been made there is a psychological temptation for its makers, and still more for those who accept it humbly as their guide, to mistake the symbols for what they symbolize. As an illustration of this temptation I am minded to take that one of Professor Whitehead's many delightful stories in which an American tourist rushes up the steps of the British Museum and in breathless excitement asks of the doorman if the Elgin marbles are still there. On getting a prompt and sympathetic reassurance, he turns away with obvious relief and starts down the steps marking something in a book as he departs. Thereupon the doorman exclaims in surprise: "But, Sir, aren't you coming in to see the marbles?" "No, no, thank you," replies the tourist, continuing his retreat, "I'll just check them off in my Baedeker." Now it may be that some of us feel a sneaking sympathy for the poor devil who, goaded by his own or his family's New England conscience, has resolved to "do" all the chief sights of old England in his month's vacation. But even so, we can hardly approve his illusion that checking them off in the guidebook is the same as observing them in the flesh.

There is, however, a very plausible reason for the nominalistic illusion that a good map is itself the reality and the only reality of that which it is supposed to map. When properly made, it constitutes an effective translation of the reality into operational terms, which are not only practically effective but empirically observable, and not only empirically observable but susceptible of symbolic manipulations with a methodological refinement and precision which no objective existence could possibly provide.

Let me illustrate the seeming strength and the actual weakness of the nominalistic procedure by another anecdote, but one that is sad rather than comical and derived from my own experience rather than from that of someone else. Impressed by the majesty of *Principia Mathematica*, and by the prestige attach-

ing to the increasing practice of devising symbolic equivalents for the supposedly subsistential reality of objective forms and their relations, I determined some fifteen years ago to try this enterprise myself. Beginning in a very small way, I took the equation $7 + 5 = 12$ which was one of Kant's examples of a valid a priori synthetic proposition and strove to reduce it to a sequence of analytic propositions. Let us regard the number one (1) and the symmetrical relation or operation of addition or plus (+) as ultimate and indefinable, and let us postulate that the associative as well as the commutative law holds for plus, so that not only $a + b = b + a$ but $a + b + c = (a + b) + c$.

In terms of these indefinables the symbols for the successive integers can be defined as

$$2 = 1 + 1, 3 = 1 + 2, \text{ and } 4 = 1 + 3. \dots$$

We now can make the following series of equations, each one derived from its predecessor by interchanging the integer symbols and their definitions:

$$7 + 5 = 12$$

because by the definition of 5

$$7 + 5 = 7 + 1 + 4$$

which by definition = $8 + 1 + 3$

" " " = $9 + 1 + 2$

" " " = $10 + 1 + 1$

" " " = $11 + 1$ which is the definition of 12.

To you this may seem a trifling and amateurish achievement, but to me it seemed very real and important. For had I not succeeded in reducing the supposedly irreducible synthetic proposition to a mere complex of analytic propositions or definitions? And what then was left of the subsistential reality or eternal objectivity of the numbers which had appealed with mystic strength to Pythagoras and Plato? Instead of saying of the numbers that they "have" symbols, should we not rather say that they *are* symbols, and that their supposedly timeless relations are nothing but rhetorical hypostatizations of our own quite temporal linguistic operations? Surely, I had gone nomi-

nalist with a vengeance! It was not until some years later that I was shaken out of my complacency and filled with consternation by noticing that the neat little procedure by which I had proved to my own satisfaction that $7 + 5 = 12$ did itself have not only a structure but a numerical structure and in fact the identical numerical structure that I had flattered myself that I had explained away. I took just five steps to reduce the original synthetic proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ to the final analytic or defining proposition $11 + 1 = 12$. And if instead of diminishing 5 to 1 and building up 7 to 11, I had built up 5 to 11 and diminished 7 to 1, thus $7 + 5 = 6 + 1 + 5 = 5 + 1 + 6 = 4 + 1 + 7 = 3 + 1 + 8 = 2 + 1 + 9 = 1 + 1 + 10 = 1 + 11 = 12$, there would have been seven of these substitutions required. Generalizing we can say that any (synthetic) equation of the type $a + b = c$ can be reduced to the defining or analytic equation $(c - 1) + 1 = c$, either by the number of substitutive steps equal to a or by the number of substitutive steps equal to b . In short, *in any transformation or translation of a pattern of objective forms and relations into a series of substitutive steps or operations with symbols, the pattern of the former will reappear in the latter*. In other words, a map owes its practical utility to its theoretical conformity to the reality that is mapped; therefore, it can never be regarded as self-sufficient, but must always be regarded as a secondary system dependent upon and determined in every detail of its structure by that objective reality of which it is the guide. But if this is the case, how does it happen that it is not recognized, and that even in high quarters the illusion of nominalism still persists? There are, I think, two reasons. The first reason is that in a nominalistic or symbolic system the combination of practical utility with high technical elegance engenders in the minds of its creators a pride and affection that is almost paternal in its tender intensity. This is the subjective reason and it is based on the generic qualities of human nature. The maker loves what he makes.

The second reason is less subjective and more specific, and is to be found in the extraordinary completeness of the disguise that the eternal truths of subsistential reality undergo when translated into a temporal series of symbolic operations. The

sequential procedure seems so obviously man-made and directed to the fulfillment of human purposes technical and practical, that it takes a tremendous effort to discover the underlying static structure to which the operations are indebted for their entire meaning.

There is here a significant parallel in a certain current misconception of the nature of *judgment*, which is shared in common by both idealists and pragmatists. Such judgments as "Snow is white," "Man is animal," "S is P," express, or symbolize in words, denotative identities (total or partial), between two connotations, or at least a coexistence in the same position of the qualities designated by the subject and the qualities designated by the predicate. And if you prefer the modernistic $A R B$, where R symbolizes any relation whatever of A to B , to the Aristotelian inclusion or exclusion of classes, the situation is not altered. The object or content of the judgment, i.e., *what* the judgment asserts, is a static structure, a propositional complex, apprehended as a portion of objective reality; and there is nothing sequential about it. But the tongue cannot utter, and the hand cannot write, more than one word at a time. So there arises an illusion that the proposition asserted or "judgment content" must share the sequential and active nature of the process of asserting or "judgment utterance" and that a statement about reality alters that reality, "breaks up an organic whole into artificial fragments," or something of the sort. Of course nothing like this ever happens. When an astronomer makes a judgment about the stars, the action is in the astronomer, his tongue, or his fingers, and not in the stars at all, which remain completely unchanged by the judgment passed upon them.

And this fallacy of projecting the dynamic technique of apprehending and symbolically reporting upon the static relations that are apprehended and symbolically reported is facilitated by the messy term "experience," which is a word devised by the devil himself to obscure the distinction between the act of cognizing and the object cognized.

When I translated the objective structure $7 + 5 = 12$ into the sequence of analytic steps, I was, for the reason that I have

been stating, deceived into thinking that I had explained away the objective structure and that like the tourist in Professor Whitehead's story, I could substitute the guidebook or map for the reality on which it was based. But now I may say (with apologies to St. Augustine for using his famous words) that having sinned like St. Paul, I can repent like St. Paul and exhort those of you who are still guilty of the illusion of nominalism to join me in awakening to the irremovable reality of Plato's world of abstract forms and relations, be they symbolized or be they not.

II. CONCERNING THE SECOND PROPOSITION

A second type of cause for the illusion of nominalism is to be found in our freedom to select from the complex structures of the Platonic world of subsistent forms any that happen to please us. This power to select is wrongly interpreted as a power to create, with the result that we arrive from a new direction at the same old nominalistic illusion—the illusion that the realm of essence and the relations of its constituents to one another have no reality outside of our own intellectual acts and the symbols or names that express them.

For more than two generations there has been talk of types of space other than the space of Euclid and of new geometries, especially those of Riemann and Lobachewsky in which the Euclidean axiom of parallels is replaced by one or the other of two opposing postulates. To the naïve question as to which of the three geometries, Euclidean, Riemannian, or Lobachewskian, is the "true" one, a playful but instructive reply could be given in the form of a counterquestion. Of the three sets of rules, those of tennis, of cricket, and of baseball, which set is "true"? Obviously, the latter question at least would be meaningless. The rules of one game are neither more true nor less true than the rules of another. Rules are man-made and conventional. Which rules are applied depends on which game, if any, you choose to play.

You can say if you like, though it is not very enlightening, that tennis rules are "true" for tennis, and that cricket and

baseball rules are respectively "true" for those games. Tennis might seem to have more objective reality than the other two because it is played everywhere while cricket and baseball are each for the most part played only in one country. In quite the same way, so it is alleged, you can in pure geometry play the Euclidean, Riemannian, or Lobachewskian game according to your taste. Adopt the appropriate postulates or rules and go ahead; each is internally self-consistent, and no one is more so than the others. But if we were to ask the further question as to which geometry most closely conforms to physical existence, we should be told that it was the Euclidean; and then we should be told further that the greater applicability of Euclid's geometry to physics had no more relevance to its *mathematical* truth than had the wider prevalence of tennis to its truth or validity as a game in comparison with other games. In short, as long as you remain in the domain of abstract forms and relations, which is the domain of mathematics in its modern and broader sense, it may seem that there is no such thing as "objective truth," but only internal consistency and intellectual convenience. And now having stated as plausibly as I could the case for this type of nominalism I will give what seems to me to be its refutation.

Whether I choose one set of mathematical postulates or another is indeed a matter of arbitrary choice like the decision to play one game or another, but if and when the postulates have once been selected, *then* theorems follow with iron necessity. (1) Euclidean, (2) Riemannian, and (3) Lobachewskian postulates compel me whether I like it or not, on pain of self-contradiction, to infer that the sum of the angles of a triangle is respectively (1) equal to, (2) greater than, (3) less than two right angles. The situation is like that which confronted a certain small boy who liked the idea that seven times eight makes seventy-eight. To a six-year-old, this sounds good and seems plausible; but, alas, it is not true. Seven times eight persist in making fifty-six, no matter how you wiggle them and no matter how you pout and stamp.

It is in situations such as this that a child is for the first time

brought face to face with one of the awful truths of eternity. He has to accept it and he had better find it pleasant. Here is where the analogy with the rules of a game breaks down completely. I can alter the game's rules in any way I like and at any time in the course of my play. The worst that could happen to me would be that spectators could call me silly—which I probably would be—and tell me that this was “really hardly cricket”; to which I could make the unanswerable retort that it was my kind of “cricket” and that I liked it, and nothing more need be said!

One specific reason for the failure to recognize the truth for what it is is the preoccupation with the spatio-temporal *Zusammenhang* of existence, in which so many people are morbidly interested. Hence the vogue of the hypothetical proposition. If p , then q . If there's an A , then there's a B . If Riemann's postulates applied to the existing world, the then existing triangles would have the sum of their angles greater than two right angles. But the tight little isle of existence is set within the ocean of subsistence. Its actuality is an infinitesimal fragment of the infinity of possibilities. *The relations which those possibilities sustain to one another are necessities.* Back of every hypothetical proposition about what *would exist* is a categorical proposition about what *does subsist*. The reason why existing triangles would be such and such *if* existing space were such and such is because from all eternity certain abstract forms and their relations have entailed or implied certain other quite definite forms and relations. And the same sort of eternal categorical truth lies behind the hypothetical truths that if there were seven octets of stars, or atoms, or apples, the total of those objects would be fifty-six rather than seventy-eight, and that if seven of them were added to five of them, the total would be twelve of them.

We can make symbolic guidebooks or maps that are both useful and ornamental; and we can direct our attention to this set of structures or to that. But the notion that because of these privileges we can regard our procedures as self-contained and self-sufficient, made out of whole cloth and dependent on noth-

ing but our caprice and the linguistic operations in which that caprice is symbolized, is to suffer from the illusion of nominalism.

CONCLUSION

THE GENUINE FREEDOM OF PLATONIC REALISM CONTRASTED WITH THE SPURIOUS FREEDOM OF NOMINALISM, SUBJECTIVISM, AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Supposing that nominalism had been refuted and that Platonism had been vindicated, you might still quite naturally ask as to the bearing of all that upon the nature of freedom or liberty, which is the theme of this volume. I should begin my reply with the reminder that a just cause can be mortally injured by false claims made in its behalf. To ascribe to the human *intellect* a kind of freedom that is spurious and foolish is to distract attention from the real freedom possessed by the human *will*. Man's liberty consists not in creating possibilities but in realizing them.

We live and move and have our being in a threefold milieu of Space and Time and Form. The structure of this triune Logos is itself incapable of change; but within it and throughout it all things change and flow. It is the eternal loom of formal possibilities and abstract laws; and across it Nature's shuttle ceaselessly flies to and fro weaving the many-colored fabric of existence. The possibilities do not themselves dictate their realization. The energies of matter by their quantity and distribution determine that; and therein consists the world's contingency. But what for nature is contingency is for man with his intelligence and power true freedom of the will. His vision of the timeless realm of possibilities brings with it liberty to choose and by spontaneous and unpredetermined effort to actualize the higher or the lower of those possibilities at each successive moment of his life.

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THE MECHANISM OF FREEDOM

THERE is an air of paradox about attempts to defend freedom. For ultimately something can be defended only by preserving the conditions under which it exists. But if freedom is dependent for its existence upon a determinate set of conditions, then freedom itself seems to be caused—and the statement of the determinate set of conditions would be the statement of the “mechanism of freedom.”

This air of paradox is here invoked only to set in relief the verbal confusions and subterfuges which dog discussions of freedom. Metaphysical controversies crystallized in our common language have set up an opposition between freedom and mechanism which could not exist without making it impossible for freedom to be controlled and extended or for free activity itself to be efficacious in the control of mechanisms. What is needed, if these consequences are to be ruled out, is a clear understanding of what we are to mean by “mechanism” and “freedom”; then knowledge of the conditions under which freedom occurs; and finally a decision as to the degree to which freedom is to be encouraged or thwarted by permitting or suppressing the conditions upon which it depends.

II

What then is to be understood by “mechanism” and “freedom”? If the terms are to be utilizable in practice, we must be

able to decide in any given case whether what is before us is or is not an instance of mechanism or freedom. So the problem becomes, under what circumstances shall we apply to something the term "free" or "mechanical"?

Since "freedom" is commonly contrasted with "mechanism," we may first glance at the latter term. In actual practice the ability to predict is taken as the test for the discovery of a mechanism: eclipses can with high accuracy be predicted, so their occurrence is said to be dependent upon a mechanism. In so far as science aims to give statements upon which accurate predictions can be made, science is in the very nature of the case mechanistic, for the mechanical is the predictable, and prediction is evidence for the existence of mechanisms. The mechanistic character of science is, however, methodological rather than metaphysical. Such statements as "the world is a mechanical system," "everything is determined," "everything is predictable," are but shorthand ways of saying that scientists have in fact isolated many mechanisms, that there is no known limit to predictability, and that the scientist as scientist must continually seek to widen the sphere of the predictable. That the expressions are programs rather than simply statements of fact is attested by the circumstance that there are many occurrences which cannot be predicted in terms of the knowledge available at the time, and that even where prediction does obtain, there are properties of the occurrence in question which were not predicted. Thus, in so far as we use terms empirically, we are, relative to our knowledge, living in a world characterized alike by chance and mechanism, novelty and law. To say that "really" there is no chance or novelty would be to affirm a body of knowledge such that from it every true statement which ever can be made can be deduced. Such an affirmation is clearly only a hypothesis, and not a dogma, since such a body of knowledge certainly does not now exist. The fact, then, that science in the nature of the case is mechanistic in method does not necessitate a mechanistic metaphysics and cannot lead to the denial of whatever chance and novelty the world, relative to existing knowledge, does in fact contain.

In so far as "freedom" means simply the absence of mecha-

nism, then freedom, in the sense of chance and novelty, is certainly a property of nature on the same empirical level as lawfulness or mechanism. Even in such a usage of the term "freedom," we could investigate the general conditions of chance and attempt in some sense to control it. For if "chance" is a term involving relativity to knowledge, we could increase the precarious nature of our world by stopping the increase of knowledge and preventing the use of what knowledge is available, or by so changing the world that the present factual basis used for determining expectations is destroyed. If, for example, the family were abolished, then, provided the psychologists are even partly correct, many present mechanisms of human behavior dependent upon early life within the family would disappear, and much would occur that our present knowledge would not be able to predict.

III

A second and common use of "freedom" is even more clearly compatible with the notion of mechanism and the theoretical possibility of the control of freedom. When the physicist speaks of a "freely vibrating body," the adverb "freely" merely indicates that nothing opposes the vibration in question. Freedom in this sense of unimpeded action is a character common to physical bodies and living beings. An organism is free with respect to a certain activity if the environment or the other activities of the organism support the carrying out of the activity in question. A man in prison may not be free to walk at will, but may be free to breathe; internal inhibitory factors may prevent him from being free to write or to speak. In this sense of freedom, no living being is completely free or entirely without freedom. Since such freedom is a property of an activity, the conditions under which the activity can operate are identical with the conditions of freedom. These conditions are amenable to investigation, and once they are determined the appearance and course of the activity can be controlled. The problem as to which activities should be developed and how far they should be allowed to operate freely is a very complicated one, and as

the problem of control ultimately becomes a moral one, it is best to postpone for a moment the consideration of the issues involved.

IV

The third and most important usage of the term "freedom" centers around the problem of choice. A being is free in this sense to the degree that the course of his life is selected from among various possible alternatives; free action is then chosen action.

A jungle is before us at this point, and we must move warily. For the notion of choice is a difficult one, and the verbal ghosts of past philosophical reflections turn us away from the analysis of concrete situations. In this jungle we easily find ourselves lapsing into the absolute opposition of freedom and mechanism, and perhaps, in the manner of Kant, placing human freedom beyond the realm of empirical description because we are unable to find, within natural processes, a place for it consistent with the admission of the mechanistic orientation of science.

Let us consider the hypothetical case of an animal that responds only to what it immediately comes in contact with, so that it responds to nothing as a sign of something else. If a suitable food object came in contact with the hungry animal it would seize it, but it would not, in the case imagined, see the object at a distance or respond to any features of its immediate environment as signs of what exists beyond this immediate environment. Such an animal, as living, would have needs and impulses, but would be at the mercy of its immediate environment for the satisfaction of these needs and impulses. Its behavior might be "free" in the first two senses of the word (it might show novel properties, and its impulses might under fortunate circumstances be unimpeded in their expression), but the behavior would not be free in the sense of chosen, since it would not be a selection out of envisaged alternatives, but simply a function of the physiological state of the animal and the immediate environment.

The situation becomes more complicated if we add to the animal's equipment the ability to "perceive" objects at a dis-

tance. Such perception involves sign processes, in that some present clue—a color or shape or sound or contact—is responded to in such a way as to take account of objects and their properties which are not in the immediate neighborhood of the organism. The animal now pursues a food object seen at a distance, and guides its behavior to this object in terms of sensory cues. Thus the conduct of the organism is in part a function of things indicated by signs. A new conception of freedom begins to emerge: it might be said that the animal is “free” from his immediate environment in the sense (and to the degree) that its conduct is not solely a function of its immediate environment. “Free behavior” begins to mean “behavior directed by the operation of signs.”

V

There is no absolute line to be drawn between the behavior of an animal that perceives and the behavior of the conceptually thinking human being; it is a terminological matter whether all sign-controlled behavior is to be designated as free behavior or whether this term is to be applied only to the most complicated phases of such behavior. Nevertheless, the differences, while differences in a continuum, are important, and there are grounds for preferring to restrict “free behavior,” in the third sense of the term, to such behavior as involves the symbolical indication of alternative courses of action and the selection of one such course of action in and through the process of symbolical indication.

Free behavior in this restricted sense is perhaps confined to human beings. The animal that perceives uses signs, and in so doing lives within a wider temporal and spatial world, but the signs to which he reacts are supplied by the immediate world—and if the clues are not given him, the sign-guided behavior does not take place. Even when signs are operative in such an animal, the embeddedness of the sign in the immediate world makes it impossible to hold on to the sign in order to explore, by related signs and tentative behavior, the alternative courses of action which correlate with the various indications furnished by what is operating as a sign. So that while the animal “chooses”

in the vague sense that among competing tendencies to behavior one action rather than another does in fact take place, the process does not involve choice in the complex sense that the alternative courses of behavior, together with certain of their consequences, are symbolically indicated, such indication being a factor in producing the resultant behavior.

It was the belief of George H. Mead that free behavior, in this sense of chosen behavior, was the unique prerogative of man, and that this humanly distinctive type of behavior was made possible through the appearance of spoken language. For in speech with others and himself man is easily able to keep the sign operative independent of the immediate environment; to bring before himself for consideration (by the interrelationship of signs) the consequences of a mode of action; and to try out experimentally alternative modes of action by stimulating himself through various sign combinations. Thus as a result of sign functioning at the linguistic level the human being reacts to a world which extends indefinitely beyond his immediate environment and his perceived environment, and is able to lay out courses of action after consideration of the consequences of various possible alternatives. In this way freedom from the neighboring environment is greatly extended and conscious choice takes on an increasingly greater role and significance.

V I

Freedom of choice, so conceived, presents no obstacle to mechanistic science and has nothing to fear (indeed, everything to gain) from the uncovering by science of as many mechanisms as possible—including the mechanism of choice.

If such freedom is dependent upon the operation of signs, then it is possible to consider the conditions under which signs function, and investigate the details of that functioning—tasks which form an essential part of the science of signs. If, in the case of man, language plays such an important function, it follows that to a large extent the conditions of individual freedom are social in origin. This fact becomes of special importance if one goes on to agree with Mead's position (stated in *Mind*,

Self, and Society) that human mentality is to be equated with the functioning of signs at the linguistic level, and that selfhood (in the sense of self-consciousness) arises in the same process. For it then turns out that the self-conscious, thinking individual is dependent for his appearance upon participation in a social process in which he takes over into himself processes operative in the objective social structure of which he is a member. The character of the individual's thought processes (whether, for instance, they are to be of a scientific temper or not) is then amenable to control by the manipulation of the social environment of the individual. Freedom, in the sense of making choices in the light of symbolically indicated consequences of alternative courses of action, is relative to the sign repertory and to the habits of sign usage which an individual is allowed to acquire. The implication of this fact is that men can be "made" free or kept from being free, and the isolation of the mechanism of freedom, as the isolation of all mechanisms, places great power and responsibility in the hands of those who direct society.

From the standpoint of the reflective individual the reliable knowledge of physical, biological, and social mechanisms is in importance equal to (or greater than) the knowledge of his own processes of reflection. For if he is to act intelligently in the light of the consequences of contemplated action, he must know what the consequences in fact will be. He must be able to predict accurately, and so possess scientific knowledge—knowledge of mechanisms. Without such knowledge he cannot wisely guide his present behavior even though a multiplicity of signs operates in such behavior, for if the reference of the signs is unsure, he cannot count on what will turn up if he embarks on a course of action. This is of course as true in regard to other persons and to himself (including his own reflective mechanisms) as it is in regard to physical processes. Hence arises the interesting conclusion that the more successful science is in isolating mechanisms, the more it advances the cause of freedom. Paradoxically put, the more mechanism, the more freedom. Put without paradox, the more scientific knowledge the individual possesses, the better able is he to guide his pres-

ent behavior through the consideration of the consequences of alternative courses of action.

The knowledge does not of course uniquely determine the resultant action. Regardless of what knowledge is utilized in the act, the resultant act may be freer in some or all of the analyzed senses of the term "freedom": the act may be less predictable (since available predictions have been utilized by the act); action may be more expressive of the total interests of the organism (since the various impulses have had a voice in determining the result); the final action remains an act of free choice (in the sense that even if the act could be predicted it would still be an act selected in the process of considering the consequences of various courses of action).

V I I

If the preceding analysis is in the main sound, the backbone of the ancient opposition between freedom and mechanism should be broken, and it is not necessary to kick the corpse in prolonging the argument. Whether the free is taken as the unpredictable or the unimpeded or the chosen, it is in any case a part of the same nature which manifests predictability, hindrances, and blindness; in every case it is a matter of degree; in every case it is open to scientific study and to control. The detailed study of the mechanisms involved is a task for science, and the finding and stating of the results must be left to science.

There remain, however, certain large problems in connection with control which are capable of general discussion. Since the problem of control ultimately runs into moral issues, it is necessary to bring morality specifically into our purview. And since the term "moral" is subject to wide variations in usage, it is necessary—if we are to remain empirical—to specify the present usage of the term. "Moral attitude" shall denote the attitude which attempts to bring about the maximum satisfaction of interests when interests are in conflict (i.e., when the satisfaction of an interest affects the satisfaction of other interests). The moral attitude is thus itself an interest in the maximum satisfaction of a system of interacting interests. A person is moral

to the degree that this interest is operative; a specific act is morally better than some other act to the degree that it gives more satisfaction to a specific system of interests. With this usage of terms, the moral interest becomes one interest among others, and to the degree that the terms "interest" and "satisfaction of interest" are used empirically, it is possible to determine whether a person is moral or not, and whether a particular act is morally better in a specific situation than another act.

It is clearly to the advantage of the moral interest that each person have this interest, for the heart of morality is found in sensitivity to conflicting interests in specific situations, and only in so far as each person has such a sensitivity can maximum justice be done to realizing the potentialities of such situations. It is also necessary, if the moral goal is to be progressively realized, that each individual be equipped with the tools necessary for moral action. Among such tools are the moral injunctions or prescriptions which embody accumulated moral experience. There are recurrent types of situations which men have found it wise to meet in such and such a way, and this wisdom constitutes the specific "oughts" of morality. But the rule-of-thumb application of specific moral injunctions is simply one tool of the moral life and not its essential feature. For such application blurs the differences between situations; the moral injunctions of any time, since they are prescriptions of habitual actions, tend to lag behind the knowledge and the techniques available at the time. It follows that scientific knowledge and the scientific attitude are also tools of basic importance for morality: scientific knowledge, because such knowledge is necessary to find out the existing system of interests and the effects of alternative actions on the system; the scientific attitude, because the process of formulating, selecting, and trying out a hypothesis as to a course of moral action is in all essentials the same as formulating and controlling any hypothesis—and the method of science represents the most highly developed form of this process.

The moral life, from its very nature, requires that the moral interest be developed in each individual, and that each individual be given the best moral experience, scientific knowledge, and scientific techniques available. The moral life involves tol-

eration of freedom in all senses of the term, for it requires the intelligent choice of an action to remove a conflict of actions, and in acting upon such choice new elements of novelty are introduced into human relations. If moral injunctions tend to mechanize life, the moral process out of which such injunctions spring, and within which they are merely one agency, is part and parcel of life's free renewal.

VIII

The moral life is committed to the increase of freedom in all individuals. To what is democracy committed?

Various are the usages of the term "democracy," and a choice must be indicated. We choose the moral interpretation of democracy which Dewey has given; put in terms we have been using, democracy is the acceptance of the moral attitude as a general principle of action. Democracy so conceived would involve the extension to social relations at large of the pattern of moral relations between smaller groups of individuals. It would aim to make every individual a consciously determining factor in the evolution of society. It would devise (and continually revise) the economic, political, and educational institutions by which each individual can be made a moral participant in the life of the community. It would implant the moral interest in its members and make available to them the most accurate knowledge and the best techniques of reflection and action. It would seek out the mechanisms of freedom, and it would extend—thoughtfully and morally—the conditions under which freedom flourishes.

The moral interest—and so democracy as its generalization—is one interest among others. It is in no individual and no society the sole interest in terms of which other interests are controlled. It is an attitude and not a dogma; it can be accepted or rejected. There are many other bases actually used to determine the amount and extent of freedom permitted in a given culture. Such bases all involve the selection of some interest other than the moral interest as norm (and in general this selected interest is the interest of some specific group of people).

Freedom is then controlled in the service of this selected interest, and the direction of human experience and social organization is prescribed within the limit set by this interest. Democracy, as Dewey states, is the only attitude which trusts men to develop, correct, and modify all their norms in the very process of experience itself. For according to the moral attitude no other interest which men have or will develop is to be left out of account—and in this sense the moral interest is not a competitor to any interest but a way of dealing with all interests. It sets no limit to the interests men will develop, nor does it prescribe the human future. It merely seeks that human life have the fullest possible value at each stage; it is willing to allow any future to emerge which emerges within the framework of the moral process.

Freedom is always a matter of degree and always operates under determinate conditions; its control is always a specific problem. A democratic society would favor all forms of freedom compatible with and required by the moral process. A moral democracy is a society of free men freely choosing at each moment its own future.

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HUMAN FREEDOM—POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

I

IN this essay I shall argue that the notion of freedom is required by our experience of choice and in order to validate our practical judgments; after clarifying the meaning of freedom, I shall defend the view that the assertion of human freedom is part of any sound philosophy.

a. The experience of choice. Freedom is an element disclosed in my awareness of myself as choosing, deciding, acting, somewhat as the relation "between" is disclosed in my awareness of my perceptual field. It is worth noting that freedom is not revealed in *moral* experience alone, but is in fact prior to it. A man may conceivably have no sense of right or wrong; he may be deciding what to do in complete oblivion of what he ought to do. He may nevertheless be aware while so deciding that he is free, for the decision to recognize moral standards or the decision to discard or ignore them is itself a free choice. In short, freedom is an ingredient of human choice, moral or otherwise.

b. Practical judgments. I hold myself—and society at large holds me—responsible for my choices. There is a set of attitudes and judgments which, by attributing responsibility to the individual for his acts, affirms him, by implication, to be free; and this set forms part of what may be called the common-sense view of human conduct. Such a common-sense view is not necessarily an inference from human experience and should be re-

garded as a component additional to the latter. Common sense, whether about the external world—its existence and nature—or about human conduct, may well consist of a set of *primary* judgments, primary in the sense that they are not derived from an analysis of experience, and indeed are not deduced from any other set of propositions. Thus conceived, common sense is surely relevant to the construction of an adequate philosophical doctrine of the real.

Judgments of common sense concerning human conduct I shall call practical judgments, dividing the latter into moral and nonmoral judgments. I shall now consider the implications of moral judgments. After the choice has been made, I may congratulate myself, or I may feel remorse over my decision. Or my friends and the public may blame me or praise me; their verdict will be, "Well done, thou faithful servant," or alternatively, "Badly done, thou unfaithful servant." I am judged praiseworthy or blameworthy because it is assumed that my choice was made freely. Take the notion of the "ought" as a component of moral judgments. I judge concerning myself that I ought to do thus and so; you judge concerning me that I ought not to have done thus and so. The judgment that A ought to do Y is a joint judgment that Y is right and that A is free to choose it.

II

Our next step is to clarify the content of the experience of choice and of the implications of practical judgment. Two preliminary points must be made. In the first place, the statement that all human actions are free is too broad; there may well be actions which are not free. We will restrict our assertion to read "some human actions are free." In the second place, freedom is a property of decision, not of action; or of action in so far as it is a result of free decision. The moment of freedom is the moment at which I make up my mind as to what to do or what to be. Freedom pertains not to the outward, peripheral, public behavior, but to the inward series of events prior to the action, during which the human being envisages several alternatives of action (or even one alternative) and then decides. Thus, it

is choice, not action, which is free. But choice too is action; and in what follows, when the term "action" (or "conduct") is used as a subject for the predicate, "free," it will refer usually to that species of action which is choice.

The notion of freedom involves two elements: the notion of causality and the notion of real possibility.

a. The judgment that A is responsible for his acts and directly for his choices is valid only if it is true that A is a cause; the judgment of responsibility attributes agency to A. I am now using the conception of causality naïvely, as when one says, "I did it," or "*He* did it." I am aware of my decision as mine, and as issuing from me. And if I blame you for your acts, I certainly mean that the acts are referable to you as the agent. The notion of legal responsibility for crime cannot stand unless it be assumed that the man is a cause of his actions.

b. The other element of freedom is potentiality. When I say that A ought to do Y, I mean that A may or may not do Y. When, after deliberation, A chooses Y, A is aware that he might have chosen X. Choice is a selection among real possibilities. I call a future event Y a real possibility whenever, given the set of present or past conditions A, Y is not necessary. Surely the assumption of real possibility is involved in moral judgment; you blame me for what I have done because, being what I am, I could have acted otherwise.

This notion of real possibility may be appropriately contrasted with Aristotle's notion of potentiality. Take a man by the name of Socrates; we will say that Socrates may or may not sit in the near future. Aristotle would maintain that Socrates (the substance) contains the opposite potentialities of sitting and not sitting. But Aristotle would also maintain that if all the conditions were specified—in the universe as well as in Socrates—then only one of the alternatives is possible. In short, by calling sitting and not-sitting potentialities of Socrates, Aristotle means that they are not necessitated by the *essence* of Socrates; he does not mean that they are not necessitated once the other factors, besides the essence of Socrates, are given. By real possibility I mean absence of necessitation given all

the conditions. Supposing I have adopted alternative Y; then, given myself and my nature, and given the whole universe, the adoption of alternative Y is nevertheless not necessary.¹

By bringing the two components of freedom into one statement, we may conclude that "A chose Y freely" means that A is the cause of Y, and that Y is not necessary, given the total situation, inclusive of A. It is unfortunate that in our normal usage the word freedom suggests only one of these elements, namely, absence of necessitation. By freedom, in this essay, I mean something negative and something positive: that the choice was not necessary, and that the choice was made by the agent (in the sense above mentioned that "he did it"). It will be found as we proceed that the various traditional theories of freedom generally fail, because they provide either for the one or for the other component of freedom, but not for both.

III

Before we go on in the direction indicated, I will attempt to remove certain formidable obstacles in our path. Why trouble to analyze the conception of freedom, since we know that everything is determined? As for the presumed bases of the conception—the experience of choice and the content of practical judgments—why take them seriously at all? Let us give the floor to Spinoza, one of the foremost spokesmen of this view.

The infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks that it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, and others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by a free command of the mind, whilst in truth they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak; so

¹ Evidently, the notion of necessity (and its absence) employed in this essay is a relational one. Thus, X is—or is not—necessary, in relation to Y. In speaking of the absence of any necessity for X, absolutely, I mean that X is not necessary relatively to all the actualities in the universe.

that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.²

The so-called experience of freedom in choice is an illusion. Our actions are necessitated not only by our individual make-up, but by nature at large; or rather, our character is determined by the nature of things. We arrive on the threshold of existence at the conclusion of a long universal process; and, unaware of the origins of our being, we have the delusion that each of us is a master of his destiny. Imagine, suggests Spinoza, a stone hurled high by man; imagine further that the stone, as it reaches the peak of its curve, comes to consciousness. The stone would then naturally think itself free because it is ignorant of the forces that launched it; and the stone would congratulate itself on its success in rising so high. So are we, human beings, missiles flung into the space of life by the hand of nature, and we delude ourselves with the thought that the trajectory of our lives is traced by our will.

Spinoza goes on to deny any validity to the ethical categories. The judgment, "I ought to do Y," is meaningless, for I will do what I will do. Spinoza is the mouthpiece of rationalism, and his views are echoed by science with its insistence that every event is determined by its antecedents. (At least, this is the standpoint of classical science.) Now rationalism, philosophical or scientific, may be a correct doctrine, but it must not be allowed to close the door at the very outset to the implications of ethical judgments. The principle that everything is determined, that what has happened has happened necessarily, that what has not happened is impossible, that, in short, there is no real possibility—all this, as is obvious from its very generality, is not an inference from experience, but an anticipation of experience. It belongs to the class of judgments which we have called primary. While we may grant the rationalistic contention that freedom is a postulate, we will insist that necessity is a postulate too. And if so, there is no justification for demanding that the postulate of freedom be

² *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. II, *Scholium*.

rejected because it does not conform to the postulate of necessity. We may recall that Kant asserted the opposite of Spinoza's contention; whereas Spinoza assumed that the rationalistic postulate is prior and then proceeded to test the ethical judgments by reference to it, Kant maintained that the moral categories are prior and so concluded that the categories of the intellect are applicable to phenomena alone, relative to the knowing subject and devoid of ontological validity. In short, if you propose to treat postulates as premises, you may just as well start with the ethical as with the rationalistic postulates.

The problem may be formulated as follows. There are two regions of common sense: one is that of rationalism and science, concerned primarily with objects, to be designated hereafter as the province of theoretical reason; the other region is that of practical common sense, concerned with subjects, persons, their relations and their actions, designated hereafter as the province of practical reason. Each of these provinces alike consists of two levels, one that of experience and the other that of postulation. We will say that the two levels—experiential and postulational—in each field respectively, constitute the set of beliefs in that province. The beliefs of practical reason embrace the experience of freedom, and the postulates of blame, praise, responsibility, and the ought. The beliefs of theoretical reason include the observation of phenomena along with the postulates of determinism, of laws of nature, and other postulates which we need not mention in this connection. It is worthy of note that both regions include a factor of postulation—a group of primary judgments and fundamental conceptions by which to interpret their respective classes of data. No doubt, too, there is an interplay between the two regions and between the two levels in each region. Postulates define experience, and experience modifies postulates.

Common sense, both in its primitive and in its enlightened form, is complex; it consists of a multiplicity of regions, scientific, theoretical, practical, religious, esthetic. Also, common sense undergoes development, in that each region individually changes and, further, in that the relation of the regions to one another is altered. Thus, at different times, one or another

region acquires domination over the rest. There are currents and fashions in the history of thought. At certain epochs, especially during the Middle Ages, the religious tradition was supreme over the other traditions; our present epoch is characterized by the supremacy of the scientific mentality. We are likely to test all the rest of our beliefs by their conformity with scientific belief; in short, we treat the former as soft data, while relatively to these, we treat the scientific beliefs as hard data. It is important to realize that this is a fashion; and that it is the duty of the philosopher to rise above fashions, to criticize current dogmatisms, to refuse the claim of a postulate to play the role of a premise, and to consider common sense in its totality.

The scientist demands universality; he regards as data relevant to the construction of theories only those sense impressions which are accessible to all minds under specifiable and controllable conditions; thus, he excludes dreams and castles in the air from his purview. He defines the real as the class of experiences which are intersubjective. The scientist demands clarity, holding that only those concepts have meaning which have denotation in "real" experience, or perhaps which can be described operationally. With respect to theories, the scientist demands predictiveness regarding the future, explanatoriness of the given, and simplicity (more picturesquely known as Occam's razor). These demands of universality, clarity, predictiveness, and simplicity are no more than rules of scientific procedure, rules adopted for the sake of results, valid with respect to certain ends and utilities and therefore arbitrary from any ultimate point of view. Since these rules are valid only within the boundaries of their ends, they cannot be set up as criteria for regions of common sense in which these ends do not apply. When the scientist rejects the notions and judgments of the moralist, when he argues that the experience of freedom must be regarded as an illusion because—so he says—all events are determined, or when he rejects the notion of free choice because it makes prediction of human conduct impossible, when he treats the ought as a confused idea because, in its assumption of real possibility, it is inconsistent with the law of causal-

ity, he is unwarrantably treating the principle of determinism as an immanent law of nature, and confusing a demand with a fact. In brief, he is converting a prescription into a description.

We may be told that the demand of determinism is a need of our nature; that, in fact, we cannot help asking for a cause of whatever happens. But so is the attitude of holding persons responsible for their acts a need of our nature; we cannot help praising and blaming choices. Moreover, the ought is an ingredient in all assertion, theoretical as well as practical. Truth is what we ought to believe. Believing is a human activity; all cognition, in a sense, is part of the province of ethics. To invalidate the ought is to invalidate the process of theoretical reason, and thus to invalidate the reasons urged against the ought.

It appears then that the appeal to what is supposed to be our nature does not help solve our problem. I conclude that we should take a naïve attitude toward the beliefs of practical reason. If it be a fact that they disagree with those of theoretical reason, they are nonetheless part of common sense. At the outset, they must be treated as data, in the same way as the beliefs of theoretical reason. If the two sets of beliefs contradict each other, obviously they cannot both be true. But the way to remove the contradiction is not by rejecting the practical beliefs out of hand, for then we would be unwarrantably assuming that theoretical judgments are "true" and valid in some absolute sense, independently of the ends to which they are relative. And although we should be naïve at the outset, we should not remain so. In our capacity as philosophers, we should throw both theoretical and practical beliefs into the melting-pot, taking neither as dogmas and treating all as soft data. In the meanwhile, our immediate task is to formulate as explicitly as we can the implications of practical belief.

IV

Self-determination. We will now consider attempts to provide for freedom within the framework of theoretical reason, i.e., on the assumption that all events are determined.

a. One line of argument proceeds by opposing determinism

to fatalism. A man is fated if his nature or desires count in no way in the production of his actions; but he is free in so far as they do count. I am responsible for my actions because in the chain of causes my desires are a link. G. E. Moore maintains that the consciousness of freedom is the awareness that I would have acted otherwise had I chosen otherwise; in short, that my action is the outcome of my choice.³ This view establishes a contrast between external and internal necessitation, denying the first while asserting the second.

What then of my desire; could I have helped desiring as I did? What then of my choice; could I have chosen otherwise? On this view, so far as I can see, I could not. My desire and my choice are links in the chain preceded by other links; they are themselves determined products of heredity and environment. I do not regard this objection as relevant. On the one hand, it is possible that I should be free in my choices while I am part of nature; on the other—and this is the important point—it is possible that I should lack freedom even though my choices are wholly determined by myself, remotely as well as proximately. The issue is not between external and internal determination, but between determination itself and its absence. Our point will become clearer when we consider Spinoza's doctrine of self-determination—a doctrine in which the question of the external derivation of choice does not arise.

b. Spinoza maintains that I am free in so far as I am *wholly* self-determined—that is to say, my act is the outcome of my nature, and my nature is the outcome of nothing outside myself. Thus, the totality of assignable causes—proximate or remote—of the act is located entirely within the self. God is free because his acts are determined by his nature and by nothing else; for there is nothing outside God. So is man free when he realizes his identity with God. Inasmuch as the notion of man's identity with God is difficult to grasp, we may shift our ground and ask whether Spinoza's God is free, and whether man, were he like Spinoza's God, would be free. Now, Spinoza's God is not externally determined; nevertheless it is true that he is determined by his nature. Given his essence, his actions are

³ *Ethics*, pp. 28-31; see also Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 205.

necessary; and the same would be true of man's actions were man like God. It follows that in Spinoza's view there is no real possibility, that the ought is meaningless, that praise and blame are invalid. In fact, Spinoza maintains that the categories of ethics are confused ideas. And this is precisely our point—that the notion of self-determination is incompatible with the implications of our practical beliefs. To conclude, the contrast between fatalism and determinism is irrelevant; it is not external determination that makes the difficulty, but the fact of any determination, internal or external. So long as God and man must do what they will do, they are not blameworthy or praiseworthy, they are not free.

V

The Supremacy of Reason over Appetite. In this section I will investigate still another variant of the doctrine of self-determinism—namely, one in which the act is explained by reference not to appetite but to reason in man. This is the teleological—as opposed to the mechanistic—account of human conduct. Thinkers like Hume and John Stuart Mill have described human action in terms analogous to those of physical action. When man deliberates between several alternatives, he is impelled by a number of different motives. Each motive has a certain force; and the outcome of deliberation is, so to speak, a resultant of the composition of forces, in which the most powerful of the motives, or of a group of motives, determines what the action will be. Contrasted with the above we have the views of the thinkers like Plato or Kant who deny that action is determined in a mechanical way. Man acts for a reason, not from a cause; he acts from purposes, not from desires; he acts owing to the persuasiveness of ideals, not through the compulsion of appetite. Thus man is free, because he is exempt from mechanical determination. My answer will be that finalism, no less than mechanism, is a doctrine in which the action is necessary and according to which therefore man is not free. I will consider the views of Plato in more detail, ignoring, for the purposes of our analysis, the differences, if such exist, between the ideas of Plato and those of Socrates.

Plato holds that virtue is knowledge; that is to say, that if we know the good we will do it. Appetites impel man in various directions but he acts from what he believes to be good. For all men always love the good, and no one is wicked voluntarily. It is true that men often act wickedly, but the reason is that they have misconceived the nature of the good. They desired to do the right; they have, in fact, done the wrong thing because they took the wrong to be right. The task of the moralist is to establish a harmony between man's knowledge and his love of the good—in short, to enlighten him as to the real nature of the good.

I submit that necessitation by reason is no less determination than necessitation by appetite. On Plato's view, to know is to do; you cannot act contrary to your reason. Moreover, man cannot go wrong (or, at least, wish the wrong) because all men seek the good, and cannot help seeking it. No man can really *be* wicked. But moral freedom is the ability to do the wrong equally with the right; choice is the choice between good and evil. In terms of Christian doctrine, man's freedom consists in the fact that he may obey or disobey the will of God; otherwise, sin would be a meaningless term. Yet, on Plato's doctrine, man cannot consciously choose evil.

Thus, it is not enough to hold that choice is *for* a reason, or according to a purpose; there must also be choice *of* purpose, if man is to be free. The difference between the conception of the self as cognizing and seeking values, on the one hand, and that of the self as an aggregate of interacting motives, on the other, is not a relevant difference. Freedom is freedom to reject values and ideals, as well as to rise above motives.

Kant's position is essentially not different from Plato's. There is appetite, and there is reason in man. Reason recognizes the moral law and respects it; appetite aims at pleasure. Yet, in fact, moral choice is a choice between reason and appetite. By identifying the self with reason, both Plato and Kant make freedom impossible, no less than Hume and John Stuart Mill do, who identify the self with appetite. To repeat—the situation of ethical choice is one in which the agent decides whether to follow reason or desire. Such a situation can obtain

only when there exists a self that is independent of both reason and desire, deciding as to the relative claims of each. In genuinely practical action, reason and desire are not agents but data for the self which is acting. The notion of freedom drives us to a construction of human nature in which the self is distinguished on the one hand from reason, and on the other from appetite. Plato and Kant reduce the self to its data, leaving no place for an *agent* of choice.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of self-determination in all its variants fails to supply the requisite of real possibility. The merit of the doctrine of indeterminism lies precisely in the fact that it tries to make a place for real possibility; it has the demerit, however, of ignoring the other of the two requisites, namely, agency.

V I

Indeterminism. One might have supposed that asses could play no part in the development of culture; yet there are two asses which occupy prominent roles in the history of thought. One is Balaam's ass, the other is Buridan's ass; Balaam's ass is noted for its independence of spirit, Buridan's ass for its abjectness of spirit. It is with Buridan's ass that we are now concerned. The story is familiar. Buridan's ass, being extremely hungry, was given food by its keeper, in the form of two bags of oats, one of which was placed on its right and the other on its left, both bags being placed at equal distances from the ass. Now since, furthermore, the two bags were exactly alike, both containing the same amount and quality of oats, the ass had no reason to choose the one bag rather than the other. The ass, then, was unable to make up its mind and though ravenous with hunger, failed to eat at all. In the midst of plenty, it starved to death. For sheer dramatic intensity, this story is paralleled only by the myth of Achilles and the tortoise, in our philosophical literature. The tragedy of Buridan's ass conforms to most of the Aristotelian canons, especially to that concerning the unity of action or—might we say—*inaction*. It evokes the emotion of pity and purges us of it; but—and here is the point—it does not evoke the emotion of terror. The flaw

in the ass to which the tragic outcome is directly traceable consists in the fact that the ass was without freedom of choice; and men are exempt from this flaw. Buridan's ass was unable to decide because the alternatives before it were equal in force. Inasmuch as human beings do not starve in the midst of plenty, it must be the case that they can act arbitrarily, without reference to reasons, and therefore freely.

What was the response of the philosophers to the story? Spinoza ungraciously suggested that anyone who took Buridan's ass seriously was an ass himself. But we know that Spinoza, who was a disciple of Descartes, lacked a due appreciation of the animal kingdom.⁴ Leibnitz replied that the story is not true to fact, for no two alternatives can ever be completely similar. Did Leibnitz mean to imply that the two bags of oats were not equidistant from the ass's center of gravity? If so, he failed to show a proper regard for the perfect spatial pattern—that unity of place which is one of the glories of this drama. But it is time that we considered the doctrine of indeterminism apart from any symbolism.

There are several variants of indeterminism of which perhaps the best known is the one set forth by William James in his essay called "The Dilemma of Determinism." All the variants agree in the view that the effect is independent of the supposed cause or causes, and they ensure that given the cause, whether as located in the person acting or in the entire universe, the direction chosen is not necessary. Indeterminism attempts to make a place for human freedom by introducing contingency, or chance, into the order of things. The past circumscribes choice but does not determine it. Bergson (who for our purposes may be taken as an indeterminist) describes nature as a creative process issuing into novelty, such that the future cannot be predicted from the past. Bergson eschews finalism as well as mechanism, maintaining that a pull from ahead would be no less determining than a push from behind. Nevertheless, he holds that his view of process can be made compatible with the scientific account which holds that nature is ordered by the law of cause and effect, provided a distinction

⁴ *Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. XXXVII, n. 1.

is made between things in the making and things as made. Process, *while it is transpiring*, is creative; but considered *ex post facto* can be construed deterministically. Whereas Bergson does not think that there is a fundamental difference between human action and the behavior of nature at large in this respect (though this point is not wholly clear), other thinkers limit indeterminism to the sphere of human choice and construe indeterminism, more specifically, as self-creation, in the sense that the self is both cause and effect. Against this view—and to some extent against Bergson's—two points may be made.

a. Although as will be seen from the later paragraphs, I have a good deal of sympathy with this view, I disapprove of the way it is formulated. How can an entity cause itself? If, on the one hand, it is there as a cause, it already exists, and therefore is not a cause of its existence. If, on the other, it is a cause, it does not exist; but how can what is not be a cause? Now, if the view under criticism be modified or amplified to mean not that the self is creative of itself, but that the self causes acts which are novel, such that they are not *contained* in the cause, new objections arise. It is not part of determinism to assert that the effect is contained in its cause; a proposition asserting a relation of cause to effect probably is a synthetic proposition. In short, the modification proposed would in no way help to distinguish the doctrine of self-creation from that of determinism.

b. It is hard to see how the view which distinguishes between the account of things *ex post facto* and that of things in the making can stand. We are told that, once having come about, events can be described as determined; but considered in the making, events are not determined. We are asked to believe, in other words, that two contradictory accounts of the *same* process are both true, if the process is described at different times. Surely, if a proposition is true of an event S at moment T_1 , it is also true of S at T_2 .

c. The main criticism of indeterminism is that it fails to fulfill its professed aim, which is to validate practical judgments. Take the judgment that A is responsible for his action Y. In order to establish real possibility, indeterminism destroys

the bond between the agent and the act; the act just happens; yet what we want is the ability to say, "He did it." Undetermined conduct is irresponsible conduct; we are given arbitrariness when we would have causal activity. Indeterminism solves the problem so drastically that human agency is denied. If the act is unconnected with the agent, it is impossible to praise or blame him *for* his act. Acts are events floating in a vacuum. As Hume pointed out, the object of anger is a person; when wicked action excites anger, it is so only by its relation to the person.

But according to the doctrine of . . . chance, this connection is reduced to nothing. . . . The action itself may be blamable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion; but the person is not responsible for it. . . . According to the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crimes, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his action, . . . and the wickedness of one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.⁵

The hypothesis of chance is altogether too negative to be useful; it denies causation of the act by the agent and thus rejects responsibility as well. Hume concludes that "it is only upon the principles of necessity that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary."⁶

But we have seen that the way back to determinism would not be a way out. While indeterminism would lead to a denial of human responsibility, determinism excludes real possibility. There is a real dilemma: to assert determinism is to deny freedom; to assert its opposite is to deny freedom too. It may well be the case—as Kant suggested—that freedom is a fact which we must assert but which we cannot understand—that, in other words, freedom is a mystery. What I hope chiefly to prove to the reader of this essay is the extreme complexity of this problem and the inadequacy of the traditional theories. And it

⁵ *Treatise*, Part III, sec. II.

⁶ *Treatise*, Part III, sec. II.

may be that no solution can be found. The easiest way out would be to deny that the problem exists—to throw the notion of freedom out of the window and to conclude, with Spinoza, that practical judgments are inadequate and confused. We have already considered this alternative and ruled it out. Shall we then say that there is no rational formula which could adequately express the experience of choice and validate practical judgments? I, for one, would not rule out the notion of mystery, merely on principle. It is possible that there are data of experience which elude conceptual formulation. But before committing ourselves to such a view, it would seem wise to explore the situation further in the hope of discovering a formula which will prove satisfactory. What then are the factors which any definition of freedom should take into account?

We should be able to say that human beings are responsible for their actions; this being so, the theory of chance is ruled out. But if man is a cause from which the act necessarily follows, real possibility is excluded. Therefore, the theory of causality as strict implication is ruled out. It is necessary to have a cause for the act, but it should not be in fact necessary that the cause eventuate in the particular effect. The trouble with determinism is that, according to the theory, the cause is in some sense determined by the effect. Putting the matter crudely, the cause *has to have* its effect; or, putting it formally, the cause entails its effect. To account for practical beliefs, we must have recourse to a type of cause from which the effect does not follow necessarily. We therefore propose to resurrect the notion of *power* which Hume had buried.

VII

Power. The current theory of causality⁷ is that of a functional relation between entities or events, such that if it be a fact that A has caused Y, it is true that in all cases A implies Y. Our notion of power differs from the above in the following respects:

a. Causality is an individual relation between individual en-

⁷ Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-208.

titles.⁸ Generality of the relation would be an additional inference, whenever the facts justify it; but generality is not a component of power.

b. Power means more than the mere fact that two events, contiguous or not, succeed each other. Power is *causal efficacy*, activity, production. The stone's impact on the window is the cause of the window's breaking, in the sense that the stone acted on the window and broke it. Hume notwithstanding, I do observe (subject to the usual reservations concerning the chances of error in any observation) that A pushed Y, or that my belief in proposition C led me to believe proposition D. The cause operates and produces the effect.

c. Power is a causal relation whereby the cause does not entail the effect which, in fact, it has caused; given the cause, a number of effects are possible. I exercise power over my conduct in the sense that I am free to act in any number of ways, or even not to act at all; this particular action which I have chosen is not necessary to me. We must note that point *c* is additional to point *a*. For, supposing we described the individual cause in all of its generic and all of its specific and unique characteristics, and supposing we described the effect in the same fashion, it would still be open to anyone to maintain that the uniquely determined cause entails the uniquely determined effect. And indeed so long as we are in the realm of essence, generic or specific, so long rather as we define the individual through its essence, we are committed to the doctrine of entailment. Power, then, is causality without entailment, and is exercised by an individual directly, not in terms of his essence.

But does causality without entailment make sense? Or if it does, how does it differ from the notion of chance set forth by the proponents of indeterminism? If the particular effect be not necessary, given the cause, then the event is a chance result. In other words, may not the doctrine of power be the doctrine of indeterminism under another name? Let us see.

⁸ See C. Ducasse for a similar view, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII (1926), pp. 57-68. Ducasse, however, maintains that the cause in all cases is an *event* or a change.

Power is production; while the cause need not have produced the effect, it did in fact produce it. Power is just this ability to produce a given effect without having to do so. The concrete fact of experience is complex: it involves both activity and genuine possibility. Traditional theories abstract from this concrete fact, indeterminism omitting the first ingredient, and determinism the second. Let us now consider what the doctrine of power means in terms of human experience.

Supposing that I have failed to perform the task which was assigned to me, you, then, blame me for my failure, urging that the failure was the outcome of a free choice. No—I reply—I failed to do the job because I am lazy; laziness is my nature. You insist, thereupon (following Aristotle), that laziness is a habit which I have formed through the kind of life I have led, the kind of choices I have freely made. Granted—I retort; but why did I behave in the way which resulted in my becoming lazy? It is because I am self-indulgent by nature.

The argument forces us to the view that my action was determined by my nature. What the argument really brings out is that unless we differentiate the self from its nature, there is no alternative to a deterministic account of human action. If the self is constituted by its nature, if substance be essence, then human choice is determined. Conversely, the self is free in the sense that it is not constituted by its nature. We must therefore eliminate Aristotle's formal cause. Aristotle defines substance as essence; we reject the definition. Essence is something that comes to be or passes away in a substance; I make or become my essence. Thus, the self is not necessarily determinate. I failed to perform my task because it is my nature to be lazy or self-indulgent; yes, but I am responsible for my nature no less than for my acts. Now, entailment is a relation among essences; *the self is a cause that does not entail its acts, because the self is not an essence—because the self causes its essence*. And that is power: the ability of the self to modify its nature. Thus, we have returned by another route to the conclusions of section V. The self is other than its nature, whether rational or appetitive; and the decision of the self is ultimately the decision to be or not to be rational. We are free

with reference to our respective natures. It is true that for the most part we act *from* our natures; but there are crises, emergencies, moments of great resolution, when a man stands apart from his character, criticizes it, and modifies his values. Laziness, self-indulgence, perseverance, temperateness—all such attitudes are freely chosen even from infancy.

To recapitulate: the notion of power involves the following elements. As to the cause: (*a*) The cause need not be an event; it may be a particular entity—namely, the self. (*b*) The cause is a substance in the sense of something which is distinct from its properties. As to the effect: (*c*) The self determines not only its acts but its properties as well; in short, its essence. As to the causal relation: (*d*) Power is a particular relation between an individual cause and an individual effect. (*e*) The cause does not entail the effect but produces it. Thus power is causality without generality and without entailment; it is exercised by a cause which is neither a change, since it is a substance underlying the change; nor a determinate form, since the substance determines its form.

A cause is a substance; the causal relation is not between essence and essence, and therefore may not be described formally. It is a relation between substance and substance directly. Self-causation is the relation by which a substance determines its own essence. In sum, causation is an actual concrete operation, not a formal or logical relation.

VIII

Theoretical and Practical Reason. We have maintained that human beings are free; we have not said, however, that there is freedom in nature or in God. It is not the intention of this essay to extend the notion of power outside the province of human choice. Now, assuming that we have solved the dilemma of determinism versus indeterminism, we still have on our hands the dilemma arising from the conflict between the beliefs of practical reason and those of theoretical reason. But before we take up this point, are we not confronted by a difficulty arising from the facts of observation itself? For instance, Hume con-

trasts the results of introspection with those of general observation as follows:

We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even when he cannot, he concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.⁹

We have in the above sentence an argument from experience, and an argument from a presumption. We will begin with the first of the two.

We have definite expectations about the conduct of our fellow-men, which are in fact confirmed. How could society operate as a going concern, unless human conduct were regular and predictable? The very fact that we punish and reward people indicates that their conduct and their character are determinately effects of causes. Now, we may admit that people have stable characters, which enable the spectator to predict their conduct; and that actions are controllable by external factors; we may admit all this, I say, without abandoning the view that human beings are free. A punishment operates on an individual so as to modify his conduct, because the individual chooses to avoid pain in the future, rather than persist in the same course of conduct and suffer unpleasant consequences. Also, the spectator is able to predict my conduct from a character which I have freely adopted. Characters are *always* habits. Freedom of choice does not imply, as Bergson thinks it does, novelty of action from moment to moment. It may still be argued, however, that under the hypothesis in question, it is open to the self to alter its character, and then expectations would be falsified. Well, are they not sometimes falsified?

Should we now be told that this view is untenable because all events are necessary, given the conditions, it will be obvious that the argument has shifted from the ground of observation to that of postulation. We are faced with the alleged pre-

⁹ *Op. cit.*, Part III, sec. II.

sumption of theoretical reason that—to repeat Hume's phrase—"were he [the spectator] acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition" he would be able to infer our actions. That this is a presumption cannot be gainsaid; it is the presumption that every event is necessarily determined by reference to a cause. What does this mean? That given the cause, no other effect was possible. But inasmuch as the relation of cause to effect is synthetic, as the effect is not analytically contained in the cause, how can anyone assert that no other effect was possible? The scientist simply observes that event Y has been produced by cause A; and if, further, he observes a similar connection at other times, he proceeds to infer that in all cases where A occurs, Y will (probably) occur. In short, all that the scientist can validly assert is predictability, but not necessity.

Now, there is no incompatibility between our definition of freedom and the conception of the predictability of events, provided that we make certain qualifications of the latter. Scientific laws, we will say, express statistical averages, enabling us to infer concerning a given individual that, in view of his character, he will probably behave in a certain way. The laws concerning human conduct will roughly take the following form: men of such and such a description, situated in such and such circumstances, can be safely expected to act in such and such a way. Now, although man's passions, reasons, and circumstances do not necessitate his actions, they do in fact incite the self to move in a particular direction. And human beings do, on the average, choose the path indicated by ideals or passions. In sum, the beliefs of practical reason can be harmonized with the presumptions of theoretical reason provided (*a*) the latter are stated so as to involve probable prediction, and (*b*) provided the former are not stated so as to exclude statistical uniformity. If, finally, we are asked, What does it mean to say that acts are free, so far as experience is concerned, when we have agreed that they are predictable? we would reply that the proposition that human conduct is free has meaning in relation to our introspective experience of choice.

IX

No philosophy is sound which takes into account only one portion of our primitive beliefs as they are embodied in common sense; no philosophy is adequate which—because it has already confined itself to one set of particular rules—excludes large portions of experience. There is a tendency at any epoch, for one or another group of primitive beliefs to take the upper hand and legislate on all the others. Philosophy is the eternal watchdog guarding man against the *hubris* of the intellect. When the mind is confronted with a variety of empirical data, not all equally amenable to the same set of rules, it is easy enough to develop a consistent theory by ignoring those elements which don't fit, or by defining them as illusory. It is the method of explaining by explaining away; and it is the line of least resistance. Philosophy is the unprejudiced insight into crude fact—fact unpolished by theory, fact not as yet brought under a rule. Thus philosophy does not so much build upon the various intellectual disciplines; rather, it undoes their work. Philosophy is the return to pure experience, away from the constructions of it engendered by the application of rules to immediacy. In our age, the rules and conceptual scheme of science have been so effective that they have tended to harden into dogmas. We are apt to regard without question as unreal any experience which does not conform to the conceptual framework of science; and as invalid all rules different from its own. Yet the experience of choice is there demanding recognition—to be naturalized rather than deported; and the judgments of practical reason are bound up with our life in all its phases, not to be brushed aside simply because they appear to be inconsistent with the judgments of theoretical reason. Our practical beliefs enter into our practice; and a philosophy which refuses to impute validity to them lays itself open to the charge of insincerity.

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FREEDOM AND OBLIGATION

THE remembrance of forbidden fruit is the earliest thing in the memory of each of us, as it is in that of mankind. We should notice this, were not this recollection overlaid by others which we are more inclined to dwell upon. What a childhood we should have had if only we had been left to do as we pleased! We should have flitted from pleasure to pleasure. But all of a sudden an obstacle arose, neither visible nor tangible: a prohibition. Why did we obey? The question hardly occurred to us. We had formed the habit of deferring to our parents and teachers. All the same we knew very well that it was because they were our parents, because they were our teachers. Therefore, in our eyes, their authority came less from themselves than from their status in relation to us. They occupied a certain station; that was the source of the command which, had it issued from some other quarter, would not have possessed the same weight. In other words, parents and teachers seemed to act by proxy. We did not fully realize this, but behind our parents and our teachers we had an inkling of some enormous, or rather some shadowy, thing that exerted pressure on us through them. Later we would say it was society. And speculating upon it, we should compare it to an organism whose cells, united by imperceptible links, fall into their respective places in a highly developed hierarchy, and for the greatest good of the whole naturally submit to a discipline that may demand the sacrifice of the

part. This, however, can only be a comparison, for an organism subject to inexorable laws is one thing, and a society composed of free wills another. But once these wills are organized, they assume the guise of an organism; and in this more or less artificial organism habit plays the same role as necessity in the works of nature. From this first standpoint, social life appears to us a system of more or less deeply rooted habits, corresponding to the needs of the community. Some of them are habits of command, most of them are habits of obedience, whether we obey a person commanding by virtue of a mandate from society, or whether from society itself, vaguely perceived or felt, there emanates an impersonal imperative. Each of these habits of obedience exerts a pressure on our will. We can evade it, but then we are attracted towards it, drawn back to it, like a pendulum which has swung away from the vertical. A certain order of things has been upset, it *must be* restored. In a word, as with all habits, we feel a sense of obligation.

But in this case the obligation is immeasurably stronger. When a certain magnitude is so much greater than another that the latter is negligible in comparison, mathematicians say that it belongs to another order. So it is with social obligation. The pressure of it, compared to that of other habits, is such that the difference in degree amounts to a difference in kind. It should be noted that all habits of this nature lend one another mutual support. Although we may not speculate on their essence and on their origin, we feel that they are interrelated, being demanded of us by our immediate surroundings, or by the surroundings of those surroundings, and so on to the uttermost limit, which would be society. Each one corresponds, directly or indirectly, to a social necessity; and so they all hang together, they form a solid block. Many of them would be trivial obligations if they appeared singly. But they are an integral part of obligation in general, and this whole, which is what it is owing to the contributions of its parts, in its turn confers upon each one the undivided authority of the totality. Thus the sum total comes to the aid of each of its parts, and the general sentence "do what duty bids" triumphs over the hesitations we might feel in the presence of a single duty. As

a matter of fact, we do not explicitly think of a mass of partial duties added together and constituting a single total obligation. Perhaps there is really not an aggregation of parts. The strength which one obligation derives from all the others is rather to be compared to the breath of life drawn, complete and indivisible, by each of the cells from the depths of the organism of which it is an element. Society, present within each of its members, has claims which, whether great or small, each express the sum-total of its vitality. But let us again repeat that this is only a comparison. A human community is a collectivity of free beings. The obligations which it lays down, and which enable it to subsist, introduce into it a regularity which has merely some analogy to the inflexible order of the phenomena of life.

And yet everything conspires to make us believe that this regularity is comparable with that of nature. I do not allude merely to the unanimity of mankind in praising certain acts and blaming others. I mean that, even in those cases where moral precepts implied in judgments of values are not observed, we contrive that they should appear so. Just as we do not notice disease when walking along the street, so we do not gauge the degree of possible immorality behind the exterior which humanity presents to the world. It would take a good deal of time to become a misanthrope if we confined ourselves to the observation of others. It is when we detect our own weaknesses that we come to pity or despise mankind. The human nature from which we then turn away is the human nature we have discovered in the depths of our own being. The evil is so well screened, the secret so universally kept, that in this case each individual is the dupe of all: however severely we may profess to judge other men, at bottom we think them better than ourselves. On this happy illusion much of our social life is grounded.

It is natural that society should do everything to encourage this idea. The laws which it promulgates and which maintain the social order resemble, moreover, in certain aspects, the laws of nature. I admit that the difference is a radical one in the eyes of the philosopher. To him the law which enunciates

facts is one thing, the law which commands, another. It is possible to evade the latter; here we have obligation, not necessity. The former is, on the contrary, unescapable, for if any fact diverged from it we should be wrong in having assumed it to be a law; there would exist another one, the true one, formulated in such a way as to express everything we observe and to which the recalcitrant fact would then conform like the rest. True enough; but to the majority of people the distinction is far from being so clear. A law, be it physical, social, or moral—every law—is in their eyes a command. There is a certain order of nature which finds expression in laws: the facts are presumed to “obey” these laws so as to conform with that order. The scientist himself can hardly help believing that the law “governs” facts and consequently is prior to them, like the Platonic Idea on which all things had to model themselves. The higher he rises in the scale of generalizations the more he tends, willy-nilly, to endow the law with this imperative character; it requires a very real struggle against our own prepossessions to imagine the principles of mechanics otherwise than as inscribed from all eternity on the transcendent tables that modern science has apparently fetched down from another Sinai. But if physical law tends to assume in our imagination the form of a command when it attains to a certain degree of generality, in its turn an imperative which applies to everybody appears to us somewhat like a law of nature. The two ideas, coming against each other in our minds, effect an exchange. The law borrows from the command its prerogative of compulsion; the command receives from the law its inevitability. Thus a breach of the social order assumes an antinatural character; even when frequently repeated, it strikes us as an exception, being to society what a freak creation is to nature.

And suppose we discern behind the social imperative a religious command? No matter the relation between the two terms: whether religion be interpreted in one way or another, whether it be social in essence or by accident, one thing is certain, that it has always played a social role. This part, indeed, is a complex one: it varies with time and place; but in societies such as our own the first effect of religion is to sustain and

reinforce the claims of society. It may go much further. It goes at least thus far. Society institutes punishments which may strike the innocent and spare the guilty; its rewards are few and far between; it takes broad views and is easily satisfied; what human scales could weigh, as they should be weighed, rewards and punishments? But, just as the Platonic Ideas reveal to us, in its perfection and fullness, that reality which we see only in crude imitations, so religion admits us to a city whose most prominent features are here and there roughly typified by our institutions, our laws, and our customs. Here below, order is merely approximate, being more or less artificially obtained by man; above, it is perfect and self-creative. Religion therefore, in our eyes, succeeds in filling in the gap, already narrowed by our habitual way of looking at things, between a command of society and a law of nature.

We are thus being perpetually brought back to the same comparison, defective though it be in many ways, yet appropriate enough to the point with which we are dealing. The members of a civic community hold together like the cells of an organism. Habit, served by intelligence and imagination, introduces among them a discipline resembling, in the interdependence it establishes between separate individuals, the unity of an organism of anastomotic cells.

Everything, yet again, conspires to make social order an imitation of the order observed in nature. It is evident that each of us, thinking of himself alone, feels at liberty to follow his bent, his desire, or his fancy, and not consider his fellow-men. But this inclination has no sooner taken shape than it comes up against a force composed of the accumulation of all social forces; unlike individual motives, each pulling its own way, this force would result in an order not without analogy to that of natural phenomena. The component cell of an organism, on becoming momentarily conscious, would barely have outlived the wish to emancipate itself when it would be recaptured by necessity. An individual forming part of a community may bend or even break a necessity of the same kind, which to some extent he has helped to create, but to which, still more, he has to yield; the sense of this necessity, together with the con-

sciousness of being able to evade it, is none the less what he calls an obligation. From this point of view, and taken in its most usual meaning, obligation is to necessity what habit is to nature.

It does not come then exactly from without. Each of us belongs as much to society as to himself. While his consciousness, delving downwards, reveals to him, the deeper he goes, an ever more original personality, incommensurable with the others and indeed undefinable in words, on the surface of life we are in continuous contact with other men whom we resemble, and united to them by a discipline which creates between them and us a relation of interdependence. Has the self no other means of clinging to something solid than by taking up its position in that part of us which is socialized? That would be so if there were no other way of escape from a life of impulse, caprice, and regret. But in our innermost selves, if we know how to look for it, we may perhaps discover another sort of equilibrium, still more desirable than the one on the surface. Certain aquatic plants as they rise to the surface are ceaselessly jostled by the current: their leaves, meeting above the water, interlace, thus imparting to them stability above. But still more stable are the roots, which, firmly planted in the earth, support them from below. However, we shall not dwell for the present on the effort to delve down to the depths of our being. If possible at all, it is exceptional; and it is on the surface, at the point where it inserts itself into the close-woven tissue of other exteriorized personalities, that our ego generally finds its point of attachment; its solidity lies in this solidarity. But, at the point where it is attached, it is itself socialized. Obligation, which we look upon as a bond between men, first binds us to ourselves.

It would therefore be a mistake to reproach a purely social morality with neglecting individual duties. Even if we were only in theory under a state of obligation towards other men, we should be so in fact towards ourselves, since social solidarity exists only in so far as a social ego is superadded, in each of us, to the individual self. To cultivate this social ego is the essence of our obligation to society. Were there not some

part of society in us, it would have no hold on us; and we scarcely need seek it out, we are self-sufficient, if we find it present within us. Its presence is more or less marked in different men; but no one could cut himself off from it completely. Nor would he wish to do so, for he is perfectly aware that the greater part of his strength comes from this source, and that he owes to the ever recurring demands of social life that unbroken tension of energy, that steadiness of aim in effort, which ensures the greatest return for his activity. But he could not do so, even if he wished to, because his memory and his imagination live on what society has implanted in them, because the soul of society is inherent in the language he speaks, and because even if there is no one present, even if he is merely thinking, he is still talking to himself. Vainly do we try to imagine an individual cut off from all social life. Even materially, Robinson Crusoe on his island remains in contact with other men, for the manufactured objects he saved from the wreck, and without which he could not get along, keep him within the bounds of civilization, and consequently within those of society. But a moral contact is still more necessary to him, for he would be soon discouraged if he had nothing else to cope with his incessant difficulties except an individual strength of which he knows the limitations. He draws energy from the society to which he remains attached in spirit; he may not perceive it, still it is there, watching him; if the individual ego maintains alive and present the social ego, he will effect, even in isolation, what he would with the encouragement and even the support of the whole of society. Those whom circumstances condemn for a time to solitude, and who cannot find within themselves the resources of a deep inner life, know the penalty of "giving way," that is to say, of not stabilizing the individual ego at the level prescribed by the social ego. They will therefore be careful to maintain the latter, so that it shall not relax for one moment its strictness towards the former. If necessary, they will seek for some material or artificial support for it. You remember Kipling's Forest Officer, alone in his bungalow in the heart of the Indian

rukhs? He dresses every evening for dinner, so as to preserve his self-respect in his isolation.¹

We shall not go so far as to say that this social ego is Adam Smith's "impartial spectator," or that it must necessarily be identified with moral conscience, or that we feel pleased or displeased with ourselves according as it is favorably or unfavorably affected. We shall discover deeper sources for our moral feelings. Language here groups under one name very different things. What is there in common between the remorse of a murderer and that racking, haunting pain, also a remorse, which we may feel at having wounded someone's pride or been unjust to a child? To betray the confidence of an innocent soul opening out to life is one of the most heinous offenses for a certain type of conscience, which is apparently lacking in a sense of proportion, precisely because it does not borrow from society its standards, its gauges, its system of measurement. This type of conscience is not the one that is most often at work. At any rate it is more or less sensitive in different people. Generally the verdict of conscience is the verdict which would be given by the social self.

And also, generally speaking, moral distress is a throwing out of gear of the relations between the social and the individual self. Analyze the feeling of remorse in the soul of a desperate criminal. You might mistake it at first for the dread of punishment, and indeed you find most minute precautions, perpetually supplemented and renewed, to conceal the crime and avoid being found out; at every moment comes the awful thought that some detail has been overlooked and that the authorities will get hold of the telltale clue. But look closer: what the fellow wants is not so much to evade punishment as to wipe out the past, to arrange things just as though the crime had never been committed at all. When nobody knows that a thing exists, it is almost as if it were nonexistent. Thus it is the crime itself that the criminal wants to erase, by suppressing any knowledge of it that might come to the human ken. But his own knowledge persists, and note how it drives him more and more out of that society within which he hoped to remain

¹ "In the Rukhs," in *Many Inventions*.

by obliterating the traces of his crime. For the same esteem for the man he was is still shown to the man he is no longer; therefore society is not addressing him; it is speaking to someone else. He, knowing what he is, feels more isolated among his fellow-men than he would on a desert island; for in his solitude he would carry with him, enveloping him and supporting him, the image of society; but now he is cut off from the image as well as the thing. He could reinstate himself in society by confessing his crime: he would then be treated according to his deserts, but society would then be speaking to his real self. He would resume his collaboration with other men. He would be punished by them, but, having made himself one of them, he would be in a small degree the author of his own condemnation; and a part of himself, the best part, would thus escape the penalty. Such is the force which will drive a criminal to give himself up. Sometimes without going so far he will confess to a friend, or to any decent fellow. By thus putting himself right, if not in the eyes of all, at least in somebody's eyes, he reattaches himself to society at a single point, by a thread; even if he does not reinstate himself in it, at least he is near it, close to it; he no longer remains alienated from it; in any case he is no longer in complete rupture with it, nor with that element of it which is part of himself.

It takes this violent break to reveal clearly the nexus of the individual to society. In the ordinary way we conform to our obligations rather than think of them. If we had every time to evoke the idea, enunciate the formula, it would be much more tiring to do our duty. But habit is enough, and in most cases we have only to leave well enough alone in order to accord to society what it expects from us. Moreover, society has made matters very much easier for us by interpolating intermediaries between itself and us: we have a family; we follow a trade or a profession; we belong to our parish, to our district, to our county; and, in cases where the insertion of the group into society is complete, we may content ourselves, if need be, with fulfilling our obligations towards the group and so paying our debts to society. Society occupies the circumference; the individual is at the center; from the center to the

circumference are arranged, like so many ever widening concentric circles, the various groups to which the individual belongs. From the circumference to the center, as the circles grow smaller, obligations are added to obligations, and the individual ends by finding himself confronted with all of them together. Thus obligation increases as it advances; but, if it is more complicated, it is less abstract, and the more easily accepted. When it has become fully concrete, it coincides with a tendency, so habitual that we find it natural, to play in society the part which our station assigns to us. So long as we yield to this tendency, we scarcely feel it. It assumes a peremptory aspect, like all deep-seated habits, only if we depart from it.

It is society that draws up for the individual the program of his daily routine. It is impossible to live a family life, follow a profession, attend to the thousand and one cares of the day, do one's shopping, go for a stroll, or even stay at home, without obeying rules and submitting to obligations. Every instant we have to choose, and we naturally decide on what is in keeping with the rule. We are hardly conscious of this; there is no effort. A road has been marked out by society; it lies open before us, and we follow it; it would take more initiative to cut across country. Duty, in this sense, is almost always done automatically; and obedience to duty, if we restrict ourselves to the most usual case, might be defined as a form of nonexertion, passive acquiescence. How comes it, then, that on the contrary this obedience appears as a state of strain, and duty itself as something harsh and unbending? Obviously because there occur cases where obedience implies an overcoming of self. These cases are exceptions; but we notice them because they are accompanied by acute consciousness, as happens with all forms of hesitation—in fact consciousness is this hesitation itself; for an action which is started automatically passes almost unperceived. Thus, owing to the interdependence of our duties, and because the obligation as a whole is immanent in each of its parts, all duties are tinged with the hue taken on exceptionally by one or the other of them. From the practical point of view this presents no inconvenience, there are even certain advantages in looking at things in this way. For, however naturally

we do our duty, we may meet with resistance within ourselves; it is wise to expect it and not take for granted that it is easy to remain a good husband, a decent citizen, a conscientious worker, in a word an honest fellow. Besides, there is a considerable amount of truth in this opinion; for if it is relatively easy to keep within the social order, yet we have had to enroll in it, and this enrollment demands an effort. The natural disobedience of the child, the necessity of education, are proof of this. It is but just to credit the individual with the consent virtually given to the totality of his obligations, even if he no longer needs to take counsel with himself on each one of them. The rider need only allow himself to be borne along; still he has had to get into the saddle. So it is with the individual in relation to society. In one sense it would be untrue, and in every sense it would be dangerous, to say that duty can be done automatically. Let us then set up as a practical maxim that obedience to duty means resistance to self.

But a maxim is one thing, an explanation another. When, in order to define obligation, its essence and its origin, we lay down that obedience is primarily a struggle with self, a state of tension or contraction, we make a psychological error which has vitiated many theories of ethics. Thus artificial difficulties have arisen, problems which set philosophers at variance and which will be found to vanish when we analyze the terms in which they are expressed. Obligation is in no sense a unique fact, incommensurate with others, looming above them like a mysterious apparition. If a considerable number of philosophers, especially those who follow Kant, have taken this view, it is because they have confused the sense of obligation, a tranquil state akin to inclination, with the violent effort we now and again exert on ourselves to break down a possible obstacle to obligation.

After an attack of rheumatism, we may feel some discomfort and even pain in moving our muscles and joints. It is the general sensation of a resistance set up by all our organs together. Little by little it decreases and ends by being lost in the consciousness we have of our movements when we are well. Now, we are at liberty to fancy that it is still there, in an in-

ipient, or rather a subsiding, condition, that it is only on the lookout for a chance to become more acute; we must indeed expect attacks of rheumatism if we are rheumatic. Yet what should we say of a philosopher who saw in our habitual sensations, when moving our arms and legs, a mere diminution of pain, and who then defined our motor faculty as an effort to resist rheumatic discomfort? To begin with, he would thus be giving up the attempt to account for motor habits, since each of these implies a particular combination of movements, and can be explained only by that combination. The general faculty of walking, running, moving the body, is but an aggregation of these elementary habits, each of them finding its own explanation in the special movements it involves. But having only considered the faculty as a whole, and having then defined it as a force opposed to a resistance, it is natural enough to set up rheumatism beside it as an independent entity. It would seem as though some such error had been made by many of those who have speculated on obligation. We have any number of particular obligations, each calling for a separate explanation. It is natural, or, more strictly speaking, it is a matter of habit to obey them all. Suppose that exceptionally we deviate from one of them, there would be resistance; if we resist this resistance, a state of tension or contraction is likely to result. It is this rigidity which we objectify when we attribute so stern an aspect to duty.

It is also what the philosophers have in mind, when they see fit to resolve obligation into rational elements. In order to resist resistance, to keep to the right paths, when desire, passion, or interest tempt us aside, we must necessarily give ourselves reasons. Even if we have opposed the unlawful desire by another, the latter, conjured up by the will, could arise only at the call of an idea. In a word, an intelligent being generally exerts his influence on himself through the medium of intelligence. But from the fact that we get back to obligation by rational ways it does not follow that obligation was of a rational order. Let us say that a tendency, natural or acquired, is one thing; another thing the necessarily rational method which a reasonable being will use to restore to it its force and to combat

what is opposing it. In the latter case the tendency which has been obscured may reappear; and then everything doubtless happens as though we had succeeded by this method in re-establishing the tendency anew. In reality we have merely swept aside something that hampered or checked it. It comes to the same thing, I grant you, in practice: explain the fact in one way or another, the fact is there, we have achieved success. And in order to succeed it is perhaps better to imagine that things did happen in the former way. But to state that this is actually the case would be to vitiate the whole theory of obligation. Has not this been the case with most philosophers?

Let there be no misunderstanding. Even if we confine ourselves to a certain aspect of morality, as we have done up to now, we shall find many different attitudes towards duty. They line the intervening space between the extremes of two attitudes, or rather two habits: that of moving so naturally along the ways laid down by society as barely to notice them; or on the contrary hesitating and deliberating on which way to take, how far to go, the distances out and back we shall have to cover if we try several paths one after another. In the second case new problems arise with more or less frequency; and even in those instances where our duty is fully mapped out, we make all sorts of distinctions in fulfilling it. But, in the first place, the former attitude is that of the immense majority of men; it is probably general in backward communities. And, after all, however much we may reason in each particular case, formulate the maxim, enunciate the principle, deduce the consequences, if desire and passion join in the discussion, if temptation is strong, if we are on the point of falling, if suddenly we recover ourselves, what was it that pulled us up? A force asserts itself which we have called the "totality of obligation": the concentrated extract, the quintessence of innumerable specific habits of obedience to the countless particular requirements of social life. This force is no one particular thing and, if it could speak (whereas it prefers to act), it would say: "You must because you must." Hence the work done by intelligence in weighing reasons, comparing maxims, going back to first prin-

ciples, was to introduce more logical consistency into a line of conduct subordinated by its very nature to the claims of society; but this social claim was the real root of obligation. Never, in our hours of temptation, should we sacrifice to the mere need for logical consistency our interest, our passion, our vanity. Because in a reasonable being reason does indeed intervene as a regulator to assure this consistency between obligatory rules or maxims, philosophy has been led to look upon it as a principle of obligation. We might as well believe that the flywheel drives the machinery.

Besides, the demands of a society dovetail into one another. Even the individual whose decent behavior is the least based on reasoning and, if I may put it so, the most conventional, introduces a rational order into his conduct by the mere fact of obeying rules which are logically connected together. I freely admit that such logic has been late in taking possession of society. Logical co-ordination is essentially economy. From a whole it first roughly extracts certain principles and then excludes everything which is not in accordance with them. Nature, by contrast, is lavish. The closer a community is to nature, the greater the proportion of unaccountable and inconsistent rules it lays down. We find in primitive races many prohibitions and prescriptions explicable at most by vague associations of ideas, by superstition, by automatism. Nor are they without their use, since the obedience of everyone to laws, even absurd ones, assures greater cohesion to the community. But in that case the usefulness of the rule accrues, by a kind of reverse action, solely from the fact of our submission to it. Prescriptions or prohibitions which are intrinsically useful are those that are explicitly designed for the preservation or well-being of society. No doubt they have gradually detached themselves from the others and survived them. Social demands have therefore been co-ordinated with each other and subordinated to principles. But no matter. Logic permeates indeed present-day communities, and even the man who does not reason out his conduct will live reasonably if he conforms to these principles.

But the essence of obligation is a different thing from a

requirement of reason. This is all we have tried to suggest. Our description would, we think, correspond more and more to reality as one came to deal with less developed communities and more rudimentary stages of consciousness. It remains a bare outline so long as we confine ourselves to the normal conscience, such as is found today in the ordinary decent person. But precisely because we are in this case dealing with a strange complex of feelings, of ideas and tendencies all interpenetrating each other, we shall avoid artificial analyses and arbitrary syntheses only if we have at hand an outline which gives the essential. Such is the outline we have attempted to trace. Conceive obligation as weighing on the will like a habit, each obligation dragging behind it the accumulated mass of the others, and utilizing thus for the pressure it is exerting the weight of the whole: here you have the totality of obligation for a simple, elementary, moral conscience. That is the essential; that is what obligation could, if necessary, be reduced to, even in those cases where it attains its highest complexity.

This shows when and in what sense (how slightly Kantian!) obligation in its elementary state takes the form of a "categorical imperative." We should find it very difficult to discover examples of such an imperative in everyday life. A military order, which is a command that admits neither reason nor reply, does say in fact: "You must because you must." But, though you may give the soldier no reason, he will imagine one. If we want a pure case of the categorical imperative, we must construct one a priori or at least make an arbitrary abstraction of experience. So let us imagine an ant who is stirred by a gleam of reflection and thereupon judges she has been wrong to work unremittingly for others. Her inclination to laziness would indeed endure but a few moments, just as long as the ray of intelligence. In the last of these moments, when instinct regaining the mastery would drag her back by sheer force to her task, intelligence at the point of relapsing into instinct would say, as its parting word: "You must because you must." This "must because you must" would only be the momentary feeling of awareness of a tug which the ant experiences—the tug which the string, momentarily relaxed,

exerts as it drags her back. The same command would ring in the ear of a sleepwalker on the point of waking, or even actually beginning to wake, from the dream he is enacting; if he lapsed back at once into a hypnotic state, a categorical imperative would express in words, on behalf of the reflection which had just been on the point of emerging and had instantly disappeared, the inevitableness of the relapse. In a word, an absolutely categorical imperative is instinctive or somnambulistic, enacted as such in a normal state, represented as such if reflection is roused long enough to take form, not long enough to seek for reasons. But, then, is it not evident that, in a reasonable being, an imperative will tend to become categorical in proportion as the activity brought into play, although intelligent, will tend to become instinctive? But an activity which, starting as intelligent, progresses towards an imitation of instinct is exactly what we call, in man, a habit. And the most powerful habit, the habit whose strength is made up of the accumulated force of all the elementary social habits, is necessarily the one which best imitates instinct. Is it then surprising that, in the short moment which separates obligation merely experienced as a living force from obligation fully realized and justified by all sorts of reasons, obligation should indeed take the form of the categorical imperative: "You must because you must"?

Let us consider two divergent lines of evolution with societies at the extremities of each. The type of society which will appear the more natural will obviously be the instinctive type; the link that unites the bees of a hive resembles far more the link which holds together the cells of an organism, co-ordinate and subordinate to one another. Let us suppose for an instant that nature has intended to produce at the extremity of the second line societies where a certain latitude was left to individual choice: she would have arranged that intelligence should achieve here results comparable, as regards their regularity, to those of instinct in the other; she would have had recourse to habit. Each of these habits, which may be called "moral," would be incidental. But the aggregate of them, I mean the habit of contracting these habits, being at the very basis of

societies and a necessary condition of their existence, would have a force comparable to that of instinct in respect to both intensity and regularity. This is exactly what we have called the "totality of obligation." This, be it said, will apply only to human societies at the moment of emerging from the hands of nature. It will apply to primitive and to elementary societies. But, however much human society may progress, grow complicated and spiritualized, the original design, expressing the purpose of nature, will remain.

Now this is exactly what has happened. Without going deeply into a matter we have dealt with elsewhere, let us simply say that intelligence and instinct are forms of consciousness which must have interpenetrated each other in their rudimentary state and become dissociated as they grew. This development occurred on the two main lines of evolution of animal life, with the Arthropods and the Vertebrates. At the end of the former we have the instinct of insects, more especially the Hymenoptera; at the end of the second, human intelligence. Instinct and intelligence have each as their essential object the utilization of implements: in the first case, organs supplied by nature and hence immutable; in the second, invented tools, and therefore varied and unforeseen. The implement is, moreover, designed for a certain type of work, and this work is all the more efficient the more it is specialized, the more it is divided up between diversely qualified workers who mutually supplement one another. Social life is thus immanent, like a vague ideal, in instinct as well as in intelligence; this ideal finds its most complete expression in the hive or the anthill on the one hand, in human societies on the other. Whether human or animal, a society is an organization; it implies a co-ordination and generally also a subordination of elements; it therefore exhibits, whether merely embodied in life or, in addition, specifically formulated, a collection of rules and laws. But in a hive or an anthill the individual is riveted to his task by his structure, and the organization is relatively invariable, whereas the human community is variable in form, open to every kind of progress. The result is that in the former each rule is laid down by nature and is

necessary; whereas in the latter only one thing is natural, the necessity of a rule. Thus the more, in human society, we delve down to the root of the various obligations to reach obligation in general, the more obligation will tend to become necessity, the nearer it will draw, in its peremptory aspect, to instinct. And yet we should make a great mistake if we tried to ascribe any particular obligation, whatever it might be, to instinct. What we must perpetually recall is that, no one obligation being instinctive, obligation as a whole *would have been* instinct if human societies were not, so to speak, ballasted with variability and intelligence. It is a virtual instinct, like that which lies behind the habit of speech. The morality of a human society may indeed be compared to its language. If ants exchange signs, which seems probable, those signs are provided by the very instinct that makes the ants communicate with one another. On the contrary, our languages are the product of custom. Nothing in the vocabulary, or even in the syntax, comes from nature. But speech is natural, and unvarying signs, natural in origin, which are presumably used in a community of insects, exhibit what our language would have been, if nature in bestowing on us the faculty of speech had not added that function which, since it makes and uses tools, is inventive and called intelligence. We must perpetually recur to what obligation *would have been* if human society had been instinctive instead of intelligent. This will not explain any particular obligation; we should even give of obligation in general an idea which would be false, if we went no further; and yet we must think of this instinctive society as the counterpart of intelligent society, if we are not to start without any clue in quest of the foundations of morality.

From this point of view obligation loses its specific character. It ranks among the most general phenomena of life. When the elements which go to make up an organism submit to a rigid discipline, can we say that they feel themselves liable to obligation and that they are obeying a social instinct? Obviously not; but whereas such an organism is barely a community, the hive and the anthill are actual organisms, the elements of which are united by invisible ties, and the social instinct of an ant—I

mean the force by virtue of which the worker, for example, performs the task to which she is predestined by her structure—cannot differ radically from the cause, whatever it be, by virtue of which every tissue, every cell of a living body, toils for the greatest good of the whole. Indeed it is, strictly speaking, no more a matter of obligation in the one case than in the other, but rather of necessity. It is just this necessity that we perceive, not actual but virtual, at the foundations of moral obligation, as through a more or less transparent veil. A human being feels an obligation only if he is free, and each obligation, considered separately, implies liberty. But it is necessary that there should be obligations; and the deeper we go, away from those particular obligations which are at the top, towards obligation in general, or, as we have said, towards obligation as a whole, which is at the bottom, the more obligation appears as the very form assumed by necessity in the realm of life, when it demands, for the accomplishment of certain ends, intelligence, choice, and therefore liberty.

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THE CONQUEST OF FREEDOM¹

I. FREEDOM OF INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE

IN this essay I shall not treat of free will or freedom of choice. The existence and value of this kind of freedom are, however, taken for granted by all I shall say. That is why I shall first give a few brief indications in their regard. The freedom I shall treat of subsequently is the freedom of independence and of exultation, which can be called also—in a Paulinian but not Kantian sense—freedom of autonomy, or also, freedom of expansion of the human person. It takes for granted the existence of freedom of choice in us, but it is substantially distinct from it.

A badly constructed philosophical theory that falsifies the reflective operation by which the mind of man knows itself explicitly can counteract and paralyze the primary and natural operation of spontaneous consciousness. As long as we are not victims of this accident each of us knows very well *that* he possesses freedom of choice, that is to say, that if we betray a friend, risk our property to aid some unfortunate, decide to become a banker, monk, or soldier, these kinds of acts are what they are only because we have involved therein our personality and have arranged that they be so rather than not. But each

¹ Translated by Harry McNeill and Emmanuel Chapman, Professors of Philosophy, Fordham University.

of us knows very poorly *wherein* freedom of choice lies. This obscurity of spontaneous consciousness, unable to bring forth what is implicit in the matter, enables philosophers, and especially savants who philosophize without knowing it, frequently to becloud the question.

Philosophers professing absolute intellectualism cannot understand the existence of free will because in their eyes intelligence not only precedes will, but precedes it in the manner of a divinity apart, which touches the will without being touched by it and without receiving from it any qualifying action. Hence the domain of formal or specifying determination (what is called the *ordo specificationis*) can never itself depend intrinsically upon the domain of efficiency or existential effectuation (*ordo exercitii*), and the will is reduced to a function by which the intelligence realizes ideas which in virtue of the mere object they represent appear best to the subject. Such was the position of the great metaphysicians of the classic age.

Pure empiricists likewise cannot understand the existence of free will, because, recognizing only sensory sequences, the idea of causality exercised upon a spirit by itself has no meaning for them. Hence when they voice an opinion on a question, which, like that of free will, lies essentially in the ontological order, they, as metaphysicians in spite of themselves (and bad ones at that), can only interpret the empirical results of observational science in the framework of classic mechanism inherited from Spinoza, and give themselves over, without knowing what they are doing, to the most naïve extrapolations. To the extent that science reveals dynamic elements working in our psychical activity, they see in the mere existence of these elements the proof that the same operate in a necessarily determining fashion—which is precisely what remains to be proved.

In our times Freudism offers the pseudo-metaphysical empiricist the greatest possibilities for illusion. I have shown elsewhere that it is very important to distinguish most clearly between the psychoanalytic method, which opens to investigation in the unconscious new roads of the greatest interest, and the philosophy (unconscious of itself) that Freud has sought

in crass empiricism, thereby leaving the field of his competence and giving full reign to his dreams. The fact, revealed by psychoanalysis, that there are unconscious motivations which the subject obeys without knowing them furnishes in no manner, as some would imagine, an argument against free will, for free will begins with intellectual judgment and consciousness. To the extent that unconscious motivation makes us act automatically, there is no question of free will; and to the extent that it gives rise to a conscious judgment, the question is whether or not at this moment it fashions this judgment, or by means of free choice is rendered decisively motivating by this judgment. In other words, the question is whether unconscious motivations are necessarily determining or simply contributing, and it is clear that the mere fact of their existence is not sufficient to decide the question.

In general, human free will does not exclude but presupposes the vast and complex dynamism of instincts, tendencies, psycho-physical dispositions, acquired habits, and hereditary traits, and it is at the top point where this dynamism emerges in the world of spirit that freedom of choice is exercised, to give or withhold decisive efficacy to the inclinations and urges of nature. It follows from this that freedom, as well as responsibility, is capable of a multiplicity of degrees of which the author of being alone is judge. It does not follow from this that freedom does not exist—on the contrary! If it admits of degrees, then it exists.

The efforts of eminent scientists, like Professor Compton, to link indeterminist theories of modern physics to our natural belief in free will may be highly significant and stimulating to the mind and efficacious in eliminating many prejudices, but I do not think that a strict proof providing this belief with an unshakable intellectual basis can be found in that direction. The direction to follow is metaphysical. It brings us to formulas like those of M. Bergson: "Our motivations are what we make them"; "Our reasons are determined for us only at the moment that they become determining; that is, at the moment when the act is virtually accomplished." But it is not by an irrational philosophy of pure becoming, it is by a philosophy

of being and intelligence like that of St. Thomas Aquinas that such formulas receive their full significance and demonstrative value.

Spirit as such implies a sort of infinity; its faculty of desire of itself seeks a good which satisfies absolutely, therefore a good without limit, and we cannot have any desire which is not comprehended in this general desire for happiness. But as soon as reflection occurs, our intelligence, confronted with goods that are not the Good, and judging them so, brings into actuality the radical indetermination that our appetite for happiness possesses in regard to everything which is not happiness itself. Efficacious motivation of an intelligent being can be only a practical judgment: and this judgment owes to the will the whole of its efficaciousness; it is will, impelled by its own unpredictable initiative towards the good presented to it by such and such a judgment, that gives this judgment the power of specifying the will efficaciously.

The free act, in which the intelligence and will involve and envelope each other vitally, is thus like an instantaneous flash in which the active and dominating indetermination of the will operates in regard to the judgment itself which determines it; the will can do nothing without an intellectual judgment; and it is will that makes itself determined by judgment and by this judgment rather than by another one.

Far from being a simple function of the intelligence, by which the latter realizes ideas which in virtue of their mere object appear best, the will is an original spiritual energy of infinite capacity which has control over the intelligence and its judgments in the order of practical choice and makes what the will wants appear best to the subject *here and now*. What constitutes the real mystery of free will is that while essentially needing intellectual specification, the exercise of the will has primacy over the latter and holds it under its active and dominating indetermination because the will alone can give it existential efficacy.

After this preliminary explanation of freedom of choice, I shall now discuss the freedom of independence.

II. FREEDOM OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PERSON

Human personality is a great metaphysical mystery. We know that an essential characteristic of a civilization worthy of the name is meaning and respect for the dignity of the human person. We know that to defend the rights and freedom of the human person we must be willing to sacrifice our most precious possessions and our lives. What values, then, deserving of such sacrifice, are enveloped in the personality of man? What do we mean precisely when we speak of the human person? When we say that a man is a person, we do not mean merely that he is an individual, in the sense that an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, or an elephant is an individual. Man is an individual who holds himself in hand by his intelligence and his will; he exists not merely in a physical fashion. He has spiritual superexistence through knowledge and love, so that he is, in a way, a universe in himself, a microcosmos, in which the great universe in its entirety can be encompassed through knowledge. By love he can give himself completely to beings who are to him, as it were, other selves. For this relation no equivalent can be found in the physical world. The human person possesses these characteristics because in the last analysis man, this flesh and these perishable bones which are animated and activated by a divine fire, exists "from the womb to the grave" by virtue of the existence itself of his soul, which dominates time and death. Spirit is the root of personality. The notion of personality thus involves that of totality and independence; no matter how poor and crushed a person may be, he is a whole, and as a person, subsistent in an independent manner. To say that a man is a person is to say that in the depth of his being he is more a whole than a part and more independent than servile. It is to say that he is a minute fragment of matter that is at the same time a universe, a beggar who participates in the absolute being, mortal flesh whose value is eternal, and a bit of straw into which heaven enters. It is this metaphysical mystery that religious thought designates

when it says that the person is the image of God. The value of the person, his dignity and rights, belong to the order of things naturally sacred which bear the imprint of the Father of Being, and which have in him the end of their movement.

Freedom of spontaneity, on the other hand, is not, as free will, a power of choice that transcends all necessity, even interior necessity and all determinism. It does not imply the absence of necessity but merely the absence of constraint. It is the power of acting by virtue of its own internal inclination and without undergoing the coercion imposed by an exterior agent.

This kind of freedom admits of all sorts of degrees, from the spontaneity of the electron turning "freely" around a nucleus, that is, without deviating from its path by the interference of a foreign particle, to the spontaneity of the grass in the fields which grows "freely" and of the bird that flies "freely," that is, obeying only the internal necessities of their nature. When freedom of spontaneity passes the threshold of the spirit and is the spontaneity of a spiritual nature, it becomes properly freedom of independence. To this extent it does not consist merely in following the inclination of nature but in being or making oneself actively the sufficient principle of one's own operation; in other words, in perfecting oneself as an indivisible whole in the act one brings about. This is why freedom of independence exists only in beings which also have free will, and presupposes the exercise of free will in order to arrive at its end.

If the proper sign of personality consists, as I have just said, in the fact of being independent, of being a whole, it is clear that personality and freedom of independence are related and inseparable. In the scale of being they increase together; at the summit of being God is person in pure act and freedom of independence in pure act. He is so personal that his existence is his very act of knowing and loving, and He is so independent that while causing all things, He Himself is absolutely without cause, his essence being his very act of existence.

In each of us personality and freedom of independence increase together. For man is a being in movement. If he does

not augment, he has nothing, and he loses what he had; he must fight for his being. The entire history of his fortunes and misfortunes is the history of his effort to win together with his own personality, freedom of independence. He is called to the conquest of freedom.

Two basic truths must be noted here. The first is that the human being, though a person and therefore independent because he is a spirit, is, however, by nature at the lowest degree of perfection and independence because he is a spirit united substantially with matter and implacably subject to a bodily condition. Secondly, no matter how miserable, how poor, how enslaved and humiliated he may be, the aspirations of personality in him remain unconquerable; and they tend as such, in the life of each of us as in the life of the human race, toward the conquest of freedom.

The aspirations of personality are of two types. On the one hand, they come from the human person *as human* or as constituted in such a species; let us call them "connatural" to man and specifically human. On the other hand, they come from the human person *in so far as he is a person* or participating in that transcendental perfection that is personality and which is realized in God infinitely better than in us. Let us call them then "transnatural" and metaphysical aspirations.

The connatural aspirations tend to a relative freedom compatible with conditions here below, and the burden of material nature inflicts upon them from the very beginning a serious defeat because no animal is born more naked and less free than man. The struggle to win freedom in the order of social life aims to make up for this defeat.

The transnatural aspirations of the person in us seek super-human freedom, pure and simple freedom. And to whom belongs such freedom if not to Him alone who is freedom of independence itself, subsistent by itself? Man has no right to the freedom proper to God. When he aspires by a transnatural desire to this freedom, he seeks it in an "inefficacious" manner and without even knowing what it is. Thus divine transcendence imposes immediately the admission of a profound defeat on the part of these metaphysical aspirations of the per-

son in us. However, such a defeat is not irreparable, at least if the victor descends to the aid of the vanquished. The movement to win freedom in the order of spiritual life aims precisely to make up for this defeat. But we must not hide from ourselves the fact that the point at which our reflection has now arrived is a crucial one for the human being. The least error costs dearly. In this knot capital errors, mortal for human society and the human soul, are mixed with capital truths to which are bound the life of the soul and that of society. We must work as hard as possible to distinguish truths from errors. There is a false conquest of freedom which is illusory and homicidal. There is a true conquest of freedom which provides truth and life for mankind.

In order to try to dissociate briefly one from the other, let me say that the false manner of understanding the attainment of freedom is based upon a philosophy called in technical language "univocalist" and "immanentist." In such a philosophy the notion of independence and freedom admits of neither internal variety nor degrees; and on the other hand God, if he exists, is conceived as a physical agent magnified ad infinitum; hence either he is considered *transcendent* and his *existence* is denied because he would be, as Proudhon believed, a sort of heavenly Tyrant imposing constraint and violence on all that is not his own; or, on the other hand, his *existence* is affirmed and his *transcendence* is denied—all things are considered in the manner of Spinoza or Hegel as modes or phases of his realization. In this way of thinking there is neither freedom nor autonomy except in so far as no objective rule or measure is received from a being other than oneself. And the human person claims for itself then divine freedom, so that man takes, in atheistic forms of thought and culture, the place of the God he denies, or man through pantheistic forms tries to realize in act an identity of nature with the God he imagines.

On the contrary, the true manner of understanding the attainment of freedom is based upon a philosophy of the analogy of being and divine transcendence. For this philosophy independence and freedom are realized, on the various levels of being, in several forms which are typically diverse: in God

in an absolute manner, and because (being supereminently all things) he is supreme interiority, of which all existing things are a participation; in us in a relative manner, and thanks to the privileges of spirit which, however profound may be the state of dependence in which it is placed by the very nature of things, makes itself independent by its own operation when it poses interiorly to itself by knowledge and love the law it obeys. In such a philosophy divine transcendence imposes no violence nor constraint upon creatures, but rather infuses them with goodness and spontaneity and is more internal to them than they are to themselves. It is not true that the autonomy of an intelligent creature consists in not receiving any rule or objective measure from a being other than itself. It consists in conforming to such rules and measures voluntarily because they are known to be just and true, and because of a love for truth and justice. Such is human freedom, properly speaking, to which the person tends as towards a connatural perfection; and if the person aspires also to superhuman freedom, this thirst for trans-natural perfection, whose satisfaction is not due us, will be fully quenched only by the reception of more than is desired, and thanks to a transforming union with the Uncreated Nature. God is free from all eternity; more exactly, He is subsistent freedom. Man is not born free unless in the basic potencies of his being: he becomes free, by warring upon himself and thanks to many sorrows; by the struggle of the spirit and virtue; by exercising his freedom he wins his freedom. So that at long last a freedom better than he expected is *given* him. From the beginning to the end it is truth that liberates him.

III. TRUE AND FALSE POLITICAL EMANCIPATION

The first problem of vital importance evoked by the preceding considerations can be called the problem of true and false political emancipation. In fact, the conquest of freedom in the social and political order is the central hope characterizing the historical ideal of the last two centuries, which has constituted at once their dynamic urge, their power of truth and of illusion. What I call false political emancipation is the philosophy and

the social and political practice (and the corresponding emotional orchestration) based upon the false manner of understanding the conquest of freedom that I have briefly discussed. Necessarily this engenders myths that devour the human substance. What I call true political emancipation is the philosophy and the social and political practice (and the corresponding emotional orchestration) based upon the true manner of winning freedom; this leads to no myth but to a concrete historical ideal and to a patient labor of forming and educating the human substance.

The misfortune in the eyes of a philosopher of culture is the fact that great democratic movements of modern times have sought true political emancipation under false standards. I mean that in the obscure work produced in the hearts of men and in their history we find a treasury of aspirations, efforts, and social enterprise obtained sometimes at the price of heroic sacrifices and originally directed towards the conquest of freedom—we find this treasury conceptualized in the metaphysics of the false conquest of freedom; and to the extent that this work has been thus corrupted and deformed by a false philosophy of life, it is accompanied by error, destruction, and ravages which tend to the negation of its own vital principle and which finally make the democratic ideal seem to many minds an imposture. The spasms through which Europe is passing testify to the immense gravity of this historical phenomenon. If the true city of human rights, the true democracy, does not succeed in freeing itself from the false, if in the ordeal of fire and blood a radical purification is not brought about, Western civilization risks entering upon a night without end. If we are confident that this will not happen, it is because we are confident that the necessary renovations will occur.

Truly, and even by reason of the complex and ambivalent phenomenon just referred to, the word democracy itself has become so equivocal that it would be perhaps desirable, as I have already urged several times, to find a new word to designate what I called a moment ago the true city of human rights. Moreover, the political philosophy involved therein goes largely beyond this or that classically recognized *political regime*. It is

equally suitable to the *regimen mixtum*—at once monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic—which was the best regime in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as to a strictly democratic, political regime. But we are not free to revise at will the vocabulary of concrete and historico-social matters. If a new democracy is actively realized in common consciousness and in existence, it will discover a satisfactory name for itself.

For the sake of further clarification let me say briefly that the false political emancipation (the false city of human rights) has as its principle the “anthropocentric” conception that Rousseau and Kant made out of the autonomy of the person. According to them man is free *only if he obeys himself alone*, and man is constituted by right of nature in such a state of freedom (which Rousseau considered as lost from the fact of the corruption involved in social life and which Kant relegated to the noumenal world). In a word, this is the divinization of the individual. Its logical consequences in the political and social order are threefold: In the first place, practical atheism of society (for there is no place for two gods in the world, and if the individual is practically god, God is no longer God except perhaps in a decorative way and for private use). In the second place, the theoretical and practical disappearance of the idea of the common good. In the third place, the theoretical and practical disappearance of the idea of ruler and the idea of authority falsely considered to be incompatible with freedom: and this in the political sphere (where the possessors of authority should direct men not towards the private good of other men but towards the common good) as well as in the sphere of labor and of economics (where the technical exigencies of production demand that men work, in extremely diverse ways and proportions, for the private good of other men). By virtue of an inevitable internal dialectic this social divinization of the individual, inaugurated by bourgeois liberalism, leads to the social divinization of the State and of the anonymous mass incarnate in a Leader who is no longer a normal ruler but a sort of inhuman monster whose omnipotence is based upon myths and lies. At the same time bourgeois liberalism makes way for rev-

olutionary totalitarianism, communist or racist, and for general slavery.

True political emancipation, on the contrary, or the true city of human rights, has as its principle a conception of the autonomy of the person in conformity with the nature of things and therefore "theocentric." According to this notion obedience, accepted for justice's sake, is not opposed to freedom. It is, on the contrary, a normal way of arriving at freedom. Man must gradually win freedom, which consists in the political and social order above all in becoming, under given historical conditions, as independent as possible of the restrictions of material nature. The human person rises above society to the extent that he is made for God and for eternal life, and owes what he is to supra-social values. He is part of society as of a greater and better whole, to the extent that he owes to society what he is.

Thus the true city of human rights recognizes as God only one God: God himself and no created thing; and this city understands that human society, despite the diverse religious families living within it, implies a religious principle and presupposes that God is accessible to our reason and is the last end of our existence. This city is founded upon the authentic notion of the common good—which is something different from a collection of private goods, but which demands to be redistributed to individual persons; it implies the effective respect for their rights and has itself as an essential element their access to the maximum development and freedom compatible with given historical conditions. This city finally implies an authentic notion of ruler and authority.

For the true city of human rights, the possessors of authority in the political sphere are, in a democratic regime, designated by the people. They govern the people by virtue of this designation ("government by the people") and for the common good of the people ("government for the people"), but they really have the right to command; and they command free persons each of whom is called to participate concretely to a certain degree in political life and who are not abandoned like atoms but rather are grouped in organic communities from the family, which forms the natural basic community, up.

In the sphere of labor and economic relations the true city of human rights demands that the constant development of social justice compensate for the restrictions imposed upon man by the necessities (in themselves not human but technical) of labor and production. We know that to serve the private good of another man and become to this extent an organ of the same is in itself an affliction for the radical aspirations of personality, but we also know that this is a condition imposed upon men by material nature, which will last in various forms and proportions as long as the earth itself. This true city of human rights demands that, by a persevering struggle for improvement due at once to the perfection and extension of mechanical equipment and to the tension of spiritual energies transforming secular life from within, the conditions of work become less and less servile and tend to a state of real deliverance for the human person. At the present stage of historical development it would seem that for certain types of workers this result can be obtained to a remarkable degree—after the catastrophe which the world is suffering today has brought about a reformation of economic structures and of the spirit—not only by lessening the hours of work but also by giving the workers a part in the ownership and management of the enterprise.

But here, as in the political sphere, the inauguration of new structures, no matter how important, does not suffice. The soul of social life is fashioned by that which superabounds in it from the true internal life of individual persons, from the gift of self which that life involves, and from a gratuitous generosity whose source lies in the inmost part of the heart. More concisely, good will and a relation of respect and love between persons alone can give to the *movement* of the social body a truly human character. If the person has the opportunity of being treated as such in social life and by it, and if the thankless works which this life imposes can be made easy and happy and even exalting, it is first due to the development of right and to institutions of right. But it is also and indispensably due to the development of civic friendship, with the confidence and mutual devotion this implies on the part of those who direct as well as those who carry it out. For the true city of human rights,

fraternity is not a privilege of nature which flows from the natural goodness of man and which the State need only proclaim. It is the end of a slow and difficult conquest which demands virtue and sacrifice and a perpetual victory of man over himself. In this sense we can say that the heroic ideal towards which true political emancipation tends is the inauguration of a fraternal city. It is seen here how, in fact, true political emancipation depends on the Christian ferment deposited in the world and presupposes finally as the most profound stimulus evangelical love exalting things of earthly civilization in their proper order.

The properties that I have just sketched were not absent from the democratic movement and hopes of modern times. They characterize, on the contrary, what was unconsciously exercised most profoundly and vitally in it. But this good seed was corrupted and vitiated by false political emancipation, and the monsters engendered by the latter grew more quickly than the authentic seed. We thus have a presentiment of the vast purifications and renovations referred to above.

IV. THE TRUE AND FALSE DEIFICATION OF MAN

There is a true and false emancipation in the political and social order. In the spiritual order there is a true and false deification of man. This is another problem of vital importance, fundamental and absolutely primary, posited by the natural instinct which impels man to win freedom.

As I have said at the beginning of this essay, by the fact that we participate in the transcendental perfection designated by the word personality, we have within us transnatural aspirations the satisfaction of which is not due us in justice but which nevertheless torment us and tend to a superhuman freedom, freedom pure and simple—that is to say, to a divine freedom. Evidence of these aspirations for the superhuman, these desires to reach the borders of divinity, has been presented by the sages of all times.

The great spiritual errors also bear witness to these aspirations. They seek the deification of man, but by man's own forces

and the development of the powers of his nature only. More often they take a pantheistic form, as can be seen in the gnostic currents of former times, in the great monistic metaphysics, and in the mysticism of quietism. It was left, however, to modern times to look for the deification of man by doing away with wisdom and breaking with God. Historically, in my opinion, the two main sources of this false deification are: (1) The immanentist conception of conscience which since the Lutheran revolution has gradually gained the ascendancy, and which demands that man within himself—"my interior freedom"—construct morality by himself alone without owing anything to law. (2) The idealist conception of science which since the Cartesian revolution has gradually gained the ascendancy and which demands that man within himself—"my self or my spirit"—construct truth by himself alone without owing anything to things. Hyperspiritualist as it first seems, these two conceptions make science independent of being and conscience independent of law, and claim for that which is within man the kind of independence proper to God. In reality these two erroneous conceptions materialize the human soul and plunge it into external action, where by seeking its proper and only mode of realization it becomes the slave of time, matter, and the world. Science finally will be subjugated by a kind of demiurgic imperialism applied to enslave material nature to the lusts of human beings. Conscience too will be subjugated by a kind of demonic imperialism applied to "oppose oneself" in order to "pose oneself," following the phrase of Fichte, and to realize oneself by dominating others. Man, become the god of this world, will believe that he will find divine freedom for himself by being independent of God, and consequently by the radical negation of God. The false deification of man will take the atheistic form which appears in our days in an amazingly barbarous light.

It had its first experiences in the disguised atheism of orthodox Kantianism and bourgeois liberalism. After the bankruptcy of this atheism which found religion "good for the people," and after the failure of the false individualistic conquest of freedom and personality, it was inevitable that the false deification of man be affirmed by the open atheism of Marxist Hegelianism which

sees in religion "the opium of the people," or the open paganism of racism which reduces religion to the idolatry of the "soul of the people." Plebeian totalitarianism, either under the Soviet Communist or German Nazi form, then undertakes to lead collective man by war, forced labor, and the standardization of souls to the achievement of freedom. Inevitably, from the moment that absolute freedom, emancipation pure and simple, divine independence, were sought in the human itself, or in other words, from the moment that the *transnatural* aspirations of the person were lowered into the sphere of *connatural* aspirations—and by that very fact perverted and made infinite—the social had to become deified, the things of Caesar had to absorb monstrously the things of God, and the pagan empire had to make itself adored.

On the contrary, the transnatural aspirations of the human person tend normally towards God, the transcendental cause of being, and they incite the soul to seek liberation in him. Despite all its imperfections and blemishes such was the *élan* of the great Hellenic wisdom. In Hindu spirituality, however, at least if its too great proliferation, at times poisonous, is reduced to what is most pure in it, are found the most significant examples of states where these *transnatural* aspirations lead man by his own action and the ascetic use of his natural powers to turn his own nature against its own current. I think that what in Christian language we call the "natural" mystical experience and the highest "natural" contemplation then reaches by the way of an entirely intellectual self-annihilation the substance of Self, and through and in it the divine Omnipresence.² This is a liberation and deliverance at one and the same time ultimate in the order of what nature is capable of, and not ultimate, absolutely speaking, in regard to our real destiny and its hidden primordial truth that nature has been made for grace. Hence this attainment of spiritual freedom is ambivalent: true and authentic on its plane if the soul does not stop there and it opens itself to the highest gifts; false and deceptive if the soul stops

² See my *Quatre essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle*, Paris, 1939, Chap. III.

there or if it looks upon it as a necessary means, or if it takes it for deification.

There is, however, a true deification of man. *Ego dixi: dii estis*. This is called eternal life—which begins obscurely here on earth. It is as fatal to renounce perfect liberation as it is to try to reach it by the wrong ways, that is to say, by oneself alone. The transnatural aspirations are supernaturally fulfilled, and by a gift which surpasses anything we can conceive. What is grace, the theologians ask, if not a formal participation in the Divine Nature, in other terms, a deifying life received from God.

The mystery of this is that the supreme freedom and independence of man are won by the supreme spiritual realization of his dependence, his dependence on a Being who being life itself vivifies, and being freedom itself liberates, all who participate in His essence. This kind of dependence is not one of external constraint, as is the case of one physical agent in regard to another physical agent. The more he realizes it the more does man participate in the nature of the Absolute. Men who have become something of God participate in the freedom of Him who cannot be contained by anything. By losing themselves they have won a mysterious and disappropriated personality which makes them act by virtue of that which they are eternally in the Uncreated Essence. Born of spirit they are like spirit free. To tell the truth, they have won nothing, and they have received all. While they worked and suffered to attain freedom, it gave itself to them. The true conquest of supreme and absolute freedom is to be made free by Subsistent Freedom and to consent freely to it. The true deification of man consists in opening himself to the gift which the Absolute gives of itself, and the descent of the divine plenitude into the intelligent creature. What I am saying is that this is all the work of love. Law protects freedom and teaches us to practice it. When love follows the path of law it leads through law to emancipation from all servitude, even the servitude of the law. I have often quoted, and I wish to quote again, the text from the *Summa contra Gentiles* where St. Thomas comments on St. Paul, which I

regard as one of the great texts absolutely fundamental for the spiritual constitution of humanity.

We must observe [St. Thomas says] that the sons of God are led by the divine Spirit, not as though they were slaves, but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of one's own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly: and what we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under compulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes nothing to the action, for instance, when a man is compelled to move by force; or it may be partly voluntary, as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is more opposed thereto. Now, the sanctifying Spirit inclines us to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inasmuch as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and for love, not slavishly and for fear: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 8:15): *You have not received the Spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons.*


Now the will is by its essence directed to that which is truly good: so that when, either through passion or through an evil habit or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good, he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something extraneous, *if we consider the natural direction of the will*; but if we consider the act of the will, *as inclined here and now towards an apparent good*, he acts freely when he follows the passion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will remains the same, he refrains from what he desires through fear of the law which forbids the fulfillment of his desire. Accordingly, when the divine Spirit by love inclines the will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He removes both the servitude [the heteronomy, as we would say today] whereby a man, the slave of passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (II Cor. 3:17): *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*, and (Gal. 5:18): *If you are led by the Spirit you are not under the law.*³

Great is the distance between the imperfect liberation whereby the highest techniques of natural spirituality oblige nature to


³ St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV. 22.

satisfy in some way the transnatural aspirations of the human person, and the perfect freedom whereby the supernatural gift the Divine Personality gives of itself to the created personality more than fulfills these aspirations. While leaving intact the distinction of natures, love, which at the end of spiritual growth creates this perfect freedom, also makes man become a god by participation. At the same time, far from enclosing itself in an altogether intellectual contemplation which does away with action, the freedom we mean lives by a contemplation which, since it proceeds from love, superabounds in action and penetrates to that which is most intimate in the world. The heroism it implies does not retreat into the sacred; it spills over into the profane and sanctifies it. Detached from perfection in perfection itself, because it wants more to love than to be without fault, it awakens, more and more, good will and brotherly love.

To return to the distinction between the social-temporal and the spiritual, the things which belong to Caesar and those which belong to God, I should point out, finally, that the false deification of man results, as we have seen, in the confusion of the temporal and the spiritual, a perverse adoration of the social, and temporal relativities erected into an absolute; conversely, the true deification of man, because it is accomplished by the grace of the incarnation and draws to itself all that is human, demands of divine things that they descend into the most profound depths of the human, and insists that the political and social order, while remaining essentially distinct from the spiritual, be pervaded and intrinsically superelevated by the current which flows into souls from the Absolute. In the degree, small as it might be in fact, that things are this way, in that degree the historical march of civilization in the attainment of relative freedom, which responds to the *connatural* aspirations of human personality, is in accord and in mutual concourse with the supra-historical movement of the soul in the conquest of absolute freedom, which responds, in transcending divinely, to the *transnatural* aspirations of the person as a person.



EPILOGUE



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THE LIBERTIES OF MAN

IT is my distinctive task not to contribute another essay on freedom to this volume, but, as the first of its readers, to report how the foregoing essays¹ illumine each other and when they leave their subject and their readers in the dark. Each essay has examined freedom in a particular context; it would be worse than useless were I to rob the problems of freedom of these contexts and to discuss kinds of freedom in abstraction as merely a series of possible definitions. My aim is rather to examine the relations that these various contexts and liberties bear to the structure of culture. For one of the objects of this Series is to make a contribution to the knowledge of culture by discovering the nature of freedom and how man's freedom is embedded or embalmed, as the case may be, in his institutions. To do this is particularly difficult, because many of the essays in this volume are philosophical and their treatments of freedom are most readily intelligible when seen in the context of a philosophical system. Being accustomed to dealing with ideas in their philosophical contexts, I feel at the outset that I am doing violence to my profession and to my colleagues when I take an idea of freedom from the system in which it is neatly encased and where it fits only too well and throw it among other ideas of freedom, likewise torn from their philosophic frames, to compare them with each other and with the general

¹ Editor's Note: A few of the essays in this volume arrived too late for consideration in the Epilogue.

context of fact and culture from which all ideas spring and to which they should apply. Philosophers usually suffer under such treatment and resent the intrusion of foreign ideas even more than they do brute facts. Nevertheless I must pursue my task.

One of the basic problems that face us here can be stated quite simply. Can freedom be built into the framework of a culture in such a way that the culture could be said to be structurally free; or is freedom too fluid, living, or intangible to be embedded in an institutional structure? The inquiry does not appear altogether hopeless on the basis of the material here assembled. For though it may be futile to approach scientific precision and verifiability in so protean and passionate a subject, even a novice can readily discover in these critical essays certain distinctions and agreements that can be applied to the history of cultures with some hope of enlightenment and some promises of science in some future culture.

Perry, in his essay, has made a careful analysis of seven kinds of freedom that serves admirably as a point of departure. It is summarized in the following outline.

- A. In relation to effective personal choice in the pursuit of an interest,
 - 1. *Negative liberty* is the absence of an external obstacle;
 - 2. *Positive liberty* is the presence of the necessary implements for attaining the end desired.
- B. In relation to an interest's claim to social recognition,
 - 3. *Primitive liberty* is the material power of an interest to assert itself in the face of others;
 - 4. *Moral liberty* is the form of conscientiousness, either
 - a. *Personal*, the interests of an individual being centered and unified by a reflective will, or
 - b. *Social*, the interests of an individual embracing an interest in the personal liberty of others, or
 - c. *Cultural*, the moral liberties of individuals being institutionalized in the joint pursuit and enjoyment of art and science, activities which are by nature "disinterested" in the sense that they serve any moralized interest.

C. In relation to government,

5. *Legal liberty* under government gives the maximum possible security to liberties 1, 2, 3, and 4.
6. *Civil* (or *constitutional*²) *liberty* against government gives security to liberties 1, 2, 3, and 4 against abuse by 5.
7. *Political liberty* for government justifies civil liberties as positive instruments of democratic government or democratic revolution.

Though these kinds of liberty are distinguished clearly and significantly, they indicate at once that the most difficult problems arise in describing their interrelations. Liberties 4, 5, 6, and 7 are evidently regulating devices for liberties 1, 2, and 3, and, if I correctly interpret Perry's argument, the liberties relating to government (5, 6, and 7) can be regarded as forms of cultural liberty (4 c), so that they might appear strictly as cultural forms of moral liberty, co-ordinate with art and science. Such a formulation of the thesis at once begs many questions, and I am compelled to begin the analysis afresh in order to do justice to the various positions taken by other authors of this volume concerning the relation of freedom to the cultural moralizations of interests.

Many of our authors agree in regarding "freedom" and "liberty" as synonyms, and in this I believe they are mistaken. "Liberty" has a plural; "freedom" has none. "A liberty" is something particular and culturally identifiable. The discussions of freedom usually take us into a philosophical or scientific context; the discussions of liberty, into the context of social rights and institutions. This fact offers a convenient way of distinguishing between the attempts to conceive freedom in terms of other basic concepts of analysis and the attempts to define particular liberties. I am inclined to think that there is intellectual progress in advancing from the problem "Is there freedom?" to the problem "What liberties are there?" And had I been asked to write on freedom, I should have been tempted to make a philosophy of history out of this distinction and to argue that out of centuries of futile debate concerning the reality of free-

² Cf. the distinction as developed by Corwin.

dom there finally emerged, three centuries ago, not merely a debate but a cultural crisis in the interests of establishing socially certain specific liberties. Be this as it may in history, it seems clear to me after reading this volume that philosophers, theologians, and natural scientists can argue for or against freedom endlessly without affecting free culture except by their mutual tolerations, but that the institutionalization of particular liberties is of crucial importance for both the practice and theory of freedom. With this end in mind I shall review successively the attempts made to define freedom in terms of independence, power, organic unity, choice, and the pursuit of happiness, suggesting the cultural contexts of each of these doctrines. I shall then discuss particular cultural liberties.

I. INDEPENDENCE

There is a temptation to conceive freedom in terms of self-sufficiency. One is either dependent or independent, so runs the argument, though gradually the idea of interdependence is becoming respectable. The belief in self-contained atoms in the void was once regarded as the ideal starting point for mechanistic analysis; now that the mechanists have become accustomed to fields of force, stresses, and strains, the ancient "free-moving bodies" are left in the hands of moralists who need a principle of autonomy. Absolute political independence or sovereignty scarcely raises its head in this volume, and its economic analogue, autarchy, is conceived frankly not as an instrument of freedom but of conflict. Similarly, the atomic individual of economic science has practically disappeared, but Brandeis believes in, or at least shows nostalgia for, "financial independence" in a fairly literal sense as an essential of freedom, while Bridgman argues that beneath the public level of conscience and knowledge there is in each a consciousness that is absolutely isolated within its own sensations. The mind is spontaneous, self-determining, says Whitehead, and he regards this belief as the permanent truth in Platonism. Conklin believes that evolution reveals an increasing "freedom of response" on the part of organisms to their environment, and Boas regards the break-

ing away of an individual from the cake of custom as the sign of cultural freedom. There are these vestiges of faith in independent beings. They are for the most part attempts to find empirical illustrations of indeterminacy or relative independence, but at least some of these theories imply beyond indeterminacy a power of self-determination.³ Variation and differentiation exist abundantly in physical and social contexts; there is no shortage of novelties. But are novelties spontaneous, and is the individual autonomous? Is a mutation free because it is a "sport"? To answer affirmatively proves too much, and Bridgman is quite right when he says: "The last thing that the average human being wants to be made to see is that as a matter of fact he is already inescapably free." Independence is not worth much if it is merely negative and offers no particular field of action. Admitting, to please Montague, that an infinity of possibilities *subsist* in perfect independence, we still do not know whether any freedom *exists*. The existence of a few measurable probabilities has more meaning for freedom than the subsistence of infinite possibilities which are not possibilities of anything in particular. All freedom in a practical sense is conditional, and to detach a body from all conditions makes it homeless and powerless rather than free. This is true even of the mind, as Gilson points out in refuting the idea of self-determination.

There are those who believe on moral grounds that there must be somewhere a "free agent"⁴ but admit that they can discover none in nature. They therefore bid us, as does Maritain, free ourselves of nature by fixing our minds and hearts steadfastly on God, who is by definition infinitely free, *causa sui*. In one sense, possibly, the worship of perfect freedom might be called an experience of freedom, but as it is usually reported by the orthodox mystics, whose piety is less permeated with romantic idealism than is Maritain's, such devotion is an act of complete surrender and yields a feeling of utter security

³ Cf. Demos.

⁴ "Free agent" is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms. In social relations an "agent" must be bound to an author or authority, and in a physical context as well an agent is helpless without specific powers related to a dynamic field.

rather than of freedom. Theologians seldom see this problem from God's point of view and do not take seriously the old objection that a God with so many creatures hanging on him could hardly be free or unconditioned. But even from the human point of view it seems a dubious liberty to love an absolute judge who, as Spinoza points out, must be impartial to be free and must therefore himself be beyond the bonds of love. It is probably more than infantilism that prompts men to believe in a Heavenly Father rather than in an Absolute Other, for even mature love is not exactly free. No doubt there is in complete dependence on the Unconditioned a sense of release and relief, an escape from both the contingencies and necessities of natural existence. One can become morally disembodied while still in the flesh, but in the last analysis it is the flesh that feels relief when the spirit comes to rest. It is not "spiritual" freedom literally, for the spirit finds peace rather than freedom, nor is it eternal, save for a brief time.

A similar short cut to freedom is to be found among the scientists who, as Einstein puts it, seek freedom of the mind in freedom from authority and prejudice. As a natural ideal in the face of natural temptations this hope of freedom is intelligible; but there is always the danger that the scientist, like the theologian, permit his scientific ideals to blind him to his natural limitations and social tools, imagining himself in a world of pure freedom which is easier to feel than to find.

The cultural implications of the belief in radical independence are various, depending on whether independence is found in the world or beyond it. To those for whom God or Truth has a being independent of the temporal order of things, the church, the laboratory, or the fountain pen exists as a refuge for freedom of spirit, and they naturally insist that worship, science, or philosophy should be free of interference from or even concern with the affairs of this world. Freedom must have its own institutions, which, though supported by the world, are responsible only to God. Were these spiritual independents content to be supernatural, they would probably not be disturbed by their less fortunate neighbors, but they usually feel

spiritually free to "judge" the world, and the world naturally takes revenge.

Those, on the other hand, who find independence in the world are for the most part social pluralists rather than rugged individualists. There are still occasional moral and epistemological individualists like Bridgman who imagine themselves and their fellows as fixed stars, each solitary with his own light in a dark moral heaven. "Future education," Bridgman writes, "will have to show the individual how to live in the midst of his social isolation and . . . to awaken a realization of all the implications of intellectual isolation." The "public level" of life, he explains, must be broken down so that we can descend to the basic level of inexorable privacy, which alone is certain, secure, and free. A few others may feel this need of a mental and moral discipline for the solitariness that unconsciously encompasses our consciousness, but those who do not believe that they are living so near the terrifying freedom of solipsism conceive independence in more social terms. Dewey pins his faith on "voluntary associations," and Whitehead gives an example of such associations when he points to a profession as an independent, self-regulating, social body and expresses the belief that freedom will find institutional embodiment when "society" is composed of such "societies," each a competent, co-operating unit, taking orders from no one and enforcing its own discipline in view of its distinctive function. Such an ideal could apply to churches, schools, unions, or, for that matter, to national and international organizations.

II. POWER

A more realistic or, at least, a more relativistic conception of freedom is what Dewey calls "effective freedom." Freedom is the ability to perform or to understand; it is effective power. It is usually defined negatively (for example, by Russell and others) as absence of external obstacles. But mere absence of obstacles might mean a mere automatic satisfaction of desire or uninterrupted "free" motion; this is mechanism rather than freedom. Freedom implies more than a smoothly running ac-

tivity; it implies art, craft, skill, or the effective use of instruments. Freedom means "knowing how" and opportunity to use this knowledge without interference. Freedom *to* and freedom *from* are contrasted frequently in this volume; taken together they appear as the opposite poles of the same power. In the fullest sense, freedom is not freedom *from* obstacles but freedom *over* them.⁵ A free man, as Riezler and Wertheimer portray him, is in productive harmony with his world, being able to use language, norms, techniques of art, truths of science, and natural resources; in short, he is "able." Though freedom does not necessarily imply the complete mastery of an art, it certainly implies freedom of growth. A tree or child is said to be growing freely when its natural powers of development are not stunted or shunted. Without a natural pattern of growth such freedom would be indefinable. Freedom is measured in terms of creation, growth, achievement of any sort. Even freedom of the mind, as Birkhoff points out, is more than the integrity defined by Einstein; it is positive resourcefulness of imagination, effective guessing, faith in exploring. Croce and Tillich have a similar idea when they point to history as the field of freedom; history is the course of human creativity. And creativity is purposely and wisely not defined except that it is "self-determination," a phrase which either begs the question or raises the difficulties mentioned in the preceding section. A man's determinate self is what he becomes in history. Man is free, not men; or, more accurately, a man is free in so far as what he does is human history.

Such power includes, of course, power over others. The free man is the master rather than merely the authority. His freedom is measured not by his right but by his ability to rule. The greater the forces under control the more extensive the freedom. A master in one field may be a servant in another. Such powers are many, and there need be no hierarchical structure of freedom. Power is obviously neither mere energy nor mere momentum; it is the art of using machinery (Millikan), and this applies to social as well as to physical analysis. The danger in social analysis, however, is that power is associated with

⁵ Cf. especially Demos' discussion of power and choice.

authority or delegated responsibility. A power in the sense of an office or responsibility may or may not be a form of freedom. Similarly property, which is a type of power, may or may not be liberating. Not legal privileges or "liberties" but actual enjoyment of resources is what makes men free in this sense.

A free culture, accordingly, would be one in which human energies are used most effectively, each person doing what he can do best. Division of labor, responsibility proportionate to capacity, knowledge, security, opportunity, abundance of resources, tools, and skills—these would make for freedom. A free man would govern by his foresight and counsel rather than by coercion. Such government might be called democratic (as by Perry and Dewey) because it would be enlightened and would rest on the willingness of the governed to be led. A free society would not necessarily imply freedom of each to share in governing all. It would rather be the division of power analogous to the division of labor. There would be many governments corresponding to various forms of activity, and no class or function could exercise sovereign power.

The exercise of freedom brings with it competition for power, ambition, jealousy, and war. Republics have been notoriously quarrelsome and have often sacrificed all for freedom. Free society, in this sense, is not necessarily peaceful or tolerant. By its very nature it often generates imperial power, and imperial power usually becomes too great a burden to be borne freely. When the exercise of power becomes a rich man's burden, being maintained in the face of growing obstacles, power ceases to be a form of freedom and becomes coercive authority. The power to use power productively is not a gift of nature, nor a delegated office, but comes from discipline and experience. Therefore such freedom implies maturity and reason. Tempering the mind to nature and the will to art is the secret of freedom.

III. ORGANIC UNITY

The idealistic theory of freedom is that freedom is will governed by reason (cf. Brightman). Socially speaking this means that a free man voluntarily co-operates with his fellows toward

a common good. The achievement of a love of law, an inner compulsion to obey the general will, an interest in interests in general—these are the traits by which the free man is recognized. Man wins his freedom by becoming incorporated. The social contract is the classic myth expressing this conception. Though not all who hold this view would subscribe to the organismic theory of society in all literalness, they at least agree that freedom is organic and is to be found only socially, in voluntary co-operation. Maritain's conception of the "conquest of freedom," though disguised in a Thomist garb, follows the general idealistic pattern. Gerard commits himself explicitly to the organic conception of both society and freedom, and this idea is implied in the essays of Riezler and Wertheimer. This freedom through law is the social analogue of the doctrine that scientific freedom is "obedience to fact" (Gilson), and that facts constitute a body of organic truth. It carries the idea of interdependence to its extreme form, assuming a moral order in which differentiated parts co-operate toward a unified end. Though some assume that there is a biological social organism, the majority regard the union as moral. It is a generalized form of "freedom of contract" or "the liberty to alienate liberty" (Clark).

A culture is free, according to this view, when it is unified not by force but by agreement. This emphasis on unity is criticized by MacIver, Clark, and others; while Bergson, developing the idea of the unity of moral obligation, has shown that such unity may be regarded as the very antithesis of freedom.

As the problem of freedom presents itself to most of the authors of this volume, there is a recognition of the need for differentiating between a free culture and a unitary one. For though a highly integrated culture may be self-consistent, powerful, and hence free, the freedom that is being sought is not for the collectivity but for the members. Members of a body are not free no matter how free the body as a whole may be; and, except in war or other group struggles when the power of the group is all-important, freedom to move within the group, in spite of the group, or even against the group is what most matters. It is true that a unified culture does not necessarily

imply a totalitarian state, for the State is usually one institution among many and can be taught to co-operate with other institutions without dominating them. But the freedom of a culture is best measured by the flexibility of its institutional structure. Without making social life intolerable, institutions can be relatively free of each other and can even compete instead of cohering. And what is true of the relations between institutions in a free culture is true of membership in a free institution. Universal co-operation is the most complete bondage.

IV. CHOICE

One of the commonest ideas is that where there is choice there is freedom. Quite apart from the ancient dispute about free choice and free will there is a very general agreement (cf. Demos, Morris, *et al.*) that to have the opportunity of choosing is to exercise freedom. If not any choice, certainly deliberate choice is called "free determination," and the use of intelligence is commonly contrasted (especially by Dewey and Bergson) with habit, instinct, custom, and heredity as the essence of freedom. Whitehead says when ideas become effective there is freedom, and Gilson restates the classic doctrine that in so far as man is governed by reason he is free. Clark defines economic liberty as the opportunity of choosing among a variety of goods in a market. Though the detailed analyses of the nature of deliberation vary significantly, the general reason for regarding it as free seems to be that the decision is made by factors internal to the situation instead of by external force, authority, law, or accident. Some call it literally "self-government" (for example, Ryan; others emphasize the determination by predication (for example, Dewey); still others think that anything done consciously is *ipso facto* free.

A free culture in these terms would give every person, ideally, an opportunity to deliberate and decide in any matter affecting his interests. This is usually identified with democracy. Whitehead argues that cultural freedom dawned when man undertook the deliberate reformation of his institutions. Many have argued that in a free culture the government must reserve

a large "field of liberty," that is, a field regulated by individual choices, free markets, genuine alternatives.

It is not clear, however, just why the need for deliberation should be identified with freedom. Being obliged to "stop and think" is often an embarrassing predicament rather than an opportunity. And even when welcome, the necessity of choosing between alternatives is not *ipso facto* "free determination"; it is often a genuine and external obstacle. Choice represents responsibility rather than freedom, and freedom from responsibility is a very important kind of liberty. To be free to choose is freedom indeed only when there is an interest in choosing, when the alternatives are severally attractive and significant, and when the implications of the alternatives are reasonably clear. Blind choice is certainly not freedom, and useless deliberations are a nuisance. In general it is not choice itself that gives freedom but important choices and wide range of opportunity. To know how to use intelligence may be freedom, but to be compelled to use it may be an imposition or a flattery.

V. THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

If we may believe some of the biologists, life itself is liberty, and if we may believe some of the moralists, liberty is the pursuit of happiness, but if the Declaration of Independence is correct, there are three things, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, the close association of liberty and the pursuit of happiness throughout the Revolutionary tradition raises the problem whether freedom is necessarily linked to happiness.

Einstein points out what seems to be very generally believed, that no one is free whose whole concern is with necessities. Freedom begins with leisure, when working for a living leaves a little time for living. Liberal arts are leisure arts not because they exist for a leisure class and certainly not because the artists have leisure but because they are both work and play. Leisure does not necessarily nor even usually bring either freedom or happiness, but without it happiness is slavish and freedom a dream. Freedom in this sense, therefore, means freedom from

working for others or for other days, and positively it means freedom for enjoying the fruits of labor.

The economists, too (cf. Clark), distinguish between formal freedom and material freedom. Freedom of contract, for example, is in many cases a legal fiction, and an "agreement" nowadays is something to sign rather than something arrived at mutually. Material freedom means the ability to satisfy wants instead of the necessity of trimming one's wants to fit the market or the purse. Even purchasing power is not freedom if what is purchased does not please. In this context, too, freedom is identified with satisfaction.

When freedom is so stretched as to include the enjoyment of leisure and the satisfaction of wants, it is obvious that a free culture must be a good one. Freedom thus becomes a normative rather than a descriptive term, and criticism of freedom is made impossible. If only the happy are free, our problem might better be formulated in terms of happiness. Socrates, when confronted in *The Republic* with the query, "But, Socrates, will the just State be a happy State?" replied that the problem of happiness could wait until the problem of justice had been settled. Similarly it simplifies the analysis of freedom if the problem of its value or its relation to happiness is temporarily postponed.

Taken negatively, however, it seems true that freedom is impossible where there is no pursuit of happiness. Slaves may be happy, and emancipated persons often discover that their freedom fails to bring happiness, but no one would call those free who profess spirituality and practice indifference. Buddha, Spinoza, and other hermits have attempted to find freedom from desire by desiring only freedom from desire. In addition to their verbal satisfactions they seem to have found peace of mind in their *amor intellectualis*, but when they call this freedom, their neighbors usually are content with bondage. Freedom, in short, is not complete when it is merely freedom of the mind. At least a culture is not free that disregards the pursuit of happiness, for even philosophers and monks then abandon it and look to heaven, or, in the case of the orthodox Buddhists, to their navels.

VI. LIBERTIES

Turning at last to those forms of freedom that imply definitely a legal context since they are claimed as rights and are in fact called "rights" in all languages except English, we come to that aspect of our subject which most closely concerns the science of culture. These liberties are still occasionally called "natural" rights, though the English who first appealed to their "ancient" liberties thought of them as birthrights of Englishmen in contrast to the burdens or impositions of feudalism, monarchy, and Church. It is one of the ironies of history that Monsignor Ryan should be one among the few authors in this volume to defend "natural" (in the sense of "inherent") rights, and that the Declaration of Independence (to which, ironically, he appeals) should declare that men are "*endowed* by their Creator" with "certain inalienable rights." Monsignor Ryan notwithstanding, men do not exhibit the "dignity" that he ascribes to them by nature but by morals. This distinction is important for Kant, who recognized inherent worth not in nature but through the moral law, and a similar distinction is at least suggested by such deistic teaching as the Declaration of Independence represents when it describes the Creator as a Moral Governor who "endows" his subjects with rights. Pragmatically the only point to the protracted controversy over natural rights is the question of inalienability. And the chief fear ecclesiastical writers usually reveal over what they now call the "naturalistic" theory of rights arises from the assumption that what the State hath given the State can take away. As far as the authors of this volume are concerned, even the most "naturalistic" of them do not assert that the giving and taking of rights is by the State. They conceive rights as arising in a social context or culture, but the State itself is a product or at best only a piece of this more general cultural context. The most useful distinction in this connection is not that between "natural" and "civil" rights, but between civil and constitutional rights, a distinction brilliantly developed by Corwin. The civil rights are what Madison called "private rights" as distinguished from "public good"; it is the proper business of

government to protect them. Constitutional rights, as Corwin uses the term, are the claims and privileges citizens have against their own government when it violates either their private rights or the public good. The basic practical problem that confronts the science of culture in this connection is whether it is possible to discover cultural patterns in which civil and constitutional liberties can maintain themselves when the government fails them or even seeks to destroy them.

1. The first form of civil liberties is *security*. Montesquieu gives the classic formulation of this idea (cited by Russell): "The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another." And, we might add, need not be afraid of the police. Where there is political liberty, only he who threatens the safety of others need fear the police power; all others, though they may not enjoy "tranquillity of mind," should at least have tranquillity. However, as Russell points out, governors too, among others, must have safety. When governments are insecure, it is idle to think of liberty. And this has a special bearing now on international insecurity. Whether Russell is right in arguing that security for national governments is possible only under international government, the general proposition certainly holds that where there is war both governments and citizens are insecure and hence no one has liberty. Before there can be liberty there must be peace. This is easy to say, but it sounds like consigning liberty to heaven, where it will be useless. Nevertheless, without waiting for the peace that passeth understanding, it is conceivable that enough peace can be assured to enough peoples to make security tangible. Such a state of equilibrium is far from the glorious reign of liberty envisioned by the Enlightenment and enshrined in New York Harbor; it is, as Whitehead says, "a mean state," itself none too secure and threatened from the right and the left. It implies only enough economic equilibrium and collective "dignity" to induce us not to attack each other violently. Equilibrium may be regarded as a "normal" state, but it is none the less a cultural achievement, not a state

of nature, and is maintained with difficulty. The majority of the readers of this book will no doubt take such "personal liberty," as Wallace still calls it, for granted; they should be less complacent, if they wish to have a proper appreciation of their liberties, for such safety is obviously not inalienable and is daily becoming more precarious. Under this head of personal security belong certain elementary property rights. *Proprietas* in classic tradition is theoretically inalienable, an extension of one's personality. Locke's theory that labor is the basis of property and that property is therefore one's very own continues this classic tradition. There seems to be general agreement now, on the contrary, that property is a privilege or liberty, a responsibility or power for the administration of certain goods in a general social context of production and administration. Though property is not necessarily created by the State or even by law, it is a form of social freedom or right, not a personal creation. Its distribution and enjoyment, therefore, as an instrument of personal security and liberty, is a more basic right than is security of property. In sum, to be at liberty means, first of all, to be out of jail, army or asylum, and this privilege is enjoyed only by those, presumably, who do not menace their fellows and who can administer their personal security.

2. There is a second sense, however, in which being out of jail is a liberty. For it frequently happens that those who are confined because they are dangerous have more security than those at liberty. A prison relieves its inmates of all responsibilities, opportunities, and choices. Though occasionally a man voluntarily surrenders the burdensome responsibilities of so-called liberty for the security of prison, there is one liberty that remains even to the most insecure, the right to "move," to leave the country. A state's boundaries are different from prison walls at least in this respect, that one is free to enter prison and to leave the country, not vice versa. When even freedom to emigrate is denied, a country may become in effect a jail. Of course one cannot leave a hospital or restaurant without paying one's bills, and no one would argue that a person ought to be free to leave his country with all his property as though he owed nothing. To assert on the other hand that one's debt to one's

country is so pervasive that one is never free to leave it is in effect to imprison the citizen. For he is then ultimately at the mercy of his government with not even the theoretical opportunity of choosing a country more to his liking. In other words, the most elementary of the "constitutional" liberties is the right to renounce citizenship, and this right is becoming increasingly rare, some states even denying it in theory, most states making it inoperative by erecting economic obstacles.

This suggests another form of constitutional liberty, namely, limitation of debt. Imprisonment for debt has been generally abolished, and some form of periodic cancellation of debts, both public and private, is necessary, it seems, to maintain what we have above called "equilibrium." Slavery of the poor to the rich, of the rich to the tax collectors, of the governments of poor countries to the governments of rich countries, and of all men to the devil, would be the inevitable fate of men under infinite "justice." A faint and strained quality of mercy is embedded in the moral structure of free cultures, as exhibited in their history, from the days of Solon to the New Deal.

The most important weapon of constitutional liberty, however, is "due process of law." A government is at bottom a power, a pressure group among other pressure groups. But at best a government lives not by power alone but by the Word. Persuasion, or, as it is often euphemistically called, "reason," is a form of control distinct from physical power. Law or court procedure is intended to settle conflicts by dispute rather than by display of force. To the extent that cultures provide opportunities for hearings and judgments on the basis of evidence, they are free—free not because their governments are impersonal (which is the classic theory) but because their powers submit to judgment. As Brandeis, Gilson, and others point out in this volume, the aim of law is to make men free of each other's power. When the courts themselves become powers or dependents of powers, or when their decisions can be disregarded by the powers that be, there is no freedom in law. Administrative law is sometimes called an instrument of freedom. Some traffic regulations are obviously necessary, but regulated traffic is not free except that it moves faster and more safely

than without regulation. To call regimented areas of life free whenever regimentation is useful is to use the term "free" too freely. If a red light stops me and lets you go, you are free and I am not. All liberties are at the expense of other liberties (cf. MacIver); that is what is meant by calling them cultural rather than natural. Hence not all men can have the same liberties; the most they can hope for are "equal," "equitable," or "like" liberties. "Reciprocal liberties" would be a still better term to denote the correlative nature of rights and duties. By the "field of liberty" is usually meant what is free from government, and "freedom through law," if it means anything more than power or security or happiness through law, means freedom from arbitrary government through just judgment.

3. There is a third group of liberties discussed in this volume to which I shall give the name *freedom of conscience*—a term that is scarcely used today, though it was once a battle cry of freedom. For historical reasons, familiar to all, freedom of conscience has been associated primarily with religious liberty, and religious liberty has been narrowed down to the separation of Church and State. But taken seriously, freedom of conscience is the most important issue underlying freedom of speech, of press, of science, of teaching—those forms of freedom for which the authors of this volume are evidently most concerned. It is frequently pointed out that to give complete freedom of speech, press, teaching, and preaching to all who seek it would subject others to intolerable burdens of propaganda, libel, misrepresentation, faction, and noise. Those who claim liberty in these fields can expect toleration only if they are conscientious. The scientist who competently communicates discoveries in his science, the journalist who really reports news, the preacher who condemns what he believes to be wrong, the agitator who works for justice, have claims to liberty in so far as these enterprises are important to the culture. A society that respects science, conscience, and justice must give liberty to them, because by their very nature they are intended to stir up trouble where trouble is needed. There is not much difference of opinion on that score. The problematic cases are on the border line. The scientist wants liberty to talk on anything be-

cause he is a "thinker," and the writer believes whatever he writes is literature. In certain literary, psycho-clinical, and religious circles freedom to tell all in public even before thinking is regarded as not only a right but a duty. Conscience has so many vagaries today that it seems possessed of little but freedom. Hence on the other side accusations are made of hypocrisy, malice, incompetence, and subversiveness. Soon conscientiousness is buried under moral indignation. Under these circumstances it is evident that liberty itself must be regulated. To prescribe the conditions under which conscience can breathe freely is an exceedingly delicate task, for liberty complains of suffocation the moment you touch her. It is usually a technical problem rather than a moral one, if we may make so dubious a distinction. Some of the essays in this volume make genuine contributions to this task. MacIver at least states the problem very clearly: "What combination of liberties and restraints is most serviceable for the existence of what men seek when they place a high value on liberty?" He continues: "but our immediate concern is with"—something else. This, alas, is the sad history of our problem. And I, too, must follow my colleagues and turn to something else.

4. Several authors, notably Adams, Beard, Shotwell, and Perry, point out that all attempts to preserve liberty structurally or formally by legislation, bills of rights, leagues of nations, are futile in the long run if there is no love of liberty. And they bid us look to the means for preserving this love. Stefansson and Whitehead both make the point that "advanced" persons and societies are often the most illiberal. "Eternal vigilance" is an ancient and bitter prescription, but it is frequently recommended as the only reliable one. Shotwell reminds us that more than the love of liberty is needed: a love of tolerance. "Only the generous are free." Croce points out very forcibly that it is difficult for some men or peoples to be free when they are surrounded by neighbors who are not free. Ryan has a similar idea when he says that freedom can be secured only where there is a love of neighbor or brother. This theme raises large issues: though difficult to answer, it is profitable to ask the question whether liberty is best gained by a love

of liberty and by preaching that freedom is an end in itself, or by a love of truth, art, neighbor, God, in the hope that the love of liberty will be a by-product. Whether freedom be an end in itself or a reward of virtue, it is apparently more cherished than understood. And whether or not it be true that all men are by nature free, nevertheless they continue to seek cultural liberties that are difficult to achieve and precarious. Those of us who still enjoy any two of these liberties should be thankful and careful.

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